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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the development gap that has emerged between the co-operative 
sectors of the Canadian provinces of Québec and Saskatchewan since 1980. It harnesses 
historical research, textual analysis, and semi-structured interviews to better understand 
how some movements are able to regenerate their movements in the face of crisis. 
  
This study examines the development gap that has emerged between the co-operative 
sectors of the Canadian provinces of Québec and Saskatchewan since 1980. It harnesses 
historical research, textual analysis, and semi-structured interviews to better understand 
how some movements are able to regenerate their movements in the face of crisis. 
  
The study finds that the regeneration of the Québec movement reflects the concertation 
(concerted action) of social movement, sector, and state actors. Deeply rooted in a 
collectivist tradition of cultural nationalism and state corporatism, this democratic 
partnership supported the renovation and expansion of the co-operative development 
system in a virtuous spiral of movement agency, innovation, and regeneration. 
Concertation of social movement and state actors created momentum for escalating 
orders of joint-action, institution-building, and policy and program development.   
 
By contrast, the degeneration of the Saskatchewan movement reflects the decline of the 
agrarian economy and movement and a failure to effectively coordinate the efforts of 
emerging social movements and the state for development action. This has yielded a 
vicious spiral of movement inertia, under-development, and decline. Although green 
shoots are in evidence, regeneration efforts in Saskatchewan lag Québec’s progress in 
rebuilding the foundations for effective democratic partnership. 
 
The study concludes with a detailed comparison of these diverging movements, offering 
conclusions and recommendations for the repair of the Saskatchewan development 
system and the regeneration of its co-operative movement.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THEORY: BUILDING THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT  
APPROACH TO CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
 
1.1 Introduction: Why study co-operative movements? 
This chapter develops the study‘s theoretical framework. It first explains why it is 
important to study co-operative movements by outlining their global scope, scale, and 
significance; their distinctively democratic structure and ethos; and their role as agents of 
economic and social change. In a world wracked with deeply rooted inequalities that 
deny the basic human needs of vast populations, there can be fewer tasks more important 
than the reassertion of democratic norms, culture, and institutions—particularly in 
economic life (International Labour Organization, 2002; Birchall, 2004). In a period of 
massive market failure, economic volatility, and state retrenchment, there are fewer 
institutional and movement models that hold out greater hope for social and ecological 
reconstruction than co-operation (Bibby, 2009; Birchall and Hammond Ketilson, 2009). 
 
The discussion next turns to the study‘s main focus: the role social movements play in 
co-operative development. This section warns against reductionist approaches such as 
economism and statism, arguing instead for a fuller accounting of movement agency—
and the importance of democratic association and action—in unfolding development 
campaigns. In other words, this chapter argues for a social movement approach to co-
operative development (Develtere, 1992; Fairbairn, 2001a). 
 
The work also extends the social movement approach, building an expanded, inter-
disciplinary, and multi-perspectival theoretical model. Since the development of co-
operatives is at once an economic enterprise and an exercise in social mobilization, 
cultural articulation, and political manoeuvre, an expanded conceptual repertoire provides 
a richer theoretical understanding of these diverse and inter-dependent determinations.  
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Of course, to yield coherent explanations, a multi-perspectival approach must be more 
than ―a mere liberal eclecticism, or merely a hotchpotch of different points of view.  
[Rather, it] should allow its various perspectives to inform and modify each other‖ 
(Kellner, 1995, p. 99). Indeed, developing a more comprehensive and coherent 
theoretical understanding is a central task of this study. The synthetic approach 
outlined here thus recognizes that co-operative development is situated within a field 
of social relationships and forces (Bourdieu, 2005); is part of a larger process of social 
innovation and innovation diffusion (Rogers, 1995); is a political process of 
movement-building (McAdam, 1982); is a cultural effort to overcome hegemonic 
economic understandings and forms of competitive, consumerist, and subordinated 
self-hood (Meek & Woodworth, 1990; Baldacchino, 1990; Greenberg, 1986; Benello, 
1982); and is a practice of technical assistance delivery, through the construction of 
institutional intermediaries (Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis, & Spear, 1988). In this multi-
level analysis, social movements struggle to mobilize co-operative development 
campaigns politically, culturally, and through technical assistance intermediaries. 
 
Building on Develterre (1992), Fairbairn, Bold, Fulton, Hammond Ketilson, & Ish 
(1991), Staber (1992), and Cornforth et al. (1988), it is further argued that co-operative 
movements also embody contradictions, and that new co-operative launches must often 
be achieved against the inertial drag of mature co-operative dominance. While the 
successes of previous waves of co-operative organization often establish strong 
movement organizations, legitimacy, and resources for new co-operative campaigns, 
their established interests, perspectives, and projects can also crowd out room for 
under-resourced, emerging sector voices. The ‗field dominance‘ of well-established 
co-operatives—and their preoccupation with their own operational and lobbying 
concerns—can set the pattern for movement dialogue, to the exclusion of the 
movement-building priorities of the new co-operatives. While the wider political 
economy sets the range of possible outcomes for co-operation, it is the capacity of 
movement agents (within and outside the co-operative movement) to coordinate action 
that decides whether emerging development needs or opportunities will be addressed 
adequately. Often it is other movements—farmers, nationalist, or labour movements 
 3 
for example—or state actors that have the strongest incentive to drive new co-operative 
development, and the co-operative movement thus responds to extended social 
movement family pressures (or fails to respond or responds reluctantly) rather than 
serving as the ‗first mover‘ in new campaigns.  
 
This paradox reflects the fact that co-operative movements‘ democratic and 
developmental commitments tend to atrophy with time (Maaniche in Crewe, 2001). 
Consequently, the claims of degeneration theorists and their critics are also reviewed to 
gain greater understanding and insight into this central democratic dilemma. This 
survey concludes by arguing that while degenerative tendencies may be inevitable they 
are not irreversible; mature co-operatives and movements can and do also regenerate. 
Through a process of ―movement-wide renewal,‖ it is argued that development 
campaigns may be both driven by emergent social movements and supported by 
regenerating older co-operatives and movement structures. This form of concerted 
action defines what is referred to below as a ―developmental movement.‖ 
 
Rather than focus on the micro-level choices of individual co-operative founders or the 
macro-level choices of public policy makers, this theoretical framework therefore 
approaches new co-operative formations in terms of cyclical meso-mobilizations—the 
historical development, degeneration, and regeneration of the movement families within 
which emerging co-operatives are nested. Indeed, this thesis is principally focused on the 
changing propensity of movements to drive development across these three stages of the 
movement life-cycle. It highlights the emergence of social movements (including co-
operative movements) as a vehicle for new co-operative development; the degeneration 
of these movements as a brake on new development; and their regeneration as a catalyst 
for new development campaigns. The central focus is thus on the situated and strategic 
social choices of social movement actors in driving (or failing to drive) co-operative 
movement renewal, including the development of new co-operatives. 
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1.1.1 Scope, scale, and significance of the co-operative movement  
Today‘s world co-operative movement employs over 100 million people, sustaining 
over twenty percent more jobs than the combined workforce of the entire multinational 
corporate sector (ICA, 2010a). But co-operatives do more than create jobs. Over 800 
million members belong to a co-operative world-wide (Restakis, 2010). Indeed, the 
United Nations estimates co-operatives help secure the livelihoods of nearly three 
billion people, half the world‘s population (ICA, 2010a). Whether measured by 
employment, membership, or contribution to household incomes, co-operation is 
significant to the global workforce and community. The International Labour 
Organization has thus called on governments to promote co-operative development to 
meet popular needs for income and decent work (ILO, 2002) and the United Nations 
has declared 2012 the International Year of Co-operatives (UN, 2010).  
 
However, to effectively encourage and support co-operative development, it is first 
necessary to adequately understand it. This is no small conceptual task since global co-
operative activity has diverse roots (Birchall, 1997), assumes many forms, and generates 
outcomes both complex and comprehensive. From credit and housing to retail and 
manufacturing, this broad-based movement of decentralized social innovation includes 
varied sectors of socio-economic production and service and reaches into eighty-five 
countries (ICA, 2010a). Organizational structures also range widely, from single 
membership co-operatives of producers, workers, or consumers to multi-stakeholder co-
operatives. This web of democratic economic action extends the scope of social choice; 
disciplines markets which are uncompetitive or unresponsive to popular needs; 
strengthens social cohesion (ILO, 2002; Fairbairn & Russell, 2004); contributes to 
regional development (Mathews, 2001; Fairbairn, Bold, Fulton, Hammond Ketilson, & 
Ish, 1991); strengthens macro-economic performance (Mintzberg, 1996); and extends 
democratic participation in socio-economic development. Rodgers (2001) provides just 
one example of how co-operation can thus address multiple bottom lines; he argues that 
co-operative housing involvements can more deeply root democratic commitments 
against the threats of rising social exclusion, alienation, criminal activity, and 
authoritarianism, including the undemocratic activities of the racist far right. 
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Beyond the everyday contributions co-operative activity make to the public interest, co-
operation also empowers purposeful democratic interventions in new socio-economic 
conditions (National Task Force on Co-operative Development, 1984; Hammond 
Ketilson, Fulton, Fairbairn, & Bold, 1992; Fairbairn, Fulton, Hammond Ketilson, Krebs, 
& Goldblatt, 1993). For example, the United Nations assigns the movement a special role 
in advancing women‘s equality (United Nations, 1995; 2010); leading the global fight 
against poverty (Birchall, 2004); strengthening fair trade (Committee for the Promotion 
and Advancement of Cooperatives, 2005); and building food security (Chambo, 2009). 
Co-operatives have long solved the collective action problems posed by market and state 
failures. However, effectively structuring and sustaining such democratic interventions is 
particularly important in the current period of market volatility (Birchall & Hammond 
Ketilson, 2009; Bibby, 2010), ecological conversion (Gertler, 2006; Anderson, 2007), the 
decline of the Keynesian welfare-state (Yeo, 2001), and the ongoing erosion of 
democratic cultures (Barber, 2001). 
 
1.1.2 The democratic structure and ethos of the co-operative movement 
While the character of co-operatives, and their regional and sectoral federations vary 
widely by social context and stage of development (Birchall, 1997), they share a 
distinctively democratic structure and a common set of defining principles. According to 
the International Co-operative Alliance, the apex organization of the world co-operative 
movement, a co-operative is ―an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise‖ (ICA, 2010b). Over the past 
century and a half, the democratic structures of individual co-operatives and their 
federations have created unprecedented opportunities for popular learning, knowledge-
sharing, and skill-building in economic life. In keeping with this historic role in popular 
economic empowerment, the movement‘s guiding principles, as spelled out in the 
Statement on the Co-operative Identity (ICA, 2010b), include ―voluntary and open 
membership,‖ ―democratic member control,‖ ―co-operative education, information, and 
training,‖ ―co-operation among co-operatives,‖ and ―concern for community.‖ Through 
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the democratic structures and ethos of the co-operative movement, generations of 
activists, workers, intellectuals, members, and managers have all contributed to an ever-
expanding movement to replace economic structures that too often exploit and exclude. 
 
Although constrained by the vagaries and vices of market competition, these member-
governed associations have often expressed popular (rather than narrowly profit-focused) 
priorities. In the service of democratic memberships, today‘s deeply rooted co-operative 
movements are also able to mobilize growing financial, political, organizational, and 
communications resources across their vast regional and sectoral networks; they are well 
positioned once again to lead necessary structural reforms in our political economy; and 
they often take leadership roles in movements for a more fair and equal world order.
1
  
 
1.1.3 Co-operation and sustainable development 
The co-operative model can also involve diverse constituencies in sustainable 
development. Based on local member control, greenhouse co-operatives, community 
shared agriculture, and farmers‘ markets can support more localized production systems, 
thus reducing long-haul transportation. Driven by members‘ moral commitments and 
supported by social networks, wind power, recycling, car share, and organic producer co-
operatives represent additional democratic instruments for sustainable market 
restructuring. These represent realistic and achievable alternatives in spheres of activity 
neglected by investor-led enterprise; they also suggest a leadership role for this mode of 
production in twenty-first century eco-social conversion.  
 
Can the co-operative movement really achieve women‘s equality, food security, and fair 
trade, end poverty, and save the planet from its unsustainable course? Not alone, not 
easily, and no time soon, but co-operators are nonetheless making meaningful differences 
on these democratic priorities. Conversely, failure to effectively coordinate co-operative 
development may exact high economic, social, and ecological opportunity costs. 
                                                 
1
 To take one example of such interventions, the apex organization of Canada‘s English-speaking co-
operatives, the Canadian Co-operative Association, is currently involved in campaigns to enlist 100 co-
operatives to support fair trade before the end of 2011; and raise $1.5 million for the international work of 
its Co-operative Development Foundation to support co-operatives and credit unions in the developing 
world by 2012 (CCA, 2010a). 
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1.2 Study focus: Movements matter 
This study is based on the double premise that it is important to effectively promote 
and support new co-operative development, as the ILO and UN emphasize; and that, to 
do so, it is also important that we better understand how co-operatives develop, how 
development obstacles can be overcome, and how more vibrant and productive 
movements can be fostered to drive development campaigns. In the following sections, 
it is therefore argued that a non-reductionist approach must place movement agency, 
and a developmental movement orientation, at its conceptual centre.  
 
Employing a social movement approach (Develtere, 1992; Fairbairn, 2001a), it is 
argued that successful co-operative development must also be won against the 
tendency of maturing co-operatives, sectors, and movements to degenerate. For well-
established ―old co-ops‖ often abandon developmental movement missions in favour 
of limited, firm-focused business goals (Meister, 1974; 1984). A ―firm consciousness‖ 
can thus easily come to displace a ―movement consciousness‖ (Greenberg, 1986). A 
coherent conceptual approach to co-operative development must, therefore, not only 
recognize that successful ―new co-op‖ campaigns are a function of the development, 
and developmentalism, of a vital and unified co-operative movement; it must also 
recognize the opposite: that development is equally undermined by the degeneration of 
that movement into a stagnant and fragmented set of enterprise and sectoral silos; and 
that this militates against substantive mutuality (i.e. co-operation among co-
operatives). For this reason, it is argued, developing new co-operatives must be part of 
a larger social project to build developmental movements. In this holistic approach, a 
developmental movement is characterized as much by the regeneration of ―old co-
ops,‖ and old movement structures and strategies, as it is by discrete forms of support 
to emerging sectors of ―new co-ops.‖ Co-operative development may benefit from 
supportive public policy and sound management but it necessarily depends on a 
concerted, ―whole movement‖ approach to drive new campaigns. 
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1.3 Beyond economism and statism 
Two influential ways of theorizing co-operative development involve approaching it from 
the perspective of the market (as do many economists) or the state (as do many political 
scientists); as if co-operatives spontaneously develop by virtue of market forces or public 
policies alone. In the discussion below, these over-determined approaches are referred to 
as economism and statism respectively. Economism is the idea that all social facts can be 
reduced to their economic dimensions and that market power is the most important 
feature of social life. Similarly, statism reduces social facts to policy questions best 
solved by government policy and action. While economic and political studies make 
important contributions, it is argued below that reductionist explanations cannot provide 
adequate understandings of the popular well-springs of co-operative development.  
 
1.3.1 Beyond economism 
Business-focused studies tend to view co-operatives as a sector of commercial enterprises 
engaged in market relations; but not also as a movement of aligned democratic 
associations geared into the networks of extended social movement families. Economism 
thus fails to account for the distinctive character of democratic economic action. At best, 
it tells only half the story; plunging co-operation‘s social development into darkness.  
 
Economism thus proposes formulaic approaches that treat co-operatives as self-contained 
enterprises operating in markets alone; as firms which have neither a democratic structure 
nor social objectives. This is, from a realist standpoint, a ―chaotic conception.‖ As Sayer 
(1984) explains, ―a rational abstraction is one which isolates a significant element of the 
world which has some unity and autonomous force, such as a structure. A bad abstraction 
arbitrarily divides the indivisible and / or lumps together the unrelated and the inessential, 
thereby ‗carving up‘ the object of study with little or no regard for its structure and form‖ 
(p. 138). Economism carves up the essential dual structure of a co-operative as if 
effective co-operative development depends on market viability, but not the associative 
viability of the emerging coalition of social actors that structure and govern the firm. 
Following Granovetter‘s (1992) argument that all economic practices are ultimately 
forms of social action, this study frames co-operative development as doubly embedded 
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in market and social relations. This is a rational abstraction; it recognizes that the 
development of co-operatives also hinges on associational work: the social development 
of democratic associations, co-operative movements, and inter-movement ties.  
 
1.3.2 Beyond statism 
Similarly, much co-operative development literature focuses on the role of supportive 
public policy such as dedicated government branches to liaise with the movement; 
promotions, research, and education programs; favourable taxation and legislation; and 
equal treatment for state subsidies (UN, 2001). This study focuses on the 
developmental role of social movements as well as the state, thus bringing the role of 
civil society and its ―social economy‖ (Quarter, 1992; Shragge, 1993; Shragge & 
Fontan, 2000) into clearer focus. This approach views the state as an important but 
embedded institution, the policy choices of which are shaped by the mobilization of 
other economic and social actors. These actors include the co-operative movement and 
its extended social movement families. While co-operative action is powerfully 
conditioned by market and state structures, it is also capable, in turn, of reshaping 
those markets and influencing state action.  
 
In this dialectical conception, social movements create openings for state action, place 
pressures on the state, and create positive conditions for state-sector partnership; they 
also play an independent role in creating positive socio-cultural conditions for co-
operative development, and driving activist participation in emerging co-operatives. In 
contrast to economistic and statist views, a social movement approach recognizes that 
extended social movement families (including but not limited to the co-operative 
movement) often respond to popular needs and aspirations when the market and state 
fail to do so, emerging as the primary movers in co-operative organizing campaigns.  
 
1.3.3  Recentring movement agency and coalition-building 
Theorizing a central role for movement action in development campaigns corrects for 
the anti-democratic tendency of positivist approaches to obscure the role of popular 
power in co-operation. Movement agency readily disappears under prevailing 
 10 
preoccupations with market forces and state power–often reified as all-determining, 
natural, or inevitable states of affairs. Beyond painting a false picture of social reality, 
these approaches thus have a self-fulfilling effect, disempowering movement actors.  
 
Culturalism provides another example, particularly common in English-language 
treatments of Québec. In this approach, culture may be accorded a phantasmic role in 
abstraction from the historical, economic, and political factors through which that 
culture evolves. To simply write off complex processes of development to ―cultural 
nationalism,‖ for example, is to subscribe to an ―over-socialized conception‖ (Wrong, 
1961) of the agent as a ―disembodied, conscience-driven, status-seeking phantom‖ (p. 
193). From a realist perspective, cultural practices and meanings need to be situated 
within a broader ensemble of social relations rather than abstracted from them and 
reified as the determining features of social life. Like economism or statism, this form 
of theoretical monism also renders ahistorical and reductionist explanations. 
 
Statism, economism, culturalism, and other reductionist approaches thus discount the 
efficacy of the very popular actions that are, in the first instance, required to drive co-
operative development. Democratic agency disappears in the fog of faulty abstraction 
and determinist conceptions; it is replaced by a misguided faith in the technocratic 
expertise of co-operative managers, state bureaucrats, or the distinctiveness of a reified 
culture–all of which distract from, and discredit, the role of human agency in processes 
of collective action and social innovation. 
 
From a social movement perspective, vital co-operative movements and their extended 
social movement ties influence the range of development possibility in a particular 
historic moment. This study explores the practical adequacy of this approach by 
investigating the role of social movements as co-operative development actors. In part, 
this involves a break with economism‘s methodological individualism; it rejects the 
atomistic and exceptionalist notion that individual co-operatives emerge through the 
utility-maximizing behaviour of their proponents alone rather than as expressions of 
wider networks of influence and aspiration. As Fairbairn (2001a) suggests, institutional 
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histories of individual co-operatives often contribute to partial and misleading accounts 
of co-operative development; yielding to an instrumental impulse that treats co-operatives 
as ―rational, self-contained, clearly-bounded organizations,‖ and reproduces uncritically 
their ―creation myths‖ and ―narratives of growth.‖ This simply reinforces economistic 
conceptions of co-operatives as stand-alone enterprises. By contrast, he argues:  
Co-operatives form, and to some extent continue to exist, within 
networks of multi-polar interaction, as constellations and coalitions 
of various groups and interests. It may be more complete to view 
them, especially in their formative stages, as parts of a web of social 
ideas and organizations, rather than as isolated and self-contained 
structures. (pp. 25-27)  
 
Unlike the economistic conception, through which co-operatives emerge as 
isolated rational choice transactions, a relational approach suggests instead that 
new co-operatives are the constructions of often complex ―development 
coalitions,‖ connecting to diverse social movements, networks, and interests 
(Carroll and Ratner, 1994; 1996; Carroll, 1997). Before the business-building 
stage, development is thus first a practice of coalition-building; drawing 
together workers, end-users, host community members (from community 
economic development organizations, church groups, trade unions, or co-
operatives and credit unions), or political allies.  
 
1.3.4 Reflexive movement self-regulation and coalition re-building  
Capturing new opportunities and responding to new needs in changing conditions 
implies the obvious need to recruit a new generation of proponents and organizers; less 
obviously, it also suggests the continual adaptation and reinvention of founding 
development coalitions. Coalition-building is a key and complex task that often 
involves matching diverse interests; fund-raising; establishing, refashioning, or 
renewing movement ties; articulating or rearticulating cultural meanings and 
attachments; and creating new models or entering new sectors of opportunity.  
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Rather than placing our faith in the semi-automatic, ―invisible hand‖ of the market to 
allocate investment profitably, the dynamics of co-operative development thus require 
that we look instead to what George Keen called the ―associative intelligence‖ (cited in 
MacPherson, 1973, p. 28) of popular movements. For it is active, democratic, and 
strategic social intervention in economic life that drives reflexive movement 
modernization, including the periodic re-pooling and re-tasking of mutualist capital. 
This requires the organizing know-how to work across movement networks and build 
new development coalitions (Carroll & Ratner, 1994; 1996; Carroll, 1997). From the 
buoyant tide of new co-operatives to the support of resource-rich old co-ops to the 
joint-creation of new development mechanisms, movement-driven social innovation 
thus conditions new development prospects.  
 
1.3.5 The developmental movement: Mutuality in action 
Like the developmental and competitive models adopted by different states 
(Mackintosh, 1993), co-operative movement organizations (CMO) also adopt varied 
approaches to development. Since these differences are of significant consequence for 
support to new co-operatives, this section contrasts these orientations.  
 
Developmental sector-movements embrace actively interventionist models of support, 
leading planned campaigns to drive new co-operative formation. In the developmental 
approach, CMOs invest significant time, resources, and energy in unifying diverse 
sectors, and stimulating, coordinating, and supporting an expanding movement. 
Developing new co-operatives is a priority but movement entrepreneurship is also 
committed to building an integrated community of mutually supportive organizations. 
A developmental approach is most likely to emerge among younger, emerging sectors 
with a less entrenched managerial class and more active, idealistic members with first 
hand development needs and organizing experience. 
 
By contrast, competitive sector-movements embrace a laissez-faire model, letting the 
market decide whether and how co-operative proponents emerge, and allowing new 
co-operatives to ―sink or swim‖ on their own merits. In this hands-off approach, 
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competitive CMOs confine their role to that of a trade association and political lobby 
for established sector interests; do not take an active entrepreneurial role in fostering 
new co-operative development; and do not act to restrain the dissolution of movement 
ties, cohesion, and co-operative identity in the face of sector fragmentation and market-
driven pragmatism. This competitive movement frame is more likely to express the 
ethos of movements dominated by more mature sectors, with more passive 
memberships, and more deeply entrenched managerial leadership—focused on the 
technical goals of efficiency, growth, and cost-containment.  
 
From this perspective, the likelihood that a movement will adopt a developmental 
orientation largely depends on its historical evolution, including the degree of mature 
sector dominance over the co-operative field, on the one hand, and the success of 
democratic movement currents in sustaining a developmental culture, on the other. In 
other words, developmentalism is inversely related to the rise of managerialism and 
directly related to democratic vitality.  
 
Moreover, this is a dialectical relationship: movement degeneration will tend to 
undermine development action and a reduction in new co-operative development will 
reinforce movement decline in a vicious cycle; as development networks are de-
mobilized, formation rates decline, the sector contracts, dues are lost to the CMO, and 
the resources, networks, skills, know-how, and organizing confidence to effectively 
regenerate erode. Conversely, of course, development action will contribute to 
movement regeneration processes and regeneration will further strengthen new co-
operative development in a virtuous spriral; as movement resources are mobilized, 
formation rates increase, the sector expands, dues are gained, and development 
resources, networks, skills, know-how, and ambition are strengthened.  
 
Rather than taking the present state of co-operative movements for granted as natural, 
functional, or inevitable, we may more fruitfully thus treat them as products of social 
choice, often the outcome of a struggle between competing interests and conceptions. 
However, as argued below, it is important to resist the essentialist and moralizing 
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reflex to simply blame established or emerging sector leadership for movement 
degeneration. For degeneration is a ―coordination failure‖ rather than a failure of 
character or ethical standing; likewise regeneration is a social project that requires 
inclusive, movement-wide involvement, education, and action to arrive at a mutually 
advantageous new ―place to meet.‖ While a certain amount of self-seeking, shirking, 
prejudice, and free-riding behaviour is to be found in any group, degeneration is a 
structural problem and collective challenge rather than a moral failure. Indeed, historic 
inter-sectoral rivalries or social antipathies within movement circles—toward workers 
(or managers), youth (or boomers), women (or men), urbanites (or farmers), to cite 
only a few possible faultlines—represent non-antagonistic contradictions that pose 
important cultural barriers to good faith discussion, negotiation, and the achievement 
of the synergistic relations on which a developmental movement is premised. 
Overcoming these internal divisions must therefore be a central focus in rebuilding 
inter-co-operation and viable development coalitions. Effective mutuality must be 
firmly grounded in a democratic foundation of mutual respect and recognition of the 
primacy of shared co-operative values and common movement interests. Scapegoating, 
rivalry, and hegemonistic division will not advance that agenda. 
 
1.4 The social movement approach and movement life-cycles 
The social movement approach to co-operative development thus rests on a theoretical 
understanding that there is a structural contradiction between developmental 
movement aims and the tendency of a maturing movement to degenerate. The life-
cycles of co-operative movements are therefore best understood in terms of their 
development challenges, degeneration crises, and regeneration options. Since co-
operative development ebbs and flows with the rhythms of these social movement life-
cycles, these processes are briefly outlined below. Before turning to the arguments of 
degeneration theorists and their critics, the social movement approach to co-operative 
development (Develtere, 1992) is first further discussed and extended.  
 
The social movement approach suggests that associational life is not only central to the 
effective functioning of co-operatives‘ member control structures, sustained member 
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loyalty, or broader social movement solidarity. Vital co-operative associations and 
movement cultures play a crucial role in driving new development campaigns. Indeed, 
the illusion that co-operatives can be socially engineered ―from above‖ by state policy or 
―from outside‖ by development agencies is, according to Develtere (1992), the key to the 
failure of patron-led co-operative development efforts in the developing world. Rather 
than adopting a ―blueprint approach‖ which sets the institutional framework for the 
development of a co-operative sector but not a movement, he argues for a social 
movement approach (pp. 2-3). In his scheme, the identity of a social movement emerges 
from the interaction of its organization, praxis, and ideology, each of which has its own 
adherents within the evolving field of co-operative development. 
 
The ‗ideologists‘ push for purity and object to ‗deviances‘ which 
occur both in the praxis and the organization components. The 
‗activists‘ push for action and radical involvement of, and response 
to, the expressed views and needs of the members. The ‗managers‘ 
push for realism and adjustment of the movement to the so-called 
objective conditions of the environment. The group that is 
responsible for the reconciliation of the three forces is that of the 
‗social movement entrepreneurs‘. (p. 22) 
 
With this formulation, Develtere defines co-operative movements as ―social movements 
which use some form of economic co-operation (organization) to the benefit of, and with 
the involvement of, the social group concerned (praxis) in order to defend the interests of 
the group which are considered endangered if the members would not react co-
operatively (ideology)‖ (p. 27). The success of a co-operative movement depends largely, 
in his conception, on the internal balance of these forces; their interaction shapes 
movement identity, including its development orientation.  
 
Sector diversity may also lead to intra-movement conflict. For example, a well-
established, male-dominated, and farmer-led co-operative movement may not share the 
interests or ideological orientations of struggling, urban-based, parent-led childcare co-
operatives. Part of the challenge of co-operative development is thus reconciling the need 
to build strong, internally cohesive sector-movements which may have distinct interests, 
values, and understandings while also finding common ground within a broader co-
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operative movement coalition. This sense of common cause and commitment also 
conditions the prospects for substantive mutuality and a developmental movement.  
 
Develtere argues ―co-operatives cannot be analyzed as distinct social movements,‖ 
suggesting ―it is this relationship with other social movements which to a great extent 
accounts for the diversity and scale of co-operative activity‖ (p. 28). Indeed, extended 
social movement families represent important resources for co-operative development, 
both as informal channels of co-operative innovation diffusion and member recruitment. 
Consider the population of child care boards by women‘s movement activists or the 
affinity between the values and objectives of worker co-operators and the labour 
movement. A more formal example of inter-movement synergy is the housing co-
operative campaign jointly undertaken by the Canadian co-operative and labour 
movements in the seventies (Goldblatt, 2000). This case illustrates how overlapping 
social missions and pooling of movement resources met working families‘ needs for 
adequate, affordable housing. By furnishing their activists, supporters, and members, 
social movement ties also condition the prospects for a developmental movement.  
 
A social movement approach thus suggests co-operative formations depend on 
democratic achievements. For example, co-operative governance can empower members 
to build democratic skills, knowledge, confidence, and escalating capacities for 
movement activity and community development. Effectively cultivated and supported, 
democratic participation continuously pools human and social capital (Coleman, 1988) 
for movement renewal. In this conception, social movements are the prime movers of co-
operative innovation because co-operative development is a social process of adult 
learning, communication, and democratic development as well as a process of business 
building. As agencies of socialization, movements help connect and cultivate activist co-
operators; and without committed agency, of course, there can be no collective action. 
 
Develtere (1996) argues that evolving co-operative movements are not simply a 
collection of profit-maximizing businesses; their democratic, member-driven enterprises 
also reflect community needs and social purposes; and are embedded in a shifting field of 
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economic and political relations. Their development paths may thus reflect the interests 
of patrons, aligned movements, and the wider balance of social forces. Driven and 
defined by the associative activity of this wider social movement family, the co-operative 
field is thus shaped by democratic strivings as well as market forces or state policies. 
 
Granovetter (1992) argues all economic activity is a mobilization of social relations. 
After all, markets are deeply embedded in social structures such as trust relations, 
business conventions, public policies, infrastructure, and legislation. But nowhere is the 
embeddedness of economic activity in social relations more pronounced than the case of 
co-operatives. For a co-operative fundamentally embodies a democratic logic of member 
control and expresses a social purpose that transcends, or at least rivals, strictly profit-
maximizing behaviour. As Develtere (1996) emphasizes, it is both a member-based 
expression of a social movement and a business organization embedded in a competitive 
market. Theory must account for this deep embeddedness.  
 
1.4.1  Extending the social movement approach: Co-operative development as  
field-dependent 
Drawing on Bourdieu (2005), this study shows how mature, highly structured, and 
differentiated co-operative fields have developed in Saskatchewan and Québec. Within 
these fields, waves of established and emerging co-operatives have struggled to define 
their movements‘ identity and direction: through episodes of inter-co-operative support 
and rivalry; periods of expansion, program development, and institution-building; and 
intervals of setback, stagnation, and retrenchment.  
 
Bourdieu‘s field theory helps answer the question of how the ―field effects‖ of dominant 
co-operatives, emerging sector insurgencies, engaged states, or aligned social movements 
shape the historical context, character, and trajectory of co-operation. This approach 
illustrates how the Saskatchewan and Québec movements evolved as the balance of 
power within, and over, the co-operative field shifted. Drawing on Fairbairn‘s (2005) 
―five waves‖ periodization for Saskatchewan and Lévesque‘s (1990) ―three waves‖ 
periodization for Québec, development waves are viewed as transforming the field; 
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bringing into being new field structures and forms of field dependence. For example, in 
the movements‘ founding periods, the dominance of the caisses populaire in Québec and 
producer pools in Saskatchewan powerfully structured those fields. Similarly, the 
dependence of the early caisses on church patronage, and the early wheat pools on 
organized agrarian agitation, defined the relative autonomy of those fields.  
 
Indeed, co-operative sector-movements do not operate in self-enclosed, autonomous 
fields. Their development is historically dependent on other, overlapping social 
movements. Often, parent movements help give rise to emerging fields of co-operative 
activity, with the farm movement driving the campaign for wheat pooling in 
Saskatchewan (Brown, 1973; Knutilla, 1994) and the parish network providing the 
mobilizing channels for Québec‘s caisses populaires (Poulin, 2000; Fairbairn, 2000; 
Lévesque, 2008). These parent movements provided a basis for member adhesion, 
farmer-based in Saskatchewan and clerico-nationalist in Québec. Similarly, the rise, fall 
and succession of parent movements–as well as their engagement, disengagement and re-
engagement—thus shape the ongoing prospects for co-operative action. 
 
Fields also evolve in ways that reflect market and state power. As Hoyt (2004) argues, 
public policies range from destructive efforts to suppress co-operative development to 
neutral, supportive, participating, and controlling policies (pp. 306 - 308). Selective 
support to particular sectors or regions may further skew incentives and the structure of 
the co-operative field. Similarly, macro-economic policies such as market deregulation 
can impact co-operative sectors differently, generating complex field effects.  
 
Like the state, and often in concert with the state, investor lobbies may also adopt varied 
approaches to co-operation: viewing the sector as a rival to be quashed; as another set of 
businesses to be neither feared nor favoured; as a positive contribution to economic 
growth to be encouraged; or as a potential partner to be co-opted within an investor-led 
bloc. The historic dependence of the co-operative field on these evolving political and 
economic fields also largely defines the context, and prospects, for co-operative 
development. 
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1.4.2. Extending the social movement approach: Co-operative development as  
social innovation 
Waves of co-operative development can also be understood as processes of social 
innovation; as a series of popular responses to structural crises and emerging needs and 
ideas in the wider political economy. Although diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 
1995) has traditionally focused on individuals‘ adoption of technological innovations, the 
more sociological framework of a social movement approach can also help answer the 
question of how co-operative innovations are mobilized across movement networks. In 
this comparative case study, diffusion theory illustrates how mobilizing networks channel 
innovations and provide leverage for escalating orders of institutional and policy reform. 
In particular, it highlights the importance of  ―prior innovation adoption decisions‖ (such 
as creating technical assistance networks or financing pools) to the creation of new 
development horizons (being able to deliver frontline advice or financing). Diffusion of 
innovations theory is thus used to contextualize co-operative development in a long-
range, historical process of ongoing and cumulative social innovation (Andrew & Klein, 
2010; Beaulieau, 2009). A social innovation focus extends the social movement approach 
by sensitizing us to key choice-points and practical, institutional, and policy options for 
developmental movements. 
 
1.4.3 Extending the social movement approach: Co-operative development as 
political process 
This study also builds on the political process model (McAdam, 1982) of social 
movements to extend Develtere‘s approach yet further. McAdam‘s study of the U.S. civil 
rights movement found that African-Americans realized new political opportunities and a 
heightened sense of political efficacy through black colleges, churches, and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) (p. 230). Through this 
mobilizing network, activists gained knowledge, skills, and relationships for effective 
movement participation. Of course, the movement was also shaped by the macro-
economic and macro-political contexts and spanned a multitude of micro-political action-
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contexts. However, McAdam demonstrates how these intermediary institutions informed, 
shaped, and tied together isolated local pockets of insurgency. Through the deliberate 
creation of institutional resources, communication channel supports, and policy leverage, 
the struggle to build the civil rights movement is therefore understood as a political 
process. It was this meso-mobilization that unified and coordinated a mass base capable 
of transforming a nation. The political process model, in short, emphasizes the 
importance of meso-level agency and organization in driving social movements. It, 
therefore, also suggests a leading role for intermediary institutions and network 
mobilization in structuring co-operative movement campaigns. 
 
For McAdam (1982), successful social mobilization depends on the group‘s level of 
organization, its assessment of the prospects for success, and the political alignment of 
groups in the larger environment (p. 40). Also crucial is the group‘s conversion potential, 
i.e. their ability to ―‗convert‘ a favourable ‗structure of opportunities‘ into an organized 
campaign of social protest‖ (p. 44). This depends, in turn, on the emergence of a 
movement consciousness. This involves what Piven and Cloward call three necessary 
cognitions: ―a conviction that the situation is unjust; an assertion of the need for change; 
and a striving to make that change‖ (cited in McAdam, 1982, pp. 49-50).  
 
Following McAdam, a social movement approach suggests co-operative development is a 
function of social movements engaged in a political process; and that this process is also 
key to understanding co-operation‘s history and future prospects. Adapting McAdam‘s 
model, a co-operative movement would require vibrant associations to drive the 
enterprises‘ launch and democratic governance; it may thus also require educational-
cultural assistance to build their capacity for effective democratic association and action. 
The necessary cognitions or movement ideology include convictions that a co-operative 
enterprise would better meet the needs of the constituent population; that the benefit is 
worth working for and / or financially supporting; and that the enterprise, once launched, 
deserves their loyal support. Realizing co-operative development, as surely as civil rights 
insurgency, thus depends on effective network mobilization. 
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While McAdam does not address the case of the co-operative movement, Fairbairn 
(1994) clearly locates its roots in a political process.  
 
It is… reasonable to say that the forces of poverty and need inspired 
the formation of the Rochdale co-operative. But they did so 
somewhat indirectly, mediated by the agency of idealism and critical 
social thought, and by the activists of Owenism, Chartism, and other 
social movements. The Rochdale Pioneers did not rise spontaneously 
from need, but were organized consciously by thinkers, activists, and 
leaders who functioned within a network of ideas and institutions. 
The same can probably be said of all successful co-operatives in all 
times and places: they arise from need–when some activists, 
institutions or agencies consciously promote and organize them. (p.4) 
 
The political process model treats the rise of social movements as neither automatic nor 
inevitable. Instead, agency and contingency loom large. For this reason, Hammond 
Ketilson et al. (1992) argue the co-operative option must be championed by meso-
institutional actors able to link and mobilize the grassroots base and effectively pool 
resources to carry the program. Indeed, they argue no co-operative movement in the 
Canadian context has ever emerged without such mobilizing networks. 
 
Experience has … shown that most communities cannot entirely ‗pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps.‘ As the history of co-operatives 
has shown, every major co-operative movement in Canada today was 
sponsored originally by some larger social movement and received 
educational and organizational assistance from established agencies 
that had staff and resources. This was true of the Antigonish 
Movement, the caisses populaires, and the farmer co-operatives in 
western Canada. Canadian history does not support the idea that 
bands of individuals just come together to form co-operatives. (p. 4) 
 
1.4.4  Extending the social movement approach: Co-operative development as 
cultural construction  
Building on the notion of necessary cognitions in the development process, this study 
also draws from cultural hegemony theory. This further deepens the analysis because co-
operation is also a cultural practice of enlisting members into meaningful forms of 
democratic participation, often against ideological and cultural resistance. Co-operative 
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ideas meet resistance from the entrenched hegemony of the investor-owned firm model, 
the competitive individualism of market-led cultures, and the lack of business confidence 
cultivated among popular classes and marginalized groups most in need of co-operative 
options. Effective co-operative diffusion thus requires the development of unifying and 
empowering discourses; it demands educational, cultural, and political support as well as 
merely technical or financial aid (Meek & Woodworth, 1990; Baldacchino, 1990; 
Greenberg, 1986; Benello, 1982).  
 
Hegemony theory helps answer the question of how actors make sense of their situation, 
enter into particular movement formations, and thus vie for cultural power and authority. 
It is thus used to outline the ways in which co-operative movements communicate, 
educate, and engage in articulation strategies and cultural politics to effect successful 
social mobilizations for economic power. This approach helps shape the treatments of the 
historically parallel but deeply distinct movements in Québec and Saskatchewan and 
sheds important light on their inner life and cultural evolution. For example, Gramscian 
cultural studies enables us to better address the cultural embeddedness of early co-
operative movements: in the prairies, it situates the campaign for wheat pooling in 
agrarian settler hegemony and the emergence of farmer-led left populism; in Québec, it 
highlights clerical hegemony and defensive nationalism in the early strivings of the 
Mouvement Desjardins. Hegemony analysis thus highlights the important role of social 
subjectivity in expanding the cultural frontiers of co-operative enterprise. It helps account 
for the shifting roles of religion, political ideology, education, and journalism in the 
evolving cultures, movement subcultures, and social psychologies of the day. 
 
1.4.5  Extending the social movement approach: Co-operative development as 
practical problem-solving 
Technical assistance mobilization also plays an important role in the effective 
development of co-operatives. While adult education has been assigned an important, 
even leading, role in the successful development of co-operatives (Hammond Ketilson et 
al., 1992; Stefanson, 2002), this is particularly true for emergent sectors such as worker 
co-operatives (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Adams & Hansen, 1992; Quarter, 1989; 
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Krimerman & Lindenfeld, 1992; Benello, 1982). Recognizing the dual structure of co-
operatives as both movement-based, democratic associations and market-based, 
commercial enterprises, Cornforth et al. (1990) argue that the Co-operative Development 
Agency (CDA) network played a decisive role in the new wave worker co-operative 
boom that swept the U.K. in the 1980s, swelling that sector from about 35 co-operatives 
in the early seventies to over 1000 by 1985 (Cornforth et al., 1988, p. 1). Through 
movement-building activities and delivering effective technical assistance to emerging 
co-operatives and sectors, they conclude the CDA network was ―probably the most 
important development in the continuing development of the U.K. worker co-operative 
sector‖ (p. 19). Along with France‘s boutiques de gestion, it also inspired the re-invention 
of this innovation in Québec in the 1980s (Tremblay, 1985).  
 
Like the institutional intermediaries which linked pockets of insurgency together into a 
sustained civil rights movement in McAdam‘s conception, Cornforth et al. (1988) suggest 
co-operative campaigns also require intermediaries to bridge the centralization of apex 
resources and the dispersion of local initiatives. These bridging institutions can facilitate 
the necessary political, cultural, and entrepreneurial mobilizations of a co-operative 
development campaign. This study‘s theoretical synthesis therefore proposes that co-
operative innovation is dependent on political processes (McAdam, 1982), generally 
associated with social movements, and technical supports (Cornforth et al., 1988), more 
closely associated with business development. Certainly, there are substantial differences 
between the models advanced by McAdam and Cornforth et al.. Their studies were 
conducted in separate fields of disciplinary specialization; treat distinct historical periods 
in different national contexts; and the co-operative case clearly diverges from the general 
case of social movements, focused on political protest rather than economic action. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis Cornforth et al. place on CSO leverage aligns well with the 
role of meso-institutions in McAdam‘s political process model. This conceptual overlap 
provides for constructive theoretical extension of Develtere‘s conception. 
 
Much as the American network of black colleges, churches, and NAACP chapters scaled 
up the civil rights mobilization, Cornforth et al. (1988) suggest the British CSO network 
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drove mobilizations for worker co-operation. However, like the mobilizing network that 
forged the American civil rights movement from 1955 to 1968, the British CSO network 
of the early 1980s was also embedded in a wider ensemble of social movement relations 
and alliances. Like Develtere (1992), Cornforth and Thomas (1990) conclude that an 
institutional perspective on co-operative development thus needs to be embedded in a 
social movement approach to be sensitive to contextual and cultural factors: 
 
We need to go beyond concentration on individual co-operatives and 
the individual mechanisms for support and to look more closely at 
cultural and ideological factors in particular movements. This is one 
route to explaining why some support structures work well at 
regenerating co-operative ideals while others with similar structures 
can be more or less stultifying. Hence it is important to look at the 
processes at play within co-operative movements as well as at 
individual co-operatives and their requirements. (p. 459)   
 
Clearly, the dual structure of co-operation—as a business sector and a movement of 
democratic associations—has implications for how we conceive of co-operative 
development. It logically follows that developing co-operatives, unlike investor-owned 
businesses, requires a movement (and social movement organizations) to animate, 
educate, and organize co-operative proponents and members into vital democratic 
associations. At the same time, they require a technical assistance infrastructure (or 
business development organizations) to help build strong businesses that can succeed in 
market competition. Rather than treat co-operatives as economic units operating in a self-
enclosed, functional economic system, and development as a series of isolated, utility-
maximizing ―transactions‖ of atomized joiners, this perspective places development in a 
larger socio-historical context populated by evolving and inter-dependent institutions, 
networks, ideologies, and movements. Co-operatives thus emerge in a field of 
relationships that either help, or fail to help, define and develop them.  
 
Following on Rogers (1995), innovation-adoption decisions take place in an historical 
context of institutionally structured choices. In other words, the founding members‘ 
decision is a contingent decision: it is shaped by prior innovation-adoption decisions by 
social movements and other players. For example, the co-operative movement and state 
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may decide to develop intermediary organizations, financing pools, or tax incentives to 
support co-operative innovation. Co-operative firm formation is therefore both part of a 
broader, historical process of social innovation (i.e. developing the field or climate for co-
operative development) and a discrete business decision by one particular set of founding 
members of one particular co-operative in one time and place. Long-range strategic 
movement decisions necessarily define the range of tactical options available to 
prospective new co-operative sponsors in the short-term. By raising the innovation‘s 
profile, minimizing risk, and introducing incentives for adopters of the co-operative 
model, prior innovation decisions can inform, motivate, protect, and persuade. While the 
transactional approach thus discounts the historic role of movements in conditioning 
future innovation-adoption decisions, the relational (or developmental) approach places a 
premium on this aspect; this is the conceptual basis for active development strategies. 
 
1.4.6 Pulling together the threads: Illustrating the model 
The conversion of many of Québec‘s investor-owned ambulance firms to union-led 
worker ownership provides one illustration of the multi-perspectival approach 
summarized above. Without the mobilizing leverage of the Confédération des syndicats 
nationaux (CSN) (Confederation of National Labour Unions), which was open to the co-
operative model and to collaborating with the co-operative movement (and vice versa), it 
is very doubtful that individual groups of emergency medical services (EMS) workers 
would have been able or willing to decide to adopt this innovation strategy in 1988. 
Moreover, the CSN itself did not even come into existence until 1960, an expression of 
that broad-based social movement known as the Quiet Revolution. By establishing a 
credit union in 1971, the CSN built its financial know-how and capacity to subsequently 
launch an in-house technical assistance unit for worker co-operatives in 1987 and a 
labour-sponsored investment fund in 1996. Over three and a half decades, the trade union 
thus put in place important mechanisms for innovation adoption by the EMS workers.  
 
Also crucial to the ambulance service conversions was a parallel chain of policy 
innovations within the state apparatus. These included forming a co-operatives branch in 
1963; introducing co-operative development subsidies in 1976; creating a system of 
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development groups and a crown corporation to finance co-operatives in 1979; creating 
an Act enabling the formation of worker shareholder co-operatives in 1983; and creating 
a network of regional development co-operatives and an enabling policy framework, 
including tax incentives for worker buy-outs, in 1985. 
  
These parallel and inter-dependent innovation chains transformed the climate for co-
operative conversion, overcoming barriers to subsequent innovation adoption. They 
transformed the structure and autonomy of the co-operative field. Coordinating these 
disparate elements into a coherent development system rested on a mobilizing network 
which aligned the CSN, the CCQ (later the CQCM) and the state. A series of conferences 
and summits helped integrate popular sector and state efforts. 
 
The ambulance buy-outs are therefore cases of ―contingent innovation decision making,‖ 
―choices to adopt or reject that can be made only after a prior innovation-decision‖ 
(Rogers, 1995, p. 30). In particular, the conversions depended on the CSN‘s technical 
assistance unit and solidarity finance fund. The CSN‘s move to establish these 
development mechanisms, in turn, was conditioned by two prior innovation decisions. 
The first was its involvement in the founding of its caisse d’économie, which later 
provided financing to emerging co-operatives and built the CSN leadership‘s confidence 
in increased economic development involvements. A 1983 move by its rival, the Québec 
Federation of Labour (QFL), to launch the Solidarity Fund, further reinforced 
commitments to social finance innovation.  
 
The ambulance sector campaign also built on broader state and co-operative sector 
innovations. Specifically, it hinged on the regional development co-operative network‘s 
launch and other policy reforms pushed forward by the provincial apex organization, now 
the Conseil québécois de la co-opération et de la mutualité (CQCM). These impressive 
social innovations effectively defined the viability and even possibility of co-operative 
conversion in the ambulance sector. With this concerted, multi-party mobilization, a 
substantial share of Québec EMS services are now delivered by worker co-operatives. 
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The ambulance campaign illustrates that democratic movement and technical assistance 
mobilizations are equally necessary development tasks. They provide the well-springs of 
social innovation but neither the market nor the state can be relied on to deliver these 
mobilizations; it falls to organized movement campaigns to secure them. The prospects 
for new co-operative development thus rest on the strength, vitality, and reflexivity of a 
developmental parent movement, or movements. 
 
Of course, the conceptual focus of the social movement approach on mobilizing networks 
and movement cultures as the forces motrice of co-operative development also implies its 
opposite: a need to understand the nature and significance of degenerative pressures that 
frustrate movement aims, and drive the entropic decline of movement organizing skill, 
know-how, relationships, and developmental commitments. The section below therefore 
borrows from, and extends the work of, theorists of democratic movement degeneration 
(Webb & Webb, 1914, 1921; Michels, 1949; Weber, 1958) and their critics (McAdam, 
1982; Meister, 1984; Cornforth, et al., 1988; Cornforth, 1995; Maaniche in Crewe, 2001).  
 
1.5 De-mobilizing co-operative development:  Theories of movement 
degeneration  
Co-operative development efforts are often deeply embedded in the democratic social 
action of organized religious, nationalist, farm, or labour movements (Develtere, 1992). 
However, as co-operatives become self-sustaining, market-focused, and professionally 
managed, they may drift away from these democratic currents. Movement values and 
goals, like the development of new co-operatives, may erode. Just as mobilizing networks 
once drove development, their demobilization can thus stall it.  
 
This failure to found new co-operatives does not simply affect the proponents and 
beneficiaries of those emerging enterprises; it has negative consequences for the 
movement as a whole. For new co-operatives also help build movement scope and 
strengths as older co-operatives fail or contract. They pay dues, which sustain important 
movement functions. They bring new entrepreneurial energy and ideas, demographic 
diversity, and associational vitality to democratic movement structures and new 
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customers and members to the co-operative cause. In a context of continual demographic, 
economic, and social change, this renewal helps co-operation remain relevant to 
contemporary constituencies and needs. The movement‘s development thus depends as 
surely on successfully developing new co-operatives as the fate of new co-operatives 
depends on movement-building. Against the drag of traditional values and managerial 
ideology in mature sectors, new co-operative sectors can thus drive necessary movement 
revitalization and act as an important check against oligarchization, stagnation, and 
movement decline.  
 
Conversely, failure to develop new co-operatives may be understood as an index of 
movement degeneration. As Maaniche‘s generation and a half theory argues, co-operative 
movements tend to degenerate as the energy, ideology, and influence of founding 
members dissipate over time.
2
 As institutional memory and movement know-how erodes, 
so does our understanding of how new co-operatives develop. MacPherson thus suggests 
arrested co-operative development reflects a ―loss of organizing skills.‖ Without 
educational interventions, our ―understanding of how co-operative entrepreneurship, 
building on context and networks, worked in the past‖ simply decays (1987, p. 10). As 
we forget how fundamentally things have changed, the benchmark for ―normal‖ in co-
operative development may also shift. Diamond (2005) refers to this perceptual trap as 
―landscape amnesia.‖ Forgetting how development campaigns were actually organized by 
previous generations of activist co-operators, we are left with a ―common-sense‖ notion 
that co-operatives develop more or less spontaneously. 
 
The decline of movement memory, founding principles, and associational vitality in 
established co-operatives is also often matched by the rise of market pressures, growing 
management power, and the dominance of business objectives. As institutions mature, 
social objectives and the democratic movement ethos may thus be subordinated to market 
                                                 
2
 Maaniche‘s theory underpinned significant innovations in co-operative adult education in Saskatchewan 
in the forties and fifties. The theory predicts the life cycle of a co-operative will be limited to only a 
generation and a half without educational interventions to revitalize the founding principles and energy of 
the co-operative (cited in Crewe, 2001, p.12). Like corporate boards, movements too need succession 
planning. 
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pragmatism and managerial hegemony. Indeed, as management is forced to fill the 
governance vacuum left by retreating activist members, sustaining movement values and 
development momentum can become increasingly difficult. 
 
The tendency of movement parents, established co-operative sectors, and movement apex 
organizations (which established co-operatives generally dominate) to neglect 
development and desert new co-operatives has been a frequent complaint of orphaned 
emerging co-operatives and sectors. Under the influence of corporate-style managers and 
passive custodial boards, movement priorities and identity can gradually drift from the 
developmental ambitions of movement founders toward the more managerial approach of 
the co-operative establishment. 
 
Theorists have spilled considerable ink to explain the paradox of these organizations: 
founded by vital democratic movements but undermined by a trend toward declining 
democratic involvements. In the sections below, this dilemma is considered in terms of 
theories of organizational and movement degeneration. For just as dominant firms can 
―define the regularities and sometimes the rules of the game‖ (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 194) in 
a given field, the degeneration of a powerful bloc of mature co-operatives can reshape 
movement culture and drive degenerative effects across the wider co-operative movement 
field.  
 
1.5.1 Theories of organizational degeneration 
There is a long tradition of anti-democratic pessimism in the social sciences. According 
to Michels‘ (1915) ―iron law of oligarchy,‖ all democratic organizations are prone to elite 
capture over time; as organizations become increasingly large and complex, power is 
delegated to a specialist leadership. This managerial oligarchy tends to have greater 
political skill, access to information and communication channels, and control over 
rewards and sanctions. While formally democratic procedures may remain, this self-
perpetuating leadership defends its own interests and consolidates its leadership. 
Democratic participation and values inevitably wane.  
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Weber (1958) proposes a similar tendency to rationalize bureaucratic rather than 
democratic norms in large scale organizations. Calculation, technical efficiency, and 
goal-orientation all tend to shape institutional values, drive centralized, specialist control 
and entrench a bureaucratic elite. For Weber, instrumental reason and oligarchic rule are 
deeply ingrained in the spirit of modernity; he called bureaucracy an ―iron cage,‖ from 
which humanity might never escape (p. 181).  
 
Similarly, McAdam (1982) argues formalizing social movement organizations (SMO) is 
crucial to sustained insurgency but warns against three degenerative processes. First, in 
oligarchization, a class of leaders may put maintaining the organization before movement 
goals. Second, in co-optation, the desire for external sponsor support may divert 
organizations from movement goals. Third, in the dissolution of indigenous support, 
organizations may become so preoccupied with lobbying or other activities that they lose 
the confidence of their own rank and file. These tendencies may combine in a vicious 
spiral of activist disenchantment and disengagement.  
 
As both democratic associations and market enterprises, the co-operative case diverges 
substantively from Michels‘ (1915) and Weber‘s (1958) treatments. It also diverges 
significantly from the SMO norm on which McAdam (1982) focuses. The degenerative 
processes McAdam identifies are salient to co-operative movements, but in distinct ways. 
First, oligarchization is a larger threat for a co-operative than a traditional SMO because 
business culture sanctions strong management, expert leadership, and confidential and 
fast decision-making to meet the challenges of market competition. This powerful 
competitive discourse underlines the need for unfettered elite leadership.  
 
Second, while co-ops are less subject to the kinds of state and foundation co-optation 
more typically associated with SMO funding,
3
 they may depart from movement goals to 
remain competitive, meet the demands of a bottom-line focused consumerism, and adopt 
corporate-managerial practices. Market involvements make co-ops more susceptible to 
                                                 
3
 Of course, CMOs may seek state funding to supplement member dues and realize shared state-sector 
objectives. They may thus be steered into compromises to accommodate state agendas. 
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market values; serving to ―weaken the social movement character of co-operative 
movements far more than the institutionalization and bureaucratization processes 
observed with all social movements‖ (Develtere, 1992, p. 32). Co-operative organizations 
are less susceptible to state cooptation, but more likely to be coopted by capitalist values. 
 
Third, in the dissolution of member support, the drift from movement to managerial goals 
may undermine members‘ adhesion and sense of movement belonging. This is a two-step 
process. First, as co-operatives mature, the movement values, relationships, and 
organizing know-how of the founding generation wither. Second, filling this vacuum in 
the organizational culture are market demands, managerial power, and a drift toward 
corporate practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 2004). As members withdraw from active 
governance and executive power advances, the moral incentive to support or join the co-
operative may erode further.  
 
Meister (1974; 1984) identifies specific degenerative threats to co-operative 
organizations; they all reflect the shifting balance of class power from members to 
managers. Adopting a life-cycle model, he suggests four stages. High idealism and 
member commitment in the take-off stage leads to the first conflict, as the group 
establishes full-time administrative control. The second conflict takes place as managers 
put conventional principles of organization in place to manage growth, often in 
opposition to movement idealists. The third conflict arises as market values become 
established and democratic participation is increasingly confined to formal board 
representation. The fourth and final conflict emerges as managers use their access to 
information, expertise, and resources to consolidate control. The implication is that ―co-
operatives will move from direct democracy and collective management to representative 
democracy and professional management, until eventually the co-operative is dominated 
by this managerial élite‖ (Cornforth et al., 1988, p. 135). 
 
Like other democratic organizations, co-operatives are clearly susceptible to the erosion 
of democratic norms and movement principles over time. Some have argued this 
degeneration is inevitable. This doctrine has been most aggressively deployed against the 
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worker co-operative movement (Birchall, 1997). As a robustly democratic model, it 
appears particularly suspect to democratic cynics who stress the need for technocratic 
leadership. The Fabian socialist tradition, in particular, has been strongly influenced by 
the Webbs‘ (1914; 1921) degeneration thesis. This doctrine asserts that workers would 
either fail to manage effectively or prevent their managers from managing effectively 
because they lacked discipline, market knowledge, or resisted technological change, 
eventually driving the venture out of business; or their co-operative would be forced to 
adopt conventional management and ownership (Cornforth et al., 1988). If successful, the 
Webbs argued workers would limit membership to hoard profits, thus deforming into 
petit bourgeois firms (Birchall, 1997). In any case, the democratic ideal would be thrown 
overboard in due course. For their part, Marxists often follow Marx‘s (1966) fatalistic 
view: ―the co-operative factories of labourers themselves represent within the old form 
the first sprouts of the new, although they naturally reproduce everywhere in their actual 
organization all the shortcomings of the prevailing system‖ (p. 440).4 
 
Develtere (1992) argues that one-sided approaches which privilege either movement 
ideals or business discipline lay the basis for organizational imbalance and decline. These 
imbalanced co-operatives exist in a state of partial paralysis and are, therefore, what 
Briscoe (in Fairbairn et al., 1991) calls ―frozen co-operatives.‖ Rather than ―walking on 
both legs,‖ their leaders tend toward two extreme, and opposed, types. The ―traders‖ 
adopt single bottom-line business practices at the expense of democratic involvements. 
The ―idealists‖ compromise business rigour in favour of abstract co-operative values:  
 
In these co-operatives the stumbling block to growth was the belief 
that business success and social (or co-operative) values are 
incompatible. This belief led to two views of the world, resulting in 
two types of leaders. The first was the trader who believed that 
economic criteria solely should drive decision making. This 
individual saw adherence to co-operative principles as a burden and a 
barrier to business success. The other type of leader was the idealist, 
who was prepared to compromise economic criteria in order to 
                                                 
4
 The obvious exception to this pessimistic approach to collective enterprise on the marxist left is the 
prefigurative ‗dual power‘ model of Gramsci (Boggs, 1973; 1984; Marzani, 1980), who was deeply 
engaged in Turin‘s factory council movement (Gramsci, 1977a; 1978) and deeply critical of Marx‘s 
economic determinism (Gramsci, 1977b). 
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adhere strictly to co-operative principles. Neither approach resulted 
in rapid improvements in sales or profitability. (p. 37) 
 
As Briscoe and Develtere both argue, traders (Develtere calls them ―managers‖) are 
frequently the dominant faction in well-established co-operatives. They tend to occupy 
managerial ranks and therefore have direct control over operational decisions, the shaping 
of organizational culture, and the provision of information and options to the board. Due 
to this strategic structural position traders often influence recruitment, nomination, and 
selection to the board. By attracting like-minded traders to the board, senior management 
can gain further influence over the membership-side of the organization. However, this 
often gives rise to an internal opposition led by idealists (Develtere calls them 
―ideologists‖ and ‖activists‖) who are suspicious of management power. This suspicion 
may lead them to oppose changes necessary to long-range business success. 
 
Internal polarization poses two threats. The most obvious is business failure, under the 
influence of an uncompromising and entrenched idealist faction; the other is 
privatization, as traders take their opposition to member control and movement values to 
its logical conclusion. Between these extremes lie a wide range of organizational 
dysfunctions, from trust deficits to faction formation to organizational gridlock. 
Imbalanced management may also engender workforce and membership distrust of 
management and board as they increasingly appear to act in collusion. Failure to balance 
leadership may undermine both business efficiency and movement effectiveness.  
 
Unlike most social movements which are involved in protest activity and ―contentious 
politics‖ that target state power, the co-operative movement is focused on the struggle for 
the entrepreneurial franchise and market-share. It engages in what we might call 
―contentious economics,‖ only intermittently contending for limited political reforms. 
The principal threat to co-operative movement goals therefore is not state cooptation but 
the dominance of managerial ideology and market-driven, instrumental values.  
 
As Bourdieu‘s field theory (2005a) suggests, there is thus a structured pattern to the co-
operative movement field; it reflects the social force of movement versus market pull. 
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Movement values must be dominant in the formation stage to successfully mobilize 
social capital and voluntary energies. However, as profitable co-operatives become less 
dependent on their parent movements, which may themselves decline, market pressure on 
management to make fast decisions can become overwhelming. This may diminish 
members‘ autonomy against the pressures of the economic field. Over time, these market-
driven field effects tend to strengthen the hand of the traders, marginalizing the idealists. 
 
Duval‘s (2005) study of the ―executive effect‖ at the Parisian daily newspaper Le Monde 
is instructive. Market pressure pushed the worker-owned co-operative to subscribe 
outside capital and attract affluent readers more appealing to advertisers. The dominant 
force of the economic field over the journalistic field thus compromised the newspaper‘s 
traditionally left-leaning editorial direction (pp. 135-155). The case of Le Monde is 
particularly illustrative since its product is, literally, a ―text‖ that communicates what it 
stands for. The editorial shift at Le Monde suggests an equally significant dilemma for 
other co-operatives caught between the movement and the market: 
 
The great political daily Le Monde … has an anti-capitalist 
tradition… inherited from the post-war period. Yet … starting in 
1985, major industrial and financial groups made significant 
investments and advertising expanded. Today, Le Monde is still 
majority-owned by internal investors, including journalists and other 
employees, but the grip of market logic has increased perceptibly, as 
evinced, notably, by an increasingly sensationalized front page 
designed to increase street sales. (Duval, 2005, pp. 148-149) 
 
Since ―established co-operatives may be closer to the model of frozen co-operatives than 
to the model of dynamic and innovative leaders in community education and 
development‖ (Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 42)—and it is the established co-operatives 
which tend to define the regularities and rules of the field by virtue of their resources, 
position, and prestige—declining member adhesion in these co-operatives can also 
undermine the wider movement‘s capacity to regenerate. In short, there is a spillover 
effect on the wider movement as leading co-operatives set the pattern for movement 
behaviour, and rise to positions of leadership within apex organizations. Moreover, since 
mature, established co-operatives are more likely to be trader-led and emerging co-
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operatives are often led by movement activists and idealists, the movement itself is 
vulnerable to the pathologies of polarization. These are barriers to a unified, 
developmental movement and key challenges for the social movement entrepreneurs to 
whom Develtere (1992) delegates the reconciliation of competing factions (p. 22).  
 
1.5.2 Theories of movement degeneration 
While many studies on co-operative degeneration focus on individual co-operatives 
(Ames, 1995; Cornforth, 1995; Hadley & Goldsmith, 1995; Holmes & Grieco, 1991; 
Hunt, 1992), these organizations are nested in broader networks and movements which 
are also subject to broadly degenerative pressures (Staber, 1992). Indeed, since co-
operatives often emerge in waves—as some structural need spurs social movement actors 
to organize campaigns—cohorts of co-operatives often enter into degenerative crises at 
the same time. A leadership generation, forged by the shared experience of a concerted 
movement insurgency, may retire from their home co-operatives as well as from the 
movement‘s sectoral federations and apex organizations concurrently. Replaced by 
professional managers without founding period experience in movement-building or co-
operative development, their movement perspective, networks, and organizing 
knowledge and skills can all be lost; succeded by bureaucratic-corporate perspective and 
managerial networks, ideology, and skills. The aggregate effect may be to set the 
movement on an anti-democratic course that dispenses with movement goals and values 
in favour of market growth, organizational efficiency, and managerial rule. Whole sectors 
may thus be frozen into bureaucratic norms and market instrumentalism. Members and 
movements may feel increasingly estranged and disenchanted. 
 
Moreover, Develtere (1992) argues that co-operative movements do not stand alone. 
They tend to rise and fall with the ebb and tide of their extended social movement 
families. While he too suggests co-operatives pass from a ―utopian‖ to a ―formalized‖ 
phase in which ―value rationality‖ is subsumed by a ―calculating rationality,‖ he argues 
withdrawal from cross-movement involvements can further undermine member loyalty 
and retention, particularly in conditions of intense competition; and that this drift from 
co-operation‘s democratic movement moorings may drive degeneration.  
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This degenerative spiral can gradually undermine movement values in favour of a 
technocratic, market pragmatism. In these conditions of ―every consumer and enterprise 
for themselves,‖ the co-operative movement becomes less able to defend and expand the 
co-operative sector as a whole. As managers and board members retreat into their uni-
functional silos, and the discursive frames of their particular market sectors, openness to 
emergent community needs and new co-operative development opportunities withers. 
Standard measures of economic performance may actually improve as leadership of an 
increasingly fragmented collection of frozen co-operatives abandon social performance 
objectives, at least in the short-term. However, the long range competitive positions of 
the co-operative as a firm model, and the ethical basis for movement-belonging and 
member loyalty, may decay—slowly, quietly, and invisibly.  
 
New co-operative development, therefore, is an important investment in wider movement 
regeneration. Without active and ongoing new development campaigns, the movement‘s 
capacity for cultural expansion dissipates. By default, the investor-owned firm appears as 
the only viable vehicle for contemporary economic action, investors appear as the only 
credible economic agents, and the co-operative movement appears as a fleeting solution 
to yesterday‘s problems. This not only pre-empts emerging co-operative sectors. It also 
undercuts member (and employee) loyalty to well-established co-operatives which seem 
less salient to the needs and priorities of younger people and emergent publics. 
 
The degeneration of co-operative movements has societal implications that extend well 
beyond the survival of co-operation as a movement or an institutionalized cluster of 
sectors. For the fate of these movements is also geared into the prospects of the wider 
social economy as a mode of production based on social needs and democratic 
participation. Co-operation helps structure economic life, social organization, and the 
political culture more generally. Particularly in world-regions such as Québec and 
Saskatchewan, with high co-operative densities, the success of the co-operative 
movement casts a bright light—building democratic cultures, empowering civil society, 
and driving new frontiers of social innovation. Conversely, its degeneration casts a long 
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shadow—contributing to the erosion of democratic cultures, popular power, and 
weakening popular defences against forms of social regression.  
 
1.6 Remobilizing co-operative development: Theories of movement regeneration 
Against the tradition of democratic pessimism in the social sciences, Cornforth and 
Thomas (1990) argue social innovation can democratize co-operatives, and regenerate 
movement goals and values. Regenerative initiatives may emerge through internal 
democratic channels, through members‘ ties to social movements with similar goals, 
through the leadership of visionary boards or managers, or through a coalition of these 
forces. Central, of course, is leadership from Develtere‘s social movement entrepreneurs. 
 
Additionally, co-operators have developed support structures to counter degeneration. 
Britain‘s CDA network provides one example. Cornforth and Thomas (1990) also 
suggest the existence of well-established federations and support networks in France and 
Italy account for their success in generating new co-operatives relative to countries with 
weak support structures such as the U.K. and the U.S. In fact, Cornforth et al. (1988) 
argue that the democratic dilemmas of maturing co-operatives represent choice-points in 
the organizations‘ life-cycle; not determining influences that inevitably lead to 
degeneration. For example, they argue for support structures to match the strategic 
requirements of worker co-operatives at each degenerative stage in Meister‘s life-cycle 
typology: 
 
This would imply that CSOs continue their successful business 
advice, confidence-building and general development work 
undertaken for start-ups, and pursue management training for the 
second-stage development and growth of co-operatives once 
established. Then they would also concentrate on ways of assisting in 
the third-stage conflict and combating the degenerative tendencies. 
This might involve developing models of co-operative working and 
assisting with problems of individuals in co-operatives, from 
recruiting through discipline and pay differentials to how to reward–
and control–entrepreneurialism (pp. 199-200).   
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Similarly, Maaniche predicts a co-operative‘s democratic, movement values will be 
exhausted as the founding members‘ legacy recedes in the organizational culture, but he 
also argues that educational interventions can revitalize founding principles and energy 
(in Crewe, 2001, p.12). Like Cornforth et al. (1988), Maaniche portrays the entropic 
decline of democratic values, momentum, and projects as a function of transient historical 
conditions, and a challenge to innovate, rather than inevitable realities to which we 
should be fatalistically resigned.  
 
If movement polarization and degeneration pose threats, and challenges, for the social 
movement entrepreneurs charged with responding to these historic crises (Develtere, 
1992, p. 22), then regeneration theorists like Cornforth et al. (1988) and Maaniche (in 
Crewe, 2001, p.12) equally present them with an agenda, in outline, for unifying 
competing factions and rebuilding the necessary enabling structures, cultures, and 
strategies for movement regeneration. Indeed, the argument of Cornforth et al. (1988) for 
the role of institutional intermediaries is not narrowly focused on the instrumental and 
technical concerns associated with resource mobilization theory. Instead, based on their 
study of the worker co-operative boom in Britain in the early eighties, they also 
emphasize the educational and cultural importance of movement leadership in 
popularizing new ideas, inspiring new actors, and conducting new campaigns: 
 
Probably the most important development in the continuing revival 
of the worker co-operative sector has been the formation of local co-
operative support organizations (CSOs). Originally these came from 
the efforts of small groups of local activists, radical professionals and 
politicians, influenced by the alternative movement and by other 
moves towards decentralised, grassroots activity. CSOs can be seen 
partly as vehicles for promoting the ideals of co-operation, 
specifically those of common ownership, and partly as one of a 
number of fragmented, pragmatic responses to increasing 
unemployment … The majority of funding for CSOs has come from 
Labour-controlled councils or from central government grants aimed 
at rejuvenating urban areas which also require local government 
support. (p. 19) 
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In a sense, the British CDA network was a movement within a movement, 
institutionalizing democratic movement values from outside official structures which 
had become managerial—rather than developmental—in their orientation and slow to 
respond to new needs. As the Québec case examined here illustrates, co-operative 
movement degeneration is not inevitable. Not only do co-operative enterprises tend to 
outlast investor enterprises (Bond, Clément, Cournoyer & Dupont, 1999). Over the 
century and a half since its birth, the modern co-operative movement has spread across 
the globe and across sectors (Birchall, 1997). Certainly, some co-operatives have failed. 
Some sectors have encountered fatal setbacks. But others have expanded and enhanced 
their competitive position, retaining economic leverage for their members, insuring 
their continued loyalty, and inspiring others to action. New co-operative models have 
also been invented to respond to new threats and opportunities. The co-operative 
movement, in short, has demonstrated a compelling capacity for innovation, re-
invention, and regeneration, often by rediscovering its social movement roots and 
historic alliances.  
 
Post WWII Italy is a compelling example of this regenerative capacity. While the war 
decimated the economy, the fascist regime singled out co-operatives for special 
punishment. Mussolini‘s forces encouraged the harassment of co-operative leaders and 
the destruction and nationalization of co-operative property.
5
 Despite this, the movement 
recovered in the post-war context. Activists‘ commitments were deepened by their 
persecution, leading national reconstruction through mobilizing networks such as La 
Lega. Enjoying broad-based popular support, Italy today boasts one of the planet‘s most 
successful co-operative movements (Earle, 1986; Ammirato, 1996). 
 
Another example of movements‘ capacity to adapt and innovate is the case of the 
Mondragon group (Oakeshott, 1978; Whyte & Whyte, 1991; Morrison, 1991). Also a by-
product of the anti-fascist resistance, this complex of over 250 worker-owned firms is 
based in the Basque country in Spain. It employs over 90,000 workers (Mondragon, 
                                                 
5
 Movement newspaper La Cooperazione Italiana published a list of 198 co-operatives attacked by fascist 
squads during the months of January to June 1921 alone (Earle, 1986, p. 25).  
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2009). Developing its own university, research and development unit, and movement 
bank, this mobilizing network contrasts sharply with the degenerative model of an 
imbalanced or frozen co-operative movement that lacks developmental commitments. 
While traditional co-operative movements may succumb to institutional isomorphism, 
degeneration, and de-mutualizations—particularly as traders have come to dominate 
these organizations with a market-driven managerial ideology—the Mondragon model 
strives to balance enterprise and associational interests (Webb, 1987; Matthews, 2001; 
Axworthy, 1985; Oakeshott, 1978). 
 
Similarly, as this study illustrates, the Québec model both institutionalized support to co-
operative entrepreneurship, and introduced structural innovations that sustain the 
associative viability of the movement through the latest wave of globalization. Its 
network of CDRs, like the British and French networks that inspired them, is both a 
development mechanism for new co-operatives and a regenerative mechanism for the 
movement as a whole. It thus provides a model for regeneration in the present context. 
 
The theoretical framework developed in this chapter has focused on co-operative 
movement-building, degeneration, and regeneration as key factors in conditioning the 
prospects for new co-operative development campaigns. It has been argued that 
degenerative processes need to be a concern to movement leaders—from established and 
emerging sectors and managerial and elected ranks alike. However, it also suggests that 
regeneration strategies can effectively offset and reverse these processes. Following on 
Cornforth et al. (1988) and Maaniche (in Crewe, 2001), this review finds that institutional 
intermediaries, educational and cultural interventions, and the reconstruction of 
mobilizing networks can each play a crucial role. Like Gramsci‘s ―organic intellectuals‖ 
or Foucault‘s ―specific intellectuals,‖ Develtere‘s social movement entrepreneurs have an 
important role to play in unifying the movement‘s diverse actors—from established co-
operative managers and emerging co-operative activists to disenchanted co-operative 
workers and estranged social movement partners—in a process of whole movement 
renewal.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
METHODS: KNOWLEDGE FOR WHOM?  
 
 
2.1  Introduction: Methodological preliminaries 
The Québec and Saskatchewan co-operative movements realized several waves of 
dramatic growth through the early- and mid-twentieth century, but from 1980 to 2010 
new co-operative formation rates diverged sharply. While Québec start-ups boomed, the 
Saskatchewan sector shrank. As the statistical survey in chapter three demonstrates, this 
gap is both empirically significant and widening at an accelerating rate. Beyond 
empirically documenting this development gap, this study also has a wider exploratory 
and explanatory purpose: to test the efficacy of the social movement approach in 
explaining this divergence. Findings may suggest priorities for further research and 
action, conceptual weakness, or alternative theories or refinements to the model. Mixed 
methods are thus used to further test the framework‘s explanatory power. These include a 
review of secondary sources on the history of the Québec and Saskatchewan movements 
to construct provincial case studies, presented in chapters 4 - 7; qualitative analysis of 
relative provincial movement performance on several indices of development action in 
chapter 8; and a series of semi-structured interviews with strategically positioned actors 
to help check facts and interpretations, fill in gaps in the literature, and provide greater 
depth and interpretive understanding.  
 
This investigation‘s central research question is: Why did the Saskatchewan sector 
contract during this period while Québec‘s sector expanded? This study explores the 
proposition that Québec successfully intervened against movement degeneration over the 
last three decades while the Saskatchewan movement did not. The study‘s intent is to 
assess the validity of this claim, to explain why or why not this might be the case, and to 
provide further insight into possible development barriers and mechanisms. 
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This chapter summarizes the main methodological assumptions, reasoning, and 
limitations and delimitations which guide the study design.  
 
2.2 An interdisciplinary approach 
This investigation draws from several disciplinary traditions. Interdisciplinarity can 
breech disciplinary silos that impede innovative investigations and wider knowledge 
diffusion, and forge new connections between frequently segregated interpretive 
communities; this creates new opportunities for theoretical extension, synthesis, and 
innovation. The following analogy captures the dilemma of compartmentalized research, 
and the advantage of interdisciplinary approaches:  
 
There is a saying, indeed a cliché, that if the only tool you have is a 
hammer, you will see every problem as a nail. To paraphrase: if the 
only tool you have is history, you will see every problem as a 
question of finding documents in archives. If your tool is economics, 
you will represent reality as the outcome of maximizing agents 
whose behavior can be captured in equations containing Greek 
letters. The disciplinary organization of the university amounts to 
having teams of people who all wield hammers, others with saws, 
still others with sandpaper–each group trying to finish each job 
unaided by the others, and with no general contractor. (Fairbairn & 
Fulton, 2000, p. 21) 
 
Within the dominant disciplinary preoccupations of political science, sociology, 
economics, and history, co-operative literature is often fragmented, submerged, and 
consigned to footnotes. Alternately, it is confined to the specialist enclave of co-operative 
studies. The approach of this study, by contrast, is to adopt a clear problem-solving focus 
on co-operative development. This encourages an integrated approach, crossing 
disciplinary boundaries in purposeful ways. Drawing together diverse strands of expertise 
and methodological approaches ensures a more comprehensive understanding. An 
historical approach can place the problem in meaningful context. Economic analysis can 
illuminate the distinct traits, advantages, and dilemmas of co-operative firms. A 
sociological lens can better identify the role of social structures, movements, and 
institutional supports. Cultural analysis can clarify how various ways of life, discourses, 
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and identities shape collective actions. Finally, political science highlights issues of 
public policy and member democracy. A disciplined inquiry borrows carefully from 
diverse conceptual approaches and evidentiary bases to yield a richer, more accurate, and 
more complete account of co-operative development. 
 
Interdisciplinarity thus builds on the methods and findings of disciplinary inquiry to build 
less reductionist explanations. In contrast to positivist approaches, such as economism or 
statism, it contributes, as MacPherson (2007) urges, to ―a fuller appreciation of the social, 
economic, political, and cultural contexts that underlie both formal co-operative 
organizations and the fostering of co-operative behavior‖ (p. 458). Related to this theme 
is the rootedness of co-operation in wider social movement families. As Develtere (1996) 
notes, ―co-operative movements have seldom been studied by scholars interested in social 
movement research… often taking for granted that co-operatives belong to a special 
social movement without specifically analyzing co-operatives from that angle‖ (p. 26). 
An interdisciplinary approach can help bridge this gap.  
 
2.3  Units of analysis: Provincialization and the globalization context  
Comprehensive changes wrought by economic globalization since the eighties highlight 
the importance of an interdisciplinary approach. For global market restructuring created a 
fundamentally new context for collective economic action, generally, and the project of 
co-operative development, in particular. It shifted the terms of trade but also transformed 
the role of the state and our cultural understandings. While the National Task Force on 
Co-operative Development (NTFCD, 1984) reflects the commitment of nation-state 
sociology to centralized, federal state action, globalization reframed the terms and terrain 
of co-operative development. Increasingly, both federal and provincial states would play 
a larger role in business development through decentralist, and community economic 
development strategies (Shragge, 1993; Hammond Ketilson et al., 1992). Challenged by 
new regulatory and competitive threats, eroding local commitments, and the devolution 
of economic policy to the provincial, regional and local levels, interdisciplinary 
approaches can help clarify the comprehensive and far-reaching implications of this new 
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reality for co-operation. Comparative, inter-provincial research can further help us better 
understand these new problems and re-imagine co-operative possibilities (Findlay, 2004). 
 
Of course, globalization only further complicates the already complicated context of co-
operation under Canadian federalism. This fragmented jurisdictional reality results in 
frequently conflicting legislative regimes; varied policy goals; unevenly distributed 
resources; and frequent service gaps, mismatches, and overlaps across the country‘s 
provincial and territorial support structures (Fairbairn et al., 1993). Federal state action 
thus risks duplication. However, one advantage of the federal / provincial division of 
responsibilities is the room it opens for policy experimentation at the provincial level. 
Competitive federalism enables replication of the most successful provincial approaches 
over time, both across provinces and federally. However, this process of inter-provincial 
innovation diffusion is perhaps stickiest between Québec and the rest of Canada, since 
there is considerable geographic, cultural, and linguistic drag on policy replication. 
 
Federalism also balkanizes Canada‘s co-operative and social movements; they are 
organized into national and provincial centrals, mirroring the federal structure of 
governmental authority. The bifurcation of the federal co-operative movement between 
French-speaking and English-speaking centrals creates a barrier to innovation diffusion, 
and further institutionalizes the division of French-speaking and English-speaking co-
operators.  
 
Of course, globalization has also restricted the role of the federal state and thus the 
salience of federal lobbying. The movement‘s English-speaking federal apex 
organization, the Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA), has recognized that—under 
conditions of state retrenchment and blocked political progress at the federal level—it 
may be wisest to refocus lobbying support and technical assistance to provincial 
movements that have energy, momentum, and an opening to state partnership. The 
consulting role of the CCA‘s recently formed Research Education and Co-operation Hub 
provides one example. It conducted research on other co-operative development 
strategies across Canada at a federal and provincial level to inform Manitoba 
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consultations on a ten-year provincial sector-state development plan (Manitoba Co-
operative Association, 2008).  
 
Lewis (2010) has also recently called for a deepening provincialization of development 
energies: ―In Manitoba some 10 years ago the then draft Canadian Community Economic 
Development Network National Policy framework played a key role in influencing the 
new New Democratic Party government. However, the subsequent strengthening of the 
work there has been due to provincially-focused organizing. In Nova Scotia the focus has 
been very provincial as it has been in Québec, though the latter has expertly leveraged 
federal support as well‖ (p. 1).  
 
Comparing the globalization era experiences of Canada‘s historically most co-operative 
provinces has practical benefits for English-speaking provincial movements, and 
Saskatchewan‘s in particular, but it also helps redefine the problem at a level of analysis 
traditionally overlooked under hegemonic federalism. By selecting provincial movements 
as the unit of analysis, this comparative case study also contributes to the 
provincialization of movement strategies currently under way in English-speaking 
Canada; and to the inter-provincial transfer of key movement and policy innovations. 
 
There is another case for a provincial focus. For the decline of the nation-state also 
represents the dismantling of the main institutional base of popular democratic power. 
Indeed, democratic potential is increasingly curbed by market power and diverted by 
ethno-religious fragmentation. In the Canadian context, examples of triumphal global 
capitalism include widespread privatization, deregulation, and free trade agreements. 
Examples of resurgent ethno-religious nationalism include the rise of Christian 
fundamentalism, social conservatism and right-wing populism in the West; and the 
persistence of separatist sentiment and anti-immigrant xenophobia in Québec. Against 
this backdrop of eroding democratic cultures and institutions, co-operative movements 
can help realize popular, democratic aspirations as well as fulfil frustrated socio-
economic needs. Co-operatives can once again act as agents of democratization; 
responding to the democratic vacuum created by the increasingly impotent nation-state 
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and the increasingly omnipotent private market; and recreating vibrant intermediate 
associations to rebuild civil society‘s depleted reserves of democratic social capital.  
 
As Barber (2001) has argued, in the collision between the forces of ―disintegral tribalism 
and reactionary fundamentalism [he calls] Jihad… and the forces of integrative 
modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization [he calls] McWorld,‖ 
the reinvention of new democratic institutions (or the renewal of existing ones) can 
provide a third option: 
 
Democracy responds both to Jihad and McWorld. It responds directly 
to the resentments and spiritual unease of those for whom the 
trivialization and homogenization of values is an affront to cultural 
diversity and spiritual and moral seriousness. But it also answers the 
complaints of those mired in poverty and despair as a consequence of 
unregulated global markets and of capitalism run wild because it has 
been uprooted from the humanizing constraints of the democratic 
nation-state. (p. xii)  
 
This point warrants further elaboration. Early modern co-operation—in the wake of the 
structural dislocations of the French and Industrial Revolutions—was more than an effort 
to realize economic needs; it also embodied democratic aspirations and strivings for 
member self-realization and new forms of social solidarity or community. However, as 
democratic movement energies gradually migrated from the co-operative movement to 
win, build, then influence the modern democratic state on the one hand and trade unions 
on the other, established co-operatives were increasingly left in the hands of a custodial 
management class. By contrast, the present context suggests a reappraisal of statism, co-
operative centralism and a reinvigoration of local, regional, and provincial co-operation 
as vehicles for popular democracy
6
. As the nation-state declines, movements structured 
along the frontiers of national boundaries need to reflect on the salience of national 
organization; although the important tasks of inter-provincial innovation diffusion, 
                                                 
6
 A good example of this kind of creative re-thinking are the merger talks between the federal English and 
French speaking co-operative federations, the CCA and the CCCM. While the ethno-linguistic organization 
of these parallel movements reflects pragmatic accommodations to the distinct needs of francophone co-
operators, these discussions—and the decision several years ago to co-locate offices in Ottawa--recognize 
that a common front in lobbying, and a unified movement overall, are also valuable. 
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coalition-building, and federal lobbying still demand a strong national presence, the new 
reality also suggests the importance of rebuilding co-operation‘s base in intermediary 
associations that can shore up the movement‘s base, political influence, and movement-
building capacities at the provincial and even regional level. Co-operatives can help to 
rebuild the institutional and cultural basis of vibrant democracies as they rebuild their 
own movements‘ vitality—from the ground up, co-operative by co-operative, region by 
region, and province by province.  
 
Against the overall trend to concentrate and centralize political power in Ottawa through 
Canada‘s first century, and the more recent erosion of local attachments under the 
economic concentration and increased labour mobility of global market restructuring, the 
co-operative movement‘s decentralized, local membership base thus uniquely positions it 
to help rebuild the base for democratic values, participation, and escalating orders of 
organization in civil society. Shifting our gaze from the senior level of governance as the 
seat of democratic power toward a more devolved conception in which provincial 
movements (and provincial states) also play a key role, is thus also an important 
methodological and political shift in favour of the new emergent structure of democratic 
possibilities. It also places a focus on the new importance, and difficulties, of supporting 
grassroots local agency for social innovation and co-operative enterprise. In this study, a 
more prominent sub-periodization is thus deployed to further punctuate the waves of co-
operative formation in the globalization era; this sub-periodization focuses on the shifting 
dynamics of provincial state-sector relations within the overall life-cycle dynamics of 
these provincial movements. With the federal state in retreat, provincial states become 
more, not less, important to co-operative development prospects.  
 
2.4  A realist approach 
Although the next chapter establishes the empirical reality, scope, and scale of the 
widening development gap between Québec and Saskatchewan; and qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are viewed as complementary aspects of the research; the broad 
methodological approach for this investigation is qualitative, rooted in the realist 
philosophy of science. Realist method posits underlying causal structures, mechanisms 
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and, therefore, views theory as a process of ―conceptualization‖ (Sayer, 1992). This 
study, in other words, reflects a strongly exploratory and interpretive approach to making 
sense of this development gap; to explaining its origins as well as demonstrating its 
existence. For, as Giddens (1984) has argued, ―all so-called ‗quantitative‘ data, when 
scrutinized, turn out to be composites of ‗qualitative‘–i.e., contextually located and 
indexical–interpretations produced by situated researchers, coders, government officials 
and others‖ (p. 333). In this sense, it is also a rejection of the quantophrenia which 
prevails in some quarters, and its governing assumption that ―if you can‘t count it, it 
doesn‘t count‖ (Giddens, 1996, p. 4). A more apt description of this approach might be 
that most things you can count don‘t much matter, and most things that matter you can‘t 
count.
7
 While the positivist emphasis on discovering natural laws and relations of 
regularity is common in the natural sciences, the realist approach ―is more common in 
subjects characterized by fundamental divisions and considerable philosophical and 
methodological introspection such as sociology‖ (p. 50).  
 
This study is thus based on the premise that realism‘s stratified model of events, 
mechanisms, and structures yields a stronger sensitivity to the underlying developmental 
processes of social (and economic) change. In particular, realism highlights the 
―emergent powers‖ that are the focus of this study (the achievement of successful co-
operative development systems). For a strongly exploratory study such as this, realist 
scientific methods provide conceptual rigour, theoretical breadth, and methodological 
flexibility.  
 
A realist approach combines theoretical or ―abstract‖ research, such as the 
conceptualization of movement regeneration as an underlying mechanism of successful 
co-operative development, with historical or ―concrete‖ research (of the actual structures, 
mechanisms, and events that define the Québec and Saskatchewan cases). I argue that 
                                                 
7
 As Mills (1959) argues, ―much ‗empirical‘ research is bound to be thin and uninteresting. Much of it, in 
fact, is a formal exercise for beginning students, and sometimes a useful pursuit for those who are not able 
to handle the more difficult substantive problems of social science. There is no more virtue in empirical 
inquiry as such than in reading as such. The purpose of empirical inquiry is to settle disagreements and 
doubts about facts, and thus make arguments more fruitful by basing all sides more substantively. Facts 
discipline reason; but reason is the advance guard in any field of learning‖ (p. 205). 
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this holistic, problem-focused approach can enhance historical understanding of the 
resources and constraints available to co-operative development, and open up significant 
new lines of inquiry.  
 
2.4.1  Synthesis research 
This work fits well with synthesis research in the realist tradition. In contrast to positivist 
approaches, this approach of matching adequate theoretical concepts to specific historical 
realities does not seek to establish discrete regularities as a basis for broader 
generalization. Rather, it strives for an interpretive understanding of change processes 
within distinctive, complex systems. As Sayer (1992) argues: 
 
Synthesis research is research which attempts to explain major parts 
of whole systems by combining abstract and concrete research 
findings with generalizations covering a wide range of constitutive 
structures, mechanisms and events. Research of this kind is especially 
common in history and geography, although it would perhaps be 
fairer to say that ideally it should be interdisciplinary. Interpretive 
understanding is presupposed in all these types of research, though 
the extent to which it is problematized will depend on the topic; e.g. 
cultural studies as compared to economics. (p. 237) 
 
As discussed, this implies a relational approach to co-operative development. Rather than 
treating co-operatives as merely economic units operating in a self-enclosed, functional 
economic system, this study also views them as democratic associations that overlap with 
wider social movement families. This conception differs from a positivist approach, in 
which founding members are regarded as autonomous individuals engaged in a 
transaction of rational choice. Instead of positing a de-contextualized, asocial, and 
ahistorical model of external relations in a simple, utility-maximizing ―transaction,‖ this 
relational approach is based on a rational abstraction method. In this approach, internal 
relations are based on a conception of the embedded character of co-operative 
development. Emerging co-operatives, in other words, exist in a field of relationships that 
either help, or fail to help, define and develop them. This field includes collective social 
actors (e.g. co-operatives), underlying structures (e.g. social movements), and enabling 
development mechanisms (e.g. technical assistance, solidarity finance, policy reform).  
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Clearly, the transactional conception reflects and reinforces a laissez faire model of co-
operative development, abstracting the adoption–decision of co-operative founders from 
the wider social and historical context of co-operative development. This atomistic 
ontology is the basis for neo-liberal policies that suggest co-operative development 
should be treated no differently than any other form of business development. In this 
view, neither special supports nor development mechanisms are necessary or appropriate. 
The market should decide. It thus abstracts from and minimizes the role of the supportive 
structures and mechanisms highlighted by a relational model. While the transactional 
approach discounts the historical role of movements in conditioning future innovation-
adoption decisions, a relational approach places a premium on this aspect; this is the 
conceptual basis for developmental movements. 
 
Central, therefore, to the realist method is recognition of the crucial role of agency, 
choice, and social innovation in the cultural evolution of human societies. A realist 
approach creates a strong foundation for synthesis research since it recognizes that 
―causal, structural, and interpretive analyses are interdependent‖ (Sayer, 1992, p. 114). 
This understanding is particularly important to the study of co-operative movement 
innovation, regeneration, and re-invention—a restructuring process that so heavily 
depends on the ethical, rational, creative, and strategic conduct of movement actors, i.e. 
their ―associative intelligence.‖ Far from a structurally determined outcome of ―natural 
laws,‖ co-operative development is a problem-solving practice through which people 
adopt, adapt, and reinvent co-operative innovations to fit their specific local needs, 
opportunities, and preferences. As Sayer (1992) explains: 
 
Where structures are undergoing transformation, at different speeds in 
different places, as is common in societies, concrete and abstract research 
need to be in far closer dialogue than is ever necessary in their natural science 
equivalents of pure and applied research…. The results of studies of all but 
the more durable social structures are therefore likely to be theoretically-
informed and informative narratives rather than formal analyses of apparently 
timeless mechanisms. (p. 145) 
 
 
 51 
2.4.2  Conceptual research 
In co-operative studies, Fairbairn (2004) has also argued for a role for abstract, or what 
he calls ―conceptual,‖ research. While practitioners may be readily frustrated by research 
which is exclusively conceptual, he suggests that ―in the long run, we can‘t do without 
conceptual research if we are to avoid intellectual stagnation‖ (p. 22). Conceptual 
research allows us to think critically and reflexively about new circumstances or 
previously unexamined assumptions. It can shed important new light on outdated 
orthodoxies, mistaken beliefs, and irrational prejudices that are implicit in the everyday 
theories that guide our actions. Conceptual research is simply necessary to revising our 
―theories-in-use‖ (Argyris & Schön, 1974). It is the first step in the process of social 
innovation and movement modernization, reform, and regeneration. The social movement 
approach to co-operative development, including the interest in degenerative dilemmas 
and regenerative strategies which it implies, is thus a clear instance of conceptual 
research: 
 
Conceptual research is the basic and most fundamental kind. It deals 
with ―how we think about‖ co-operatives. It may define new models 
or kinds of co-operative structures, or new ways of thinking about old 
ones—new terms, new goals, and new kinds of intellectual tools. The 
distinguishing feature of such research is the creation of something 
new, of a new intellectual construction. (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 22) 
 
2.4.3  Conceptual-empirical research 
The case study comparison summarized in chapter 8 investigates the ability of the social 
movement approach to explain the logic, motion, and divergence of the Québec and 
Saskatchewan movements. In part, the development gap documented statistically in 
chapter 3 thus appears as an index of the tension between degenerative processes 
(dominant in Saskatchewan) and regenerative actions (decisive in Québec). Based on 
historical evidence, the comparative case method also applies a movement bench-
marking tool (the ―seven pillar model,‖ discussed below) to extend the reach of the study, 
and more adequately account for the etic perspective of contemporary movement actors. 
The study thus moves from a ―conceptual‖ research focus—on better conceptualizing co-
operative innovation within the frames of academic social science —to a ―conceptual-
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empirical‖ focus—on better understanding and facilitating innovation-transfer between 
the leaders of these geographically, linguistically, and culturally bounded movements by 
applying the action-frames of movement actors themselves. This implies a doubly 
reflexive edge: moving from ―internal critique‖ of social scientific approaches to co-
operative development to an ―external critique‖ of movement actors‘ theories-in-use.8 In 
this sense, this study may therefore also be understood as a project in ―translational 
research,‖ bridging the theory-practice divide, and bringing academic and movement 
understandings into closer and more productive dialogue. As Silka (2003) has argued, 
there is a need for ―research that closes the gap between studying a problem and 
identifying hands on solutions‖ (p. 61). 
 
The seven pillars text (CCA, 2007a), outlined below, is used as as an artefact of 
movement actors‘ conceptions and an index of movement commitments to development 
action. This reflects the fact that it is not simply development systems or their constituent 
elements, such as financing, technical assistance, etc., which must be adopted, adapted, or 
re-invented to develop viable movements or regenerate declining movements. It is also 
necessary that movement leadership have a shared vision, strategy, and discourse for 
development to justify, guide, and inspire their actions. This discursive structure may 
erode over time; become less relevant to new conditions; have to be renovated or 
hybridized with others to better meet local needs and conditions; or re-invented altogether 
to meet the fundamentally new demands of a rapidly changing economy and society. 
Discourses are themselves social forces: for development; for degeneration; for 
regeneration; or they may embody contradictory aspirations. This tacit, practical 
knowledge or ―common sense‖ is sometimes formalized in documents that can capture 
the zeitgeist. The CCA‘s seven pillars model is just such an artefact.   
 
In part, the methodological move toward textual analysis of the seven pillars movement 
document reflects the fact that, unlike natural science, social scientists are engaged in a 
                                                 
8
 Giddens (1984) defines ―internal critique‖ as ―the critical apparatus of social science, whereby theories 
and findings are subjected to evaluation in the light of logical argument and the provision of evidence‖ (p. 
375) and ―external critique‖ as ―critique of lay agents‘ beliefs and practices, derived from the theories and 
findings of social science‖ (p. 374). 
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dialogue with the world which they interpret; neither social scientists nor lay actors act in 
hermetically sealed contexts immune to the influence of the other. This methodological 
principle is thus best summed up in the concept of the double hermeneutic: ―The 
intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of social science, the 
meaningful world as constituted by lay actors and the metalanguages invented by social 
scientists; there is a constant ‗slippage‘ from one to the other involved in the practice of 
the social sciences‖ (Giddens, 1984, p. 374). As Giddens (1996) argues: 
 
Social science is concerned with concept-bearing and concept-
inventing agents, who theorize about what they do as well as the 
conditions of doing it… Unlike natural science, however, the social 
sciences involve a double hermeneutic, since the concepts and 
theories developed therein apply to a world constituted of the 
activities of conceptualizing and theorizing individuals… (For 
example,) the invention of the discourse of political science helped 
constitute what the modern state is… The discourse of economics 
entered constitutively into what industrial society is. Industrial 
society could not exist if everyday actors hadn‘t mastered concepts of 
investment, risk, cost, even the meaning of economics… The 
implication of the double hermeneutic is that social scientists can‘t 
but be alert to the transformative effects that their concepts and 
theories might have upon what it is they set out to analyse. (pp. 75-
77) 
 
In this sense, there is a necessary overlap between co-operative movement actors‘ frames 
and those of co-operative studies scholars. Movement cultures and academic research are 
imbricated in a causal network of often unacknowledged and unintended, mutual 
influence. Since social actors actively reflect on their world, choose from available 
options for action, and draw on new thinking to revise their own understandings (and 
hence their practice), they routinely draw on social scientific understanding as it cycles 
through the culture. Popularized concepts such as ―self-esteem‖ or ―body image‖ or 
―investment climate‖ all indicate the permeable boundaries that separate popular and 
academic knowledge. Similarly, ideas about development are themselves a material force 
in development, even if they circulate within and between relatively small academic and 
movement subcultures. In addition to first hand accounts gathered through interviews, the 
seven pillars document helps illuminate a more concrete, historical understanding of how 
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movement actors understand their world, how that understanding shapes their practice, 
and how that practice reshapes their world.  
 
Matching social scientific conceptualization with popular movement knowledge serves 
an important methodological role in adequately accounting for the knowledgeability of 
social movement actors. However, it also plays an important practical role in better 
facilitating, or accelerating, the social cycle of knowledge exchange and innovation 
diffusion. In this sense, it fits neatly into Fairbairn‘s (2004) definition of conceptual-
empirical research: 
 
Conceptual/empirical research combines new models or thinking 
with (the) study of at least some illustrative real-life examples. The 
idea of such research is to bootstrap thinking in a certain area by 
looking at what is ―out there‖ in dynamic or leading communities, 
and combining this with reflections, analysis, and / or 
recommendations about ―what is needed‖ or what is possible. (p. 22) 
 
2.5  Research as innovation and development catalyst 
As the ILO (2002) and UN (2001) have recognized, knowledge mobilization has an 
important role to play in expanding the global co-operative movement. Comparative 
research can overcome isolation, better transfer co-operative innovations, and accelerate 
their diffusion (Rogers, 1995). With one of the highest co-operative movement densities 
in the world, Canada both provides important lessons for development elsewhere—as 
evidenced by its longstanding and extensive involvements in international development 
efforts (CCA, 2010a)—and represents a relatively well-primed and receptive market for 
co-operative innovations. To cite one case investigated further in this study, the legendary 
movement in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan has deep local roots, but its roots in 
the international exchange of ideas and models run just as deep. Grain growers adopted 
pooling from the American experience (Sharp, 1997; Fairbairn, 2005). Consumer co-
operators took their inspiration from the great Rochdale experiment in the U.K. 
(Fairbairn, 1994; 2005). Credit unionism was relayed to the Prairies via the Maritimes, 
where the Antigonish movement was influenced by the great Desjardins campaign in 
Québec (MacPherson, 1979), itself based on the European experience (Fairbairn, 2000). 
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Research can thus play an important role in sharing co-operative innovations. Innovation 
transfer can both meet local members‘ needs and breathe new life into stagnant 
movements world-wide.  
 
To put this more formally, the conduct and publication of research can bridge what 
Burt (2002) calls ―structural holes,‖ connecting individuals and groups that circulate in 
different social networks and flows of information and would otherwise therefore not 
come into contact. In conditions of vast geographic dispersal and fragmentation by 
sector and province, this kind of isolation is a key issue in Canada—the focus of this 
study. The role of research in the Canadian context therefore looms particularly large. 
As the NTFCD (1984) reported, ―we found in our discussions across the country that 
frequently co-operatives in one province or sector were completely unaware of 
relevant developments in another part of the co-operative system.‖ A particular 
challenge to information exchange and movement learning, the Task Force 
emphasized, is the linguistic and cultural divide between French and English-speaking 
Canada (pp. 121-122). 
 
This investigation thus addresses several gaps and blind spots in co-operative studies. Its 
focus is co-operative development, an area that ―has not been an explicit subject of much 
research‖ (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 4). It also responds to the need ―for analytical studies of 
organizational and institutional factors (in co-operative development), particularly in case 
studies‖ (p. 4). This study also addresses ―the ways in which co-operative development is 
or may be lodged within (the) broader social economy (French) or community economic 
development (English)‖ (p. 14).9 Of course, Canadian co-operative studies are deeply 
                                                 
9
  Other gaps which this study addresses include ―the significance of regional or multi-co-operative 
systems or networks‖ (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 14), the role of ―alliances, networks and federations,‖ and the 
place of ―the co-operative identity‖ in strategic planning (p. 17). In particular, this study‘s focus on the 
embeddedness of co-operation in wider social movement family dynamics addresses the need for ―more 
systematic examination of member commitment, member involvement and leadership and the role of these 
factors in co-operative innovation and success‖ (p. 4). As a period study focused on the globalization-era 
context, cited as an area of particular ‗disappointment‘ (p. 15) within the existing literature, this study also 
contributes to the examination of ―international transfers of co-operative knowledge, (about which) almost 
nothing has been published in either language‖ (p. 4). 
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divided between Anglophone and Francophone movements, interpretive communities, 
and research traditions.
10
 This study bridges that linguistic and cultural divide, 
contributing to mutual understanding and conceptual exchange. A cross-cultural dialogue 
is, as Fairbairn suggests, a dialogue between the theoretical traditions of CED (in 
English-speaking Canada) and social economy (French-speaking Canada). It is also a 
dialogue between distinct experiences in innovation. For example, ―the rapidly 
developing Francophone literature on multi-stakeholder or solidarity co-operatives has no 
counterpart in the English language‖ (p. 3). 
 
2.6 Statistical analysis: Limitations and delimitations   
Statistical data collection practices in Canada limit comparative study. As Wagner (2006) 
details, co-operatives are largely regulated provincially. The use of different time 
intervals and statistical categories can frustrate comparisons. Moreover, financial and 
non-financial co-operatives are often surveyed with different supervisory and regulatory 
intent. Québec collects comprehensive sector data and makes it accessible to the public 
on a sector-by-sector and region-by-region basis, including employment and membership 
information. While Saskatchewan data collection is superior to that achieved in some 
jurisdictions, it lacks the comprehensiveness of its Québec counterpart.
11
  
 
                                                 
10
 Two examples of the discursive segregation of co-operative studies are MacPherson (1979) and Mungall 
(1986), both of which restrict their accounts to English-speaking Canada. Despite the fact that 234 of the 
country‘s 350 worker co-operatives were located in Québec, none of Mungall‘s sixteen cases is drawn from 
that milieu. Ironically, she reports that when asked about the diffusion failure of this innovation to English-
speaking provinces, the Co-operative Secretariat‘s Alain Roy said: ―We don‘t have the day-to-day habit of 
working together. Anglophones have to go to Québec if they want to benefit from our experiments‖ (p. 6). 
 
11
 Moreover, there has been some dispute over what should count as a ‗co-operative‘ in the Saskatchewan 
case. As Fairbairn et al. (1993) suggest, 208 of the 438 new co-operatives reported in Saskatchewan from 
1987 to 1992 were actually economic development co-operatives, mostly Small Business Loans 
Associations. These are government-funded local loan circles. Promoted to deliver a government program, 
they may well be effective small business financing mechanisms but it is far from clear that they embody 
the co-operative principles and constitute a form of co-operative development (p. v). Arguably, these 
government-dependent entities actually undermine co-operative development by using collective action to 
divert potential co-operative formation in favour of small investor-owned firms. Compared to the 
substantial education, commitment and autonomy that characterizes childcare, worker or housing co-ops, it 
could be argued that the inclusion of these ‗faux co-ops‘ skews statistical reports in a way that conceals the 
decline of effective development in Saskatchewan. 
 
 57 
The federal government‘s national statistics on non-financial co-operatives (available 
through Co-operation in Canada, 1941 – 94; Cooperatives in Canada, 1995 - ) track co-
operatives only since 1941. Between 1978 and 1993 this source aggregated Western 
provincial data into a regional cluster (i.e. the West), making comprehensive province to 
province comparisons impossible. 
 
Finally, non-reporting is a problem for data collection. The Secretariat corrects for this 
problem, where possible, by estimating from prior years‘ reports. It estimates its statistics 
capture about 90 percent of Canadian co-operatives. However, it is likely that the 
smallest and most distressed co-operatives in their earliest stages comprise the bulk of 
missing reports. This understates both growth overall and the contribution of emerging 
sectors in particular (Wagner, 2006, pp. 5-13). Since these sectors are the focus of this 
study, this poses another limitation to quantitative analysis. 
 
To address these statistical gaps and mismatched data-sets, the study borrows from 
available sources of empirical data, assembling as comprehensive and coherent an 
account as the available data will allow. As a result, some aspects of development are 
more fully elaborated than others. This may unintentionally telescope or skew the 
importance of particular factors or periods. In any event, since quantitative analysis can 
describe but not explain these processes, and the quantitative record is limited, the study 
is based largely on qualitative methods. 
 
2.7  Indexing development action 
This study strives to be both academically rigorous and practically responsive and 
relevant to unfolding currents of movement action. The interview guide (Appendix A) 
and cross-case comparisons in chapter 8 are thus organized in terms of a movement 
benchmarking tool developed by the CCA‘s Cooperative Development Strategy Council. 
While this academic investigation is not a collaborative exercise in action research, it 
does draw on one important lesson from action research: that critical reflection on 
development practice by practitioners themselves provides more useful grounds for 
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reform and improvement than academic studies that are abstracted from actors‘ 
subjective self-understandings.  
 
Statistics can only describe the co-operative development gap between Québec and 
Saskatchewan; they can not explain it. They are thus supplemented by historical case 
studies which rely both on academic theory (summarized in chapter 1) and the ―seven 
pillars model‖ promoted by leaders of the English-speaking Canadian co-operative 
movement (CCA, 2007a). This movement-generated definition of the situation 
identifies seven benchmarks for success in co-operative development. This study 
applies their measures to investigate the roots of these movements‘ diverging 
development paths; to test the explanatory power of this movement framing; and to 
assess the balance of managerialism versus developmentalism in the two movements.  
 
To the extent movement leaders act on their understandings of what needs to be done, 
as codified in the seven pillars, they are actively engaged in a regenerative practice; to 
the extent they acknowledge what needs to be done but fail to act, they are passive in 
the face of degenerative processes. As a sensitizing device to how and why movement 
actors act, or fail to act, along various dimensions of development practice, it is argued 
that the seven pillars model provides a useful exploratory and explanatory conceptual 
tool; it helps us move beyond the descriptive findings of statistics alone and into the 
inner-life, and development discourses, of the movement cultures themselves. It 
enhances interpretive understanding. 
 
2.7.1 The seven pillar model of co-operative development 
In English-speaking Canada, the Canadian Co-operative Association, along with 
provincial apex affiliates such as the Saskatchewan Co-operative Association, plays an 
important role in setting the agenda for development. The CCA‘s Co-operative 
Development Strategy is a statement of vision, guiding principles, goals, and strategies. 
Developed by its Co-operative Development Strategy Council and unveiled at the 2007 
CCA Annual General Meeting, this text is an important expression of the movement‘s 
efforts to drive co-operative development in the globalization era. As the dominant 
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―espoused theory‖ of the movement, it has also influenced the official ―theory-in-use‖ 
through which English-speaking sector leadership have recently acted. This text thus 
provides important insight into the development of movement vision, mission, and 
strategy for co-operative development in English-speaking movement circles.  
 
The seven pillars (Table 2.1) serve as an important conceptual foundation for the 
movement‘s development strategy. They also provide practical guidance to provincial 
and sectoral affiliate organizations and the full range of member co-operatives across 
 
Table 2.1 The Canadian Co-operative Association’s Strategic Pillar Model     
1. Co-operative sector leadership & support 
2. Outreach & promotion 
3. Public policy/ program funding/ legislation 
4. Capitalization 
5. Technical assistance 
6. Sector development 
7. Research 
Source: CCA (2007a). AGM Handbook, 8-10. 
 
English-speaking Canada. Informed by decades of aggregate and cumulative movement 
experience, this text illuminates how the development values of English-speaking 
Canadian co-operative leaders (including those in the Saskatchewan movement) may 
diverge from their actual practices, policies, and theories-in-use. 
 
Provincial movements committed to development might be reasonably expected to have 
taken significant action on each of these benchmarks. Indeed, the extent to which they 
have done so might reasonably also be considered indices of a developmental movement 
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identity; a movement committed to regeneration, extending democratic participation, and 
recentring movement values against entropic tendencies. Conversely, the extent of failure 
to act on these priorities for development action might be equally considered evidence of 
a managerial movement identity; a degenerating movement without a commitment to 
development action, or lacking the participatory values of an expanding, democratic 
movement. In chapter 8, case study findings are compared along each of these seven axes 
as evidence of an active, programmatic commitment to building a developmental 
movement or lack thereof.   
 
Pillar 1: Co-operative sector leadership and support 
This pillar expresses co-operative development as a purposeful project requiring sector 
leadership. Contending factions may disagree as to whether leadership includes the direct 
provision of practical and financial support by established sectors, how the costs might be 
shared, or what form of leadership (or whose) might be most appropriate. However, the 
main message as set out in the CCDS guiding principles is unambiguous: ―Co-operative 
development strategy should be led, owned, and supported by the co-operative sector‖ 
(CCA, 2007), and hence not by the state. As defined by English-speaking Canadian co-
operatives, sector leadership and support thus constitutes one index of a developmental 
movement. 
 
Pillar 2: Outreach and promotion 
This pillar expresses the need to go beyond the already existing movement, to identify 
and engage constituencies of need and opportunity, and to communicate the benefits of 
the model to these potential adopters of co-operative innovations. Recent studies have 
also emphasized the importance of educational efforts (NTFCD, 1984; Hammond 
Ketilson, et al., 1992; Fairbairn, et al., 1993) to foster popular economic literacy and 
support emerging proponents. On the federal stage, the development of the Co-op Zone 
website is one good example. It is an inquiry-driven information source that can reach 
dispersed individuals looking for further information, responding to our increasing use of 
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Internet sources.
12
 Outreach and promotion thus constitutes the second index of a 
developmental movement. 
 
Pillar 3: Public policy / program funding/ legislation 
While it is clear the Anglo-Canadian movement does not want development programs to 
be state-led, its ranks also recognize the importance of apex organizations as lobbyists for 
a supportive policy framework for development. As the National Task Force of Co-
operative Development (1984), Hammond Ketilson et al. (1992), Fairbairn et al. (1993), 
Loxley and Simpson (2007), and Adeler (2009) have argued, co-operative development 
requires an enabling policy environment. At the federal level, the successful lobby for the 
Co-operative Development Initiative (CDI), a state-funded, sector-managed funding pool 
which makes seed grants available to emerging co-operatives through the CCA and 
CCCM, indicates progress on this front. Supportive state policy therefore constitutes the 
third index of a developmental movement. 
 
Pillar 4: Capitalization 
The research literature is unambiguous about the crucial role of financing in co-operative 
development (NTFCD, 1984; Cornforth, et al., 1988; Thomas, 1993; Fairbairn et al., 
1993; Hammond Ketilson et al., 1992). The paucity of such funding in English-speaking 
Canada is also well documented (Notwell, 2010). Recent campaigns by the CCA to have 
the federal government establish a $50 million venture capital fund and provide Québec-
style tax incentives are important steps in this regard. The effective coordination of 
solidarity finance is the fourth index of a developmental movement. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Another important measure is the launch of a new Co-operative Development Information Service, 
March 31, 2010, providing an additional point of contact for groups interested in new co-operative 
development. Significantly, this is a CCA / CCCM joint-initiative, pooling the know-how of the otherwise 
segregated French and English-speaking movements and thus bridging important structural holes between 
movement proponents and experts and between French and English-speaking movement experience. 
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Pillar 5: Technical assistance 
Technical assistance also plays a well-documented role in new start-ups (NTFCD, 1984; 
Cornforth et al., 1988; Côté, 2007; Fairbairn et al., 1993), particularly in emerging 
sectors. For example, housing co-operatives demand a high level of technical expertise 
(Cole, 2008). The worker co-operative movement requires a profound shift in workplace 
roles and culture (Benello, 1982). Of course, co-operators may differ on appropriate 
delivery agents (e.g. apex organizations, sector federations or freelance developers), the 
value of ―soft-side‖ development (e.g. group skill building) and ―after-care,‖ but the basic 
need is clear. Solving the technical assistance problem is therefore the fifth index of a 
developmental movement. 
 
Pillar 6: Sector development 
This pillar stresses targeted strategies for the dissemination of co-operative models, 
implying support to specific sector federations. As Cole (2008), Goldblatt (2000), and 
Cornforth et al. (1988) document, individual sectors such as housing and worker co-
operation face specific dilemmas, require their own expert understanding and feature 
unique mobilization networks. Strong sector apex organizations and specialist technical 
resource groups can best roll out coherent and effective strategies to strengthen those 
sectors (NTFCD, 1984; Fairbairn et al., 1993; Cornforth et al., 1988). Support to these 
emerging sector organizations is thus the sixth index of a movement committed to 
development. 
 
Pillar 7: Research 
This pillar was an ―afterthought‖ at the Council‘s second meeting. Its late addition 
reflects an uneasy relationship between the co-operative movement and the academy. On 
the one hand, including the research community as an important factor of development is 
certainly consistent with historical experience. From the role of university fieldworkers in 
the Antigonish movement to the prodigious scholarly output on co-operative 
development, the Canadian co-operative movement has certainly benefited from the work 
of co-operative scholars and educators over the decades. (Ironically, the seven pillars text 
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is itself a product of the intellectual cross-fertilization of movement and academy over 
the last few decades). Illustrative are the National Task Force on Co-operative 
Development (1984), Hammond Ketilson et al. (1992), and Fairbairn et al. (1993). The 
sector has often also provided generous funding to research and education. On the other 
hand, late recognition of the role of research and its placement at the bottom of the list 
also reflects the wariness that also dogs the relationship in English-speaking Canada.
13
 
Progress in co-operative research is therefore the seventh and final index of a movement 
acting on developmental aims.  
 
2.8 Reconciling scientific and movement validity 
This study‘s semi-structured interviews ground the analysis in an understanding of 
movement actors‘ interpretive frames and forms of strategic conduct. Similarly, drawing 
on the CDSC document both widens the study‘s evidentiary base and narrows the theory-
practice divide by further illuminating the strategic understanding of movement leaders. 
Through espousing a theory of what should be done, they seek greater clarity on their 
situation. This movement-based document is thus an important element of their efforts to 
renew and revitalize development.
14
 
 
                                                 
13
 Among the conflicts which routinely strain community-university relationships are mismatched time-
horizons, diverging interests and priorities, cultural and discursive differences which strain effective 
communication, episodic rather than ongoing relationships, and a lack of trust. 
 
14
 Building on Vygotsky‘s social learning theory (1978), an adult education method is implied in this 
approach. In Vygotsky‘s conception, dialogue, ―cultural mediation,‖ and ―scaffolding‖ are crucial to the 
learning process. Where children have concepts that are unsystematic, disorganized, and spontaneous, he 
argued, the role of the learning facilitator is to ―match‖ interventions with more systematic, logical and 
rational concepts that build organically on the children‘s already existing capacity to understand alone. 
Vygotsky distinguished between what children could do alone with what they could do with help as the 
―zone of proximal development.‖ He argued that learning interventions should build ―scaffolds‖ on 
children‘s prior learning to consolidate new learning. As Tinsley and Lebak (2009) have argued, the 
process of adult learning also requires cultural mediation and can benefit from scaffolding strategies that 
build on the experience and understanding of learners themselves. They suggest adult education should 
pivot on a ―zone of reflective capacity.‖ This zone focuses attention on the way in which an adult‘s 
capacities for reflection can expand when he or she collaborates with other adults who share common 
objectives over an extended period of time. Tinsley and Lebak found that, by sharing feedback, analyses, 
and evaluations of each other‘s experience, collaboration expanded their potential for critical reflection. 
The zone of reflective capacity expanded as trust and mutual understanding among peers grew.  
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Including the stated concerns and understandings of movement leaders in this study—
through textual analysis and interviews—can facilitate a more experientially and 
culturally accurate and relevant framing of the problem.
15
 This method of cultural 
mediation permits an indirect pooling of experience by gathering multiple perspectives to 
report to that public. Although publication is not a face-to-face interaction, this strategy 
can also support strategic reflection about movement options. Semi-structured interviews 
and the seven pillars text provide apt starting points for such a dialogue. 
 
Of course, this movement text was formulated by a small group in 2007 and is therefore 
the product of a small sampling of sector opinion at one fleeting moment in time. It is not 
a scientific theory. However, as leading co-operative sector personnel under a mandate 
from representatives of the English-speaking national movement at large, this council 
also represents an important pooling of movement knowledge and experience. This 
collective effort is an important expression of the movement‘s self-understanding and 
accumulated learning; it illuminates a ―thematic universe‖ (Freire, 1985, pp. 75 – 118) 
and important gaps, questions, and possible misunderstandings that may obstruct 
progress. It is an expression of the dominant philosophy of practice guiding the English-
speaking Canadian movement through this critical period of challenge and change. 
Performance against this benchmarking tool also thus serves as a useful index for 
developmental movement orientations. 
 
This interpretive approach strives to lend an element of responsiveness, realism, and 
relevance to this work for movement practitioners. Working to ground this study in the 
lived realities of civil society and addressing publics beyond the university domain, this 
effort might also be considered a project in ―public sociology‖ (Clawson, 2007). This 
implies a commitment to a clear, vigorously journalistic style of writing and to supporting 
                                                 
15
 This pedagogic approach also builds on the educational guidelines developed by Harold Chapman for the 
Western Co-operative College: ―1. Problems need to be considered important to those expected to solve 
them; 2. Start where people are—not where we think they are or would like to be; 3. A person cannot 
transfer his/her knowledge and skills to another—the other must go through a learning process; 4. 
Significant learning takes place when facts and information are integrated into the experience of the 
learner; 5. A person feels more responsible for what s/he helps to create‖ (Crewe, 2001, p. 23). 
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the central involvement of the public, particularly co-operative and social movement 
actors, in resolving these public issues.
16
  
 
In the language of action research, bridging academic research and movement action can 
build the democratic, dialogic, catalytic, and outcome validities of the research: 
―democratic validity‖ energizing participants to critical reflection and action; ―dialogic 
validity‖ generating meaningful dialogue among participants; ―catalytic validity‖ 
sparking increased commitment to reflection and action; and ―outcome validity‖ 
developing a meaningful resolution of the problem (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2007, pp. 610-
611). This study thus strives to satisfy a dual accountability: to the rigorous social 
scientific standards of validity and reliable methods of inquiry; and to research that is 
relevant and accessible to co-operative movement actors and the democratic 
memberships they represent. 
 
This choice to be accountable to both academic and movement standards of social 
research reflects the author‘s own dual positionality. On the one hand, as a professional 
academic, my occupational focus is on impartially applying scientific reason and methods 
to the available evidence. On the other hand, as a democrat and someone who spent 
fifteen years establishing a Saskatchewan worker co-operative, my ethical commitment is 
also to putting those scientific findings at the service of democratic movements which 
seek to advance the public interest. The alternative, of course, is to restrict the circulation 
of that knowledge to the very exclusive ranks of other academic specialists; that is no less 
of a political choice but it is a substantially less democratic one in my view.  
 
This dual positionality represents both a study limitation and strength. It is a limitation 
insofar as my democratic value-orientation and first hand experience–as as an activist in 
an emerging sector, married to another worker co-operative organizer—may skew my 
                                                 
16
 As Mills (1959) has argued, the frequently unintelligible character of much social scientific prose is 
complicit in a serious crisis in literacy. It impoverishes public discourse, public involvement, and 
democratic possibility. Ironically, he notes that ―in many academic circles today anyone who tries to write 
in a widely intelligible way is liable to be condemned as a ‗mere literary man‘ or, worse still, ‗a mere 
journalist‘‖ (pp. 217-8). Hedges (2009) provides a more recent critique of the prevailing ―illusion of 
wisdom‖ (pp. 89-114). 
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perceptions. In this study, references to Hullabaloo Publishing Workers Co-operative—
which my wife April Bourgeois and I helped launch, and the Western Labour Worker 
Co-operative Council, the Canadian Worker Co-operative Federation, or the 
Saskatchewan Co-operative Association—with which my wife was active, are most 
likely to be invested with strongly felt beliefs, informed by experiential movement 
learning. Certainly my democratic values, commitments, and subsequent experiences 
have engendered a critical understanding of assorted forms of anti-democratic 
dysfunction within popular movements. These also represent possibly unexamined biases 
against which I have endeavoured to be vigilant.  
 
Conversely, a pseudo-scientific posture of detachment involves its own biases, as the 
professional self-interests of academic careerism often hide behind a false pretense of 
―objectivity‖ and ―value neutrality.‖ In fact, of course, our personal and institutionalized 
values invariably bleed into the research; in topic selection; in theoretical and 
methodological choices; and in the choice of whom our research serves–particularly if it 
principally serves our own career advancement. Indeed, it can be argued that my dual 
positionality as both practitioner and theorist may equally enable a critical detachment 
from the institutionalized biases of academic research; a deeper, first hand understanding 
of the co-operative movement; and a dialogical encounter between the scholastic interests 
of what Gramsci has called the ―traditional intellectual‖ and the developmental interests 
of the ―organic intellectual‖ (Boggs, 1973; 1984). To the extent this is true, it may well 
also be argued that my dual positionality is a methodological strength of the study; an 
advance over professional knowledge monopoly and the preponderant dependence on the 
voices of movement elites; and a contribution toward a more pluralist and democratized 
field of study in which the interests and voices of subaltern movement constituents are 
given more inclusive and accurate representation. 
 
2.9 Fieldwork and semi-structured interviews: Limitations and delimitations  
As an early fact-finding measure, the author participated in a September 26 – 29, 2006, 
study-tour of the Québec development system. This included site visits and presentation 
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and discussion sessions with nineteen key informants on co-operative development in 
Québec. The organizations represented were: 
 Direction des coopératives, Ministère du Développement économique, de 
l’Innovation et de l’Exportation (Cooperatives Directorate, Québec Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade); 
 Investissement Québec (Investment Québec); 
 Caisse d’économie solidaire Desjardins (Desjardins solidarity credit union); 
 Filaction (Labour-sponsored venture capital fund for co-operatives); 
 Fédération des coopératives de développement régional (Federation of regional 
development co-operatives); 
 Coopérative de développment régional Québec-Appalaches (Regional 
development co-operative of the Québec-Appalaches region); 
 Maison Alphonse-Desjardins (Museum in the historic Levis home of Alphonse-
Desjardins); 
 Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité (Québec council of co-
operation and mutuality);  
 Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec (Québec federation of Desjardins 
credit unions); 
 Fédération québécoise des coopératives forestières (Québec federation of forestry 
co-operatives); 
 La Barberie (A worker co-operative brewery); 
 Coopérative de services à domicile du Cap Diamant (Cap Dimant home care 
services co-operative); 
 Citadelle, coopérative de producteurs de sirop d’érable (Citadelle maple syrup 
producers co-operative); 
 Coopérative d’habitation La Corvée (La Corvée housing co-operative); 
 Coopérative de solidarité en soins et services de St-Camille (St-Camille home 
care solidarity co-operative); 
 Coopérative des techniciens ambulanciers de l’Outaouais (l‘Outaouais 
paramedics worker co-operative); 
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 Librairie coopérative du CÉGEP de Sainte-Foy (Student bookstore co-operative 
at Sainte-Foy college); 
 Coopérative funéraires des Deux Rives (Two shores funeral co-operative); and 
 Coopératives des artisans et commerçants du quartier Petit Champlain (Quartier 
Petit Champlain artists and merchants co-operative). 
 
This study-tour also provided for discussions with other tour participants, including 
senior officials from the CCA, the British Columbia Co-operative Association, and the 
Government of Saskatchewan. To provide additional depth and fill in further gaps in the 
analyses, over two dozen semi-structured interviews were also conducted: seven in 
Québec and three in Ottawa in the summer of 2009; and seventeen in Saskatchewan in 
the summer of 2010. The target population for interviews was a purposeful sample of 
meso-institutional players, well positioned to inform the analysis of these provincially-
bounded systems.
17
 Interviews in Québec and Saskatchewan were supplemented with 
federal sources to aid in contextualizing and comparing the provincial cases. The 
objective was to pinpoint specific, English-speaking informants in a segmented set of 
fields (such as established and emerging co-operative leaders, CED leaders, social 
economy leaders, academics in the field, or government and CSO personnel). These 
perspectives helped triangulate and build case reliability. In keeping with the emergent 
design, I also used the snowball method to locate supplementary respondents.
18
 Given the 
division of co-operative fields between old co-operatives and new co-operatives and 
                                                 
17
 Staggenborg (2002) distinguishes meso-mobilization actors, which coordinate groups and networks, from 
micro-mobilization actors, which mobilize individuals. This methodological approach shifts the frame from 
individual co-operative organizations (the firm) to the larger context, ecology and mobilizing structures 
(the movement) through which new co-operative development is nurtured or suppressed. For individual co-
operatives ultimately are embedded in social movement networks as well as a co-operative movement 
community. It is in these networks and in this movement community that movement-building collective 
action campaigns are constituted.  
 
18
 As Sayer (1992) has suggested, methodological openness is itself a purposeful sampling technique 
because the causal structure of the field comes into clearer view through the research: ―Intensive research 
focuses mainly (though not exclusively) on groups whose members may be either similar or different but 
which actually relate to each other structurally or causally…. One contact leads to others with whom they 
are linked, so that we build up a picture of the structures and causal groups of which they are a part‖ (p. 
244). 
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emerging and established sectors, special effort was made to ensure a balanced sample of 
informants to help understand the difference of perspectives. These informants included: 
 
 A senior leader in the Chantier de l'économie sociale, a non-profit organization 
administered by 28 representatives of various networks of co-operatives, non-
profits, community development organizations and social movements; 
 
 A professor specializing in co-operatives in Québec;  
 
 A professor specializing in social innovation; 
 
 A staff person with a solidarity finance institution; 
 
 A former staff member with La Fédération des coopératives de développement 
régional du Québec; 
 
 A civil servant with the Cooperatives Directorate, Québec Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade; 
 
 A worker co-operative developer and consultant from Québec; 
 
 A long-time leader in emerging co-operative sector development;  
 
 An executive with the Canadian Co-operative Association;  
 
 An associate with the Canadian Worker Co-operative Federation;  
 
 A co-operator associated with Access Communications; 
 
 A co-operator associated with the Conseil de la Coopération de la Saskatchewan; 
 
 A retired civil servant, serving the co-operative sector in Saskatchewan; 
 
 A co-operator associated with the Farmer Direct Co-operative;   
 
 A senior officer with the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour; 
 
 An activist involved with the Childcare Advocacy Association of Canada; 
 
 A professor specializing in co-operatives in Saskatchewan; 
 
 A Western Labour Worker Co-operative Council member; 
 
 An activist involved with a Saskatchewan training and employment co-operative;  
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 An associate with FCL Ltd; 
 
 An associate of the National Farmers Union; 
 
 An associate with the Co-operative Housing Association of Saskatchewan;  
 
 An associate with the Co-operative College of Canada;  
 
 Activist involved with Saskatoon‘s Quint Development Corporation;  
 
 An associate with with the Saskatchewan Co-operative Association; 
 
 A doctoral candidate in Co-operative Studies; and 
 
 An associate with the Saskatchewan Credit Union system. 
 
In all cases, the same interview guide was used (Appendix A). To avoid expense and 
distortions of translation and interpretation, all informants were fluent English-speakers 
and all interviews were conducted in English. Since the author is not fluent in French— 
and was unable to either interview in French or read the French-language literature—the 
author‘s over-reliance on English-speaking sources and translations is a major limitation 
of this study. However, given gaps in the comparative literature and the significance of 
the topic, a study limited by language seems better than no study at all. Fluent English-
speakers in Québec may tend to be better educated, more affluent, and less likely to 
identify with sovereignist and working class movements than unilingual Francophones. 
In addition, there is the ―official source bias‖ implicit in a research design that focuses on 
leadership ranks—often populated by urban, male, white, middle-aged professionals. The 
research method attempts to control against such biases through careful source selection. 
The interview guide (Appendix A) also includes questions designed to probe class and 
ideological affiliation.  
 
Full anonymity was granted to encourage frank comment. Respondents were advised, at 
the beginning of each interview, that their identities would not be disclosed and that 
direct quotations would not be used. There were three reasons for electing to use 
summary or paraphrasing rather than direct quotations. First, this tactic provided added 
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reassurance to informants that they could speak candidly. Many of these respondents are 
embedded in dense and delicate working relationships, where their views may be well 
known or phraseology easily recognized. While it could be argued that anonymity, 
masking, or the use of composite identities would provide objectively sufficient 
protections, the principal concern was with the informants‘ subjective feeling. Opting for 
both anonymity and paraphrasing demonstrated extra vigilance to protect their 
anonymity; it was intended to build trust and comfort levels, similar to journalists‘ 
invitation to sources to ―go off the record‖ when they know they will be unable or 
unwilling to speak otherwise. In the author‘s view, this tactic eased interview anxiety, 
helped establish positive rapport, and facilitated more frank, open, and productive 
conversation. While this added protection may have had different salience to different 
subjects, and its efficacy is impossible to establish definitively, this was the principal 
intent of the choice.  
 
This comfort level was crucial to the project‘s success for several reasons. In the author‘s 
view, building trust with strangers—many of whom may have reason to distrust 
Anglophone student-researchers—had to be a priority to secure candid comment about 
delicate issues such as sovereignty, sector-state relations, and inter-movement rivalries, 
for instance. Those relationships could be strained by citation that, even without 
attribution, could expose their identities or cast doubts or suspicions over others. Such 
citation might, for instance, be taken to be the words of person X when they are not. 
Respondents would be wisely reluctant to say anything that might undermine trust and 
cohesion in the often strained and fragile networks within which they work, thus 
sanitizing their accounts and distorting the study‘s findings.  
 
Informants‘ everyday political instincts are often to represent their own organizations in 
the most positive possible light, to choose their words carefully and to avoid critical 
comments or comments that might ―get around.‖ This assurance that their comments 
were truly off the record was intended to establish a clear break between their everyday 
discourse and the level of critical reflection and honest assessment that the study sought. 
This choice resulted in a trade-off against first-hand quotations that would have added 
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further depth, colour, and insight to interpretive frames, but it also protected informants‘ 
freedom of expression. It decreased the incentive to gloss their comments, pull their 
punches, or recant / massage the interview material when quotations were submitted for 
their clearance. This climate of complete protection yielded fuller, less guarded, and less 
distorted accounts of their experience and thus a more authentic and stronger evidentiary 
base for the study. 
 
Second, unattributed paraphrasing allows a focus on the concurrence of multiple 
respondents on key themes, which builds the reliability of each position. While an 
informant's position can be easily dismissed, a consensus or a constituency of opinion 
cannot.  
 
Third and finally, a technical reason to adopt paraphrasing as a rule was consistency of 
style. While only one subject expressed a willingness to be cited directly, the researcher‘s 
view was that the coherence and balance of the overall narrative would suffer if some 
informants were quoted directly, even without attribution, and others were not. 
 
As with any exploratory study, design elements have emerged in the course of the 
research. However, the scope of this study is limited geographically, historically, and by 
sector. This study does not deal with mixed enterprises such as investor-owned firms with 
employee share purchase schemes. It neither addresses the co-operative sectors of other 
regions nor offers an account of the pre-globalization era (i.e. pre-1980), except insofar as 
it is necessary to illuminate the historical context.  
 
Further, while the decentralist and community-based nature of co-operative development 
often results in the unplanned diffusion of innovation, the concern of this study is with 
the active, strategic, and planned dissemination of co-operative innovation beyond mere 
passive response to grassroots initiatives. The focus is on the emergence of co-operative 
development systems. Similarly, while established sectors have well developed internal 
structures to develop new ―franchises,‖ or the ―simple replication‖ of retail co-operative 
or credit union branches, the concern of this study is not with the growth or ―franchising‖ 
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of established sectors but with the strategic development of new co-operatives and 
emerging sectors. The greatest potential for growth, and the greatest need for external 
support and facilitation, exists in these emerging sectors. In the language of the CCA 
Development Strategy, primary focus should be on the necessary conditions for new 
―sector development.‖  
 
2.10  The special case of the worker co-operative sector-movement 
Finally, a comprehensive account of the diversity of emerging co-operative sectors is 
beyond the scope of this work. I have therefore focused principally on one sector—the 
worker co-operative sector—for four reasons. First, this movement has emerged as a 
global leader in new co-operative formation since 1980. By 2000, worker co-operatives 
accounted for 25 percent of all jobs in Québec‘s non-financial co-operative sector, greater 
than any other non-financial co-operative sector (Québec, 2003, p. 17). In contrast, the 
Saskatchewan worker co-operative sector employs less than one percent of the non-
financial co-operative work force (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2007). As an extreme case, 
the worker co-operative thus provides a particularly revealing comparative index of co-
operative development performance and movement degeneration / regeneration in the 
two provinces.  
 
Importantly, the worker co-operative model has laid the basis for innovative new co-
operative development systems such as the Mondragon complex in the Basque region of 
Spain (Whyte & Whyte, 1991; Cheney, 1999; Oakeshott, 1978) or the La Lega federation 
in the ―Third Italy‖ (Ammirato, 1996; Earle, 1986; Oakeshott, 1978). It has also acted as 
a ―wedge sector‖ in the creation of new co-operative models which involve workers as 
members (Quarter, 1989; Côté, 2007). These new models include worker shareholder co-
operatives, student co-operatives, and solidarity co-operatives (Quarter, 1992; Jordan, 
1989; Girard & de Bertoli, 2004). The worker co-operative campaign of the early eighties 
signaled openness to innovation and inclusion, and an emerging capacity and willingness 
to scale up and modernize Quebec‘s co-operative development system. By contrast, 
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Saskatchewan‘s missed date with worker co-operation both reflected and reinforced that 
movement‘s inertia and degeneration.19 
 
This ―reinvention of innovation‖ (Rogers, 1995, pp. 174 - 180), led by, but not restricted 
to, the worker co-operative movement, suggests new paths for contemporary co-operative 
development. As established sectors mature and approach their expansion potential 
within a given industry-market, emerging sectors that include workers in governance can 
diversify the movement beyond its strongholds in agricultural, financial, insurance, or 
retail sectors. These emerging sectors thus represent the greatest potential for new co-
operative growth. In conditions of continuing urbanization, they can also assist the 
movement to reach out to working class and urban constituencies, rebuilding on more 
secure foundations.
20
 Moreover, in a period of global recession and recovery—in which 
viable businesses are placed at-risk, first by stalled private capital markets and then by 
curbed public spending—the worker co-operative sector has much to offer counter-
cyclical employment and regional and inner-city development strategies. 
 
Second, worker co-operatives are perhaps the most structurally vulnerable of all co-
operative sectors. As Quarter (1992) argued in the context of the boom of the early 
nineties, ―in spite of high levels of growth at present the worker co-operative has proven 
to be the most difficult of all forms of co-operatives to sustain‖ (p. 28). These difficulties 
have, therefore, generated considerable literature on the role of technical assistance and 
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 Of course there is a complex ensemble of extenuating circumstances that militated against innovation, as 
the study details. These include issues around the agrarian base of the movement, state-hostility toward the 
model, and a failure to overcome the distrust of the labour movement. However, none of these elements of 
the failure to coordinate a successful worker co-operative campaign obviates the central problem of an 
agrarian-based movement in crisis, preoccupied with defensive retrenchment, and reluctant to focus on 
‗broadening out‘ the movement. 
 
20
 There is compelling evidence that there is significant untapped potential in non-traditional constituencies 
for co-operative development. In addition to the broad-based backlash against corporate globalization 
(Klein, 2007; Stiglitz, 2003), demonstrated by the protest waves of recent years and intensified by the 2008 
stock market crash, many young and immigrant workers in particular resent the trend to McJobs and ―talent 
under-employment‖ that has been exacerbated by increasing educational attainments (Livingstone, 2004). 
As Findlay (2004) notes, this has a precedent in the wake of the Industrial Revolution: ―the new economy 
required a better educated labour force but could not fully control what that force would do with its 
expanded literacy and numeracy‖ (p. 25). Rising anti-authoritarianism and on-the-job self-actualization 
values (Nevitte, 1996) also increase the appeal of workplace democratization.  
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solidarity finance in worker co-operative development (Benello, 1982; Russell, 1991; 
Cornforth, 1988; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Webb, 1987; Thomas & Cornforth, 1989; 
Krimerman & Lindenfeld, 1992; Meek & Woodworth, 1990; Thomas, 1993). This 
knowledge has benefited the broader family of emerging co-operative sectors and the 
social economy which face similar obstacles.
21
  
 
Third, the worker co-operative movement is a hybrid movement. It belongs to a wider 
social movement family that extends beyond its associations with other co-operative 
sector-movements alone. This wider association includes, most obviously, the labour 
movement.
22
 As a sector that is often non-unionized, and is viewed as a potential source 
of downward pressure on wages in unionized sectors, its relationship with the wider 
labour movement can be frequently strained. On the other hand, in its commitment to 
worker self-management and alliances with the labour movement, the sector can also find 
itself at uncomfortable odds with the more conservative, managerial elements of the co-
operative establishment. This ―black sheep‖ status sheds some light on the difficult 
political process of mobilizing social movement coalitions to support new co-operative 
enterprise formation generally. It provides valuable insights, too, into both the problem of 
inter-movement rivalries and the potential of the worker co-operative sector to act as a 
bridge to inter-movement cohesion. It illuminates also the intra-movement tensions 
between emerging sector innovations and established sector conventions. For example, 
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 Indeed, the migration of the founders of the ―invisible college‖ (Rogers, 1995, p. 44) of worker co-
operative studies through the eighties and nineties, such as Cornforth (1988) and Quarter (Quarter & 
Melnyk, 1989; Quarter & Wilkinson, 1990; 1995) to leadership positions within the broader problematic of 
the social economy (Quarter, 1992) is instructive. Rather than the informal network of researchers gathered 
around the worker co-operative problematic eroding, we find the network reconstituting itself around the 
social economy as a new and broader common focus. This shift reflects the transfer potential of the 
knowledge produced through these seminal worker co-operative studies. It also reflects a radical 
recognition of the fundamentally dependent relationship, or embeddedness, of worker co-operative 
development prospects within the larger fortunes, and policy and program achievements or ‗system effects‘ 
(Rogers, 1995, p. 25) of the social economy. As this theoretical model suggests, the kind of networking and 
alliance strategies pioneered by the worker co-operative movement are crucial to the prospects of emerging 
co-operative and social economy sectors generally. 
 
22
 Less obvious is its affinity toward the fair trade movement, also driven by a quest for fair wages and 
working conditions. Examples of Canadian worker co-operatives which act as a conduit for fair trade 
include Just-Us Coffee (http://www.justuscoffee.com/ ) and La Siembra 
(http://www.cocoacamino.com/en/about_coop.php ). 
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the special role and methods of democratic management in worker co-operatives provides 
important insights for other co-operative sector managers who seek democratic and 
developmental objectives that effectively mobilize members and workers and transcend 
conventional, and self-defeating, corporate-style managerialism. The worker co-operative 
sector is simply a special case that tells us a lot about co-operatives‘ developmental 
potential, their wider social movement family, and the dynamics which their overlaps 
express.  
 
Fourth and finally, as noted above, my own background is in the worker co-operative 
sector and I thus feel best equipped to build on that first hand experience. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT GAP: 
QUÉBEC & SASKATCHEWAN, 1980 – 2010. 
 
Over the last century, co-operation has played a decisive role in weaving the economic, 
socio-cultural, and political fabrics of Québec and Saskatchewan. While the comparative 
scale of co-operation in these provinces provides important context, the focus of this 
chapter is the recent divergence in their scope, growth, and significance.  
 
Both movements have had a strong historical presence, often dominant positions, in many 
major sectors (Hammond Ketilson, 1998; CCA, 2007a, 2007b). For example, in the year 
1900, the Desjardins caisses populaires (credit union) movement emerged from the 
kitchen table of its founders Alphonse and Dorimène Desjardins in Lévis, Québec 
(Birchall, 1997). Within the span of a century it had become the largest private employer 
in Québec (CCA, 2007a; ICA, 2009). By the year 2006, Québec‘s family of non-financial 
co-operatives, caisses populaires, and insurance mutuals boasted over 3200 enterprises, 
sales of over $20 billion, and assets of over $130 billion. This powerful movement had 
over 7.7 million members and generated almost 81,000 jobs (CCA, 2007a, p. 1). Québec 
co-operatives were over twice as likely as private businesses to survive ten years (Bond et 
al., 2003, p. 22), yielding a durable sector. 
 
However, the start-up rate for co-operatives in Québec also indicated a new vitality at the 
close of the twentieth century. Annual start-ups were on a very sharp incline, nearly 
doubling from 85 in 1995 to 169 in 2000. During this period, the number of jobs in non-
financial co-operatives jumped 46 percent, compared to 9.2 percent for the economy 
overall. From 2000 to 2006, jobs in the co-operative sector posted an additional 11 
percent gain, net sales increased by 43 percent, and assets spiked by 57 percent (Finance, 
 78 
économie et recherche, Québec, 2003, pp. 16 - 20). This was also a movement 
characterized by significant innovation. For example, almost half the co-operatives 
created in 2006 were ―solidarity co-operatives,‖ a multi-stakeholder model introduced 
only a decade prior (CCA, 2007, p. 1).  
 
Since the great agrarian pool movement of the early twentieth century, Saskatchewan‘s 
economy has also been powerfully shaped by co-operative innovation. Despite a sparse 
population of around a million, Saskatchewan boasted over 1560 co-operatives in 1996, 
generating revenues of almost $7 billion, assets of over $9 billion, and employing 14,400 
people (Hammond Ketilson, 1998, p. v). However, by 2007, the number of co-operatives 
had declined to about 1200. This 30 percent decline in one decade was a reflection of 
consolidation in the financial industry and rural decline. Employment and assets edged up 
only slightly to 15,000 jobs (4 percent) and $10 billion in assets (11 percent) (CCA, 
2007b). While Saskatchewan did not exhibit the intense growth and innovative activity 
evident in Québec, it nonetheless demonstrated core strength and resilience in its 
retailing, financial, and insurance sectors. 
 
Table 3.1: Total co-operative sector comparison, Québec vs. Saskatchewan, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Québec 
 
Saskatchewan 
Jobs (2007) 81,000 15,000 
Jobs per capita .01  .015 
Assets (2007) $130 billion $10 billion 
Assets per capita $17,333 $10,000 
Source: CCA, 2007a; 2007b.  
The scale of co-operative enterprise in Québec dwarfs the Saskatchewan co-operative 
sector in absolute terms, but Québec‘s population also dwarfs Saskatchewan‘s 
population. The provinces thus contend more closely for leadership on a per capita basis, 
as Table 3.1 indicates. Each sector contributes significantly to its provincial economy, 
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although in different ways. For example, while Saskatchewan co-operatives generate fifty 
percent more jobs per capita than Québec, the Québec movement‘s asset base is seventy 
three percent greater than Saskatchewan‘s on a per capita basis.   
Far from marginal curiosities, and despite the high profile de-mutualizations of the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Dairyworld, and Lilydale (Fulton & Hueth, 2009), these 
parallel economic forces continue to drive the mixed economies of Québec and 
Saskatchewan. They constitute critical foundations for economic development. 
3.1 Non-financial co-operatives 
A comparison of Canada‘s top fifty non-financial co-operatives from 2007 provides some 
useful indications of the weight and comparative state of established sector strength in 
Québec and Saskatchewan (see Table 3.2). Of Canada‘s leading co-operatives, 
Saskatchewan accounts for 7 (or 14 percent) of the top tier co-operatives. Québec 
accounts for 13 or (26 percent). While these provinces‘ combined populations account for 
only 26 percent of the nation‘s overall population, their co-operatives account for a full 
40 percent of the nation‘s top 50 non-financial co-operatives. Clearly, the development 
paths of these provinces have led to significant divergence from pan-Canadian norms in 
economic structure. As the shift in rankings illustrates, both provinces‘ established 
sectors are also increasing their historic advantages over co-operatives in other provinces. 
For Saskatchewan, two co-operatives (including the top ranked Federated Co-operatives 
Limited
23
) held their 2006 rankings. The other five all moved up the chart. Similarly, 
only one Québec co-operative slipped in rank. Four were steady and eight moved up the 
ranks. In percentage terms, 61 percent of Québec‘s leading co-operatives moved up the 
ranks from 2006 to 2007. 71 percent of Saskatchewan‘s leading co-operatives increased 
their comparative position in relation to the nation-wide cohort (Co-operatives 
Secretariat, 2007).   
 
                                                 
23
 FCL is based in Saskatchewan but its member retails span the West. This lack of clear provincial 
boundaries for the co-operative movement taints the province-to-province comparison somewhat. The FCL 
case is also indicative of increasing inter-provincial organization of established co-operative sectors. For 
example, at writing Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan is in merger discussions with the Alberta 
central, and enabling legislation for federally incorporated credit unions suggests another wave of inter-
provincial sector consolidation may lie ahead. Similarly, Desjardins is already expanding nation-wide.  
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Although Québec has nearly double Saskatchewan‘s number of co-operatives in the top 
50, Saskatchewan has over four times its per capita weight in the top 50. On a revenues 
basis, Québec‘s top-ranked co-operatives have a margin of only 7 percent over 
Saskatchewan‘s; Saskatchewan‘s leading co-operatives hold over a third more assets, at 
35 percent. On a per capita basis, Saskatchewan‘s top non-financial co-operatives out-
performed Québec‘s 7:1 on revenue and 10:1 on assets. In full-time employment, 
Québec‘s non-financial sector-leaders clearly dominate with over four times the jobs 
posted by Saskatchewan‘s leading non-financial co-operatives. But once again, 
Saskatchewan has double the per capita share of employment, since Québec has 7.5 times 
Saskatchewan‘s population base (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2007).    
 
What is perhaps most revealing about these rankings is what they tell us about the long-
range comparative structure of the two provinces‘ co-operative sectors, and what 
questions they raise about these divergences. For example, in Québec all the old co-
operatives that have achieved economic dominance, with one exception, are primarily 
agricultural (Appendix B). By contrast, by 2007 Saskatchewan had lost the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool
24
 and other leading producer co-operatives to mergers and privatization. In 
fact, all seven leading Saskatchewan non-financial co-operatives are now affiliated with 
the second-tier Federated Co-operatives Limited wholesale co-operative, including a 
number of big city co-operatives
25. While the commanding heights of Quebec‘s non-
financial co-operative sector are heavily dependent on agriculture, the Saskatchewan 
sector is utterly dependent on its retail federation.
26
 
                                                 
24
 This key setback is discussed in greater detail on pp. 267-8. 
 
25
 Arguably, the key to FCL‘s success was its foray into oil refining in the Great Depression (Fairbairn, 
1989). Retail petroleum sales across its network of retail stores, convenience stores and gas bars, and bulk 
sales at agri-service centres provide FCL with a significant competitive advantage over competitors like 
Wal-Mart—which otherwise dominates retail by scope, scale, and penetration of urban markets. This key 
innovation goes a long way to explaining why consumer co-operation in Saskatchewan has had such 
enduring and expanding success. Ironically, the privatization of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool may have 
strengthened FCL by releasing local member loyalties to the Pool, and driving co-operators to FCL co-ops 
for their farm supply purchasing. The Pool‘s farm supply sales had more than doubled from 1992 to 1998, 
representing sales of 448 million in 1998 (Hammond Ketilson et al., 1998, p. 13). Farm supply provides 
FCL with another key advantage over traditional retail competitors. 
26
 These findings raise a few questions that are beyond the scope of this study. First, how did Québec 
protect and maintain its larger agricultural co-operatives where Saskatchewan failed? A related question 
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Table 3.2 Top 50 Non-financial co-op comparisons, Québec and Saskatchewan, 2007 
 Québec Saskatchewan 
Top ranking Cdn co-ops 26% (13) 14% (7) 
Percent of Cdn population 23 3 
Top co-ops to population 
ratio 
1.1 4.7 
Revenue  $7.3 billion $6.8 billion 
Revenue per capita $973 $6800 
Assets  $2.6 billion $3.4 billion 
Assets per capita  $347 $3400 
Full time employment 18,281 4,184 
FTE per capita .002 .004 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (2007). 
3.2  Financial Co-operatives 
While each province also boasts a range of insurance mutuals, a simple comparison of 
their credit unions and caisses populaires provides significant insights into the 
comparative economic structure of each province‘s financial co-operative sector (Table 
3.3). Since the Canadian top 50 list of credit unions excludes Québec, this table relies 
instead on provincial and Canada-wide statistics. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
concerns the sole non-agriculture based Québec co-operative, the Fédération des co-opératives du 
Nouveau-Québec. How did Québec succeed in establishing consumer co-operation in the North when it 
failed to do so in the South? Similarly, why did earlier efforts in Saskatchewan‘s North fail to realize 
comparable sector consolidation when FCL was so successful in the south? What are the relative 
implications of the sectors‘ lack of diversification at the upper reaches of their movements? These are only 
a few of the questions of clear significance for co-operation that comparative study of these cases suggests.  
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As with non-financial co-operatives, both the Québec caisses populaires and the 
Saskatchewan credit unions rank considerably higher than pan-Canadian norms. Key 
indices include membership, branches, and assets per capita (nation-wide data on 
employment was not available). The numbers of credit unions per capita in 2007 were 
relatively even, at well over double the Canada-wide density. Québec had only a modest 
advantage on a per capita basis. However, Québec led by a wide margin in per capita 
membership, assets, and employment, a likely result of the two-decade lag in diffusion 
and widespread adoption of the credit union model in Saskatchewan (MacPherson, 1979, 
p. 164). Québec has a per capita advantage of 18 percent in assets, 20 percent in 
membership, and 40 percent in workforce.  
 
Table 3.3 Financial co-operative sector comparisons (credit unions and caisses 
populaires), 2007 
 
 Saskatchewan Québec Canada 
Members 524,840 5,500,000 10,846,512 
Members Per Capita              .52 .72 .33 
Credit  unions      75 572 1059 
Credit unions per  
capita 
.000075 .000074 .000032 
Assets ($M) $11,248 $106,000 $209,190 
Assets Per Capita ($) $11,248 $13,789 $6,352 
FT Employees 3,000 35,493 n.a. 
FTE Per Capita .003 .005  
 
 
Source: Canadian Co-operative Association. (2007b; 2007c); Credit Union Central of 
Canada (2008). Statistics Canada (2009). 
 
At a macro-economic level, therefore, the comparative, historic structures of the 
established Québec and Saskatchewan co-operative sectors come into clearer focus. 
While Saskatchewan failed to maintain its founding strength in agricultural producer co-
operation, which was heavily dependent on the grain economy, Québec‘s strengths rest 
largely on this historic foundation. These are primarily dairy, pork, and poultry—led by 
Co-opérative Fédérée. Its other major foundation is the financial sector, led by its 
Mouvement Desjardins. Saskatchewan‘s strengths, by contrast, have shifted to insurance 
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mutuals, consumer co-operation, and its credit union movement as demutualizations 
swept the dairy, poultry, and grains sectors. As we will see, the structuring of established 
co-operative sectors in Saskatchewan and Québec has shaped the economic terrain for 
movement momentum, direction, and new sector development in the post eighties period. 
 
3.3 Globalization: The co-operative provinces’ paths diverge  
The development paths of these twin movements for economic democracy ran in rough 
parallel for the better part of a century, before diverging in the eighties. This was an era 
of globalization-related dislocations that hit both provinces hard. But the nature of the co-
operative movement response, and the scope and scale of their achievements, contrasted 
sharply. A startling development gap opened up, in part driven by the privatization of 
Saskatchewan‘s leading co-operative, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. The incorporation 
rate of new co-operatives and the overall number of members, revenues, and assets all 
grew rapidly in Québec. La belle province pulled decisively ahead of Saskatchewan. 
Table 3.4: The Saskatchewan - Québec development gap, number of non–
financial co-operatives, 1985 - 2005 
Year Saskatchewan Québec 
1985 764 895 
1990 864 1433 
1995 967 1650 
2000 991 2032 
2005 845 2257 
Rate of Growth 
(1985 - 2005) 
+ 11% + 152% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006)  
As Table 3.4 illustrates, the growth rate for non-financial co-operatives in Québec from 
1985 to 2005 was almost fourteen times Saskatchewan‘s. Moreover, while Québec posted 
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consistent, cumulative gains in new co-operatives, Saskatchewan's growth slowed in the 
late nineties. In the first five years of the twenty-first century, the number of 
Saskatchewan co-operatives actually fell by fifteen percent. The divergence is even 
starker when inter-provincial trends in membership, earnings, and assets are compared. In 
all three categories, Saskatchewan‘s sector actually contracted from 1985 to 2005. 
Meanwhile, Québec posted triple digit growth rates in all categories.  
Table 3.5: The Saskatchewan-Québec development gap, membership in non–
financial co-operatives, 1985 - 2005 
Year Saskatchewan 
(thousands) 
Québec 
1985 508.8 497.2 
1990 503.2 611.4 
1995 502 1148 
2000 518 892 
2005 467 1022 
Rate of Growth   
(1985 - 2005) 
- 8% + 106% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006)  
As Table 3.5 illustrates, membership in Saskatchewan‘s non-financial co-operatives 
(about 47 percent of provincial population) had dropped by 8 percent from 1985 to 2005, 
while the Québec co-operative movement had more than doubled its ranks (to 14 percent 
of provincial population). In part, this reflects rural depopulation, the privatization of 
dairy and poultry, and the pruning of the rural retail store network. Mostly, it reflects the 
loss of 35,000 SWP members (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2004). The contrast in non-
financial co-operative assets in the two provinces is greater still. From 1985 to 2005, 
Saskatchewan‘s asset base contracted by 12 percent, while the Québec sector‘s assets 
almost quadrupled. Table 3.6 illustrates the widening gap. In Saskatchewan, dairy and  
poultry facilities were transferred to new owners, abandoned rural stores were written off, 
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Table 3.6: The Saskatchewan-Québec development gap, non–financial co-operative 
assets (in $M), 1985 - 2005 
Year Saskatchewan ($M) Québec 
1985 1,130.8 1034.3 
1990 1,314.6 1,687.7 
1995 1,725.9 2,552.7 
2000 2,389.1 3,043.2 
2005 989.8 3,859 
Rate of Growth   
(1985 - 2005) 
- 12% + 273% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006)  
and $700 million in SWP assets were transferred to the investor-owned Viterra (Co-
operatives Secretariat, 2004). During the same period the influx of new investment to its 
start-ups drove the accumulation of Québec sector capital. Much of this new capital came 
from pools of ‗solidarity finance‘ developed since the eighties to finance co-operative and 
social economy enterprises. 
Table 3.7: The Saskatchewan-Québec development gap, non–financial co-
operative revenues (in $M), 1985 - 2005 
Year Saskatchewan ($ 
millions) 
Québec 
1985 3,162 2,658.8 
1990 3,270.4 2,804.5 
1995 4,032.7 5,039.9 
2000 4,654.5 5,173.3 
2005 1753.9 6,918.8 
Rate of Growth   
(1985 – 2005) 
- 45% + 160% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006)  
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Finally, as Table 3.7 demonstrates, the starkest indicator of the reversal in sector growth 
in Saskatchewan can be found in declining revenues. The drop-off in this index over two 
decades is an unsettling 45 percent, four times the rate of contraction in assets and over 
five times the decline in membership in Saskatchewan over the same period. This 
compares to Québec‘s sector which more than doubled its revenues. Once again, the loss 
of $1.4 billion in SWP receipts (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2004) illustrates the 
magnitude of the Pool‘s loss to the Saskatchewan sector.  
 
3.4 The development gap widens, 2000 – 2005 
A further cause for concern for Saskatchewan co-operators is the trend to accelerating 
decline in membership, assets, and revenues from 2000 to 2005 (Table 3.8). The most 
arresting index is the rate of asset depletion which quadruples over the twenty-year trend. 
Moreover, this development gap constituted a qualitative as well as a quantitative leap. 
The breadbasket of the world was suffering a farm crisis, rural depopulation, and the 
Table 3.8: The Saskatchewan - Québec development gap widens. Indices of 
Saskatchewan sector contraction, 2000 - 2005 
Saskatchewan 
indices 
20 year trend                        
(1985 - 2005) 
5 year trend              
(2000 - 2005) 
Number of co-ops + 11% - 15% 
Membership - 8% - 10% 
Assets - 12% - 59% 
Revenue - 45% - 62% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006).  
established sectors were preoccupied with defensive retrenchment, amalgamations, and 
mergers. The privatization of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, set in motion in 1996 and 
completed in 2007, was one casualty of the dire effects of the farm crisis on this 
agriculturally dependent economy. As the flagship co-operative in the province, its 
failure had a demoralizing and discrediting effect. Unlike these lost decades to co-
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operative development in Saskatchewan, Québec‘s movement was transformed by a 
surge of social innovation. It emerged as a world leader in co-operative development. 
 
One useful index of new co-operative development is the rise of service co-operatives, 
including healthcare clinics, daycares, ambulances, taxis, recreation facilities, restaurants 
and hotels, and arts and culture organizations. As Table 3.9 illustrates, from 1993 (the 
first year these provincial statistics were reported) to 2003 there were 516 new service co- 
operatives in Canada, 360 in Québec and 23 in Saskatchewan. The Québec rate of sector 
growth over the decade was 28 percent, i.e. double the nation-wide average and almost 
six times the Saskatchewan growth rate.  
Table 3.9: Comparative growth of service co-operatives in Saskatchewan and 
Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec  Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 1,257 504 3,645 
1998 1423 602 4201 
2003 1617 527 4161 
Numerical 
growth/shrinkage  
1993-2003 
+ 360  + 23  + 516 
Percentage 
growth/shrinkage 
1993-2003 
+ 28%  + 5% + 14% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004).  
Unlike the old growth sectors—such as the mutuals, credit unions, and consumer and 
producer co-operatives—service co-operatives represent a lot of the co-operative sector‘s 
new growth. Growth in these sunrise sectors therefore also provides an index for 
development innovation. While Québec leads Saskatchewan and the country overall, 
category-by-category comparisons are mixed. For example, Saskatchewan boasts over 
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Table 3.10: Comparative growth of daycare co-operatives in Saskatchewan 
and Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 0 33 69 
1998 0 36 74 
2003 0 35 69 
Numerical 
growth/shrinkage 
0 + 2 0 
Percentage 
growth/shrinkage  
0 + 6% 0 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004).  
half the co-operative daycares in the country (Table 3.10), a sector organized as 
unionized non-profits in Québec‘s publicly subsidized childcare network.  
 
Similarly, while Québec has a small number of pre-school co-operatives, the 
Saskatchewan sector out-numbers them 5 to 1 (Table 3.11). Each of these childcare 
sectors was relatively stable over the decade.  
Table 3.11: Comparative growth of pre-school co-operatives in 
Saskatchewan and Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec  Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 11 67 323 
1998 11 84 357 
2003 13 64 317 
Numerical 
growth/shrinkage 
+ 2 - 3 - 6 
Percentage 
growth/shrinkage  
+ 18% - 4% - 2% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004) 
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In other sectors where Saskatchewan has pioneered, such as recreational co-operatives 
and health clinics, the province lagged nation-wide and Québec growth rates through the 
nineties. Its historic leadership role in community clinic development was also lost in this 
decade. While Saskatchewan failed to build on the three clinics in operation in 1993, 
Québec went from zero to four by 2003 (Table 3.12). 
Table 3.12: Comparative growth of health clinics / hospitals in Saskatchewan 
and Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec  Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 0 3 8 
1998 1 4 10 
2003 4 3 13 
Numerical growth 
/ shrinkage 
+ 4  0 + 5 
Percentage growth 
/ shrinkage 
- 0 + 62.5% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004).  
In recreational co-operatives, Table 3.13 shows that Saskatchewan continues to lead the 
nation with over half the co-operatively organized facilities, despite losing 9 of these co-
operatives by 2003. Meanwhile, Québec nearly doubled its number—from 18 to 35.  
Table 3.13: Comparative growth of recreation co-operatives in Saskatchewan 
and Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec  Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 18 178 272 
1998 22 190 292 
2003 35 169 274 
Numerical 
growth/shrinkage 
+ 17 - 9 + 2 
Percentage 
growth/shrinkage  
+ 94% - 5% + 1% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004).  
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Similarly, Table 3.14 indicates that while Saskatchewan also boasts over half the 
country‘s farmers‘ markets, this sector was relatively stagnant over the decade examined. 
By contrast, Québec developed four farmers‘ market co-operatives. It had none in 1993.  
Table 3.14: Comparative growth of farmers’ market co-operatives in 
Saskatchewan and Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec  Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 0 25 46 
1998 1 34 55 
2003 4 26 44 
Numerical +/- + 4 + 1 - 2 
Percentage +/-  - + 4% - 4% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004). 
There are several additional areas where Québec has recently out-paced Saskatchewan. 
Table 3.15 illustrates the reversal in the arts and culture sector. While Saskatchewan 
added only one art co-operative, Québec organized 19, reversing a development gap that 
favoured Saskatchewan by three co-operatives to one in 1993 to a 20 to 4 gap in 
Québec‘s favour by 2003.  
Table 3.15: Comparative growth of arts and culture co-operatives in 
Saskatchewan and Québec, 1993 - 2003 
Year Québec  Saskatchewan  Canada 
1993 1 3 10 
1998 11 5 28 
2003 20 4 37 
Numerical 
growth/shrinkage 
+ 19 + 1 + 27 
Cumulative 
growth/shrinkage 
in % 
- + 33 % 270 % 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1993, 1994, 2003, 2004).  
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3.5 The co-operative innovation gap 
While trends are mixed at the level of discrete categories, the overall tendency is clear: 
development momentum in the service sector moved decisively to Québec in the 
nineties—and this pattern is likely to continue over the near term. The cases of 
Aboriginal and worker co-operatives provide further evidence for a widening gap in co-
operative innovation.  
 
3.5.1  The Aboriginal co-operative innovation gap 
As Table 3.16 illustrates, Québec and Saskatchewan clearly lead the provinces in this 
area (the only region to out-perform these provinces was the North West Territories, 
which was home to almost 38 percent of Aboriginal co-operatives in 2000). Taken 
together, one third of all Aboriginal co-operatives in Canada are located in Québec and 
Saskatchewan (Belhadji, 2001, p. 72). 
Table 3.16. Comparative Aboriginal co-operative densities in Saskatchewan and 
Québec, 2000 
 Québec Saskatchewan                                   Canada    
Number of  Aboriginal co-ops 23 21  133                 
Nation-wide percentage of Ab‘l co-
ops 
17% 16%  100%                      
Proportion of  Aboriginal to 
provincial population 
1.1% 
 
13.5%  3.3%                       
Co-ops per capita, provincial 
Aboriginal population 
.00039 .00016  .00013                     
Source: Hammond Ketilson & McPherson (2001), p. 71. Note: Population based on 2001 
Census. 
Since Québec‘s population (7,125,580) was over 7 times Saskatchewan‘s (963,155), the 
per capita performance of Saskatchewan‘s movement in generating Aboriginal co-
operatives would appear to be seven times greater. However, Aboriginal population in 
Saskatchewan (130,185) was greater than the Québec Aboriginal population (79,400), in 
both relative and absolute terms. Since Aboriginal people comprise about 13.5 percent of 
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the population in Saskatchewan compared to only 1.1 percent of the Québec population, 
provincial per capita comparisons are therefore misleading. A more salient measure of 
Aboriginal co-operative development performance is based on a per capita calculation of 
each province‘s Aboriginal population. By this measure, Saskatchewan does only slightly 
better than the nation-wide average of 13 co-operatives per 100,000 Aboriginal people. In 
2000, Saskatchewan had only 16 co-operatives per 100,000 Aboriginal people. By 
contrast, and despite a sparser Aboriginal population in Québec, the success rate for 
Aboriginal co-operatives in Québec is 39 co-operatives per 100,000 Aboriginal people. 
That is exactly triple the pan-Canadian rate of 13 co-operatives per 100,000 Aboriginal 
people. It is well over double the Saskatchewan rate. Given demographic projections for 
Saskatchewan, the Aboriginal aspect of the Québec-Saskatchewan development gap is an 
area of particular concern and opportunity. 
 
3.5.2 The worker co-operative innovation gap 
Another illustration of the widening co-operative innovation gap is the case of worker co-
operation. Incorporation statistics show Canadian worker co-operatives benefited from 
the world-wide shift in workplace values during the eighties. From a standing start, 
membership boomed, with 225 incorporated by the mid-nineties (Co-operatives 
Secretariat, 1999). The fledgling sector‘s national organization, the Canadian Worker Co-
operative Federation, founded in 1991, led to the rapid launch of several capacity-
building innovations for the sector, including a group RRSP plan, a nation-wide 
developers‘ network, and pilot funding for a worker co-operative venture capital fund 
(Corcoran, 2007).  
 
Of course, worker co-operatives remain marginal to the Canadian non-financial co-
operative sector overall. However, as Table 3.17 clearly illustrates, the growth rates for 
the Canadian worker co-operative sector since 1985 out-perform the sector as a whole in 
new co-operative development and revenues. This emerging sector also out-performs the 
co-operative sector as a whole in asset appreciation since 1992, when the Cooperative 
Secretariat began tracking this index. The worker co-operative boom in Canada, as we 
will see, has been largely centred in Québec.  
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Table 3.17: Comparative growth rates for all non-financial co-operative 
sectors vs. the worker co-operative sector in Canada, 1985 - 2005 
Development 
indices 
Non-financial co-operative 
sector  
Worker co-op 
sector 
Membership + 98% + 102% 
Number of co-ops + 63% + 248% 
Revenues + 91% + 437% 
Assets *    (from 
1995 - 2005) 
+ 22% + 42% 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1985-1994; 1995-2005) 
While worker co-operative membership only slightly edged out percentage gains in 
sector-wide membership, the other three indices show very significant development 
differentials. Its asset base grew at almost double the sector-wide average over the last 
ten years. Since 1985, the worker co-operative sector growth rate has been over four 
times the sector-wide average growth, both in revenues and number of co-operatives.  
As the success of Mondragon (Whyte & Whyte, 1991), Emilia-Romagna (Earle, 1986), 
Québec and other jurisdictions with longer established and better resourced support 
systems for worker co-operative development suggest, tailoring entrepreneurial 
infrastructure to worker co-operatives‘ needs is bound to enhance further their economic 
prospects in English-speaking Canada. However, with only a few worker co-operatives, 
Saskatchewan trails Québec by three decades. 
 
3.6  Conclusion: Explaining movement divergence 
Quantitative analysis can describe but not explain the growing co-operative development 
gap between Québec and Saskatchewan. This chapter has empirically demonstrated that 
the Québec movement has effectively consolidated and expanded its position in the 
globalization era while the Saskatchewan movement has contracted overall. As indices of 
development innovation in each province, particular attention was paid to green shoots in 
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the emerging areas of service, Aboriginal, and workers co-operatives. While limitations 
of data set comparability and complex sector by sector historical differences make broad 
generalization difficult, the available evidence clearly suggests more effective co-
operative development innovation in Québec during this period. To the extent it is 
possible to statistically index social innovation within these movements, it seems clear 
that the development gap between these sectors is significant and growing, and that a 
significant share of that gap may be attributed to the relative success of the two 
movements to effectively support new co-operative development as an engine of 
movement renewal and expansion. To further explore the reasons for this growing 
statistical gap, the study next turns to qualitative methods, and the development of 
historical case studies of co-operation in Canada‘s two most co-operative provinces.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
MAÎTRES CHEZ-NOUS: 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE FIELD  
 
IN QUÉBEC, 1900 - 1980 
 
 
 
4.1 The historical origins of co-operation in Québec: Church, state, and class 
Although a comprehensive history of co-operative development in Québec is well beyond 
the scope of this work, this chapter outlines the origins, and evolving structure, of that 
movement to provide historical context for the detailed period study in the next chapter. 
Particular attention is paid to two aspects of the Québec co-operative movement‘s 
evolution: the shifting position of co-operation vis à vis the wider socio-economic forces 
of Québec society (i.e. the autonomy of the co-operative field) and the fundamental 
dynamics, divisions, and tendencies which have shaped the ―inner life‖ and structuring of 
the co-operative movement itself (i.e. the structure of the co-operative field). This is not a 
comprehensive account of the many regional, sectoral, and other discrete aspects of co-
operation in Québec. It is an overview of the development of the field on which the 
subsequent developments of the globalization era were predicated. 
 
This overview is organized in terms of co-operation‘s ―three waves‖ in Québec 
(Lévesque, 1990), each transforming the co-operative field. This periodization highlights 
the shifting character of the movement‘s patrons, mobilizing networks, and social base 
over the last century, and how these have shaped its development path during the period 
under investigation (1980 -2010). Simply put, the path of co-operative development 
before 1980 creates its foundation, momentum, and development trajectory after 1980.
27
  
 
 
                                                 
27
 In economics, inertial drag on social innovation created by past conditions is called ―path dependency.‖ 
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4.2      The first wave: Paternalism, Catholic social action, and the petite-bourgeoisie 
The evolution of co-operation in Québec begins with the well-established co-operatives 
which have institutionalized regional federations and other second- and third-tier 
organizations: ―the farm co-ops and the savings and credit unions (which emerged) at the 
turn of the century, and the fishing and food co-ops (which emerged) after the 1930s 
crisis‖ (Lévesque, 1990, p. 110). These first two waves laid strong foundations in Québec 
for a ―culture of collective action‖ (Poulin, 2000, p. 38) and channelled the collective 
character of that action. Rooted in the needs of the rural and urban poor, the first wave 
(farm and credit co-ops) also gained wider support from powerful patrons for two main 
reasons: its character as a force for cultural nationalism and its character as an agent of 
moral reform for the urban and rural poor.  
 
4.2.1 A “Blessed Movement:” Co-operation as cultural nationalism 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the traditional Québécois way of life—along with the 
conservative social order that underpinned it—was threatened by the rise of Anglo-
American industrial urbanism. Indeed, from 1851 to 1911, the proportion of rural 
Québécois declined from 78 percent to half the province‘s population. Migration from 
country to city, and rural workshop to factory, widened the gap between Francophones 
and Anglophones as Francophone urban migration took place more slowly (Gagnon, 
2004). The church, state, and local elites responded to co-operation instrumentally: as 
part of a new social contract to stabilize the order, protect their privileges, and 
accommodate the needs of a restless working class. A strong guiding spirit of cultural 
nationalism defined the first wave: ―Co-ops were seen as a means of preserving the 
French language and the Catholic religion, and of supporting a traditional way of life as a 
bulwark against the North American lifestyle prevalent in the large cities‖ (Lévesque, 
1990, p. 110).  
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The roots of cultural nationalism and social solidarity sink deep in Québec history and 
collectivist Catholic values. Campbell (1983) argues that they sprang organically from 
the foundation of early New France, its plots allocated in strips to ensure river-front 
access. This built population density and intensive social interaction. W. A. Riddell, one 
of Canada‘s earliest sociologists, argued the extraction of unruly youth as voyageurs for 
the fur trade reinforced harmonious communal values in these clustered agricultural 
settlements (Campbell, 1983). This sense of collective identity was sacralized by the 
economic and cultural power of the Catholic Church, which received about a quarter of 
the seigneurial land granted under the French regime. This tribute was paid for the 
clergy‘s role in education, health, and social service provision (Armstrong, 1984). Civic 
dependency on the church further enforced clerico-nationalist hegemony. 
 
However, the decisive turn toward two centuries of protective nationalism and clerical 
rule came with the Fall of New France in 1759. After the fall, important sections of the 
mercantile and political elites fled for France, leaving a leadership vacuum into which the 
Catholic hierarchy stepped as the de facto civic authority. This was an arrangement the 
British fostered, happily yielding religious and civic affairs to the Catholic hierarchy in 
exchange for the Church‘s support for British rule. The Church‘s influence as the 
legitimate representative of the occupied population, and as an ―honest broker,‖ 
underpinned the rise of ecclesiastical rule (Campbell, 1983, pp. 63-69). This alliance 
between church and state persisted through two centuries, up to the Quiet Revolution. 
 
An important feature of church-sponsored nationalism was its promotion of a retreat from 
the urban, Anglo-Saxon bases of administrative and commercial power to rural parishes. 
From 1840, this protective nationalism returned urban workers to farms, ―le retour à la 
terre.‖ These agrarian and anti-statist biases were important ideological pillars of French 
Canadian tradition, providing important foundations for clerical authority. 
 
The mouvement caisse populaire emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, when 
church hegemony over Québec had been firmly established. The caisse movement 
successfully earned the support of the church, the petite-bourgeoisie, and the state 
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because these elites were convinced the caisses could help contribute to the cultural 
retrenchment and reproduction of the status quo against an encroaching Anglo-capitalist 
lifestyle. In other words, les caisses had a manifest function—to pool credit from popular 
savings—and a latent function—to restore the conservative authority of the Church and 
―French society.‖ It was a form of economic action which was also deeply ―embedded‖ 
in clerico-nationalism. As Fairbairn (2000) argues, the church provided an important 
mobilizing network and theological justification for the social and cultural construction 
of first wave co-operatives in Québec: 
 
The clergy… were essential to the spread of … Desjardins‘ co-
operatives. Priests assembled groups of parishioners to speak about 
the merits of economic co-operation; they spoke to young men and 
community leaders, urging them to join; often they served as 
secretaries, managers, and bookkeepers for new co-operatives–free of 
charge, of course…. The social role of the clergy in the co-operatives 
was critical to their success, for the clergy brought both skills and 
legitimacy to the new organizations. As educated men who were (or 
were supposed to be) impartial in community affairs, above all family 
and factional divisions, priests brought trust: today we would say 
they reduced the ―transaction costs,‖ the uncertainties and suspicions 
of forming co-operatives. In a larger sense, they conferred a blessing 
on the co-operative movement, suggesting that it was about a higher 
purpose, something more noble than a conventional business in 
which a priest would rarely have taken part. (p. 19) 
 
Unlike the relatively autonomous mutual societies of the working class that had provided 
fire and life insurance since 1830 (Vaillancourt, 2009; Girard, 1999) and the early worker 
co-operatives of Montréal and Québec City from 1865 (Bridault & Lafrenière, 1989; 
Girard, 1999), Alphonse Desjardins sought the Church‘s blessing and support for this 
new movement. Organizing the caisses parish-by-parish, he ―did not like to found a 
caisse in a parish without the explicit support of the parish priest, and very much hoped 
that a priest would participate in the administration, and if necessary, management of the 
organization‖ (Poulin, 2000, p. 35). By 1920, priests were the chairmen of 116 of the 160 
caisses and leaders in 140 (Lévesque, 2008). 
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Church sanction made securing political support easier in this deeply Catholic 
jurisdiction. By 1906, Desjardins had secured provincial passage of the Co-operative 
Syndicates Act, pre-empting banks lobbying to curtail the sector‘s expansion (Lévesque, 
2008). It further established the security, profile, and prestige of the caisse model and 
opened the door for fishers‘ co-operatives in the mid-twenties. It also laid the 
groundwork for the 1908 Act Respecting Co-operative Agricultural Associations, which, 
in turn, enabled the federation of agricultural co-operatives (Co-opérative Fédérée de 
Québec) and strengthened the rural reach of co-operative ideas and practices. For 
Desjardins, ―political and church institutions were pragmatic means to realize ideals in 
the context of the times‖ (Fairbairn, 2000, p. 18). The increasing influence of the anti-
socialist Church over the co-operative field, and the strengthened rural basis of this first 
wave, also undermined the early union-backed but fledgling worker co-operatives in the 
cities (Bridault & Lafrenière, 1989). This movement was marginalized within the 
agrarian-financial structure, and the clerico-nationalist culture, of the emerging co-
operative field. 
  
First wave co-operation was, therefore, more complex and contradictory than romantic 
narratives may suggest (Rudin, 1990). The Mouvement Desjardins was not simply the 
epic work of a great man. It was not simply the heroic rising up of the disenfranchised. It 
was also a fundamentally dependent movement, incorporated into the larger class project 
of its clerical and petit-bourgeois patrons. Organized around the parish structure, les 
caisses were used to reinforce the commitment of parishioners to traditional values. For 
one thing, caisse organization diverted them from trade unions, self-managed worker co-
operatives, or socialist ideas. For unionization was becoming a force in Québec in the 
1880s. Trades and labour councils were founded in Montréal in 1885 and in Québec City 
in 1890; between 1901 and 1911 province-wide union membership grew from 10,000 to 
25,000. As an alternative to militant trade unions, co-operation appealed to employers 
and the ruling elite. Indeed, language law controversies in 1912 and the conscription 
crisis of 1917 helped lay the basis for a similar co-optive strategy within the unions. The 
formation of a Catholic trade union central in 1921 represented a turn toward clerico-
nationalism and away from militancy (Armstrong, 1984). Catholic unionism ―came into 
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existence to dampen social change and as part of a strategy designed to extend clerical 
control to all aspects of social life‖ (Gagnon, 2004, p. 261). 
 
The traditional compact that ruled Québec sought, therefore, to sacralize and assimilate 
the labour and co-operative movements. As Vaillancourt (2009) notes, the social 
economy of this period was ―patron-led.‖ The influence of the social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church was ―implemented in the province by the Société canadienne de 
l’économie sociale de Montréal (SCESM), founded in 1888, and the Jesuits’ École 
sociale populaire (ESP), set up in 1911. Desjardins was a member of the SCESM‖ (p. 5).  
As Rudin (1990) argues, cultural nationalism so strongly defined the caisse populaire 
movement that ―the caisses have proved attractive almost exclusively to the French-
speaking population of the province.‖ The residual strength of cultural nationalism within 
the Mouvement Desjardins remains so strong today that ―within Québec in general and in 
Montréal in particular, it is frequently possible to determine whether a neighbourhood is 
predominantly English-speaking by noting the absence of a caisse‖ (p. x).  
 
Co-operation fit well with the prevailing doctrine of social Catholicism. In this 
conception, ―support for the working class would help circumvent social conflicts, spell 
defeat for socialist propaganda and protect the religious values and moral authority of the 
Church‖ (Poulin, 2000, p. 36). In this sense, supporting caisse and co-operative 
development was part of an historic compromise. The co-operative project would not 
simply meet the needs of desperate working and farm families. It would also avert a crisis 
of authority for the ancien régime, keeping both socialism and English-speaking 
Protestant capitalism at bay. Elite sponsorship of early co-operation was part of a 
hegemonic strategy to influence its development.  
  
As the founder of the caisse populaire movement, Desjardins‘ shrewd manoeuvring to 
enlist church support, to use his Conservative party connections (Poulin, 2000), and to 
involve local elites was decisive. For a faltering elite, Desjardins granted reassurance and 
the reinforcement of traditional moral authority. To the ranks of the urban and rural poor, 
he promised greater financial security, and an extension of the democratic and collective 
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entrepreneurial franchise. The mouvement caisse populaire was part of a new accord 
between the classes. It offered opportunity to the excluded and stability to the privileged. 
4.2.2 Desjardins’ mission: Co-operation as moral reform 
Desjardins is often eulogized as the ―patron saint‖ of co-operation in Québec (Fairbairn, 
2000, p. 14). Indeed, his work in reconciling elite and popular interests does provide 
useful insight into the contradictory nature of these early social mobilizations. For the 
caisse populaire movement was more than the expression of coinciding church, state, and 
petit-bourgeois interests ―from above.‖ It was also a popular project, an expression of 
collective action by the ranks of the urban and rural poor who joined the caisses in great 
numbers even if they did not lead them. For, as Gitlin (1980) has argued in another 
context, hegemony is a reciprocal, or dialectical, concept: it ―is done by the dominant and 
collaborated in by the dominated‖ (p. 10). As a member of the petite-bourgeoisie, 
Desjardins was well positioned to act as a broker between these often antagonistic 
interests. Indeed, this public servant was more than a patriote, a Catholic, or a 
Conservative. Rudin (1990) argues he was also part of a traditional rural elite with much 
to lose if farmers moved from regions such as Levis to the cities for lack of available 
credit. 
 
Desjardins belonged to a particular social class, namely Québec‘s 
traditional petite bourgeoisie of small businessmen, clerics, and 
professional men. These men, like their counterparts elsewhere in the 
Western world, were suffering from a loss of prestige caused by 
industrialization and urbanization. (p. xii) 
  
When he became aware of the scandal of usury, Desjardins fell back on his experience as 
a journalist (Poulin, 2000). He investigated credit co-operatives abroad, reporting his 
findings to a widening circle of supporters (Fairbairn, 2000). He corresponded with the 
president of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) and managers of peoples‘ 
banks or credit co-ops in France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland before settling on the 
German Schulze-Delitsch model. It organized popular credit by pooling the savings of 
ordinary working families. Desjardins‘ petit-bourgeois standing positioned him well both 
to recognize and to take advantage of the political opportunity. 
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Desjardins‘ mission was only in part to liberate the working poor from their dependency 
on loan sharks. He also viewed the caisse as a way of pooling local credit to assist local 
enterprises, viewing local farmers and small businesses as anchors of the local way of 
life. Desjardins turned to the publication of brochures and newspaper and magazine 
articles to enlist the literate ranks of the professional classes. His advocacy journalism 
reached into the ranks of petit-bourgeois opinion much as he had co-opted the social 
networks, communication channels, and moral authority of the church to reach into parish 
congregations. He enlisted the support of a young priest who contributed regularly to 
Québec City publications La Verité and L’Action Catholique. When Henri Bourassa 
launched Le Devoir in 1910, it also editorialized in favour of the caisse movement 
(Poulin, 2000). As a journalist, organic intellectual, and movement entrepreneur, 
Desjardins understood how to use the power of the press. 
 
From its inception, the caisse movement was based on an unequal cross-class alliance. It 
reflected and, to an important extent, reinforced the structure of Québec society. That was 
no accident. Indeed, just as Desjardins had involved the clergy in leadership positions 
within the caisse project, he also actively cultivated other members of the liberal 
professions to take a leading role in their administration (Poulin, 2000). In the spirit of 
noblesse oblige, Desjardins enlisted many officials and property owners. It was a 
movement for working and farm families as well as a movement of working and farm 
families; as much a clerical and petit-bourgeois movement of ―other-help‖ (Fairbairn, 
2000, p. 20) as agrarian or proletarian ―self-help.‖ These competing visions of co-
operation as a vehicle for moral reform, on the one hand, and economic democracy, on 
the other, existed in an uneasy alliance. This conflict existed even in the hearts and minds 
of individual proponents. ―While the members of the petite-bourgeoisie were inspired to 
establish the caisses to a great extent by their desire to regain their lost place in Québec 
society, they were also motivated by a genuine humanitarianism‖ (Rudin, 1990, p. xiv).  
Standing at the historic crossroads of a semi-feudal traditional society and an emerging 
urban, industrial modernity, Desjardins was thus able to conscript both clerics and the 
petite-bourgeoisie in this project of conservative modernization. 
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Certainly, the first wave co-operative movement, like the temperance movement, needs to 
be partially understood, therefore, as a project in elite paternalism. Part of the appeal of 
the caisses for clerics and local elites was their power to discipline; to inculcate the habits 
of thrift, saving, and sobriety among poor farmers and workers. This project of moral 
reform was largely undertaken under the administrative direction of the clerics and petite-
bourgeoisie, the gatekeepers of credit within the caisses.
28
 In this sense, Desjardins‘ early 
technical assistance cadres were moral entrepreneurs rather than movement 
entrepreneurs. Many of their ranks viewed co-operation as part of their religious mission: 
a means of preparing the vulnerable urban and rural poor to defend their traditional, 
Catholic way of life. This new economic moralism would require caisse members to 
learn to save, spend wisely, delay gratification, and plan ahead. Indeed, at the very heart 
of the Desjardins (and Schulze-Delitsch) concept was the idea that it was ―through the 
practice of good savings habits that members could demonstrate their moral value and 
become deserving of obtaining credit when needed‖ (Poulin, 2000, p. 30). In a sense, the 
caisses represented an important moment in the making (and disciplining) of the Québec 
working class. Under the direction, and surveillance, of the clerics, this was a new 
institutional means for expanding Catholic hegemony. While the caisses provided needed 
credit and the opportunity to save and earn interest for les Québécois, it also extended 
clergy reach into their parishioners‘ household affairs. The caisses created new 
mechanisms of surveillance and social control, at the service of clerical hegemony. As 
Girard (1999) notes, Desjardins even reached into the schools, and the socialization of 
children, through a thriving school savings program. 
 
Desjardins‘ contradictory cultural mobilization defined the spirit of the first wave in ways 
that would effectively resonate with the cultural realities, and hierarchies, of his era. His 
project rested on a complex articulation. He drew on the residual ―common sense‖ appeal 
                                                 
28
 As Thompson (1966) has chronicled, this tradition of bourgeois benevolence also has deep, conflicted 
roots in Owenism and the English co-operative tradition. As Thompson recounts, Owen ―proposed to put 
the poor into ‗Villages of Co-operation,‘ where—after an initial capital grant out of taxes—they would pay 
their own way, and become ‗useful‘, ‗industrious‘, ‗rational‘, self-disciplined, and temperate as well‖ (p. 
782). He suggests that ―for many years the co-operative movement continued with this co-existence of 
philanthropists and working-class radicals‖ (p. 806). 
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of popular working class experience with mutual societies in the middle of the nineteenth 
century (Mendell, 2008; Vaillancourt, 2009). He drew on the dominant conception of 
Catholic social economy favoured by clerical elites and the SCESM. And he drew on 
international expertise, appealing to petit-bourgeois sensibilities. He combined these 
diverse elements in a unifying, organic new ideology.
29
 Desjardins mobilized resources 
from more powerful patrons and networks by articulating co-operation in a way that was 
attractive to prospective members and powerful patrons alike. Combined in a narrative 
that represented co-operation as a protective dike against the rising tide of industrial 
urbanism, he made a persuasive case for collective action. It was a defence of the poor. It 
was a defence of the Catholic, Québec nation. It was a defence against moral laxity. And, 
it was a defence against militant trade-unionism and socialism. In the moral panic over 
usury (Poulin, 2000), in particular, he exploited a unique political opportunity to 
construct and mobilize a diverse coalition of popular and elite forces. Desjardins was 
engaged in much more than popular economics narrowly conceived. He was engaged in 
sophisticated cultural politics to strategically articulate co-operative credit within a wider 
field of social forces. Like Calvin‘s Protestant Ethic, which provided early capitalists 
with the requisite motivational urgency to kick-start capitalism, the basis of Québec‘s 
social economy also rested on the power of Catholic social doctrine to drive movement 
participation in collective entrepreneurship.  
 
It can be argued, following on McAdam (1982), that the Mouvement Desjardins met the 
necessary conditions for an effective social movement mobilization. The movement 
emerged in the socio-economic context of urbanization, industrialization, and 
encirclement, broad processes threatening the traditional, Church-led way of life and the 
Québec nation. Like the emergence of a defensive, enclave co-operativism in the Basque 
region of Spain during the Franco regime (Whyte & Whyte, 1991; Morrison, 1991), this 
threat fuelled a clergy-led, nationalist response. This conjuncture, combined with the 
Church response of colonisation, a return to the land and traditional rural life, created a 
political opportunity. Desjardins framed the caisse movement as both a response to the 
                                                 
29
 This conceptualization builds on Williams‘ theory of residual, dominant, and emergent cultures (2005, 
pp. 37-42). 
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sin of usury in line with social Catholicism and as a defence of traditional rural life, in 
line with clerico-nationalism and the social economy doctrine of the SCESM. This 
collective attribution of the problem combined class interests ―from below‖ with the 
cross-class interest in a national-popular project. Desjardins forestalled a social control 
response from church and petit-bourgeois elites by co-opting them into leadership 
positions. With their support, parishioners were actively encouraged to join the caisses. 
State sanction, through enabling legislation, was won against the possibility of bankers‘ 
objections. With powerful patron support, each caisse populaire built credibility and 
momentum for further organization across the parish network. This was a sustained social 
and economic insurgency against the Anglo-bankers and the loan sharks alike.  
 
Through his vast research, Desjardins was able to define his project with increasing 
clarity. Drawing on his journalistic and professional political experience, he appealed to 
the desire of church, state, and the professional and propertied classes to harness co-
operation as a vehicle for moral integration and social stability. He was able to construct 
the basis for the caisse populaire movement by articulating this project with the wider 
anti-secular, anti-Anglo, anti-Protestant, and anti-socialist movement for Catholic social 
action. This was more than a strictly self-help movement (although it incorporated a new 
sense of personal transformation into the more secular understanding of collective 
enterprise embodied in the mutual societies that preceded it). It was part of a wider 
political mobilization for conservative restoration. The mouvement caisse populaire 
sought to protect rural life, the Catholic religion, and the French language against an 
ascendant Anglo-capitalist urbanization on the one hand and an insurgent working class 
radicalism on the other.  
 
An alliance with the church and the petite-bourgeoisie, largely on behalf of farmers and 
workers, first wave co-operation was a somewhat messy affair. The Mouvement 
Desjardins was embedded in a wider social movement, social Catholicism. It, therefore, 
emerged through a clergy and petit-bourgeois led technical assistance mobilization that 
was itself a paradox. On the one hand, this paternalist leadership base reinforced the 
existing social hierarchy. On the other hand, the democratic structure of the caisses was 
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an academy for future generations. Through it, the urban and rural poor learned to take an 
increasing role in democratic movement self-management. Through the example it set, 
the practices it established, and the alliances it forged, the Desjardins legacy profoundly 
shaped the terrain on which further movement activity would unfold. 
 
4.3 The second wave: Secularization, the emergence of a new middle class, and 
the struggle within Catholicism 
Three decades after the Desjardins movement got its start, the Great Depression swept 
North America, adding strong new incentive and political opportunity for co-operative 
social innovation in Québec. At the turn of the century, the usury debates had created a 
discrete crisis of authority for the predatory actions of the loan-sharks and the 
exclusionary Anglo-banks that enabled them. This scandal created an opening for 
Desjardins to focus popular commitment on the creation of co-operative credit. In the 
throes of depression, the wider failure of the market and the state to meet Québec 
citizens‘ needs provoked a more generalized crisis of economic authority. It highlighted 
the importance of co-operative innovation—but now on a broader scale.  
 
However, this was not a simple transition. As Vaillancourt and Tremblay (2008) argue, 
the early years of this period featured an attempt at ―social restoration‖ led by the Jesuits‘ 
École sociale populaire (ÉSP). Like the SCESM, it was committed to stemming the tide 
of anti-capitalist ideas and reinforcing the doctrinal supremacy of the church. The formal 
conservative response to the Depression involved a couple of study days in March and 
September of 1933. The first focused on the moral and doctrinal dimensions of the crisis 
and was led by clergy. The second brought in select secular resource people, including 
economist Esdras Minville from École des hautes études commerciales (HEC), to work 
out the socio-economic dimensions of the restoration plan in line with the Church‘s social 
doctrine. In the following months, the ÉSP facilitated numerous workshops, establishing 
their anti-statist vision, and extending Catholic social corporatism through the parish and 
caisse networks (Vaillancourt and Tremblay, 2008). For several years, this residual, and 
resurgent, clericism was the dominant conception within the co-operative field. 
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In the post-Depression recovery, the Québec co-operative movement diversified into 
fishing, food (Lévesque, 1990), forestry, housing, education, and consumer co-ops 
(Mendell, 2008) and electricity and telephones. Established first wave sectors in 
agriculture and credit also experienced remarkable growth (Vaillancourt, 2009). Agropur, 
the giant dairy co-operative, was founded in 1938 (Girard, 1999). Building on the 
achievements of first wave co-operation in Québec, the second wave moved beyond 
Desjardins‘ early patron network. Although the steady expansion of the clerical ranks had 
dramatically decreased the ratio of faithful to clergy, from 1,836 in 1831 to only 87 in 
1941 (Gagnon, 2004, p. 247), the leadership and membership bases for this evolving 
movement were now also shifting. The formation of over 160 forestry co-operatives from 
1933 to 1970 was emblematic. They brought subsistence farmers and organized farm-
labourers together to supplement their earnings. While often encouraged by parish 
priests, the efforts of Minville and the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs (UCC) were 
key (Girard, 1999; Bridault & Lafrenière, 1989). Similarly, the formation of about fifty 
electricity co-operatives to roll-out rural electrification in the post-war period was driven 
by a program of government grants (Girard, 1999). 
 
The number of caisses nearly doubled from 1939 to 1945. Membership almost tripled and 
total assets increased five-fold (Rudin, 1990). Movement leadership passed from the 
traditional ranks of rural clerics and professionals to the ―new middle class:‖ ―With a 
leadership that was no longer part of the same petite bourgeoisie that gave rise to the 
caisses, the movement in the post-war era played a dramatically different role within 
Québec society‖ (Rudin, 1990, p. xv). Increasingly, managers and bureaucrats were in 
charge of a more diversified movement. Protective nationalism was once the movement‘s 
driving force; now the values of efficiency, growth, and social progress came to the fore. 
 
A profound transition was taking place in post-Depression Québec. Ultimately, it would 
explode in the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. The traditional Québec lifestyle, and the 
clerico-nationalist hegemony it supported, was gradually eroding. Behiels (1989) notes 
that, from 1941 to 1961, the French Canadian population living on farms dropped by two-
thirds, from 41 percent to 13 percent (p. 322). Urbanization and industrialization chipped 
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away at the agrarian and anti-statist pillars of clerical authority, and they began to 
crumble. A new, more modern ―common sense‖‘ was emerging. It was an increasingly 
urban and liberal national-popular culture. It was ―pervaded by secular values, by 
individualism and by rationalism‖ and was led by a ―new technocratic and bureaucratic 
class‖ (Behiels, 1989, p. 320). This was the pre-dawn of the Quiet Revolution. A new 
consensus for change was emerging, against the heavy hand of conservative nationalist 
Premier Maurice Duplessis: 
 
The Duplessis mixture of manipulative, right-wing and paranoid 
nationalism, relying on patronage, corruption and the cultivated 
ignorance of the masses had to be swept away. The new trade unions, 
locked in a fierce battle with English and / or American bosses 
backed by the Duplessis regime, had to be supported in their bitter 
struggle. The Catholic Church, which held a central position in the 
conservative power bloc and which intruded heavily on daily life, had 
to be trimmed, tamed, set aside and directed to focus on spiritual 
concerns, leaving worldly power and administration to democratic 
and secular forces. Québec had to catch up quickly if the Québécois 
nation was to determine its future effectively. (Conway, 2004, p. 59) 
 
This new consensus had consequences for the practice of co-operation. In fact, it was at 
the very centre of a larger social struggle between the clerico-nationalist old guard and 
the emergent liberal bloc, led by the ―new class.‖ It was a terrain of struggle on which the 
new Québec was born and through which the secular independence of the co-operative 
movement would be won. Of course, not all members of the co-operative family 
benefited from the shifting balance of power within the co-operative movement. The shift 
from clerical to managerial authority simply reinforced the earlier marginalization of the 
worker co-operative option in Québec. Beyond the forestry co-operatives and the 
exceptional case of Harpell‘s printing co-operative (Bridault & Lafrenière, 1989),30 it 
wouldn‘t be until the 1970s that this sector would really come into its own.   
                                                 
30
 John James Harpell was Québec‘s answer to Robert Owen. He established Garden City Press as a model 
of worker and community empowerment. The worker-owned print business was part of a ten-acre 
development that included housing gardens and recreational facilities for the employees. Harpell was 
introduced to the ―Garden City‖ worker community concept during a 1910 trip to Europe. He then 
implemented it in St Anne-de-Bellevue. In 1922 Harpell established the Institute of Industrial Arts, and the 
St. Anne‘s Study Club, which were aimed at industrial workers, particularly in the pulp and paper industry. 
Some of the courses were held at Garden City Press for which Harpell would pay full tuition for his 
employees. Completion of the courses was then used as incentives for the promotion of employees. In 
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4.3.1 « La liberté, c’est du Dieu aussi »: The role of Georges-Henri Lévesque 
Père Georges-Henri Lévesque was to the emerging ―second wave‖ of co-operation what 
Desjardins had been to the first. Like Desjardins, he was an ―honest broker‖ between the 
old regime and the popular interest. He, too, pushed back the horizon of the possible 
within the constraints of his time. Lévesque modernized co-operation while calming a 
panicked Catholic hierarchy. This was no small task. As Lévesque notes, the creation of 
the Conseil supérieur de la coopération (CSC) in 1939 was based on non-denominational 
co-operatives (in Vaillancourt & Tremblay, 2008). This opposed the ÉSP‘s doctrine of 
social corporatism and led to divisions within the co-operative family.
31
 Just as his 
cultural and symbolic capital enabled Desjardins to mediate popular and elite interests, 
Lévesque‘s role as an ordained Dominican priest lent him the necessary authority to lead 
a break with church doctrine.  
 
Trained as a sociologist, Lévesque was the first director of the School of Social Sciences 
at Laval in 1938, a position he held, through the transition to full faculty status, when he 
became dean. Before retiring in 1955, he played a leading role in the Quiet Revolution. 
Championing the legitimacy of scientific reason and a Québec sociology, he preached 
and practiced activist social intervention, in accordance with a liberal interpretation of 
Catholic social doctrine. He forged important alliances with the labour, co-operative, and 
other social movements. Through Laval, Lévesque and his faculty diffused reformist 
ideas and trained a new generation of intellectuals and technocrats. As teachers, social 
workers, and labour organizers, Laval‘s graduates were foot-soldiers for the Quiet 
                                                                                                                                                 
1935, in a show of solidarity for community development, adult education, and co-operatives during the 
Depression, Harpell used Garden City Press to publish literature for the Antigonish movement (Canadian 
Co-operative Hall of Fame, 2010).  
 
31
 In 1942, the Fédération des caisses populaires withdrew from the CSC, owing to opposition from the 
Union regionale de Montréal, which feared outside interference and was against the principle of non-
denominationality. This dispute, which intensified in 1945, revealed two different conceptions of co-
operation, nationalism, and the place of religion in the economy. For the Québec City School of Social 
Science, co-operation represented an end in itself owing to its rules, whereas, for the supporters of 
corporatism [more rooted in the Montréal area], it was a means toward collective emancipation. (Lévesque 
in Vaillancourt, 2008, pp. 7-8; translation) 
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Revolution in the sixties. As Lévesque‘s conflicts with Duplessis attest, he was a leading 
architect of this decisive rupture with traditional authority (Campbell, 1983).  
 
It was also from this perch that Lévesque intervened to modernize the co-operative 
movement. Freshly installed at Laval, Lévesque organized the CSC. Establishing an apex 
organization to unify the sector and strengthen its collective voice (Campbell, 1983) was 
no small achievement. Desjardins had gone to his grave in 1920 unsuccessful in his 
efforts to persuade the 138 caisses then in operation to form a second-tier federation to 
deliver financial and technical services to its branches (Poulin, 2000). As President of the 
CSC, the modernizing cleric-sociologist moved quickly to launch the magazine Ensemble 
as the voice of the Conseil. His campaign of co-operative organization, education, and 
outreach continued as director of the School, editor of Ensemble, and publisher of the 
dozens of pamphlets, or cahiers, that streamed out of the School from 1941 to 1945. 
Lévesque‘s own curriculum vitae cites 48 publications, most in non-academic journals. 
About a third dealt with Québec‘s co-operative movement (Campbell, 1983). Like 
Desjardins, Lévesque was an organic intellectual and a movement entrepreneur. Unlike 
Desjardins, he was able to build on the proven accomplishments and organizations of the 
Québec movement‘s first wave. He was also able to promote a more liberal and secular 
path, both for Québec and its modernizing co-operative movement‘s second wave. 
Lévesque walked a careful line between the traditionalist and modernizing factions of the 
Catholic Church, arguing his outreach was consistent with evolving Catholic social 
doctrine. Indeed, just as Desjardins built on the efforts of a network of clerics who 
viewed co-operation as ecclesiastical base-building, Lévesque justified his involvements 
as a modern day extension of the church‘s relationship with the working class: 
 
The dean was convinced that the extreme individualism, and the pre-
eminence of personal gains, which he saw as characteristic of North 
American capitalism, could induce Québec workers to leave the 
church, which they would see as incapable of serving the needs of an 
industrial society. To forestall this possibility, Québec must develop 
an extended co-operative network and must have dynamic Catholic 
trade unions, fully able to respond to the needs of the workers. 
(Behiels, 1989, pp. 327 - 328) 
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Still, social science in general, and his institution in particular, were viewed as a threat by 
traditional clerics and the Union Nationale. As Campbell (1983) notes, ―petitions were 
sent twice to Rome by various factions of the clergy and once by the Duplessis 
government in an attempt to have Lévesque censured, removed or both;‖ Duplessis, who 
called Lévesque ―le p’tit rouge,‖ tried to pressure Laval to fire, or at least demote the 
reformist (pp. 220 - 221). State hostility posed a threat to the very existence of the fragile 
social sciences at Laval, as the government first culled, then eliminated, its funds and 
blacklisted its graduates. Defeating the government became a matter of survival for 
Lévesque: ―This implied an alliance, on the one hand, with the trade unions and co-
operative movements and, on the other hand, with the Liberal party‖ (Behiels, 1989, p. 
321). However, this conflict was a conflict within Catholicism, rather than against it. 
Duplessis and the clerical traditionalists railed against Lévesque for ―heresy‖ and called 
on the Vatican to arrest his ―undue political influence.‖ They claimed Lévesque would 
bring down the only Catholic government in North America (pp. 332 - 334).  
 
That Québec society was polarizing quickly was reflected in the divisions within the 
church. Ultimately, Lévesque‘s faculty and graduates played a key role in promoting a 
―new identity for the Québécois collectivity, one that was rationalistic and secularized‖ 
(Behiels, 1989, p. 322). This cultural mobilization disarticulated the clerico-nationalist 
social bloc. Laval graduates secularized the traditional system of church-administered 
charities. Lévesque‘s faculty promoted union radicalization through a Department of 
Industrial Relations, which organized regular conferences. In 1960 the Confédération des 
syndicats Nationaux (CSN) was born as the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques 
du Canada (CTCC) severed its ties with the church (Gagnon, 2004). But it was on the 
issue of independence for the co-operative movement that Lévesque was eventually 
called to the Vatican to account for the ―heresy‖ of abandoning the ―sacralization‖ of 
worldly institutions as unworkable and counter-productive. Against Duplessis, the 
Vatican granted his request for full movement autonomy. ―The decision marked an 
important transition in Québec society, towards an intellectual climate that was more 
democratic, pluralistic, and secular than before‖ (Behiels, 1989, p. 332).  
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This ―new intellectual attitude,‖ that freedom itself was a sacred gift, also transformed the 
culture of co-operation. It represented a decisive break with the vestigial paternalism, 
authoritarianism, and dependency of the first wave. Second wave co-operation was 
escaping from the orbit of clerico-nationalism and entering a more popular, participatory, 
and democratic universe of member self-governance. While Lévesque‘s was a minority 
position from 1938 to 1945, Vaillancourt (2009) argues that after WWII, the clerico-
nationalist alliance began to erode in favour of a more secular, economic nationalism. 
Church-run schools, health care, and social welfare became increasingly inadequate to 
the needs of an urban, industrial society and the clerical administration of public service 
increasingly blocked the career paths of the new middle class (McGrane, 2007).  
 
From the 1950s to the Quiet Revolution, rattrapage (catch-up) thinking increasingly 
came into conflict with the hold-over agrarianism and anti-statism that had their roots in 
the Eighteenth Century. As Québeckers migrated en masse to the cities, the hold of rural 
parish organizations also loosened. Several organizations, including the Confédération 
des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC), the Fédération des unions industrielles 
du Québec (FUIQ), Le Devoir, and several Catholic social movements, fell away from 
the Duplessis-Catholic Church alliance (Vaillancourt, 2009).  
 
Mass media also helped set a new economic and political agenda ―from below:‖ ―Cité 
Libre expressed … the new middle class desire for state-run public services while neo-
nationalists at Le Devoir argued for the creation of the modern welfare-state and the 
intervention of the provincial state to reduce foreign domination of the economy‖ 
(McGrane, 2007, p. 193). However, these media struggles were merely episodes in the 
longer range structural transformation of Québec‘s public sphere. In the thirties, the 
introduction of radio and public broadcasting, in particular, played a leading role.  As a 
federal crown corporation, Radio Canada provided a relatively free forum for the 
expression, diffusion, and development of French Canadian culture—beyond the 
censorious reach of Québec‘s traditional elites and political allies. It overcame the 
province‘s intellectual isolation and the ideological hegemony of clerico-nationalism. 
Radio Canada transformed Québec‘s journalistic field, opening up space for increasingly 
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vigorous, independent, and challenging journalism. In the late forties and fifties, Le 
Devoir moved aggressively into this space. As Québec‘s leading daily, Le Devoir‘s 
ideological migration reinvigorated journalism. From a bastion of conservatism, Radio 
Canada and Le Devoir transformed the press into a catalyst for change and a 
communication channel for the gathering Quiet Revolution: ―The press … became a 
center of new ideas, a locus for the spread of new perspectives and developing 
movements‖ (Milner & Milner, 1973, pp. 234 - 235).  
 
The rapid diffusion of television through the fifties provided further ideological and 
cultural momentum for change. It was an important platform for rattrapage intellectuals 
and projected a compelling alternative to the clerical world view. Like the role of 
journalism in the desacralization and delegitimation of monarchist, clerical, and 
aristocratic rule in late eighteen century France and the historic formation of a secular 
―public‖ (Carey, 2007), rattrapage journalism helped forge a ―post-traditional‖ public for 
the democratic upsurge of Québec‘s Quiet Revolution). 
 
The breakdown of the traditional, clerico-nationalist bloc reinforced the co-operative 
movement‘s sense of independence. It also helped re-embed co-operation within the 
secular, democratic movements of civil society. This shift would set the stage for the rise 
of a new activist ethic, opening-up a development path for the ―new co-ops‖ of the third 
wave, and the ―new social economy,‖ in the decades ahead. It suggested new possibilities 
for an enlarged, secular social movement family on the one hand and a new partnership 
between a modernized co-operative movement and the modernizing state on the other.  
 
Père Lévesque helped forge the new intellectual conception and vanguard that would 
lead the movement‘s renewal and win its field autonomy from the long arm of the church. 
Together with his peers and students, he helped defeat clerico-nationalism. This 
progressive social bloc would continue to radically revitalize Québec, and the co-
operative movement, through the 1960s. He was a father of the Quiet Revolution.
32
 The 
                                                 
32
 ―Apart from the national and Catholic trade unions, it was the Faculty of Social Sciences at Laval that 
was in the 1940s the main centre of opposition to the policies of the Duplessis regime, to traditional 
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sixties involved a major crisis in the structure of established authority in Québec and 
opened the door for new actors and new ideas. Just as the flight of New France‘s 
mercantile and colonial elites after the Fall created a power vacuum into which the 
Church moved, the secularization of Québec once again created an epistemic break with 
the past. It opened up new political space, into which the ―new co-ops‖ would also move.  
 
Central to the consolidation of the secular progressive project was the structural reform of 
Québec schooling. Under the long dark shadow of the Church, Francophone children in 
Québec generally had to join the priesthood or nuns‘ orders to move on to post-secondary 
education. In fact, schooling was made compulsory only up to the age of 14 in 1942. 
Until the sixties, the Church delivered schooling to French-speaking children and 
published all French-language school texts. Like the structural transformation of the 
public sphere, driven by Radio Canada in the thirties, the introduction of public 
schooling, CEGEPs, and the Université du Québec in the sixties effectively consolidated 
the secularization of childhood, education, and Québec society (Milner & Milner, 1973). 
 
The vacuum created by the rollback of Church control and influence was filled by two 
dominant forces. The Keynesian welfare state, under the aegis of a modernizing 
economic nationalism, supplanted the Church in the areas of health, education, and social 
welfare. It also played a leading role in the new means to popular salvation: intervention 
in the economy. This involved the cultivation of a Québec bourgeoisie, the creation of a 
crown sector and economic co-operation with the ―old co-ops.‖ Much as the rattrapage 
State emerged, with a vengeance, from its dependence on the Church, this period also 
saw the emergence of many secular civil society organizations. The rise of new social 
movements including the mouvement communautaire played a vigorous role in the moral 
and intellectual reconstruction of post-traditional Québec, redefining the role of women, 
students, and workers in society. Some proposed a state independent of Canada.  
                                                                                                                                                 
French-Canadian nationalism and to the supremacy of the church in education and social services. During 
the 1950s several members of the faculty identified themselves with other opposition groups, such as the 
Cité Libre group led by Pierre-Elliott Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier, or the Institut canadien des affaires 
publiques, through which those on the left developed and publicized a systematic critique of Québec 
society and especially of the traditional nationalist ideology‖ (Behiels, 1989, p. 327). 
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Certainly, the sixties saw a surge to the left across North America and a continent-wide 
challenge to traditional authority. Nowhere was this movement more profound or its 
legacy more deeply rooted than in Québec. Here it coincided with the collapse of a major 
institutional order and the state that protected it. The Quiet Revolution was about 
substantially more than sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Insurgent sovereignty and socialist 
movements filled the vacuum left by clerical traditionalism and the Union Nationale. The 
spirit of rattrapage modernization didn‘t include ―dropping out‖ of Québec society. It 
inspired engagement and revolutionary structural reforms. Unlike the episodic nature of 
the US New Left, tied to the foreign policy crisis around the Vietnam War, the Quiet 
Revolution in Québec was an organic, long-range crisis in the very nature of the new 
Québec. The popular movement insurgency was therefore much more focussed on the 
long range project of social reconstruction. The sixties in Québec featured movements 
with deeper roots in fundamental and necessary social change.  
 
These movement commitments proved durable. The Québec labour and women‘s 
movements remain the strongest in North America, and their legacy has been more 
consequential. The sovereignty movement emerged as a serious force in the seventies and 
went on to form government. It introduced significant social democratic reforms, and 
held referenda on sovereignty in 1980 and 1995. Resurgent co-operation was just one 
expression of the popular energies of this extended social movement family, forged in the 
crucible of the Quiet Revolution. Largely, its rank and file were also devoted to re-
imagining and rebuilding Québec on new foundations. As we will see, when Québec 
encountered deep recessions in the seventies and 1982, Anglo capital flight, and then the 
shocks of global restructuring, this well-defined and deeply rooted popular movement 
culture shaped innovative, mature, and sophisticated responses. It was not on the margins 
of Québec society. It helped constitute the new Québec.  
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4.4       The third wave: The Quiet Revolution, economic nationalism, and the    
“new co-ops” 
Benoît Lévesque (1990) argues that the rise of consumer society in the post-war period 
set the stage for a final break with the development path of the old co-operatives of the 
first and second waves. The Quiet Revolution, and the state-led project in economic 
nationalism that emerged from it, transformed both the economy and co-operation in 
Québec. While first generation co-operation relied on church patronage for its practical 
and moral advancement, and the second generation struggled for independence from the 
church, the Quiet Revolution tilted the terrain toward a new patron: the modern state.  
 
4.4.1 Rattrapage co-operation 
The co-operative movement first emerged in Québec as an agent of French-Canadian 
social cohesion, moral cohesion, and cultural nationalism, under Church sponsorship. It 
was virulently anti-statist. By contrast, the modern co-operative movement of the Quiet 
Revolution became thoroughly implicated in the modernizing state‘s project of economic 
and social rattrapage. The Lesage Liberals created the first Co-operatives Branch in 1963 
and drafted the initial plans for the Société de développement co-opératif (SDC). These 
were just two important expressions of the post-traditional, more bureaucratic approach 
to co-operatives that would define the increasingly interventionist state.  
 
This expanded state role was also expressed and supported in the dramatic expansion of 
post-secondary education, research, and co-operative expertise. The Université du 
Québec opened its doors to the working class. Specialist research agencies supplanted the 
previously hegemonic role of the SCESM and ÉSP in articulating co-operative 
development options. The new professionalism extended the developmental reach of the 
state and the Conseil Québécois de la coopération. New agencies institutionalized the 
secular and scientific authority of the perspective first advanced by Georges-Henri 
Lévesque in 1938. These included the formation of CIRIEC-Canada in 1967 and HEC 
Montréal‘s Desjardins Centre for Studies in Management of Financial Services Co-
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operatives in 1975 (Vaillancourt & Tremblay, 2008, p. 29).
33
 The co-operative movement 
found itself supported by rattrapage expansion in education as well as in the economy. 
Increasing numbers of university-educated, Francophone Québécois, who had limited 
opportunities in English-dominated private enterprise, found opportunities in the 
expanding state and crown sectors, in higher education, and in the co-operative sector. 
 
This was a period of rapid change and aggressive state action, often in concert with the 
established sector. For example, the sixties saw a new player enter the co-operative field. 
Historically marginalized by the European settlement project, Inuit groups began using 
the co-operative model to break the Hudson Bay Company monopoly over supply and 
marketing. After two centuries of company rule, a federation was created in 1967, with 
the aid of the Mouvement Desjardins, the CCQ, and the state (Girard, 1999).  
 
Indeed, civil society initiatives paralleled the expansion of corporatism and the Keynesian 
welfare-state through the seventies. The emergence of second-wave feminism (Maille 
cited in Gagnon, 2004, p. 291) and the energetic expansion of the mouvement 
communautaire reshaped the political terrain. The seventies were an ―abrupt turn‖ in 
Québec politics. Increasing popular demand for opportunities to participate converged 
with the unions‘ adoption of living conditions as a ―second front;‖ a realignment of Quiet 
Revolution alliances around the PQ program after the October, 1970 FLQ crisis; and the 
graduation of a new generation of secular progressives eager for social change. It was a 
―decisive period in the development of community organization‖ (Lamoreaux, Mayer & 
Panet-Raymond, 1991, p.12).  
 
These mobilizations had roots in the creation of Associations d’économie familiale 
(ACEF) in 1962. Their early focus was on credit counselling and welfare rights advocacy 
for the poor. In 1968 they launched a legal aid service. Critical to the gestation of a new 
co-operative movement were its co-operative development courses, providing assistance 
                                                 
33
 The rise of a class of co-operative experts outside the management ranks of the movement itself reflected 
a dynamic expansion in the scope and credibility of social research in Canada through this period. For 
example, between 1956 and 1977, the number of sociologists teaching in all Canadian universities 
increased twenty-fold from only 32 to 917 (Hiller cited in Brym & Fox, 1989, p.20). 
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to groups launching production, credit, and food co-operatives. By 1973, the ACEF 
network had 53 full-time staff and hundreds of volunteers. It represented 389 member 
associations, a significant grassroots network for co-operative innovation diffusion. 
Moreover, by cultivating the financial support of trade unions and caisses populaires 
(Fournier, 1976), the ACEF network bridged the urban reform movement, the established 
labour and co-operative movements, and the emerging ―new co-operatives.‖ 
 
In the seventies, grassroots efforts to build alternative institutions, beyond the market and 
the state, included community radio, housing co-operatives, and non-profit childcares. 
Desjardins adapted the criteria for caisse populaire membership, traditionally tied to the 
parish, to include trade union sponsored caisses d’économies. The state increasingly 
funded community-based service delivery and advocacy organizations (Vaillancourt & 
Tremblay, 2008). The consequences of community organization in the Quiet Revolution 
were felt long after the FLQ crisis, prefiguring what would later come to be known as the 
New Social Economy.
34
 An early expression of the confidence of emerging popular 
movements and surging co-operative innovation in the sixties were grassroots efforts to 
launch ―phoenix co-operatives‖ to re-open abandoned plants. Ex-workers and local elites, 
embittered by absentee owners‘ unilateral decisions, favoured worker self-management 
schemes. They met stiff opposition. In one study, nearly half the businessmen canvassed 
viewed production co-operatives as a ―threat to the economic system.‖ As a result, the 
state provided financial assistance only to co-operative projects that avoided worker 
participation. Local communities kept some plants open but their efforts to wrest control 
from investors were frustrated (Fournier, 1976). 
 
                                                 
34
 The pace and scope of this community movement was dizzying through the first half of the decade, as 
Lamoureux et al. (1991) document: ―ACEFs became more and more numerous, dozens of consumer 
associations sprang up, food co-ops expanded, Associations pour la dés droits sociaux groups mushroomed 
and organized significant battles, and the popular education movement experienced spectacular growth. 
New groups emerged: community daycare centres, worker co-operatives, and community media. Political 
theatre groups and progressive filmmakers, writers and musicians appeared on the cultural front. 
Associations were formed to defend the rights of retired people, the handicapped and injured workers‖ (p. 
12). 
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However, it was mostly a big business roundtable, the Conseil d’orientation économique 
du Québec (COEQ), that brought established co-operative and state elites together to 
define the rattrapage agenda for co-operation. The Chamber of Commerce requested Co-
op Fédérée and Desjardins become members of the COEQ in 1961. Joining this strongly 
interventionist, state-led development project was a decisive break with traditional co-
operatives‘ anti-statism and their anti-business mentalité. The COEQ created the 
institutional basis for Québec‘s new state-based corporatism. Its development plan 
assigned the state ―a major role in the control and direct placement of investment.‖ The 
Lesage Liberals launched the Société générale de financement (SGF) in 1962 and the 
Caisse de dépôt de placement in 1965. The Desjardins movement created the Société 
d’investissement Desjardins (SID), and its subsidiary, the Crédit industriel Desjardins in 
1971. Desjardins was the leading financier of the provincial state under the Bourassa 
Liberals (Lévesque, 1990, pp. 112 - 114).  
  
The established co-operative movement thus entered into a top-down strategic alliance 
with the state and the private sector to repatriate economic power in Québec through the 
sixties. A secular and largely bureaucratic project, co-operation in the new Québec was 
strictly secondary to the zealous exercise of state power welcomed by the Quiet 
Revolution. The Lesage Liberals were preoccupied with creating state enterprises from 
1960 to 1966. In 1962, the entrepreneurial state created the SGF to accelerate industrial 
development. In 1963, it moved to capture revenues from power generation by launching 
Hydro-Québec. In 1964, on the initiative of Lesage‘s Minister of Natural Resources René 
Lévesque, the Liberals formed the Québec Steel Corporation (Sidbec), making steel 
available to Québec industry at affordable prices. The next year, Lévesque accelerated 
resource development by creating the Québec Mining Exploration Company (Soquem). 
Also in 1965, several pension funds were amalgamated to create an investment pool, the 
Québec Deposit and Investment Fund. Finally, in 1969 this string of innovations in 
Québec public enterprise led to a crown corporation to explore, produce, and distribute 
oil: the Québec Petroleum Operations Company (Soquip) (Fournier, 1976). 
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The preferential role given co-operatives by the Lesage Liberals nonetheless positioned 
Desjardins as the province‘s leading financial player. It assumed an economic and 
industrial development role, financing major public projects like schools and hospitals. 
Active state engagement created favourable conditions for well established co-operatives. 
However, this new-found state recognition, and protection, also threatened movement 
autonomy. Indeed, joining this corporatist alliance laid the basis for an ideological crisis 
within the movement was deepened by Marxism‘s increasing influence within the social 
movements and the ―new co-ops.‖ The sector was participating ―in the renewal and the 
strengthening of the Québec bourgeoisie‖ (Lévesque, 1990, pp. 113 - 115).  
 
In fact, for many, the co-operative sector had become an important fraction of the 
Francophone bourgeoisie, and the project of French Canadian capitalism. In Fournier‘s 
analysis of the ―Québec Establishment,‖ for example, he calls Co-opérative Fédérée and 
the Mouvement Desjardins ―key French Canadian Corporations.‖ He even refers to 
Desjardins as a ―co-operative monopoly.‖35 Since the late sixties, the co-operative 
establishment thus faced a challenge ―from below.‖ This was the rapid rise of a new 
generation of co-operatives, driven by the new attitude of the Quiet Revolution and the 
new social movements. Large numbers of new co-operatives emerged in housing, work, 
forestry, and ―new food‖ co-operatives throughout the seventies (Lévesque, 1990). Often 
led by women (Goldblatt, 2000) and community activists, these emerging sectors were 
frequently at odds with the more typically male, white, rural, older, and more 
conservative leadership of the old co-ops. This new co-operative resurgence benefited 
from the mobilizations of the mouvement communautaire, social unionism, and second 
wave feminism through the seventies. It was an expression of new energy from the 
broader social movement family within which third wave new co-ops were embedded.  
 
                                                 
35
 ―The fraction that operates at the Canadian level, or that is organically linked to Canadian financial 
networks and the Canadian state, is mostly federalist. On the other hand, the fraction that operates mainly at 
the Québec level depends on the local market, or is supported by the Québec state, tends to be nationalist 
and sees the eventual growth of the Québec state as a means of improving its relative position. This latter 
group includes some of the key state enterprises and the large co-operative monopolies, such as the 
mouvement Desjardins‖ (Fournier, 1976, p. 210). 
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As Lévesque (1990) argues, the new co-operatives represented more than a diverse, 
activist social base within co-operation. They also represented a rival bloc or ―alternative 
co-operative project‖ based on a new activist ethic and new co-operative models. Often 
shunned by co-operative traditionalists and marginalized within established movement 
structures, the new co-ops existed in an uneasy alliance with the old co-ops. These needy, 
youthful, and reform-minded new sectors were therefore more receptive to government 
involvements in emerging sector development than the established movement leadership. 
By 1976-78, this division between established and emerging co-operative sectors would 
increasingly lead the new Parti Québécois government of René Lévesque away from the 
corporatist policy of preferential treatment for established co-operatives in favour of 
green shoot policies geared to the launch and expansion of the new co-ops:  
 
The state under the Péquiste regime was able to play a major role in 
the development of new co-operatives while the traditional co-
operatives isolated themselves from demands arising from the new 
social movements. These found their expression in the new co-
operatives. Yvon Gauthier goes even further noting that the ‗petite 
bourgeoisie‘ who reigned over the Caisses populaires had little faith 
in housing co-operatives, in consumer co-operatives and even less in 
worker (production) co-operatives… The traditional co-operatives 
rejected the role of initiators or promoters of new co-operatives. (p. 
129; my emphasis) 
 
A new regionalism was also beginning to stir from below. This cross-cut the centralized 
silo structure of established co-operatives. In the early seventies, the Conseil des 
coopératives de l’Outaouais emerged. This experiment in joint regional action inspired 
the launch of the co-opératives de développement régional (CDR) program in the 
eighties. Pilot initiatives in Outaouais, Québec, and Saguenay / Lac-St-Jean in 1983 
generated 27 new co-operatives and 275 permanent new jobs within two years 
(Tremblay, 2005, p. 147). This regional development co-operative network, modeled 
after the UK‘s Co-operative Development Agencies and the French boutiques de gestion, 
would revolutionize development practice in the decades ahead (Girard, 1999). 
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4.4.2 A Movement Divided 
It was against this conflictual backdrop, compounded by the rising tide of sovereignist 
sentiment, that the co-operative movement was enlisted by the Parti Québécois. The PQ 
was launched in 1968 and first formed government in 1976. The PQ rolled out the Société 
de développement co-opératif plans conceived by the Liberals but incorporated Liberal 
program and policy in a more aggressive economic nationalism. Indeed, the early PQ 
modernization project was based on a traditional social democratic approach: fostering a 
mixed economy where co-operation played a larger role but the state took the lead. It 
would involve several established co-operative federations in the effort to ―catch up.‖ But 
the PQ also subsidized the launch and expansion of new co-operatives.  
 
The PQ approach was triply determined: by the rattrapage emphasis on modernization 
and the corporatist networks it inherited from the Lesage and Bourassa Liberals; by a 
redoubled economic nationalism befitting a sovereignist party; and by a new, 
democratizing emphasis on the new co-ops and the new social movements, of which the 
PQ was itself an expression. There would be a special, but more complex, relationship 
between the co-operative tradition and the PQ project, just as the Lesage Liberals had 
seen a special role for the Mouvement Desjardins in financing rattrapage. PQ leader 
René Lévesque hailed co-operatives as ―parmi les plus authentiquement et 
interacinablement Québécois que nous ayons [among the most authentic and deeply 
rooted Québécois institutions that we have]‖ (McGrane, 2007, p. 232). Indeed, in a 
synergistic expression of movement and state goals unprecedented in North America 
since the election of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan in 
1944 (Lipset, 1959), the Péquistes‘ ten-point economic platform in the 1976 election 
mentioned the co-operative model in at least six places (Lévesque, 1990).  
 
This enthusiasm for co-operation as a public policy priority was driven by two realities: 
the Péquistes‘ long-term need to protect the economic integrity of a sovereign Québec 
and their short-term political need to establish the credibility of their economic program 
with the voting public. The sovereignty movement needed to defend its project, against 
both capital flight and the destabilizing economic tactics of its enemies. In the seventies, 
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Lévesque‘s social democratic platform led the media to regularly compare him to 
―Castro‖ (McGrane, 2007). However, the campaign to discredit the P.Q. went well 
beyond name-calling and red-baiting. It was deeply rooted, in the monopolistic structure 
of corporate media power in Québec and the concerted efforts of federalist interests. 
 
4.5 The Péquiste agenda and the media backlash 
The position of Montreal daily La Presse illustrates entrenched media opposition to the 
Péquistes‘ agenda. On February 24, 1970, the owner of La Presse told the Senate 
Committee on Mass Media he would intervene if one of his dailies endorsed the PQ 
editorially. Paul Desmarais said he would prefer to let La Presse die than let it be 
controlled by its journalists. Further, in a December 9, 1972, editorial statement, La 
Presse declared its intention to resist state efforts to diminish the power of private 
capital.
36
 The entrenched and determined opposition of Desmarais‘ La Presse took on 
further significance on August 10, 1973, when La Presse acquired its rival Montréal-
Matin—and control of two-thirds of French language daily circulation in Québec 
(Fournier, 1976). As Milliband had argued, ―for indoctrination to occur it is not necessary 
that there should be monopolistic control and the prohibition of opposition: it is only 
necessary that ideological competition should be so unequal as to give a crushing 
advantage to one side against the other‖ (1973, p. 164). 
 
Like media owners, advertisers were prepared to exercise their market power for political 
ends. The cases of Québec Presse, a nationalist left-wing weekly, and Le Jour, a PQ-
backed daily, illustrate. Launched in 1968 with the support of the unions, the Québec 
Presse co-operative was forced to fold in 1974, unable to hold a sufficient adverting base. 
A PQ-backed Montréal daily, Le Jour was launched in February, 1974—also motivated 
to counter the biases of the established dailies. This newspaper co-operative was also 
undermined by an advertiser boycott. While Le Jour and Le Devoir had comparable 
circulation, Le Devoir had triple Le Jour‘s advertising revenues (Fournier, 1976, pp. 105 
                                                 
36
 ―The newspaper La Presse believes in private enterprise such as it is practised and is evolving in the 
world, but it approves limited intervention and planning by the state. The newspaper La Presse will follow 
with a vigilant eye any trend that could incite governmental leaders to go beyond the limits of healthy state 
intervention‖ (in Fournier, 1976, p. 104). 
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- 106). The Québec Press Council found several ministries had conspired to withhold a 
fair share of government advertising from Le Jour (Raboy, 1984). Fournier also found 
that a third of canvassed Québec business people felt companies should not advertise in 
―newspapers opposed to the present political system‖ (1976, p. 105). 
 
The investor-owned press clearly operated as a social control mechanism to keep 
sovereignty and social democracy at bay—with economic, ideological, cultural, and 
political consequences for co-operation. However, the co-operative challenges mounted 
by Québec Presse and Le Jour placed the legitimacy—and legitimation role—of the daily 
press in popular question. Indeed, a rash of exposés on the Québec media were published 
from 1971-73. These included a press freedom manifesto, published during the 1971 
strike at La Presse, outlining 14 alleged cases of censorship by the newspaper‘s 
management (Fournier, 1976). Indeed, like the public service strike of 1972, the issue of 
press freedom during the La Presse strike forged new solidarity among the unions. This 
built on increasing broad-front co-operation and an emerging commitment to ―social 
unionism.‖ According to Raboy, the role of Québec-Presse in establishing a sense of 
belonging to a new common political culture ―cannot be overestimated‖ (1984, p. 62).  
 
4.6 The Péquiste agenda and the federalist backlash 
As Conway (2004) argues, federalists repeatedly resorted to economic blackmail and 
dirty tricks to intimidate Québec into not separating. This became a central political 
preoccupation for the Péquistes. Lévesque first experienced what he would refer to as 
―economic terrorism‖ in 1970, the first provincial election in which the PQ vied for 
power, and lost.
37
 This scare campaign accentuated the attractiveness of co-operative 
                                                 
37
 ―(M)any in English Canada and federalist circles feared that the charismatic Lévesque could conceivably 
win. So the … fear campaign began. Federalists in Québec and Ottawa claimed that the Québecois would 
experience an overnight drop of 35 percent in their standard of living if Lévesque and the PQ were elected. 
Plants would shut down, unemployment would spiral and savings and investments would be put at risk. 
Potential investors would panic and refuse to risk their capital. Worse there would be massive flight of 
capital out of the province.  
 
This point of view seemed confirmed by the events of early Sunday 27 April, two days before the election. 
That morning, nine Brinks trucks pulled up to the front door of the Royal Trust building on Dorchester 
Boulevard. This in itself was unusual, not only because it was Sunday morning but also because Brinks 
typically used the garage entrance, for obvious security reasons. Despite the early morning hour, 
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enterprise to the PQ and to sovereignists inside and outside the co-operative movement. 
Co-operative capital was member-owned, territorially rooted, and was therefore an 
important hedge against capital flight. After being defeated at the polls by economic 
threats that spring, sovereignist resolve deepened to strengthen the francization of the 
economy. This included a commitment to expanding co-operation. Indeed, the ―co-
operative project‖ was an important terrain on which sovereignist and social democratic 
interests fused. The co-operative revival would help consolidate the PQ‘s project.  
 
Indicative of the green shoots thinking of the new government after 1976, the Péquistes 
supported co-operative housing starts and regional expansion of forestry co-operatives. In 
1977, about twenty technical assistance groups were formed to address the housing 
shortage. Over the next decade, this intervention boosted the number of housing co-
operatives from 30 to over 700 (Lévesque, 1990). Lévesque‘s Parti Québécois also 
reserved forestry management contracts on fifty percent of crown forests for co-
operatives in 1978 (Girard, 1990). This drove further diversification of forestry co-
operatives and curbed company exploitation of lumberjacks through contractors or 
―jobbers‖ (Bridault & Lafrenière, 1989, p. 164). Aiming to have an operational forestry 
co-operative on every management unit of public forest, the state recognized the 
importance of these co-operatives in forestry workforce development and as local hubs 
for diversification into reforestation and industrial wood-processing (Carrier, 2004).   
 
It is also within this context of its impatient rattrapage, social democratic, and 
sovereignist agendas that, in 1979, the Parti Québécois took control of the Société de 
développement co-opératif (SDC). In 1977, the SDC was established by the PQ as a joint 
state-movement agency to finance co-operatives, particularly in new sectors. However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
photographers from the Montreal Gazette were on hand to get some front-page pictures. The trucks were 
ostentatiously loaded with boxes of ―fleeing capital‖ in the form of what were claimed to be ―securities‖ 
and were driven to the Ontario border… which … broadcast and rebroadcast for the next two days to 
counterpoint the newspaper pictures and headlines and … interviews with representatives of the business 
lobby and responsible Québec politicians, like premier-in-waiting (Robert) Bourassa. The event had been 
elaborately staged, requiring the co-operation of the media, Royal Trust and the Brinks Company. It was 
just one more incident in a campaign of hysteria and fear, which Lévesque denounced as ―economic 
terrorism.‖‖ (Conway, 2004, p. 76) 
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the PQ had grown restless with the pace of co-determination. For its part, the sector had 
grown nervous with being harnessed to the state‘s rattrapage agenda. The SDC was 
brought under full state-direction to break the gridlock. The PQ allocated $25 million to 
the SDC for co-operative capitalizations and $5 million for technical assistance and 
agency operations. Against the established sector‘s ambivalence toward new sector 
development, the SDC moved ahead with its own plans. It targeted the development of 
housing, forestry, and the consumer co-operative sectors. The PQ also provided tax 
credits to encourage investment in co-operatives. While it came to the aid of a number of 
distressed caisses populaires, the Parti Québécois also diverged from the objectives of 
the established co-operative movement. This further strained state-sector relations. The 
nationalization of electricity, which undermined electrical co-operatives, is one example. 
 
This polarization between established old co-ops, which resisted innovation, and 
emerging new co-ops, which embodied it, destabilized co-operation in Québec. Both 
internal movement cohesion and government-sector relations were disrupted as the state 
shifted support from the ―frozen‖ traditional co-op sector to the dynamic new co-
operatives. As globalization swept the province in the eighties, the co-operative 
movement was divided between an ambivalent established sector and a vulnerable set of 
emerging sectors orphaned by the intransigence of their old co-op movement parents. The 
co-operative movement was challenged to revisit, re-invent, and re-align its policies and 
development strategies to meet the new realities. Once again, co-operation in Québec was 
at a crossroads.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
ANOTHER NATION IS POSSIBLE: 
GLOBALIZATION, CONVERGING MOVEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC 
DEMOCRACY & QUÉBEC’S CO-OPERATIVE RESURGENCE, 1980 - 2010 
 
As the eighties dawned in Québec, the co-operative movement was mired in division. On 
one side were the ―new co-ops‖ that reflected a left-leaning urban counter-culture, but 
lacked capital, technical assistance, and the enabling policy framework to develop 
effectively. On the other side were the old co-ops. Focused on serving their mostly rural 
members, rooted in another generational experience, and unsympathetic to the new 
worlds of worker and housing co-operation, they disavowed responsibility for developing 
these emerging sectors (Lévesque, 1990). This generation gap left the energy for new 
development on the sidelines of official co-operative business. The dominant 
establishment of old co-operatives ruled the oligarchic CCQ. The dominated new co-
operatives struggled to establish themselves. Encountering establishment indifference, the 
orphaned new co-ops instead found shelter in state-funded pilot projects, in the labour 
movement, in the community economic development movement, and, by the mid-
nineties, in the social economy movement.   
 
The co-operative field which emerged from this contradictory situation over the past 
three decades introduced further innovations: new economic intermediaries and solidarity 
finance instruments, including trade union funding and technical assistance. But behind 
the new economic intermediaries, state policies, sector strategies, and research output 
were the constant presence and pressure of Québec‘s uniquely well-organized social 
movements, particularly the mouvement communautaire, the labour movement, and the 
women‘s movement. The broad confluence of movement-driven economic action that 
emerged in the eighties enabled a grand strategy to support the development of the social 
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economy from above and from below. This dense network is almost entirely the product 
of post-1980 innovation, organization, and struggle. 
  
All of this activity and innovation took place, of course, within a larger macro-economic 
and macro-political context. For the divided trajectory of the co-operative movement was 
disrupted by three powerful new social forces in the early eighties: economic 
globalization, the decline of the Keynesian welfare state (KWS), and the deepening crisis 
of Canadian federalism. These new forces fundamentally reshaped the co-operative field 
of action. They forged new social actors, disrupted the balance of power within the CCQ, 
challenged the orthodox view that the CCQ had no role to play in new co-operative 
development, and led to new movement collaborations. They also set the stage for a bold 
new partnership with the state to drive co-operative development.  
 
Indeed, this emerging co-operative development network was supported by sweeping 
state policy modernization, including legal reforms, new capitalization and financing 
tools, the establishment of consulting services across Québec, and recognition and 
promotion of the co-operative option (Clement, 2009; Vézina, 2001, p. 149). This chain 
of policy innovations was negotiated in partnership with the movement. This ―democratic 
partnership‖ in policy production drove reform. Indeed, campaigns to develop new 
sectors and new models frequently involved tight sector-state coordination.
38
  
 
5.1 Globalization: From retreat to renewal  
Economic globalization redefined the structure of opportunity for co-operatives 
everywhere in the eighties. Markets were liberalized, deregulated, and unleashed new 
                                                 
38
 This ―co-construction‖ of co-operative development policy itself represented a pioneering innovation. 
Traditionally, as Hoyt (cited in Fairbairn, 2004) has argued, public policies have varied. She has plotted 
five distinct approaches, based on the degree of intervention in co-operative development. These range 
from destructive policies that actively seek to suppress co-operative development to neutral, supportive, 
participating and controlling policies (pp. 306 – 308). While the conventional wisdom of the co-operative 
movement‘s liberal democratic mainstream gives preference to neutral or supportive policies, Québec‘s 
paradigm of ―democratic partnership‖ rejects neutrality, actively embraces supportive policies and seeks 
forms of ―negotiated participation‖ that might be considered a distinct new policy position between 
supportive and participating policies (or, perhaps more accurately, combining supportive and participatory 
policies).  
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cross-border competitive threats. Few could match the capitalization, or economies of 
scale, of the multinationals. Co-operatives were among many businesses to fail in this 
new competitive environment. Other co-operatives demutualized, merged, or abandoned 
their federated structures—just to stay in business (Lévesque, 1990). At first, these new 
competitive threats to established sectors further diverted development activity in 
Québec. Suddenly exposed to a wider competitive field, established co-operatives put the 
defence of their own operations first. The watchwords of the day were to protect, 
retrench, and consolidate. A survivalist common sense prevailed. At best, the 
development of new co-operatives, while the existing sectors were under siege, seemed 
like a frivolous luxury. At worst, it was a dangerous distraction. Other social actors could 
not afford to be so sanguine. The increasing economic and social dislocations of 
globalization in general, and the recessions of the late seventies and 1982 in particular, 
drove activists, researchers, social movements, and the state to search for new job 
creation and regional development strategies. Many called for a scaling up of co-
operative development over the ―dead body‖ of the established co-operatives and the 
CCQ.  
 
In 1982 the worst crisis of joblessness since the Great Depression beset Québec, 
engendering an enduring resolve to create jobs. The unemployment rate climbed to 
fourteen percent, hitting young workers hardest. For those between the ages of twenty to 
twenty-four, the jobless rate hit twenty percent. New investments were dampened by 
interest rates ranging from twenty to twenty-two percent (McGrane, 2007). Once again in 
1990-93, Québec suffered ―the highest unemployment in 60 years‖ (Girard, 1999, p. 20). 
It was in this context of persistently precarious employment that the labour movement, 
the community economic development movement, and, later, the social economy 
movement filled the development vacuum left by the retreat of the established co-
operatives and the CCQ.  
 
This wave of popular economic insurgency would provide new movement allies to the 
previously orphaned new co-op sectors. Over the longer term, it would also place new 
bottom-up pressure on the CCQ to join these strategies for economic regeneration. 
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Indeed, the new alliances between these ―new co-ops‖ and their adoptive new social 
movement parents put the popular legitimacy of the co-operative establishment in 
question. This both spurred new intermediary organizations and the eventual renewal and 
re-engagement of the CCQ. A major consultation and mobilization led by CCQ President 
Claude Béland in the early nineties, the États generaux de la coopération, signaled a new 
openness to the emerging sectors.
39
 But by the time the CCQ regrouped and was ready to 
re-engage the development field it found a range of other players already in place. It had 
lost its monopoly position, much of its moral and intellectual authority, and was now 
forced to reposition in a radically redefined field of development activity.  
 
5.2 After the welfare state: The retreat of the state, the resurgence of civil society, 
and the rise of targeted partnership 
In addition to its profound economic impact, globalization shifted the terms of co-
operation indirectly by transforming the terrain on which the state manoeuvred. 
Beginning in the eighties, the neo-liberal doctrines of free trade, deregulation, and 
privatization curbed elected governments‘ ability to intervene in economic life. 
Globalization drove the decline, in particular, of the interventionist policies and social 
program spending that defined the Keynesian welfare state (KWS) and the robust Québec 
model of economic nationalism. A ―competitive state,‖ based on minimal services within 
a market society, was widely viewed as the only alternative in the new global economy.  
 
The crisis of the KWS and economic nationalism in Québec was further deepened by 
increasing public debt. The PQ government‘s credit rating was downgraded in 1982 
(McGrane, 2007), as the recession drove up unemployment and interest rates (Girard, 
1999). By 1994, the debt to GDP ratio had tripled from 1976, reaching 33 percent 
                                                 
39
 ―This event was held from 1990 to 1992 and consisted of about forty local and regional forums followed by 
a provincial conference. The entire process involved thousands of officers, managers and members and 
culminated in the adoption of a manifesto and several resolutions to ensure more cohesive action on the part 
of the Québec co-operative movement. Following along these lines, two summits were held, one on co-
operative education in 1993 and one on worker co-operation in 1996. With the collaboration of union 
partners, a foundation was also created to promote co-operative education. The Conseil commissioned a few 
studies of current interest… (and) received a mandate to manage financing programs such as the program for 
CDRs‖ (Girard, 1999, pp. 21-22). 
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(McGrane, 2007). This rollback of the state also redefined the program and policy regime 
within which co-operatives operated. The retreat of the state, like that of the CCQ 
through the eighties, implied a civil society response to the crisis that included filling the 
co-operative development void. 
 
As Lévesque suggests, the 1980 Summit on Co-operatives illustrated the reciprocal 
retreat of the established co-operatives and the state from developmental responsibilities, 
the marginal role of the CCQ in development, and the resort of emerging sectors to 
appeal directly to the state for targeted support: 
 
After three years of preparation, the economic summit on co-
operatives came off only with great difficulty in February 1980. From 
the outset, Bernard Landry affirmed that ―the state should not be the 
motor of the action.‖ Highly structured co-operatives and the CCQ 
asked the state to limit its intervention to changes in the legislative 
framework, which would permit co-operatives ―to act with the same 
ease as other enterprises operating in Canada,‖ specifically in the 
areas of investment and savings. New co-operatives, and particularly 
those in the sectors of housing, work and forestry, had more precise 
demands to make of government and were far more receptive to 
government intervention. This summit meeting clearly marked a 
turning point in government policy. The new co-operatives would 
now be the ones favoured by the state, while traditional co-ops would 
be left more or less to themselves. (Lévesque, 1990, p. 119) 
 
This shift toward a targeted strategy of supporting emerging sectors built on the early 
initiatives of the PQ in housing and led to a focused effort to promote worker co-
operatives. The housing initiative of the late seventies was distinct in that it brought 
together the reform of state structures (the formation of the SDC), the development of 
region-based institutional intermediaries (the technical resource groups), and the 
mobilization of citizen organization (the housing co-operatives) as a combined force for 
development. In this sense, it was a paradigm of the new development model that would 
emerge more fully in Québec through the eighties. Support for this technical resource 
group strategy in housing prefigured a wider and deeper shift. The state-led approach, 
which embedded co-operative development in economic nationalism (Vaillancourt, 
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2009), was being superseded by a decentralized approach that engaged civil society as a 
partner in regional development.  
 
Devolution to civil society fundamentally redefined the terrain of co-operative 
development. In the new paradigm of local and regional development, resources would 
be decentralized. Completely new intermediary organizations, including Community 
Economic Development Corporations (CEDC), Regional Development Co-operatives 
(CDR), Local Development Centres (CDL), Local Social Economy Committees (CSEL), 
and federal Community Futures Development Corporations (CFDC) would emerge in the 
eighties to regroup local actors and resources. Together, these local and regional 
development coalitions would coordinate development from the ―bottom-up.‖ As 
Neamtan (2004) argues, ―the CEDCs represent a major cultural shift toward collaborative 
partnership in Québec over the past twenty years‖ (p. 26). By the nineties, this 
comprehensive restructuring, decentralization, and devolution of development strategy 
had led to a dense regional, local, and sectoral network of intermediary organizations. It 
also led to the full-fledged recognition of community economic development as a 
legitimate development strategy alongside those of public and private capital. In 1996 a 
new player entered the field, the Chantier de l’économie sociale. It further expanded the 
scope and scale of alternative development strategies proposed by the social economy.
40
 
 
Early success inspired the state to replicate its housing development model in the worker 
co-operative sector. Here, too, the coincidence of an objective need for jobs and the 
cultural shift in favour of citizen action and worker self-management had created a 
political opening for the state. Like the technical resource groups in housing, the 
formation of worker co-operative advisory groups (groupes-conseil) led to a tripling in 
                                                 
40
 Lévesque argues that this emerging model for the ―social economy‖ had five defining elements: ―1) 
recognition by all social players in the new social economy of its potential for local development and job 
creation; 2) adoption of a relatively consistent development strategy, at least for some sectors, a strategy 
that combines government financial and technical assistance with continued autonomy of these businesses 
and organizations; 3) importance of sectoral consolidation and local government of the CEDC or CFDC 
type; 4) replacement of a dual model by a social economy that is a full member of the economy as a whole, 
and of collective services; 5) a diversity of forms of institutionalization based on pilot projects.‖ (1990, p. 
118) 
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the number of worker co-operatives in Québec in only five years. From 1982 to 1987, the 
sector grew from about 100 firms to over 300 (Lévesque, 1990). This represents only the 
beginning of the innovation string. Indeed, the new development model would be applied 
in various contexts. It would be adapted and re-invented. Ultimately, these experiments 
set in motion a chain of sequential and reciprocal innovations that would fundamentally 
transform Québec‘s co-operative economy within the span of three short decades. By 
2010, the co-operativization of funeral homes, home-care services, ambulance services, 
and the emergence of new co-operative models such as worker shareholder and solidarity 
co-operatives had transformed the structure of the co-operative field and the balance of 
power between the old and new co-operative sectors. These initiatives all owed a debt to 
the early experiments with technical assistance groups. 
 
Early initiatives to promote co-operative housing and worker co-operatives also provide 
textbook examples of the new development dynamic. The cultural shift toward citizen 
action and co-operative living and work
41
 drove a successful political mobilization to 
address the popular needs of the day. This led, in turn, to financial, legislative, and 
technical assistance responses from the state. In this sense, these were also exemplars of a 
new attitude toward co-operative development, and toward a new understanding of the 
role of civil society and the state. The housing and worker co-operative pilots created 
important early working models and demonstration projects for building democratic 
participation in sector development strategies. Of course, the roll-out of these innovations 
would also take on a particular importance as governments grappled with de-
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 The World Values Study (WVS) uncovered evidence of a new global work ethos, including shifting 
public preferences toward greater participation in workplace decision-making (Nevitte, 1996). In English-
speaking Canada, declining confidence in business management through the eighties was closely correlated 
with a spike in support for an increased role for employees in business decision-making. A 1994 Ontario 
study found that only eight percent favoured ―privately owned enterprises run by executive management.‖ 
64 percent favoured ―employee participation.‖ 26 percent supported organizing the economy around ―co-
operative enterprises owned and managed by employees‖ (Livingstone, 2004, p. 261). But in Québec—
with broad-based momentum for worker co-operative development—declining support for owner, state, 
and employee-employer management had migrated entirely to employee ownership and elected 
management. While English Canada favoured investors running businesses and appointing management 
over employee ownership and elected managers by a margin of seven to one, in Québec that margin has 
been reduced to only three to one. Less than half of French-speaking Canadians supported the traditional 
owner-manager accord (Nevitte, 1996). This legitimacy crisis for the investor-owned firm model also 
represented something of a cultural revolution in the economic life of les Québécois. It both reflected and 
reinforced the pace and cultural significance of social innovation in Québec. 
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industrialization and recession, embraced neo-liberalism, and set about scaling back the 
welfare state. As Lévesque argues, the new co-operatives were favoured by the eighties 
because they helped the state reduce its social costs, from public housing to social 
assistance to job creation (p. 131). In this respect, their appeal resembled that of co-
operation‘s first wave caisse populaire movement. The worker co-operative model at 
once promised to meet popular economic needs, the state‘s fiscal needs, and an elite 
interest in social cohesion.  
 
At the opening of the twentieth century, church and petit-bourgeois protection for the 
caisse movement defined the co-operative field‘s relative autonomy. It was dependent on 
the clerico-nationalist social project. At the close of the twentieth century, it was state-
sponsorship, and its project of economic nationalism, that principally conditioned the 
possibilities of the co-operative movement. The coincidence of co-operative development 
prospects with the demands placed on the state by global restructuring, i.e. to create 
cheap jobs, housing, or social services to backfill for the downsized welfare-state, defined 
the new horizon of the possible. Where once there was the Church or the developmental 
state, now there was the competitive state. However, this was a state in transition. It was a 
state facing an unemployment crisis and in desperate need of new, energetic social 
partners and development mechanisms to resolve it. It was a state that was open to 
innovation and compelled to partnership.  
 
In this context, three key factors helped create the basis for a new, more comprehensive 
sector-state partnership to address the jobs crisis. These were the recently successful 
experiments in housing and worker co-operative development, the traditions of state 
support for community action (Lamoreaux et al., 1991; Caillouette, 2004), and corporatist 
inclusion of trade unions and the co-operative sector in macro-economic planning 
(Montpetit, 2004). This partnership regulation paradigm would support a new generation 
of co-operatives, primarily through the creation of a network of Co-opératives de 
développement regional in 1985. The CDR program was funded by the state but 
eventually managed by the CCQ. Each CDR had a core staff of seven and was self-
governed by a board drawn from co-operatives in their region. Their task was to promote 
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co-operative development and deliver technical assistance to emerging co-operatives in 
their region. The CDR network was a hybrid enterprise that tapped both state funds and 
co-operative movement resources and networks. It was the centrepiece of an innovative 
restructuring of the co-operative development function in Québec. It was a window, too, 
into the shifting terms of the alliance between the old co-ops, the new co-ops, and the 
state. Interview subjects repeatedly referred to the CDRs in our conversations. The 
network was widely perceived as the force motrice of co-operative revival in Quebec. 
 
The distinct counter-cultural mobilization which the new co-ops had expressed since the 
sixties both applied pressure, and opened up political space, for this, and other, 
innovations. This process took on a life of its own as macro-economic and political 
conditions drove the state and other social actors toward the new development 
mechanisms as a solution to the jobs crisis. Pilot collaborations in housing and worker 
co-operative development preceded, and made the case for, the CDR network. Similarly, 
the introduction of this new development system also illustrates the key role of cultural, 
political, and technical assistance mobilizations in co-operative innovation. Its success 
both required, and provided considerable impetus for, further social innovation. 
 
5.3 After Canada: The sovereignty movement, economic anxieties, and the search 
for alternatives 
The continuing crisis in federalism fuelled a full-blown sovereignty movement in Québec 
through the eighties. This would prove to have significant consequences for the 
development path of co-operation. The Parti Québécois (PQ) first formed government in 
1976. It won forty percent of the population to a ―Oui‖ vote in the 1980 referendum, 
nearly securing a mandate to negotiate political sovereignty and economic association. It 
won a second term in 1981. As part of their social democratic program, the Péquistes 
introduced several important reforms to strengthen the emerging co-operative sectors 
(Lévesque, 1990), particularly worker co-operatives (Quarter, 1992; Melnyk, 1989; 
Bridault & Lafrèniere, 1989). However, it also faced a sustained campaign of economic 
destabilization from federalist forces, and the reality—and threats—of capital flight 
 136 
(Conway, 2004). This political dynamic, too, introduced significant new threats and 
opportunities for co-operative proponents.  
 
In 1981, two critical conflicts raised the stakes in the sovereignty debate, and deepened 
the resolve of the sovereignists. The first was Claude Morin‘s private admission to PQ 
Premier René Lévesque in October 1981, that he had been an informer for the RCMP‘s 
Security Service since the early sixties. Although the truth did not come out publicly until 
1992, Lévesque found out about the betrayal of his Minister of Inter-Governmental 
Affairs on the eve of the first minister‘s conference on the constitution in November.42 It 
was with this personal betrayal and the spectre of federal conspiracy as a backdrop that 
Lévesque was subjected to the public humiliation of a back-room deal that excluded and 
isolated Québec (Conway, 2004). This would come to be known as ―the night of the long 
knives‖ and would further stoke the embers of melancholic nationalism (Maclure, 2004). 
It would also set in motion a chain of events that would nearly mark the end of 
Confederation as we know it. Lévesque‘s controversial and divisive ―beau risque‖ 
gambit—to postpone the sovereignty question as an insurance policy to negotiate a better 
accommodation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney—collapsed in 1985. On Lévesque‘s 
death in 1987, a hundred thousand mourners washed into the streets (Conway, 2004). The 
subsequent failure of the 1990 Meech Lake Accord was exploited to support the 
formation of the Bloc Québécois, a sovereignist party in the federal House of Commons. 
The Charlottetown Accord‘s failure, followed by the Bloc‘s rise to official opposition in 
1993, would push the indépendantistes back to a hairs-length from victory in the 1995 
sovereignty referendum. 49.4 percent voted ―Oui‖ to secede from Canada, if efforts to 
negotiate a new partnership with Québec were unsuccessful. 
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 As Conway (2004) recounts, the impact on Lévesque was devastating: ―Evidence presented to the 
McDonald Commission, a royal commission established in 1977 to inquire into the RCMP‘s secret ―dirty 
tricks‖ campaign against separation in Québec, revealed the high quality of the information obtained by the 
RCMP from ―paid sources in the PQ,‖ including ―the annual budget of the PQ, a project for an independent 
Québec, a possible Québec cabinet shuffle, the legislative priorities of the Québec government, a proposed 
federal-provincial agreement and the instructions from a Québec cabinet minister to Québec public servants 
on how they could use federal funds abroad to promote Québec interests.‖ (p. 118) 
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One central theme throughout this secessionist period had special significance for co-
operative development: the theme of economic fear. The province was plagued by a 
series of recessions—in the mid-70s, in 1981-82, and in 1990-93 (Girard, 1999). The 
shifting base of Canadian capitalism to Toronto and the initial shocks of globalization 
both hit Montréal hard. They presented two disturbing trends to an already politically 
anxious and economically insecure Québec working class. Separatists cast Québec‘s 
economic woes as a function of limited powers and wrong-headed federal policies; 
Ottawa sold its transfer payments and program spending as a lifeline without which 
Québec would certainly plunge into a far more desperate crisis. As Conway (2004) has 
documented, politics in Québec throughout this period were largely shaped by this 
debate.  
 
In 1978, the PQ drew the battle lines with the introduction of Bill 101, enforcing English 
as the official language in all areas of life. Like the dramatic spectacle of capital flight 
seared into the public‘s imagination by Royal Trust‘s convoy of Brinks trucks in 1970, 
Sun Life Insurance very publicly announced it would now move its head office from 
Montréal to Toronto: ―There was a haemorrhage of English head offices leaving Québec 
in the ensuing years, including, according to a survey by Québec‘s organized business 
lobby, 629 firms between 1979 and 1982 alone‖ (Conway, 2004, p. 101). This 
politicization of investment decisions was polarizing. It led both to trauma and increased 
anxiety for an economically vulnerable population and to outrage and defiance for 
sovereignists and trade unionists, in particular. The importance of economic policy and 
economic reassurance to a nervous electorate could not have been clearer to the 
indépendantistes. Predictably, a renewed interest in the development of member-based, 
territorially-rooted co-operatives resulted. They were owned and controlled by 
Francophone Québécois and they were not a flight risk. This new interest in co-operatives 
was shared by federalists eager to stabilize the union. Jobs lost to Anglo-capital flight and 
global structural adjustment concentrated the attention of a wide constituency on job 
creation. 
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The downgrading of the PQ‘s credit rating in 1982 accelerated the rollback of state 
investment and program spending. Since it coincided with a deep recession (McGrane, 
2007), it also reinforced the need for grassroots economic action. Much as the early 
Rochdale co-ops benefited from the release of activist energy and commitment after the 
political failure of Chartism (Fairbairn, 1994), many sovereignty and federalist activists 
alike now embraced local economic action between elections and referenda. For example, 
one CDR manager described the co-operative movement to the author as an expression of 
the cultural struggle for national emancipation and the francization of the economy.  
 
In the run up to the Charlottetown referendum in 1992 and the 1994 Québec election, 
economic fear appeared to be realizing diminishing returns for federalist forces. 
Sovereignists were pushing back. Grassroots backlash encouraged many Québec 
businesses, including the Chambre de Commerce du Québec, to opt for neutrality during 
the Charlottetown Referendum.
43
 The legitimacy of federalist scare tactics took another 
blow when Pierre Trudeau, former prime minister and iconic foe of independence, 
denounced the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. In a 1 October speech, he railed against 
Accord advocates‘ economic scare tactics. The highly publicized and credible criticism 
made it difficult to deploy these tactics effectively. Trudeau‘s dramatic move likely pre-
empted federalists from pursuing scare tactics as energetically as they might have 
(Conway, 2004). 
 
Similarly, in the run up to the 1994 provincial election the banks encountered stiff 
opposition to their gloomy economic forecasts for a sovereign Québec. Once again, the 
Royal Bank weighed in against sovereignty and once again the sovereignists pushed 
back. The difference this time was that the balance of public opinion had shifted. 
According to a January 1994 Gallup poll the province was nearly split on whether 
Québec would be economically better or worse off outside Canada (Conway, 2004). The 
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 ―These decisions may have had something to do with the hostility faced by the Royal Bank in Québec 
following its intervention on the Yes side. Many customers in Québec closed their accounts in protest, Non 
stickers were plastered on many branches, and Non campaign leader Parizeau accused the bank of profiting 
by secretly speculating on the sharp decline in the Canadian dollar that the bank had helped to provoke‖ 
(Conway, 2004, p. 155). 
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confidence of the PQ in taking the offensive against Bay Street had shifted too. Building 
on the new realities of a borderless world posed by globalization and the (post Free Trade 
Agreement) continental economy, the new leadership of the PQ and the Bloc argued that 
sovereignty now made even better economic sense. They also intimated that a PQ 
government was ready and willing to punish the banks for fear-mongering.
44
 
 
In the 1995 referendum, federalists would once again resort to scare tactics. This time, 
the Péquistes would retaliate with more than self-confident rhetoric. When Standard 
Life‘s Claude Garcia urged voters to ―crush‖ the separatists, putting the sovereignty issue 
to rest once and for all, the government called for bids on $11.5 million worth of 
insurance contracts held by Standard Life. The PQ also fired Garcia from his position as 
Chair of the board of the Université du Québec á Montréal. Receiving the message, this 
time the business community would largely sit the campaign out. What is more, business 
leaders were divided on sovereignty. Those opposed confined their efforts to backstage 
contributions to the Non campaign, which strove to create a crisis atmosphere. Prime 
Minister Chretien suggested the Québécois might lose their pensions, currency (and 
therefore their savings), and passports. Provincial Liberal leader Daniel Johnson 
predicted average tax increases of $3,000, a mushrooming deficit, and an immediate loss 
of 92,000 jobs. Federal Finance Minister Paul Martin claimed a Oui vote would 
jeopardize a million jobs (Conway, 2004). 
  
Even after the razor-thin victory of the Non forces in the 1995 referendum, the economic 
warfare continued. As Conway argues, the federal government‘s post-referendum 
strategy had four elements. First, it aimed to destabilize the Québec economy by forcing 
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 ―Parizeau, a distinguished economist, a top-level career civil servant and academic, and member of the 
economic elite himself, was particularly confident in his knowledge and experience and dealt easily with 
complex economic issues, preferring to attack federalism as a drag on Québec‘s economy rather than 
apologizing for sovereignty or agreeing there might be large costs involved. Indeed Parizeau consistently 
blamed federalism and the constitutional deadlock for Québec‘s stagnant economy and high unemployment 
and poverty figures…. Whenever prominent business leaders or financial institutions warned about the 
heavy costs of sovereignty, Parizeau and Bouchard were both quick to rap their knuckles for ―fear-
mongering‖… Parizeau and PQ candidate Daniel Paillé implied that banks, brokerage houses and other 
financial institutions that persisted in such economic fear tactics in the run-up to the Québec election would 
pay a price after a PQ victory in lost business. The result was fewer negative interventions from the 
business community‖ (Conway, 2004, pp. 193-4). 
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the PQ to contend with internal challenges from English language rights groups, 
partitionists, and from Ottawa. This undermined its ability to focus on good government. 
Second, it polarized by encouraging extremists in the minority and business communities, 
a classic form of low-intensity conflict meant to further undermine the resolve of the 
indépendantistes, and frighten away their soft support. Third, these tactics were meant to 
destroy the PQ, even if it meant losing Liberal seats in the next federal election. Finally, 
by punishing business friends of sovereignty and rewarding its vocal critics with high 
profile business patronage, Ottawa further divided the sovereignty movement. The PQ 
was caught between business demands for spending and tax cuts, on the one hand, and 
demands for new spending from its social democratic base, on the other (Conway, 2004). 
 
This highly charged environment set the stage for the first 1996 economic summit, which 
would lead to the historic inclusion of the community sector and the creation of the 
working group on the social economy, le Chantier de l’économie sociale. Given the 
threats posed by globalization, capital flight, and the retreat of the state, the achievements 
of popular economic innovations over the past two decades, and the cumulative effects of 
the recession of 1990-93 (Girard, 1999), the timing was auspicious for a concerted 
mobilization of popular movement forces. State support would follow. 
  
5.4 The new political economy of co-operation in Québec  
The three inter-locking crises of globalization, the KWS, and Canadian federalism 
defined the new political economy of co-operative development in Québec, profoundly 
shaping the autonomy and structure of Québec‘s co-operative field.45 However, these 
contradictions would not simply create new threats to co-operative development. They 
also created an environment for social innovation. In this emerging culture of open-ended 
economic possibility, the co-operative model was seen as a solution. Co-operative 
development was harnessed to solve the problems of deindustrialization and job loss, to 
compensate for the inability of the state to deliver needed new public services, and even 
as the basis for a more stable, more territorially-rooted economy in which French was the 
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 As Giddens (1983) has argued, ―the more there is a fusion or ‗overlap‘ of contradictions, the greater the 
likelihood of conflict and the greater likelihood that such conflict will be intense‖ (p. 145). 
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language of work and Francophones could move up the ranks to management. Co-
operation was a resurgent feature of a distinct new Québécois development model.  
 
The fusion of these contradictions generated intense conflict and diverse popular 
movement responses. Trade unions turned to worker co-operation as a mechanism to 
arrest job loss. Communities organized community development corporations (CDCs) to 
overcome local and regional under-development. The women‘s movement organized 
regional social economy committees to campaign for social infrastructure and women‘s 
employment in areas like childcare and homecare. Sovereignists, socialists, and social 
democrats all increasingly recognized the importance of economic action to advancing 
their larger social projects. Federalists, many of whom were also socialists and social 
democrats, recognized the importance of reinforcing the role of the Canadian state in 
aiding the Québec economy. However, this groundswell of diverse initiatives and actors 
would also drive a longer range confluence of social movements toward increasingly 
ambitious, and co-ordinated, forms of popular economic action. This insurgency from 
below would condition the co-operative movement‘s growth, character, and innovation 
capacity over the next three decades. 
 
5.5 Understanding the “co-operative boom” in Québec (1980-2010)  
It is tempting to characterize the past three decades of innovation and achievement in 
Québec as a co-operative boom. However, the term ―boom‖ connotes a merely 
quantitative, all-encompassing growth of already-existing sectors. It is, therefore, a 
misleading characterization of a deeply contradictory situation in which there was strong 
growth in some sectors but colossal failures in others. This was, rather, a shift in the 
balance of power from distressed or stagnant sectors to the new growth poles of the 
movement, i.e., the emerging sectors. It was a transformation of the structure of the co-
operative movement that was very fluid and subject also to reversals. 
 
Some established sectors continued to prosper in the restructured new global marketplace 
of the eighties. While free trade brought the threat of competition from American 
financial service companies, by 1993 Desjardins bought out a private sector competitor, 
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La Laurentienne, a $20 billion acquisition (Girard, 1999). Indeed, by 1996, Desjardins 
had consolidated its position, with five million members (out of a provincial population 
of seven million), assets of almost $83 million and 1300 caisses across Québec 
(Lévesque & Ninacs, 2000). Today, it is expanding across Canada. 
 
Emerging sectors also made headway. In 1985, both the worker co-operatives and the 
worker co-operatives in the forestry sector established federations. Through a strategy of 
aggressive diversification, forestry co-operatives took up logging and wood processing, 
seedling production, forestry management, and reforestation, and became a leading 
player in the local development of resource regions. They generated an annual turnover 
approaching half a billion dollars by mid-decade (Girard, 1999). Indeed, first among the 
many accomplishments of this period of social innovation was the early boom in worker 
co-operative development. From 1993 to 2003, this sector posted an eighty-seven percent 
rate of growth (Craddock & Kennedy, 2006). Worker co-operatives, a historic footnote to 
the co-operative movement, accounted for ten percent of all co-operatives in Québec by 
the turn of the millennium. Worker co-operatives in forestry alone accounted for eighteen 
percent of all co-op sector jobs (Vézina, 2001).  
 
This ―wedge sector‖ also acted as a powerful demonstration case for broader co-operative 
possibility, particularly in job creation, and for the involvement of workers in new co-
operative structures. Consequently, this period also marks the adoption of the worker-
shareholder co-operative and solidarity co-operative models—and the exponential growth 
of these new sectors. These hybrid models have each since overtaken the worker co-
operative as growth poles of the sector. While legislation enabling the incorporation of 
worker shareholder co-ops was not passed until 1983 (Girard, 1999), these co-operatives, 
which fuse worker and shareholder stakes, already accounted for nine percent of all jobs 
in the entire Québec co-operative sector by 2001 (Vezina, 2001). By 2006, there were 65 
worker-shareholder co-operatives, employing 3,991 people in Québec. There were 172 
solidarity co-operatives, employing 2,674. While marginal in a macro-economic sense, 
when combined with the 7,009 people employed by the province‘s 184 worker co-
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operatives, the net employment created by these emerging sectors (13, 674) constituted a 
full third of jobs in Québec‘s non-financial co-operative sector  (Clement, 2009).  
 
In 1987, the funeral co-operatives formed a federation, five housing co-operative 
federations consolidated into one sectoral organization and the worker shareholder co-
operative model began to extend the reach of worker-led co-operative organization into 
capital-intensive enterprises that were previously beyond the reach of workers‘ savings 
alone. In 1990, the CCQ commissioned a study on this new model‘s prospects. 
 
Other sectors suffered very real setbacks. In the recession of 1982, for example, the 
federation of co-operative food stores collapsed. The following year, the federation of 
fishers‘ co-operatives also folded (Girard, 1999). Indeed, Lévesque (1990) paints an 
alarming portrait of the ―disaster‖ of the recession‘s collateral damage in the traditional 
co-operative movement.
46
 
 
Further complicating matters, there were also many reversals of fortune for these sectors. 
For example, in the late nineties, the steady growth of school co-operatives encountered 
stiff competition from e-commerce in the book trade and virtual libraries. During the 
same period, the worker co-operative sector also became a victim of its own successes. 
Worker co-operative advocates interviewed explained that the sector‘s rapid growth 
inspired wider efforts to organize more flexible models like the solidarity co-operative, 
and more capital-intensive worker-shareholder co-operatives that could generate more 
jobs per start-up. They also explained that forestry worker co-operatives took a particular 
hit when the industry fell on hard times after 2000. Despite co-operative innovations in 
agro-forestry and some resilient worker co-ops, the global market increasingly favoured 
the fast timber growth, low wages, and low taxes of the tropical lumber harvest. 
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 ―These included: the disbandment of the caisses d’entraide économique; the liquidation of the 
Fédération des magasins Coop and the failure of several Cooprix stores; the financial difficulties, then 
failure, of Pêcheurs-Unis; the disappearance of the Ligue des Caisses d’économie; the mergers (to 
consolidate enterprises in financial difficulties) of the Féderation des caisses d’économie and of the small 
Féderation de Montréal with the Fédération de Montréal et de l’Ouest-du-Québec; the reduction in the 
number of federation members of the CCQ and the marginalization of this organization; not to mention the 
disappearance of the (CCQ) publication Ensemble!‖ (Lévesque, 1990, pp. 119 - 120). 
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By contrast, in 1994, a new food consumers‘ federation arose from the ashes of the 
federation which had failed a decade earlier. Also that year, co-operation penetrated new 
sectors in cable television, agricultural machinery, and agricultural manpower co-
operatives. By the late nineties, funeral co-operatives had captured thirty percent of the 
provincial market (Girard, 1999). Even the CCQ emerged after ―many years of 
inactivity‖ to help drive the development of home care services and in the establishment 
of a co-operative education fund and a foundation to manage it. As Vézina notes, by 
2000, the apex organization once disinterested in development activity was ―increasingly 
serving as a catalyst in penetrating new sectors when asked to do so‖ (2001, p. 144). 
Many informants confirmed this perception of a critical ―turn-around‖ at the CCQ. 
 
5.5.1 Uneven development 
In reality, the ―co-operative boom‖ was a deeply uneven and contradictory period of 
volatility, transition, and innovation. Job growth from 2002 to 2006 still varied widely 
from sector to sector. At the bottom of the rung is the once-explosive worker co-operative 
sector. Decimated by the forestry crisis and ―diluted‖ by worker shareholder and 
solidarity co-operative incorporations, it posted a net loss of one percent. In the mid-
range, at 16-17 percent, were the producer and consumer co-operative sectors. Leading 
the field in this period were the solidarity co-operatives, with a dramatic 21 percent jump, 
and the worker shareholder co-operatives, with a 25 percent gain in jobs created 
(Clement, 2009). Through these ups and downs over the last three decades, the very 
structure of co-operation in Québec has been transformed. Rather than treat this as a 
boom period for co-operation, it makes more sense to understand this as a series of 
sector-specific booms, fuelled by frenetic activity in research, innovation, and 
organization. It was centred on the worker co-operative, worker-shareholder co-operative, 
and solidarity co-operative sectors—in that order, although with considerable overlap. 
These growth poles of the renewed co-operative movement were driven by systematic 
innovation dissemination mechanisms such as the CDR network. The roll out of these 
models was also strategic. The systematic conversion of ambulance services to worker 
co-operatives was union-led. The ambulance sector, which didn‘t feature a single co-
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operative at the outset of this period, included 700 unionized employees in five co-
operatives by 1999. They held the dominant market position in seven administrative 
regions (Girard, 1999). Home-care services were targeted for delivery by solidarity co-
operatives. Like funeral co-operatives, launched to counter multinational incursion into 
the Québec market, home care was also rolled out as part of a concerted sector 
development strategy. These three target sectors alone account for a considerable share of 
new co-operative development activity in this period. Their rapid rise to dominant market 
positions had powerful promotion effects for co-operative innovation in Québec. Indeed, 
the tone of discussions with interview subjects in Québec was underwritten by a 
consistently striking tone of pride and confidence in the movement‘s momentum. 
 
5.5.2 Renewal 
The Québec co-operative ―boom‖ was more than a simple, quantitative growth spurt 
which made the already existing co-operative sector larger. It also represented the 
regeneration of the co-operative movement within a transformed co-operative field. This 
renewal process led to entirely new sectors, and co-operative models. It also forced a 
radical reappraisal of attitudes toward the importance of sector, state, and civil society 
involvements in development activity. Through this field transformation, the previously 
dominated ―new co-ops‖ of the third wave gained the necessary traction to take off as 
engines of job growth, regional development, and the delivery of key proximity services.  
 
Far from the governing disinterest in development characteristic of the CCQ ―old guard‖ 
that dominated in the seventies (Lévesque, 1990), development now emerged as a 
legitimate, and leading, concern of the reconstituted new co-operative movement. The 
CCQ even assumed management of the province‘s major development infrastructure, the 
network of eleven CDRs. This shift from rejecting the role of initiating or promoting new 
co-operatives to aggressively embracing a lead role was a fundamental shift in identity 
and priorities. It was a major victory for the new co-ops, their social movement allies, and 
the ―partnership state.‖ The CCQ had moved a long distance in a very short period. 
Under the statist regime of economic nationalism in the late seventies, it had been a 
traditional lobby group and a reluctant development partner. By the nineties, it was an 
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increasingly reflexive, modernizing, and developmental movement. It had become a full 
partner in what Vaillancourt (2009) has described as the ―co-construction of public 
policy‖ within the span of two decades. The eighties was the turn-around decade. 
Something very fundamental had changed about co-operative development in Québec 
during this period. The Québec development system is today the envy of co-operators 
across North America.  
 
What are the foundations and dynamics of this rapid and dramatic period of social 
innovation? On the one hand, the Old Social Economy co-operatives were organized 
hierarchically, under the umbrella of the CCQ and sectoral federations, a template drawn 
from the industrial, Fordist model of organization. New co-ops were marginalized within 
this fraternity, ―old co-ops‖ dominated,47 and clear boundaries were established between 
co-operatives and other social movements or non-profit organizations (NPOs). They 
might share values and objectives but did not use the co-operative legal model and were 
therefore ―outsiders‖ to leaders of the co-operative establishment. On the other hand, the 
New Social Economy, which began to emerge in the eighties, was characterized by a 
post-Fordist network model in which ―new co-ops,‖ new constituencies, and new 
alliances were part of a wider associative dynamic and innovation system that actively 
supported the development of new co-operatives. In this alliance, supportive social 
movements and NPOs that shared the values of the ―social economy‖ were embraced in 
an effort to build a wider, stronger, and development-focused movement for democratic 
economic action. This split was an evolution of the seventies conflict between the 
fraternity of ―old co-ops‖ and the insurgency of the ―new co-ops.‖ By the late nineties, it 
would evolve into a rivalry for leadership of the co-operative movement—between the 
limited aims of the co-operative sector‘s CQCM (formerly the CCQ) and the Chantier de 
l’économie sociale, which also included non-profits and social movement organizations 
in a wider network with a much bolder developmental mission. This was largely a battle 
between the agrarian-financial, anti-statist, and conservative Old Social Economy and the 
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 As Lévesque (1990) documents, ―in 1983, the 15-member administrative council (of the CCQ) included 
seven representatives from the insurance sector and four from the savings and credit sector, ‗comprising a 
74 percent representation coming from the financial sector‘‖ (p. 120). 
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more urban, activist, and left-leaning ranks of the New Social Economy. But the new 
regime of democratic partnership was fundamental to co-operative regeneration in this 
period.  
 
5.6 The new co-operation in context: State, civil society, and the rise of 
“democratic partnership” 
In the seventies, co-operation was embedded in a configuration dominated by economic 
nationalism. In the nineties, it would become embedded in a new configuration 
characterized by the recognition of the social economy (Vaillancourt, 2009). But in the 
eighties, the co-operative movement was in transition. In this shifting environment of 
structural change and rapid innovation, different sectors and regions of the movement 
were challenged in different ways. However, the strength of the movement, both 
structural and political, positioned the co-operative model well as a credible solution to 
the new problems faced by the popular movements and the state.  
 
The social base and organizational structures of co-operation were transformed through 
this period. There were differences, divisions, and discord, although this transition has 
also helped regenerate and strengthen the movement as a whole. The sectoral bases for 
sustained development booms shifted over the last three decades, but co-operative launch 
rates remain vigorous. Start-ups doubled from 1995 to 2009. In fact, since 2003, more 
than fifty percent of the new co-operatives developed in Canada are located in Québec 
(Clement, 2009). What is more, with the support of innovations such as the CDR 
network, co-operatives in Québec are over twice as likely to survive ten years as investor-
owned firms (Bond, et al., 1999) so these gains are relatively durable.  
 
This vigorous pattern of innovation, growth, and co-operative sustainability is, in part, a 
function of the ―steering mechanism‖ of state-sector coordination. As Côté and Vézina 
(2001) argue, ―It is the combination of a series of initiatives, prompted both by the state 
and the co-operative movement itself and, better still, by concerted action by both that 
allows a co-operative to expand into traditional sectors of activity and penetrate new 
areas of promise still untapped‖ (p. 76). This innovation-adoption process consists of 
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three steps: 1) researchers build the model; 2) acting as ―social entrepreneurs,‖ they 
solicit sector commitment; and 3) acting as ―policy entrepreneurs,‖ they solicit state 
investment. With a working model, sector co-operation, and state resources and support 
in place, the innovation can be effectively rolled out. 
 
In the late seventies, when the established sector was still focused on international 
development, respondents explained that innovation was driven by researchers at HEC 
(Jean Claude Guérard and Benoît Tremblay, in particular), playing a leading role in 
conceptualizing the CDR network. In fact, Tremblay would leave the HEC to implement 
the program as Assistant Deputy Minister for Co-operatives at the Industry and 
Commerce Ministry from 1984-86 (Tremblay, 1985). The HEC would also play a pivotal 
role in the organization of an international conference on worker co-operatives in 1996 
(Girard, 1999) and in developing and promoting the worker shareholder and solidarity 
co-operative models.  
 
Through ongoing consultation and involvement of the sector, and the demonstration 
effect of these innovations, the HEC helped thaw sector reluctance to participate in 
development efforts. Of course, the specialist research support system for movement 
renewal extended far beyond HEC. It also included dedicated researchers, networks like a 
Canadian chapter of the Centre international de recherches et d’information sur 
l’économie publique, sociale et coopérative (CIRIEC-Canada), the Centre de recherche 
sur les innovations sociales (CRISES), research alliances like the Alliance de recherche 
université-communauté en économie sociale (ARUC-ÉS), and the Réseau québécois de 
recherche partenariale en économie sociale (RQRP-ÉS), institutions like the Institut de 
recherche et d’éducation pour les coopératives et les mutuelles de l’Université de 
Sherbrooke (IRECUS), research chairs, and journals like Co-opératives et développement 
(later the Revue Économie et Solidarités). Through encounters with the policy and 
research communities and the CCQ consultations and conferences led by CCQ President 
Claude Béland through the eighties, subjects recounted how the sector increasingly 
opened itself up to the possibilities of new sector development, particularly after the CCQ 
discontinued its international development work under pressure from Desjardins and Co-
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op Fédérée. Presently, two professors specializing in co-operatives serve as observers on 
the CQCM board of directors: Marie Bouchard (UQAM) and Louis Favreau (UQO). 
 
In the present context, this process of sector-state concertation, facilitated and brokered 
in part by engaged academics, remains crucial. One illustration described to the author is 
the ―internal market‖ in research and development funds of $1 million a year, ear-marked 
by the state and sector to finance co-operative innovation. In this process, a state-sector 
committee reviews competitive proposals. (Since emerging co-operative sectors are the 
principal beneficiaries of this process, they are excluded from the adjudication process to 
avoid conflicts of interest). In the year 2009, the forestry workers co-operative 
federation—which was under significant strain—presented several projects. The 
committee approved two: one for short-term technical assistance to distressed co-
operatives; the other for longer-range work on bio-mass, viewed as a potential solution to 
the forestry industry crisis. Typically, sector-federations submit five to ten proposals and 
one or two will be funded. 
 
There are other examples of this continuous and comprehensive dialogue. It is now 
institutionalized through a dense network of state-sector committees and consultations, in 
which academic experts are often involved. These include a ―think-tank‖ made up of 
about fifteen people, including staff from the government‘s co-operatives branch, 
recognized research experts such as Benoît Lévesque, Daniel Côté, and Jean-Pierre 
Girard, and established co-operative representatives from Desjardins and Co-op Fédérée. 
Many key breakthroughs have emerged from this roundtable exercise, according to key 
informants. For example, the idea of the Desjardins Regional and Co-operative 
Development Fund, passed into law in June 2001, came out of roundtable discussions 
about means to finance larger projects. The concept rested on a state-sector negotiation. 
Desjardins accepted the mandate to focus investments on co-operatives and regional 
development in exchange for preferential tax treatment akin to the RRSP-eligible labour 
tax credits first offered by the Solidarity Fund two decades earlier. The RRSP incentive 
made the concept attractive to an aging population.  
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Similarly, in one conversation, a study collaborator described how a new policy was 
adopted by Desjardins in 2007 to take an equity stake in retirement successions structured 
as worker shareholder co-operatives (including at least a 15 percent management and 15 
percent worker stake). In this scheme, Desjardins takes on annual investments of up to 70 
percent in 5 to 10 new businesses, employing over 100 workers each. The scheme has 
already resulted in the retention of 180 jobs at a Montréal software plant. A plant 
employing over 1000 workers was in development in 2009. Since the success of this 
policy hinges on the availability of CDR network support for promotion and 
implementation, joint state-sector coordination was crucial to its development. 
 
Continuous, multi-party strategic reflection creates important social capital (trust, 
information exchange, and norms of reciprocity) (Coleman, 1988) and joint-leadership 
for sector development. It provides a forum for periodic high-level review of the four key 
axes of co-operative development policy to meet emerging challenges: law, financial 
instruments, technical assistance, and strategic planning. Corporatism helped build 
strategic clarity, commitment, and ―concertation‖ at the highest level. 
 
This model of tight corporatism has also facilitated increased involvement of the sector in 
development planning. The partnership agreement with the CCQ in 2004, in which the 
federation assumed management of the state-funded CDR network, was a ―turning point‖ 
in this process. Ten years ago, the state drove development; now the sector plays an 
important leadership role. According to one source, the president of the CCQ now meets 
monthly with the head of the provincial co-operatives branch to discuss problem areas 
and progress on priorities. At the time of writing, priorities were bio-mass, wind energy, 
health care co-operatives, proximity services, worker shareholder co-operatives, and 
daycare. Each area requires different kinds of support, much taken on by the CQCM 
since 2000 when it began to build internal research capacity. The author was told that this 
has enabled the CQCM to participate more directly in research collaborations such as 
those of the federally-funded ARUC-ÉS research alliance, further breaking down the 
division between academic and movement research. 
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As the market restructuring and neo-liberalism of the eighties swept the province, the 
movement from a ―market regulation paradigm‖ to a "partnership regulation paradigm‖ is 
relevant (Caillouette, 2004). Sector-state partnership has clearly been hard fought for 
over the last three decades and highly consequential for new co-operative development in 
Québec.
48
 Indicative of this new level of sophistication in state-sector co-ordination, and 
central to the present-day Québec model of co-operative development, is the CDR 
network. However, this achievement is also deeply embedded in a whole string of social 
movement struggles, and institutional and political reforms; that is, in an ongoing process 
of social innovation. Simply put, the CDR network is a development mechanism within a 
larger social innovation network of co-operatives, trade unions, social movements, 
researchers, and other economic intermediaries and regional development actors. This 
innovation network creates the conditions of the CDR network‘s possibility, supports its 
successful operation and protects it against regression or elimination by hostile 
administrations. It is ―embedded‖ in a movement for co-operative development and in a 
social bloc that unifies powerful institutional actors. That movement overlapped, but was 
distinct from, the co-operative movement itself. Its reach also extends far beyond the 
state that funds it. 
 
It would be a mistake to consider Québec‘s co-operative sector in isolation from its 
associative ties to an extended social movement family (SMF). This wider SMF doubly 
determines the context for co-operative action. First, the SMF significantly constitutes the 
―internal life‖ of the co-operative movement by virtue of the overlapping involvements 
and affinities of their respective membership bases. Many of the members of these 
distinct movements are, in fact, the same people. Just as they have been from its inception 
in the nineteenth century, co-operative movement activists are often active in community 
and trade union movements. Many activists now also overlap the women‘s movement. 
                                                 
48
 Vézina captures some of the underlying institutional and social conditions that made the achievements of 
this period possible: ―Over the years, under the influence of the players involved in the co-operative 
movement, conditions for co-operative development in the province of Québec have improved considerably 
in several regards: legislation is better adapted to current needs; co-operative forms are more diverse and 
flexible; financial, tax and support tools are more effective; and there exists a greater degree of 
cohesiveness within the co-operative movement as a whole. Co-operative potential therefore is asserting 
itself more and more openly in relation to emergent social and economic changes.‖ (Vézina, 2001, p. 149) 
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The culture of co-operation is thus an aspect of the broader culture of the popular 
movements. It reflects the structure and balance of power within and between, those 
associated movements. Indeed, many co-operative leaders‘ involvements are principally 
driven not by co-operative values as such, but as a means to realize other fundamental 
values. Many co-operative activists in the eighties have been drawn to the movement by 
nationalist, socialist, social democratic, or social Catholic convictions (Vaillancourt, 
2009). The SMF, in large part, creates the content of the co-operative movement‘s 
program and ideology; it helps forge the movement‘s political culture ―from within.‖ 
 
Second, the SMF helps define the co-operative movement‘s ―external field‖ of operation. 
Public policies that favour co-operative penetration of new sectors are conditioned by the 
strength of the social democratic, indépendantiste, and communitarian movements. The 
strength of community movements, most notably the trade unions, the women‘s 
movement, and the service-based community organizations active in the health and social 
service sectors, have played key roles in shaping the co-operative movement‘s 
development path in recent decades. The SMF thus creates much of the context for the 
co-operative movement‘s program and ideology of the day, ―from outside.‖ It helps shape 
the popular political culture within which the co-operative movement must manoeuvre. 
 
Indeed, following on McAdam (1982), it is important to understand the social movement 
for co-operative development innovation since the eighties as a political process. One 
result of the confluence of these diverse social movements in the terrain of economic 
action during this period was the concerted political mobilization for a new development 
accord. This movement for ―concertation‖ characterized the co-operative movement‘s 
SMF relations, relations within the co-operative movement, and relations between the 
movement and the state. The formation of the CDR network in 1985 was only one 
important expression of this new regime of ―democratic partnership‖ (Vaillancourt, 
2009). An alternative to both welfare-statism and neo-liberalism, the partnership 
regulation paradigm (PRP) (Caillouette, 2004) had to be fought for, consolidated, 
defended, and continually improved to survive. This complex realignment created the 
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institutional basis for the CDR‘s broad-based technical assistance mobilization, a key 
driver of Québec‘s development boom over the last three decades.  
 
As the emergence of the social economy movement demonstrates empirically, it is often 
social movements that drive established sector and state responses. Social movements can 
condition the possibilities for the development and direction of these kinds of sector and 
state action, including the possibility of joint-agency. Indeed, it will be argued below that 
three particularly important episodes of popular economic insurgency helped create 
conditions for the sector and the state to come to the table. In each case, the first movers 
of social innovation were neither state nor co-operative sector leaders. Rather, they were 
social movement actors from outside the established co-operative movement.  
 
These players need to be understood as part of co-operation‘s extended social movement 
family (i.e. the social economy). However, it is significant to our understanding of co-
operative development that they are each also very clearly outside the established co-
operative sector and the state apparatus. Of course, it is almost certainly true that 
individual civil servants, CCQ officials, and politicians supported the emerging 
movement regeneration agenda. In particular instances, it is above doubt that officials in 
key positions have advised and encouraged particular courses of action for the 
movements. However, it is also clear that they relied on social movement pressures to 
open up political space for manoeuvre. As the entrenched reluctance of old co-op and 
state elites to take the lead in co-operative development demonstrates, the role of social 
movement activists in the emerging housing and worker co-operative sectors, and at the 
regional level, were critical in forcing a new accord. Through the eighties and nineties co-
operative movement regeneration was driven by:  
 
1) an early turn to labour as a development agent—a process already underway 
through the seventies; 
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2) a turn to community economic development strategies beginning in the early 
eighties, and built largely on the organization and energy of the mouvement 
communautaire; and 
3) a turn to the social economy, driven at first by the women‘s movement, in the 
mid-nineties.  
 
Each aspect of this unfolding popular sector response to globalization-related dislocations 
featured a different ―first mover‖ in the innovation-chain. Yet, their cumulative effect 
was to disrupt the structure of the co-operative field, challenge the established practices 
and understandings of lead-actors, and draw out the attention and support of the research 
community and state.  
 
Overall, then, it is important to understand the contradictory pressures at work in this 
period of restructuring. It was driven both by the globalizing market-logic of de-
industrialization and neo-liberalism from above and by a democratizing logic of popular 
economic action from below. To a significant extent, the established co-operative 
movement and the state found themselves caught between these pressures. The 
implications of market-driven restructuring ―from above‖ were understandably the main 
initial preoccupations of the established co-operative movement. It moved to manage the 
threats and opportunities posed by economic globalization (such as investment and trade 
liberalization, deregulation, etc.) for its own operations. However, as the broader social 
and economic impact of market-driven restructuring was met by a popular movement 
response, the cultural self-understandings of social movement actors, their relationships, 
and the popular understanding of economic possibility were fundamentally altered. Co-
operatives, which have both an enterprise and an associative life, were uniquely 
conflicted. They faced contradictory pressures both to adapt to new competitive realities 
in the marketplace and to respond to new member needs and movement pressures. While 
the state and co-operative sector retreated in the face of structural adjustment, the social 
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movements mounted their own popular responses and extended the horizon of co-
operative possibility. 
 
5.7 Labour steps up: Co-operation as a solution to the jobs crisis 
The first front in the popular economic insurgency of the eighties in Québec involved a 
rediscovery of the worker co-operative and the place of the labour movement in co-
operative development. In part, this ―labour turn‖ in co-operative development built on 
the ongoing urbanization of the movement. Mutual economic aid funds and consumer, 
housing, and school co-operatives had urbanized the co-operative formula after the 1960s 
(Vézina, 2001). The worker co-operative revival emerged as part of this co-operative 
rattrapage by the late seventies. It recognized the development gap between the old, 
rural-based sectors and the new needs in the cities, mostly for employment.  
 
The legitimation of the worker co-operative was a significant break with co-operative 
convention and the established structure of authority. Encountering considerable 
resistance from the ―old co-op‖ circles which dominated the CCQ, the orphaned sector 
first sought refuge under the protective wing of the state in the seventies. However, as the 
leading role of state-led economic nationalism eroded, recessionary pressures in the late 
seventies and early eighties pressed the labour movement to take direct action on the jobs 
crisis. Worker co-operation benefited considerably from being adopted by the 
Confédération des syndicates nationaux, a powerful movement patron from outside the 
co-operative movement. Unlike the CCQ, the CSN had deep roots in the urban centres 
and the productive life of the urban working class. Also, unlike the CCQ, its members 
had a pressing personal need to find solutions to unemployment. Indeed, against the 
threat of de-industrialization, the leading federations of the Québec labour movement 
moved beyond traditional collective bargaining to enter the arena of direct economic 
action to protect and create jobs. This reorientation also redefined the development 
frontier for co-operatives, particularly worker co-operatives.  
 
This shift represented more than a new development path for previously marginalized 
worker co-operatives. Opening up a second development front in the cities also disrupted 
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the established structure of co-operative development. This parallel movement, like the 
workers who populated it, would be strongly influenced by its patron, the trade union 
movement. This set the stage for new forms of movement-to-movement co-operation. It 
also helped set the stage for subsequently bitter inter-movement rivalry. It pitted the old 
social economy, essentially the old co-ops which dominated the CCQ, against the new 
social economy. The NSE included the new co-ops in a social movement alliance with 
other groups that shared their values and preoccupation with development.  
 
Although union-based worker co-operative organizing has its Québec roots in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century efforts of the Knights of Labour (Quarter, 1992; 
1995; Bennett, 1987; Bridault & Lafrenière, 1989), labour‘s rediscovery of this tradition 
is rooted in 1968. In that year, the CSN launched a ―second front‖ in favour of a social 
wage. This was a move beyond bread and butter unionism in favour of coalitions with 
community movements and the women‘s movement to press for social reform (Raboy, 
1984). It is important to note that unionization rates doubled from 1961 to 1971 
(McGrane, 2007). With their new power and momentum, unions were vigorously 
involved in co-operative promotion in the seventies, including the CSN‘s creation of the 
Caisse d’économie solidaire Desjardins in 1971 (Vaillancourt, 2009, p. 30). The Caisse 
would help labour take control of its own capital and redirect it to socially useful 
purposes like job creation. It would emerge as the lead financier for the worker co-
operative movement. Labour‘s response to the recessions of 1981-82 was built on its 
support for worker co-operatives in the seventies.  
 
The CSN brought the co-operative movement, indépendantistes, workers, and the 
Péquiste government into closer dialogue. This emerging concertation took diverse 
forms. It informed the state-led staging of the Sommet sur la co-opération, which urged 
further measures to support co-operatives, particularly worker co-operatives, in 1980. It 
helped drive legal modernization in 1983 to enable worker shareholder co-operatives and 
clarify worker co-operative ground rules (Girard, 1999). In 1984, the PQ set up a system 
of development groups (groupes conseils) and a crown corporation (Société de 
développement des coopératives) to deliver financial assistance to worker co-operatives 
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(Quarter, 1992). In 1985, the Coopératives de développement régional (CDR) network 
was launched, focusing first on worker co-operative development.  
 
The CCQ launched its extensive consultations from 1990 to 1992, the États generaux de 
la cooperation, an important series of fora for the increasingly confident and credible 
proposals of new co-operative and social movement partners. Among other things, this 
process of co-operative movement animation led to the formal involvement of the trade-
union movement in the creation of a foundation to promote co-operative education, 
following another summit on this subject in 1993. It also led to a CCQ-sponsored follow-
up summit on worker co-operatives in 1996 (Girard, 1999). As the CSN launched a 
consulting unit to advise worker co-operatives in 1987 and a labour sponsored investment 
fund (LSIF), Fondaction, to provide their financing in 1996, it became clear that the trade 
union federation needed to be consulted, involved, and included in the CCQ‘s efforts.  
 
Through the eighties and nineties, the trade unions continued to build mechanisms to save 
and create jobs. They won increasing support from the state, and sections of the co-
operative sector and research community. The labour movement‘s evolving response is 
best characterized by three key innovations: the expansion of the Québec Federation of 
Labour‘s Solidarity Fund, created in 1980 (Hebb & Mackenzie, 2001); the creation, in 
1987, of a CSN consulting arm to support worker co-operative buy-outs; and the 1996 
formation of Fondaction, a CSN labour sponsored investment fund (LSIF). 
  
5.7.1 Crossing the Line: The QFL Solidarity Fund  
The creation of the QFL‘s Solidarity Fund reflected a new labour militancy. The first 
LSIF in Canada, the Solidarity Fund signalled a revolution in Québec, and Canadian, 
capital markets. Indeed, ―Labour Sponsored Investment Funds now account for 50 
percent of available venture capital in Canada‖ (Hebb & Mackenzie, 2001, p. 128). 
Although the Solidarity Fund did not earmark investments in co-operatives, it nonetheless 
signalled a revolution in labour movement thinking about the collective power of worker 
savings, and of economic investment as a terrain of struggle. This would have significant 
influence on the political culture and popular understanding of the economy in Québec 
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over the decades to follow. For millions of workers in Québec, the Solidarity Fund‘s 
success validated union-led economic action as a practical, realistic, and legitimate 
political goal. 
 
It is hard to overstate the economic or popular political importance of the QFL‘s bold 
move. Economically, Laliberte (1999) argues that the Solidarity Fund took Québec from 
being a ―have-not‖ province, in terms of investment capital, to being a ―have province.‖49 
The Solidarity Fund‘s success also had a powerful effect on the political culture—
particularly that of the labour movement and its larger social movement family. Viewing 
―collateral benefits of job creation, local investment, worker participation, and education 
as the primary purpose of the fund,‖ it placed conventional thinking about bottom-line 
market rationality in radical question. Its success—saving, retaining, and creating 65,534 
jobs in its first five years—created infectious enthusiasm for the wider horizons of 
possibility for popular economic action (Hebb & Mackenzie, 2001, pp. 145-6). Building 
on the CSN‘s creation of the Caisse d’économie Desjardins in 1971, the Solidarity Fund 
was an important second step in Québec‘s emerging solidarity finance movement. 
 
Structured along participatory and self-managed lines, the Solidarity Fund built a 
democratic movement for economic action. This secured more than investment in job 
creation. It insured the economic animation, education, and engagement of rank and file 
workers: ―By establishing sales structures and marketing initiatives aimed at working 
people, union-controlled funds broaden participation in investment across a large 
segment of the economy. Through the active participation of workers, LSIFs become a 
tool for broader popular intervention in economic life rather than simply a pool of capital 
governed by conventional understandings‖ (p. 147). Unlike other LSIFs, ―the Solidarity 
Fund (FTQ) uses only unionized workers as sales agents who sell shares to their co-
workers in their own workplaces. This mechanism established a level of comfort and trust 
                                                 
49
 ―Québec as a region went from being a region with limited sources of venture capital to one gathering the 
largest share of overall venture capital in the country. While the province‘s economy represents 21 percent 
of Canada‘s GDP, it had some 52 percent of the country‘s venture capital under management in 1995. 
Today the province has levels of capital per capita that compare favourably with areas like California and 
New York known for their availability of venture capital‖ (Laliberte, 1999, p. 140). 
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among working people‖ (pp. 147-8). It also spurred confidence and support for union-led 
economic action. It would empower shop-floor activists. It would also inspire community 
activists who were becoming involved in efforts of their own to address the crisis. 
 
This influence was not confined to Québec‘s industrial heartland, Montréal. In 
partnership with the Québec state, the QFL would build on its initial success by 
launching a network of regional funds, les fonds régionaux de solidarité, helping 
maintain and create another 3802 jobs by Aug 31, 1998. Furthermore, in 1997, the 
Solidarity Fund launched another 86 local funds or Solides in partnership with the 
Québec union of municipalities (Hebb & Mackenzie, 2001). The Fund systematically 
captured workers‘ savings and redirected them to job-creation across Québec.  
 
Through the Fund‘s ―open-book process,‖ employers are required to support the financial 
education of their own workers through Solidarity-delivered training modules. This 
popular economic education mechanism extended the influence of the new economic 
thinking. It extended the frontier beyond organized QFL workplaces, where rank and file 
members sold shares in the fund, and into unorganized workplaces—reaching out to the 
beneficiaries of the redirected savings of well-paid, unionized workers elsewhere. Rather 
than allowing under-capitalized businesses to depress wages and drive out unions, the 
Solidarity Fund was proactive. By design, it was an organizing tool to drive unionization 
through its power as an investor in those businesses (Hebb & Mackenzie, 2001). It also 
demonstrated in a very public and dramatic way that ―solidarity‖ was a viable and 
attractive principle of economic organization. 
 
The broad reach and success of the Solidarity Fund evoked a new paradigm of 
democratic possibility for the Québec working class and social movements. It 
demonstrated the potential of economically targeted investments (ETIs) in jobs and 
regional development and the benefit of taking social action to secure those benefits 
(Hebb & Mackenzie, 2001). By contributing to Québec‘s economic success, and 
overcoming its detractors, it strengthened further the already significant prestige of the 
labour movement in Québec, which has the highest rate of unionization in Canada. It 
 160 
shifted perceptions of working class capability, among the public at large and among 
Québec working people themselves.  
 
This achievement takes on particular importance when it is placed in historical 
perspective against the backdrops of the politics of globalization and the rise of the New 
Right on the one hand and Canada‘s constitutional crisis on the other. For the restless 
experimentation and innovation of the late seventies and early eighties–that perhaps 
reached its apogee in public awareness with the success of the Solidarity Fund—provided 
a unique form of ideological inoculation for Québeckers against the rise of neo-
liberalism. With Margaret Thatcher in office from May 1979 until November 1990 and 
Ronald Reagan serving two terms from January 1981 to January 1989, the New Right 
revolution simply redefined political reality during the eighties. However, while the 
Anglo-American axis moved right, toward global market integration, many Québeckers 
marched in the opposite direction: toward a sovereign, social democratic Québec. The 
efforts of the labour movement, which viewed the Péquistes as their best bet to achieve 
social democratic reforms, were an integral part of that counter-hegemonic project. 
 
The New Right‘s brand of individualist market populism finally came home to roost in 
Canada with Brian Mulroney coming to power in 1984. The Mulroney Tories adopted the 
neo-liberal restructuring plan proposed by the corporate lobby group, the Business 
Council on National Issues (BCNI) (Brym & Fox, 1989). Both social democrats and 
sovereignists were dismayed by the so-called ―Beau Risque‖ to achieve a settlement for 
Québec within federalism. They pushed back against ―Ottawa‘s agenda‖ for Québec.50   
 
Mulroney carried out an agenda of privatization and deregulation and fought the 1988 
election over free trade with the United States. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell; in 1991 the 
Soviet Union collapsed. Despite much ado about the ―end of history,‖ Québeckers 
                                                 
50
 Péquiste ministers resigned over this decision to pursue a deal with Ottawa. With the failure of the 
Meech Lake Accord in 1990, Lucien Bouchard resigned from the Mulroney cabinet, and the Bloc 
Québécois was formed to represent an independent Québec‘s interests in the federal parliament. In 1993, in 
the wake of the subsequent failure of the Charlottetown Accord, the Bloc formed federal opposition and 
support for sovereignty surged.  
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resisted the reigning ideology that ―there is no alternative.‖ For social democracy had 
established deep roots, building on deep national traditions of social solidarity and 
collective entrepreneurship. But, more recently, the Québécois had been active 
participants in, or at least witnesses to, the emergence of an alternative, social democratic 
model in which trade unions were beating venture capitalists at their own game. While 
others experimented with privatization and acquired a religious fervour for liberalization, 
Québec had front row seats for an unprecedented socialization of capital and 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, the early efforts of the PQ to stem the tide of capital flight to 
Ontario gave it a conceptual and strategic head start in coping with globalization-era job 
loss. By 2005, the Solidarity Fund had amassed $6.2 billion in assets; had created, 
maintained or retained 105,596 jobs; and was receipting over $32 million a month in 
payroll deductions (Bourcier, 2009). The Solidarity Fund was the force motrice for the 
re-pooling of popular savings and the repatriation of economic control to Québec civil 
society. 
 
5.8 The community economic development (CED) response 
The first CED steps in Québec were also deeply influenced by the recession of 1982. 
Grassroots mobilizations secured pilot investments in early CED initiatives in Montréal 
(Fortan, 1993) and Québec‘s first CED corporation in Bois Francs (Ninacs, 1993). These 
investments were matched by PQ commitments to worker co-operative development 
(Quarter, 1992) as a CED tool. Indeed, the launch of the CDR network was modeled after 
the local initiative of a co-operative council in Outaouais. It had organized local capacity 
by stepping outside the formal structures of the CCQ (Girard, 1999). Like Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs), the CDR network and co-operative investment plan 
(CIP)—modeled after the QFL‘s Solidarity Fund (Tremblay, 1985)—both harnessed the 
capacity of new co-operatives to drive regional development. With regional job creation 
as their primary goal, worker co-operatives were the CDR network‘s first priority. The 
CIP tax credit of 150 percent sheltered workers from the double risk of losing their 
investments and their jobs. It helped raise $100 million in worker co-operative 
investment over 13 years (Girard, 1999, p. 21).  
 
 162 
The federal state also recognized the long-range implications of structural adjustments to 
the economy, formally embracing CED in 1986 with the launch of the Community 
Futures Development Program. This decentralized business development program 
organized 55 CFD Corporations in Québec, and an investment fund of about $2 million 
per community from the Federal Office of Regional Development – Québec (FORD-Q).  
 
The CDR and CFDC networks indicated a decentralist economic policy shift (Lévesque, 
2000). Also indicative of this search for local solutions were the early efforts in 
Montréal‘s Pointe Ste-Charles neighbourhood. From 1951 to 1981, this neighbourhood 
lost 22,000 residents, declining from a population of 35,000 to 13,000. By 1981, forty-
three percent of this population was living below the poverty line (Fortan, 1993), in 
response to which, Michele Soutiere (Clinique Populaire de Pointe Ste-Charles) and 
Nancy Neamtan (Pointe Ste-Charles YMCA) launched a pilot youth training and business 
development project in November 1983. It failed. Rather than walk away, they convened 
a community colloquium, built a coalition of a dozen CBOs and submitted a report to the 
minister of manpower and income security calling for CED investment in the 
neighbourhood. In May 1984, the coalition received a $70,000 grant to set up a CED 
corporation. Established as the Programme économique de Pointe St-Charles, it became 
the Regroupement pour la relance économique et sociale du Sud-ouest de Montréal 
(RESO), incorporating other CEDCs in 1991. This struggle represented an important 
redistribution of power: ―the power of knowing and doing as well as having‖ (Fortan, 
1993, p. 90). 
 
Ninacs (1993) tells a similar story about Québec‘s first community development 
corporation (CDC), established in Bois Francs after local activists effectively pressured 
for pilot project funding in 1983 at a regional economic summit. The achievement built 
on two decades of community organizing by activists ―inspired by the Mondragon co-
operatives in Spain‖ (pp. 96-98).51 These community organizing efforts, like the 
                                                 
51
 While Mondragon has had wide influence internationally, this initiative within the Basque country of 
Spain has had a special nationalist resonance for Québeckers who are also engaged in a project of ‗enclave 
co-operation‘.  
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pioneering efforts of co-operators in the Outauouais region, would also lead to the 
systematic, state-funded replication of their pilot projects. Through the eighties and 
nineties, a network of 15 CEDCs and about 30 CDCs were established to involve 
community players in local development. A network of 105 Local Development Centres 
(CLDs), which included community movement representatives, was established after 
1998 (Caillouette, 2004).   
 
The replication of the Bois Francs and Pointe Ste-Charles CED initiatives—like the CDR 
network, the CFDCs, and the CLD network—reflected the rise of a ―new regionalism‖ 
with deep roots: ―The new focus on ‗the local‘ as cities suffer the effects of 
deindustrialization, high rates of unemployment and a growing marginalized population, 
is not entirely the result of community pressure or heightened social awareness, but part 
of the generalized policy impasse at the macro level.‖ In the context of economic 
globalization and the retreat of the state, there was a ―need for new mechanisms‖ to 
―mobilize untapped or under-utilized resources‖ for development (Mendell & Evoy, 
1993, p. 45). Furthermore, this community development strategy needed to be ―based on 
a broad social coalition, not one dependent on the state or on the private sector … in 
many urban areas… there is little social cohesion to generate commitment to a common 
goal; the social group, the community, in a sense has to be created‖ (pp. 47-48). Echoing 
the arguments of Shragge (1993), they emphasize the importance of a ―transformation 
from economic and social victims to actors and agents of change‖ (p. 48). Much like the 
transformative role of the CDR network or labour-driven innovations, Mendell and Evoy 
credit the parallel CED movement for creating ―new social partnerships (that) are (also) 
re-embedding the economy in society… by democratizing the market so that it responds 
to the needs of the people‖ (p. 58). 
 
Like the economic radicalization of the labour movement, engaging activists of the 
mouvement communautaire in CED strategies drew another important part of co-
operation‘s extended social movement family into new co-operative development. As 
Lévesque (2000) argues, ―a large number of leaders in Québec‘s social economy have 
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their roots in these movements, and bring with them an experience based on commitment 
and innovation to offset their meagre financial and material resources‖ (p. 118). 
 
5.9  Union-delivered technical and financial assistance: The CSN groupes conseiles   
       and Fondaction 
In 1987, the CSN launched a bold response to long-range de-industrialization trends in 
general and the 1982 recessionary shocks in particular. The CSN established a consulting 
staff of seven (groupe conseil spéciale) to monitor at-risk plants, to prevent closures and 
to do feasibility studies to assist worker buy-outs where warranted. Buoyed by almost 
two decades of successful investment through their caisse d’économie, challenged by the 
need of fledgling worker co-operatives for significant technical assistance beyond the 
reach of the Caisse, and inspired by the success of their rival federation‘s Solidarity 
Fund, the CSN launched this unit with start-up funds from a federal Innovations grant 
(the unit is now self-sufficient).  
 
In 1988, the CSN consulting group led a path-breaking series of worker buy-outs 
financed by the union-backed caisse d’économie in the ambulance sector, transferring 
half the province‘s ambulance services to co-operative worker ownership (Quarter, 
1992). By 2007, six paramedic workers‘ co-operatives had become the largest service 
provider in Quebec after Montréal‘s Urgence-santé (DeBertoli & Girard, 2007). 
Avoiding salvage operations of marginally viable companies, the CSN‘s Groupe Conseil 
also assists displaced workers in developing new enterprises, such as a rubber recycling 
plant, developed to make use of workers‘ skills and some assets of the shut-down 
Uniroyal plant in Montréal (Quarter, 1992). In 2001, Fondaction joined a massive effort 
to redevelop an entire urban area in Montréal. The Technopôle Angus project 
encompasses 20 buildings and 2500 workers (Beaulieu, 2009). The CSN‘s vigorous co-
operative development role encouraged the CCQ to recognize the CSN as a development 
partner and to undertake a study on the worker shareholder model in 1990; it encouraged 
the involvement of unions in a CCQ-led co-operative education conference in 1993 and 
their participation in the resulting educational foundation (Girard, 1999). By the mid-
nineties, the CSN‘s significant financial and technical assistance resources for co-
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operative development, and its leading position within the wider development network, 
positioned it as a powerful player within the emerging social economy movement.  
 
Since 1971, the CSN‘s Caisse d’économie Desjardins des travailleuses et travailleurs 
(now the Caisse d’économie solidaire Desjardins) has forged social investments through 
four networks: trade unions, co-operatives, the community sector, and arts and culture. 
The Caisse‘s contribution has been crucial to the social economy, supporting housing, 
worker, consumer, funeral and educational co-operatives, as well as training businesses, 
recycling enterprises, daycares, theatres, artists centres, museums, community radio 
stations, technical resource groups, and sectoral federations and associations. The first 
financial institution to back the Cirque de soleil, it funded more than 2,800 collective 
enterprises and associations by 2003. By 2005, the Caisse had a staff of 80 and three 
service centres (Caisse d’économie solidaire, 2010). 
 
In 1996, the year the Chantier de l’économie sociale was formed through a major 
Provincial economic summit, the CSN next launched its own LSIF, Fondaction. Its 
mandate targeted important new support, momentum, and direction to emerging co-
operative and CED efforts. Unlike the broad mandate of the QFL‘s Solidarity Fund—to 
protect and retain jobs in Québec—Fondaction focused on socially responsible 
investments along the lines pioneered by its own Caisse. With the Chantier launching its 
own fund to support social enterprise in 1997 (the Réseau d’investissement social du 
Québec), Fondaction was a crucial bridge between the early innovations of the Caisse 
and the Solidarity Fund to an emerging, multi-tiered suite of social investment vehicles 
known as the ―solidarity finance movement.‖ Securing access to capital for community-
based organizations was a crucial link in the innovation chain that led to the social 
economy resurgence in Québec. It de-linked investment from the logic of capital 
accumulation, placing it instead at the service of democratic community empowerment. 
Social movements—chroncially under-resourced, transitory, and unstable—were now 
able to build a sustainable economic base.  
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Unlike the Solidarity Fund, Fondaction uses social and environmental screens to guide its 
investments in firms embracing participatory management, non-profits, co-operatives, 
and firms advancing environmental objectives. Just as the CSN had eschewed ―bread and 
butter unionism‖ in favour of ―social unionism‖ in the seventies, Fondaction acted in 
concert with the wider social movements. Its reconstructive social project aimed not only 
to protect the economy as it was but aimed to change it. Like the Solidarity Fund a 
decade and a half earlier, Fondaction revolutionized thinking about investment, further 
extending the horizon of democratic possibility on the economic terrain. 
 
Like the QFL‘s diversification into regional and municipal mini-funds, the CSN also 
diversified over the decade that followed. However, rather than segment the investment 
market regionally like the QFL, it created Filaction to focus exclusively on social 
economy enterprises, firms that encourage worker participation and local development 
funds. In concert with RISQ, it also created Fonds de financement coopérative to fund 
co-operatives (Réseau d’investissement social du Québec, 2005). It segmented a smaller 
social responsibility investment market, by sector rather than region. By 2009, the CSN 
had consolidated its family of financial instruments in the Carrefour financier solidaire, a 
centre adjacent to the union‘s headquarters. With over 100,000 members and 
shareholders, $1.5 billion in assets and investments in 2,500 companies and 
organizations, CSN‘s financial actions have supported 35,000 jobs across Québec 
(Beaulieu, 2009). 
 
5.10 The new social economy: Ally, rival, catalyst 
In the nineties, the labour movement, the CED movement, and the new intermediary 
institutions began to restructure their relationships with the co-operative movement. 
Through the États generaux de la coopération consultations, the co-operative movement 
reassessed its own role. At this point, the non-profit service and advocacy groups also 
begin to emerge as a component of the widening new movement for economic 
democracy. They constitute the emerging social economy‘s third front. Building on the 
tradition of the mouvement communautaire since the sixties, Boucher (in Caillouette, 
2004) notes, ―the specificity of the Québec development model lies largely in the action 
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of social movements‖ (p. 16). For Caillouette, the nineties were defined by the success of 
community movements, building organization and state recognition, while protecting 
their autonomy of action. These institutionalized compromises stoked the resurgent social 
and solidarity economy. Against neo-liberal efforts in the eighties to co-opt community-
based organizations (CBOs) into a market regulation paradigm (MRP) in which they 
become cheap, service-delivery instruments of the state, this movement successfully 
defended its autonomy. It asserted the central importance of community action in ―the 
production of citizenship‖ (p. 17). Democratic legitimation was crucial in building and 
consolidating the case for the partnership regulation paradigm (PPR).   
 
Foremost in this movement for a different kind of state
52
 were women‘s organizations. As 
Maillé (2004) argues, the scale of feminist organization in Québec is unique in Canada, 
encompassing thousands of women‘s groups. Rooted in campaigns for daycare, 
employment equity, and reproductive rights since the sixties, these groups took off during 
the seventies. The 1995 Bread and Roses March and the 2000 World March of Women 
against poverty provided strong impetus to women‘s issues, women‘s involvement in 
movement politics, and to the mouvement communautaire and l’économie sociale (Maillé 
(2004, pp. 287-303). The New Social Economy championed ―pink collar‖ sectors like 
daycare, homecare, and social housing (Vaillancourt & Tremblay, 2008).  
 
Activists in the women‘s movement, the new co-ops, the labour movement, the CED 
movement, and the human service agencies all sprang from common roots in the Quiet 
Revolution. Unlike the more traditional charitable sector or old co-ops, these social 
enterprises share strong participatory movement values. As products of the same era, 
rooted in similar values, they also had overlapping memberships. Their rank and file 
exchanged information and supported each other‘s struggles. The evolution of the new 
co-operative movement settlement and relationship with the state and the new regime of 
democratic partnership between the CBO sector and the state were parallel.  
 
                                                 
52
 For English-speaking Canadian perspectives on this movement to democratize the state, see Albo, 
Langille & Panitch (1993).  
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As Lévesque (1990) notes, both community enterprises and ―new co-ops‖ began to 
emerge—the precursors of the new social economy—in the mid-seventies. While the PQ 
were experimenting with housing and worker co-operatives in the eighties, they were also 
experimenting with alternatives to welfare state provision. This cultural shift against 
welfare-statism drove a rapid and significant devolution of services to community and co-
operative agencies. For example, ―at the beginning of the 1970s until 1978, the portion of 
the budget of (the Ministry of Health and Social Services) designated for ‗support of 
community agencies did not exceed $1.5 million per year, distributed among about fifty 
agencies,‘ while in 1986-87 ‗this budget had increased to $426 million and was 
distributed to 1,000 agencies‘‖ (Lévesque, 1990, p. 124). These inter-related strands of 
the social economy would come together as part of a concerted effort for co-operative 
and social development under the banner of the NSE in the late nineties. 
 
The real historic breakthrough for the nascent ―social economy,‖ which created both new 
complexity and new opportunity for resurgent co-operation in Québec, came in 1996 at 
the Province‘s Summit on the Economy and Employment. It built on the province‘s 
historic commitment to corporatism (Montpetit, 2004) and responded to emergent social 
networks. These had been established through the CSN‘s Caisse d’économie Desjardins 
des travailleuses et travailleurs and its Groupes conseils, the QFL‘s Solidarity Fund, and 
the achievements of the CED movement. Most importantly, pressure from the women‘s 
movement‘s 1995 Bread and Roses March drove the creation of a summit task force to 
explore how social investment could contribute to the twin crises of the province‘s 
welfare state and jobs. This task force, the Chantier de l’économie sociale, given six 
months to develop job creation proposals, tabled its recommendations in October 1996 
(Neamtan, 2004). The lifespan of the Chantier was extended to roll out its proposals. It 
was later formalized as a permanent structure by its constituent networks, and it finally 
succeeded, in 2008, in securing the commitment of the Province—against CQCM 
opposition—to a comprehensive social economy development policy. This included 
commitments of $16.7 million in new funding to the Chantier, its 21 regional hubs, and 
several new projects such as a social economy portal, www.economiesocialequebec.ca 
(Neamtan, 2008). 
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The social economy in Québec today is a wide, multi-organizational field with ill-defined 
boundaries. Old co-ops, new co-ops, human service agencies, old philanthropic 
foundations and service clubs, advocacy groups, trade unions, and community 
development corporations all continue to struggle against conflicting interests and 
organizational cultures to develop a common vision and agenda. Within this context, the 
leadership of the co-operative and social economy movements have clashed repeatedly. 
Many established co-operative traditionalists view the new social enterprises and social 
economy organizations as they had the new co-ops of the seventies, as impractical 
diversions of resources from ―real‖ co-operative development work and potentially 
corrupting deviations from orthodox co-operative principles. Many have deep 
reservations about non-profits, which are viewed as ―managers‘ organizations‖—with 
more shallow roots than co-operative memberships. Since it is easier to establish a NPO 
to meet state needs quickly, there is a concern that the growth of non profit social 
enterprises will come at the expense of co-operatives which take longer to establish but 
are, it is argued, more durable and democratic. Many others simply view the Chantier as 
a threat to CQCM influence over the co-operative movement. It is hard not to understand 
this concern walking into the Chantier‘s head-quarters—an abandoned caisse populaire 
that features a bust of Alphonse Desjardins. Many viewed the upstart social economy 
movement as a threat, both to future co-operative formation and co-operative movement 
cohesion. According to several informants, the relationship has been very difficult, with 
one former CQCM leader calling for aggressive action to ―smash the Chantier.‖  
 
At the same time, paradoxically, the social economy movement also strengthened the co-
operative movement. It reinforced the legitimacy, currency, and importance of such 
member-led, community-based development strategies. This opened up new ideological-
cultural space for strategic manoeuvre, and created a common front against wholesale 
privatization. The social economy also helped re-connect the co-operative sector to an 
activist popular movement base, and wider social bloc. This lent it new leverage for 
political and development action. The paradox of the relationship is that it also implied a 
new form of power-sharing with which elements of the CCQM were far from 
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comfortable. For example, the author learned from one source that CQCM President 
Hélène Simard had sparked a firestorm of controversy when she accused the Chantier of 
attempting a ―hostile take-over‖ of RISQ (Lévesque, 2006). Breaking news as a front-
page article in Le Devoir, this led to a series of interventions by luminaries such as Benoît 
Lévesque and others in the letters pages over the course of the following weeks. Many 
suggested the Chantier should confine itself to being a ―non-profit network.‖  
 
Despite growing pains and turf wars, all of this reciprocally interdependent innovation 
within Québec‘s rapidly expanding and diversifying social economy has created a 
distinctive and important model. It also provided strong momentum for sustained 
innovation and sector expansion. Co-operation plays a leading—but qualified and 
contested—role in the wider social economy field. To maintain its prominent position, 
and to respond to the needs and opportunities articulated from this increasingly dense 
ensemble of partners and supportive institutions, the co-operative movement has 
(partially and reluctantly) ―opened up‖ to new partnerships and alliances just as the state 
has also (with its own hesitations) opened up to the social economy movement and the 
Chantier. This is a complex, new, and wider field than the co-operative field of the 
seventies within which the CCQ governed unchallenged. For today‘s CQCM, the stakes 
are higher and the competitive pressure to lead is stiffer. Within this field, organizations 
have come to occupy distinct niches. The social economy‘s organizational ecology is 
now highly articulated and characterized by a complex new division of labour: 
 
 Technical assistance agencies, such as the CDR network, independent CSOs and 
the CSN consulting arm, Groupe Conseil 
 Referral agencies, such as the CLDs and the CLSCs  
 The co-operative apex organization, the CQCM 
 Co-operative sectoral federations organized under the umbrella of the CQCM 
 The social economy apex organization, the Chantier 
 Territorial organizations, such as the CFDCs, CEDCs, and CDCs, many with their 
roots in the mouvement communautaire and the ACEFs 
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 The research community, including the Centre de recherche sur les innovations 
sociales (CRISES), the Alliance de recherche université-communauté en 
économie sociale (ARUC-ÉS), the Réseau québécois de recherche partenariale 
en économie sociale (RQRP-ÉS), the Institut de recherche et d’éducation pour les 
coopératives et les mutuelles de l’Université de Sherbrooke (IRECUS), and 
journals like the Revue Économie and Solidarités. 
 Social movement organizations, including the trade unions – particularly the 
CSN, the women‘s movement, and the anti-poverty movement 
 Non-profit service organizations, which often include revenue-generating 
activities 
 Non-profit advocacy organizations, identified with the mouvement 
communautaire which disavow revenue generation to defend their state-funding 
but often advocate for policies consistent with social economy values and 
objectives  
 Solidarity finance instruments such as the QFL Solidarity Fund, Desjardins‘ 
Regional and Co-operative Development Fund, the CSN‘s Caisse d’économie 
Desjardins des Travailleuses et Travailleurs, FondAction, FilAction, Fonds de 
Financement Coopératif, the state‘s Investissement Québec, and the Chantier‘s 
Réseau d’invesstissement social du Québec (Réseau d‘invesstissement social du 
Québec, 2005) and Fiducie du Chantier, etc. (See Appendix C). 
 
5.11 Social innovation as a political process 
The three decades of intensive social innovation outlined here is clearly a political 
process, involving cross-sectoral conflict, negotiation, and coordination. Co-operative 
proponents engage the state, economic intermediaries like the CDCs, the CEDCs, the 
CFDCs, and the CLDs, and movement partners like the old co-ops, the unions, and local 
groups in an effort to enlist their support. The development strategy proposed is counter-
hegemonic in that it constitutes a break with the exclusionary, status quo development 
model. In this sense, it is, by definition, a challenge to the traditional duopoly of state and 
private enterprise. The case for economic pluralism is a political argument that builds on, 
and extends, the democratic logic of corporatist traditions at the state level. By 
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destabilizing economic and political settlements in favour of innovative action, the rise of 
the social economy also contributes to the renewal of co-operative traditions and 
organization, labour movement innovations (such as LSIFs and the Groupes Conseiles), 
and community-level action and organization, notably feminist mobilization. The social 
economy has forged an awkward and fragile new coalition of social actors for economic 
action. This is an incomplete and conflictual revolution which remains largely 
aspirational in its character, prescribing what the social economy should and could be 
rather than simply reducing it to an inert, inanimate, empiricist category of what is. The 
Chantier‘s prescriptive definition can be found in its 1996 report, Osons la solidarité 
(Chantier de l’économie sociale, 1996). Its conception of the social economy is an idée 
force, a driving force for a different form of economic action by non-traditional economic 
actors. It is as, one Chantier participant described it to the author, ―a work in progress.‖ 
 
Neamtan emphasizes the strategic centrality of ―cultural shifts‖ in this emerging 
movement (2004, pp. 26-30). For these innovations were preceded, as Gramsci (1990) 
might put it, by ―an intense labour of criticism,‖ a ―diffusion of culture,‖ and ―the spread 
of ideas.‖ Like past insurgencies against the status quo, the new co-operation, too, had to 
achieve the ―ties of solidarity‖ and ―unified consciousness‖ necessary to its renewed 
vitality (p. 14). Activists, researchers and developers were all engaged in an intellectual 
and cultural struggle to both define a new co-operative project and win hearts and minds 
to it. They built popular mental preparedness for the necessary ―cultural expansion‖ of 
co-operation—and other forms of social ownership. In short, it took communication and 
education to assemble a viable ―historical bloc‖53 to advance this new conception of the 
―social economy movement.‖ 
 
One expression of this process of community animation was the extensive reflection 
within co-operative ranks initiated by the CCQ under Béland‘s leadership. By convening 
a series of regional roundtables on the state of Québec‘s co-operative movement, the 
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 Carroll and Ratner (1989) have defined Gramsci‘s concept of an historical bloc as ―a strategic alignment 
of classes, class fractions and popular groupings whose interests and outlook are realized within the project 
and whose coalescence establishes an organic relation between (the economic) base and (the ideological-
cultural) superstructure‖ (p. 30). 
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CCQ engaged its own rank and file in a structured reflection on the need for co-operative 
economic action. Thousands discussed how best to achieve co-operative renewal. This 
was paralleled by an international conference on worker co-operatives and by a series of 
regional economic summits during the early eighties. Certainly, these popular 
consultations fed into the substantial technical, financial, legal, and organizational 
innovations cited by Vézina (2001). For example, support to worker co-operatives, the 
creation of the CDR network, and the Co-operative Investment Plan were all 
recommendations brought directly forward from the economic summit on co-operatives 
in February 1980. However, underpinning all of these discrete achievements is the 
political process of building movement understanding, will, and agency for concerted 
economic action. ―Cognitive liberation‖ (McAdam, 1982) required active and sustained 
intellectual and ideological struggle, from inside and outside the co-operative movement.  
 
Neamtan (2004) has described three of the cultural shifts that continue to define the 
conscientization
54
 of Québec‘s popular movements. First, she argues, the community 
sector and social movements need to ―move from opposition to proposition and from 
conservation to innovation in the political discourse.‖ Second, popular forces need to put 
―aside nostalgia for the welfare state and instead (rethink) what progressive government 
should look like in the 21st Century.‖ Third, she argues the popular movement needs to 
better understand and assert ―the link between social and economic development … to 
impose itself as an actor in economic development to democratize our economy‖ (p. 30).  
 
These cultural shifts, which began to emerge in the eighties, involve more than a rational 
shift in the collective definition of the problem and a resolve to do something about it. 
They require a fundamental shift in identity, affectivity, and agency: ―Empowerment… 
involves changing power relations… and … a process of personal change… Self-
perception moves from victim to agent, as people are able to act in a political and social 
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 Freire (1985) argues that achieving a critical consciousness depends on a process of conscientization. 
This is a popular education process through which participants achieve a clear understanding of the world, 
allowing for them to take informed and strategic action against oppressive elements in their lives.  
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arena and pursue their own interests‖ (Shragge, 1993, iii). Neamtan proposes a social 
movement for economic action that is focused, forward-looking, and persuasive. 
 
Developing a new sense of collective identity and agency is an important political 
process of cognitive liberation in which actors come to make sense of their situation in a 
new way. This is how actors become agents of an emergent development paradigm and 
social movement and begin to define a social project that reflects their interests, values, 
and aspirations. This process of collective attribution and alliance formation is neither 
automatic nor simple for it requires reaching new understandings and relationships. With 
the labour movement, for example, this means ensuring the social economy does not 
become a ―starvation economy‖ of contracted out social services or a means of 
privatization and union-busting. With the state, it means ensuring respect for the 
autonomy of social economy actors within a pluralist economy. These ideological 
accords are benchmarks of movement authority and the authority and appeal of the 
pluralist model. 
 
In establishing the case for the social economy within a plural economy, its agents must 
enforce these kinds of boundaries to secure its ethical and political basis. Internally, 
social economy actors must share a common movement ideology as codified in its 
documents, declarations, and periodicals, a common non-hierarchical and collaborative 
habitus—or working relationship—within the ―network of networks,‖ and a set of 
practices that embody these ideas and values and effectively reproduce the movement‘s 
autonomy. Its partners also need to understand those boundaries, understand why they 
exist and respect them. Without a working consensus around what the social economy 
stands for, how it works and the specific means through which it realizes its objectives, 
movement autonomy risks being reduced by the isomorphic pressures of the market and 
the state.
55
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 As Lévesque & Ninacs have argued, social economy initiatives risk being assimilated into 1) traditional 
non-profit organization (NPO) norms of state-dependent service delivery; 2) mercantile encroachment and 
cooption into commercial norms; or 3) the steering of profitable innovations into the private sector and less 
profitable ones into state delivery. They provide the example of the institutionalization of community-based 
pilot projects in health and social services, like community clinics in the seventies. These demonstrate the 
potential for state takeover of civil society initiative. Similarly, the privatization of recycling social 
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The tacit accord between social economy actors, the unions, and other social movement 
patrons provides important limits in negotiations with the state and defines norms of 
appropriate movement conduct that reflect ―social economy values.‖ As Lévesque writes, 
these include: 1) a wage floor of $8.50 per hour; 2) no raiding of public sector jobs; 3) 
universal service standards regardless of user income, e.g. child care centres; and 4) 
integration to insure innovation transfer across sectors (2000, p. 120). ―Women are 
adamant that the jobs created in the social economy be stable, decently paid, and provide 
good working conditions‖ (p. 123) as opposed to simply creating a pink collar ghetto that 
reproduces the traditional derogation of care (i.e. women‘s work). When these norms are 
breeched, as in the case of home care co-operatives which overlap public service 
delivery, the author learned that movement relations may be strained. Cross-sectoral co-
operation and movement morale can be tested. 
 
While social economy leaders emphasize that the movement is a work in progress, a 
series of workshops, summits, newletters, declarations, and online and educational tools 
have helped to refine, develop, and popularize its ethico-political principles (Chantier de 
l‘économie sociale, 2006; Réseau d‘investissement social du Québec, 2005). Rather than 
develop enforcement mechanisms, the Chantier has created a forum for continuous 
debate, discussion, negotiation, and the forging of a shared political culture (Neamtan, 
2004).   
 
Vézina (2001) provides documentary evidence that Québec public servants understand 
the tacit assumptions of cross-movement solidarity upon which effective social economy 
development is predicated. For example, using the social economy as a vehicle for 
privatization or contracting out is a non-starter. Civil servants explained their emphasis 
on creating new jobs would extend the reach of the public service to meet emerging 
needs but Québec was not prepared to follow the lead of their neo-liberal neighbours in 
                                                                                                                                                 
enterprises demonstrates the broader potential for privatization of social innovations. Both forms of 
assimilation undermine the democratic practice characteristic of civil society. Takeover by the state or 
investors both limit the mobilization of community and movement resources (2000, pp. 120 - 121).  
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Ontario (Browne, 2000), eager to cannibalize services already in the public sector for 
short-term cost-savings. ―Services assumed by a co-operative must complement and not 
take the place of activities offered by the public sector‖ (Vézina, 2001, p. 148). In this 
case, partnership regulation clearly trumps market regulation. 
 
The importance of disciplined movement self-regulation, and the capacity to enforce its 
own norms against isomorphic pressures, is evident in the co-optive efforts of neo-liberal 
administrations. For example, Ontario has moved to harness the third sector as a vehicle 
for contracting out, union-busting, and cost reduction (Quarter, 2000; Browne, 2000). In 
the U.S., the movement toward ―social enterprise‖ often amounts to individual, 
entrepreneurial initiatives or ―philanthro-capitalism,‖ a contracting relationship without 
regard for the kind of movement standards now entrenched in Québec. As Browne 
argues, ―the privatization of the management of poverty… is a facet of neo-liberal social 
policy‖ through a ―new contracting regime‖ that provides a ―cheap substitute for 
unionized, better paid public service.‖ (2000, p. 67). In this neo-liberal model, voluntary 
labour and charitable donations are exploited to reduce state-spending, which is then 
redistributed (upward) through tax breaks. Far from Québec‘s social democratic 
partnership, social enterprise can also become part of a regressive social policy paradigm. 
Indeed, a neo-liberal approach can even supplant the prior liberal-democratic emphasis 
on funding advocacy, the basis of citizenship rights for the disadvantaged and their 
service-providers. In the market regulation paradigm, advocacy is deemed a ―waste of 
scarce resources needed for frontline service delivery‖ (p. 68).  
 
Of course, there are conflicts and tensions between partners based on which movements 
are the vehicles of sector expansion and whose memberships, dues, and institutional 
power bases are therefore enhanced. Unions may object to the wages paid in home care 
co-ops or their expansion into markets where public provision is available. Conversely, 
several co-operative movement actors expressed displeasure with the state‘s decision to 
opt for a unionized, non-profit model for its $5 a day daycare program.  
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In addition to the sectoral turf wars that are bound to arise from serious development 
initiatives, there are plenty of other divisions. One of the most significant is gender-
based. As Lévesque notes, ―Some polarization does exist in social economy support 
structures. The regional social economy committees—technical assistance support groups 
made up of women—tend to perceive the social economy as limited to service and 
mutual assistance initiatives, in other words non-commercial and non-profit activities. On 
the other hand, the regional development co-operatives often limit their assistance to 
manufacturing and commercial co-operatives‖ (Lévesque, 2000, p. 123). This tension 
between the primacy of social and economic objectives also reflects a private-public 
polarization along gender lines, between the productivist, patriarchal tradition of (male) 
―bricks and mortar‖ job creation and a ―business-like approach‖ and the feminist 
emphasis on care, a ―community-service approach,‖ and ―pink collar‖ employment for 
women. Like the conflict within co-operatives between associational and enterprise 
aspects, Lévesque argues this is an endemic conflict for the wider social economy. 
―These two visions, based respectively on need and business development, must be 
merged‖ (p. 123). 
 
Of course, one of the most vexing divisions, a partial continuation of the tension between 
the old co-ops and new co-ops in the 60s and 70s, is between the old social economy—
particularly the CQCM, and the new social economy—represented most clearly by the 
Chantier. Underlying this rivalry, several respondents outlined, is a complex articulation 
of oppositions. This includes a regional component, with the Chantier weighted toward 
Montréal and the CQCM weighted toward the rural regions. The CQCM culture is 
business-like, hierarchical, conservative, and rooted in self-help doctrine. The Chantier 
culture is rooted in a non-hierarchical network model, and a protest movement tradition 
inflected by rights advocacy, trade union adversariality, and leftist and feminist politics. 
The CQCM is viewed as more traditional, older, and ethnically homogenous whereas the 
Chantier appears younger, more cosmopolitan, and more engaged with the cultural 
sector.  
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This chapter has tracked the evolution of this movement for democratic partnership—
against the social forces of globalization, the decline of the KWS, and the crisis of 
federalism on the one hand and as an expression of the confluence of labour, CED, and 
social economy movements on the other. However, it needs to be stated clearly that the 
search for a ―first mover‖ in this innovation network is fundamentally wrong-headed. For 
the real essence of these innovations is the ―concertation‖ of diverse actors in new forms 
of partnership, both within civil society and between civil society and the state. This more 
subtle and complex narrative of the co-operative resurgence reflects its embeddedness in 
larger social movement dynamics, including the redefinition of the role of a 
developmental state. Certainly there are specific, discrete, and important innovations—
such as solidarity finance instruments, the CDR Network, the CDL network, the creation 
of the Chantier de l’économie sociale, the law against poverty, and the development of 
new legislative tools and organizational models—each of which deserve more detailed 
attention in themselves. These innovations are each, indeed, potential elements of 
development strategies elsewhere. However, efforts to replicate any of these discrete 
institutional or policy innovations outside a wider, context-specific strategy of social 
innovation that accounts for the vital participation of social movements in democratic 
partnerships would be a mistake. 
 
It is also important to note that while the structural and organizational bases for co-
operative development were redefined through the eighties, a parallel development of 
community organization was also taking place. This new element began to reshape the 
co-operative field in the nineties, as co-operative development was increasingly 
understood as part of the larger efforts of the ―social economy.‖ From 1996, in particular, 
the view was increasingly, and forcefully, advanced that community movements and non-
profit organizations (NPOs) shared the democratic, associative principles that place 
service before profit. They were, therefore, increasingly viewed as part of the same broad 
social movement for economic democracy. Building, in part, on the extended social 
movement affinities between the ―new co-ops‖ and their social movement constituencies, 
Lévesque (in Vaillancourt, 2009) argues that co-operation needs to be understood within 
that emergent context.  
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As Lévesque explains, in the globalization era, co-operation goes through a fundamental 
and conflictual transition, from being embedded within economic nationalism (from 1960 
to 1990) to repositioning within a recognition of the social and solidarity economy (from 
1990-2008) (in Vaillancourt, 2009). In large part, this is the history of the development of 
a ―democratic partnership,‖ in which civil society has played a leading role, for co-
operative economic action. This new regime has involved both a confluence of social 
movement action in the economic field, i.e. the rise of the social economy and a 
redefinition of state action, i.e. the rise of the new partnership state. It is only from within 
this context that the co-operative movement transformation from an interest group lobby 
to a developmental movement makes sense. For, as argued above, the co-operative 
movement is necessarily embedded in an ensemble of social relations. Just as the 
restructuring of global markets facilitated the growth of the multinational corporate sector 
by securing new legal and political facilities, so too did the restructuring of the co-
operative economy in Québec depend on complementary innovations in the wider field of 
economic policy, political culture, and institutional supports. Economic restructuring, in 
this sense, depends on a broad social process of reciprocal and interdependent innovation.  
 
Finally, Vaillancourt (2009) argues that Québec‘s co-operative movement is currently at 
yet another turning point in its history. He suggests the imminent institutional possibility 
of a further evolution: a re-embedding of the social economy (and co-operation) within a 
renewed social democratic politics. This possibility would replace the statism and 
centralism of traditional social democracy with a developmental commitment to a robust, 
participatory social economy alongside the public and private sectors. He contends that, 
from 1990 to 2008, an essentially social democratic conception of state support, shorn of 
its statist and centralist prejudices,
56
 has germinated in Québec but also that this is only 
                                                 
56
 The re-invention of social democracy is a matter of particular import for Québec and Saskatchewan, 
among Canada‘s most social democratic provinces. Yeo (2001) has also described the encounter between 
New Labour and a new mutualism as an advance for ―associationism,‖ voluntary, associational activity, 
over ―collectivism,‖ rule by professional and managerial experts. Unlike statism and collectivism, Yeo 
argues that only associationism offers a ―democratic, inclusive way forward‖ (p. 227). Yet, despite the 
pronouncements of Third Way theorists, entrenched authority in the managerial ranks of state and sector 
power alike can be expected to resist such democratization. As Greenberg (1986) has argued, ―the social 
democratic strategy, concentrating as it does on elections, encourages a politics of occasional or 
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one possible outcome of the emerging possibilities (p. 33). However, he also suggests 
that historic co-operation elsewhere, such as in Saskatchewan, has been heavily 
influenced and supported by social democratic movements. He claims that the ―missed 
date with social democracy‖ in Québec is an ―astonishing fact‖ (pp. 3, 18). 
 
According to Vaillancourt, there is an unrecognized basis in Canadians‘ social 
democratic values for co-operative enterprise. He claims that, in Québec, the convergence 
of a social and solidarity economy and a renewed social democracy is now on the agenda. 
He argues that social democracy was critiqued from the right from 1930 to 1960, and 
from the left from 1960 to 1990. However, he claims that current conditions favour a 
popular commitment to a different kind of capitalism. This new economic settlement is 
characterized by a robustly ―plural economy.‖ In this new political economy, there is 
room for a new balance between the solidarity economy (giving and reciprocity), the 
public economy (redistribution), and the market economy (p. 28). In fact, this perspective 
parts company significantly with the statist social democracy which prevails in English-
speaking Canada. This may be the most telling difference in the way Québec co-operators 
and English-speaking co-operators outside Québec frame the politics of co-operation. In 
the English-speaking Canadian tradition, there is a dualistic tendency to view co-
operation either as an alternative to capitalism, following in the tradition of the early 
agrarian radicals and the Marxist tradition, or as a remedy to its excesses, as in liberal co-
operativism. The informants engaged in this study had their differences. But they all 
spoke in a different common language, not only about the ―social economy‖ but also 
about the politics of the economy. This reframing of the problem, toward a different kind 
of capitalism, with a larger co-operative and socially-owned sector, i.e. a plural economy, 
appears to be an important part of the unity, coherence, confidence, and accomplishments 
of the Québec movement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
intermittment involvement among the people. It asks its adherents to read its literature, to attend meetings 
and rallies, and to cast votes. It does not ask that they create and run their own institutions in their 
neighbourhoods and workplaces. It does not ask people to become self-governing citizens but to be 
followers, responding to the signals of well-meaning but distant and powerful institutions (p. 180; my 
emphasis). 
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Others warn of a neo-liberal regression: ―The return to the political economy of the 
Victorian era only too naturally leads to a return to 19
th
 century philanthropic ideals and 
practices‖ (Browne, 2000, p. 74). Vaillancourt admits that this too is a possibility. He 
suggests the contradiction is between forces that would co-opt non-profit organizations 
(NPOs) and co-operatives into low-cost, low wage service provision and forces that view 
the social economy as part of a structural reform to advance popular democratic 
participation. In the neo-liberal version of contracting out, social enterprise is consistent 
with an agenda of privatization, union-busting, and minimal service delivery. This is a 
paradigm of market regulation. In the social democratic version of social economy 
development, Vaillancourt argues, alternative development actors, principles, and 
objectives redefine a different kind of capitalism. In the latter conception, the social 
economy is regulated from above by a renewed social democracy and from below by a 
renewed social movement. This relationship is governed by a paradigm of partnership 
regulation or democratic partnership. In any event, the different possible outcomes serve 
to illustrate that the social economy is neither essentially positive nor negative; rather, it 
is a terrain of struggle. What shape it may take depends entirely on the balance of social 
forces. This globalization-era settlement or ―historical compromise‖ is open-ended. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RISE AND FALL OF AGRARIAN SOCIALISM:  
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE FIELD  
IN SASKATCHEWAN, 1900 - 1980. 
 
An agricultural economy in the making, farmers‘ movements drove co-operative 
innovation in the region of present-day Saskatchewan through the first half of the 
twentieth century. Farmers‘ organizations, starting with the Territorial Grain Growers 
Association (TGGA), were the early co-operative movement‘s protagonists and patrons. 
Pragmatic farmers first organized producer pools to market their wheat, dairy, eggs, and 
poultry before organizing themselves as consumers, launching buying clubs for bulk 
commodities, and later joining full-scale co-op stores and forming wholesales. In the 
Great Depression, they extended their reach by joining credit unions. This restless 
grassroots diffusion, adaptation, and re-invention of the co-operative model responded to 
the evolving challenges faced by the province‘s increasingly class conscious farmers. 
While wider involvement would follow, co-operation in early Saskatchewan was 
producer-dominated. Co-operation was an organic extension of the farmers‘ movement. 
 
In this agrarian phase of co-operative innovation, Saskatchewan farmers relied heavily on 
intermediary organizations like the TGGA. It raised funds to organize co-operative 
development campaigns, lobby government, and disseminate information. However, 
these intermediaries were more than simply conduits for resource-mobilization. For the 
achievements of Prairie co-operation also reflect the history of ideas, ideological struggle, 
and cultural development that defined the farmers‘ movement. The TGGA and its 
successor organizations were part of a vast adult education network. This network 
encompassed organizations like the Patrons of Husbandry, organs of the agrarian press 
like the Territorial Grain Growers Guide, and political parties such as the Progressives. 
These organizations formed the early mobilizing network of the evolving agrarian revolt.  
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Agrarian intermediary organizations helped animate the emerging self-definition of this 
class of modern farmers. They cultivated the ―inner-life‖ of the agrarian and co-operative 
movements. For the building of co-operation was a process of constructing meanings, 
identities, and communities as well as building organizations and grain elevators. Co-
operative organizing and membership were embedded within the emerging ―social bloc‖ 
of the prairie farmer‘s movement. As Fairbairn (1994) has argued, need is never a 
sufficient condition to mobilize co-operative innovation. To be successful, the early 
producer co-ops also required the coherence and coordination that emerges from within a 
network of ideas and institutions (p. 4). The development of co-operation in 
Saskatchewan also required the development of human potential. For, in the final 
instance, it takes the agency and adhesion of knowledgeable, skilled, and energized 
members and strategically-led movements to build viable co-operative sectors.  
 
Saskatchewan‘s co-operative movement was far from the automatic consequence of 
agrarian class organization and consciousness. It was an uneven, conflictual, and 
evolving struggle. Early Prairie co-operation was an ideologically diverse movement, 
combining liberals, pragmatists, purists, Marxists, and social democrats. Some viewed 
co-operation as part of a transformative movement for broader social change. Others 
viewed it as a means to correct abuses. Still others viewed it as a tool to advance the 
interests of specific occupational groups (MacPherson, 1979). Early co-operators faced 
the challenge of sustaining unity through periods of crisis, strain, and difficulty. Of 
course, factions remained. The history of Saskatchewan‘s co-operative movement is 
largely the history of those shifting alliances, ideologies, and the struggles between these 
tendencies for leadership within the emerging movement. 
 
In Saskatchewan, these diverse movement tendencies were powerfully conditioned by 
immigration patterns and the early dominance of producer co-operation. As Fairbairn 
(2005) chronicles, the Saskatchewan movement defined itself through three sets of 
tensions. First, there was the opposition between the utilitarian and idealist factions. 
Pragmatic materialists were motivated by short-term self-interest. He suggests this was 
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the dominant strain among farmers. Pitted against this tendency, there was a smaller, 
more active group of true believers, idealists like E. A. Partridge, who challenged the 
limited goals of liberal pragmatists, pushing forward his vision of wheat-pooling and 
agrarian socialism. Partridge and other movement visionaries looked well beyond 
farmers‘ short-term self-interest and the terms of a frontier political economy. Second, 
there were some co-operators influenced by the British and some by the American 
traditions. Third, there were those who principally favoured producer or consumer based 
models of co-operation. These differences tended to cluster into two broad tendencies: 
pragmatic, American-influenced producer co-operators on the one hand and more 
idealist, British-influenced consumer co-operators on the other (Fairbairn, 2005). 
 
The early co-operative field in Saskatchewan was built on the foundations of the farm 
movement, producer co-operation, and the American experience with pooling. However, 
over the first half of the twentieth century the province‘s emerging co-operative tradition 
also widened into a more inclusive, diverse, and ―communitarian‖ movement. It came to 
span consumer co-operation and credit unionism. It also grew to overlap North America‘s 
most successful socialist movement (Lipset, 1959).  
 
This robust frontier expansion could not be sustained indefinitely. In the latter half of the 
century, the traditionally dominant agrarian tradition declined as farm sizes increased and 
farm numbers declined. Cohesion frayed as farming—and the agrarian movement—
polarized between small family farms and larger industrial farms. Reinforcing internal 
divisions was the steady growth of urban employment and the rise to dominance of the 
resource economy. Retail co-operatives and credit unions refocused on growing urban 
populations. New urban co-operatives, such as community clinics and child care co-
operatives, struggled to sustain themselves and build viable sectors.  
 
6.1 Precedents and parallels: Establishing the conditions for settler co-operation, 
1884 – 1905 
The story of co-operation in Saskatchewan begins against the backdrop of two defining 
social forces at the turn of the twentieth century. The great land rush saw the settlement 
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of a million immigrants in the Prairie West within the span of two decades (Conway, 
2006). From 1901 to 1911, Saskatchewan‘s population increased more than five-fold 
(Brown, 1973). The wheat boom followed. These remarkable developments set the stage 
for equally remarkable campaigns to establish the great Prairie wheat pools early in the 
twenties. Rapid settlement and agricultural exploitation defined early Saskatchewan, 
driving early co-operation on the agricultural frontier.  
 
As Waiser (2005) argues, the ―big idea‖ of Saskatchewan as a grain-growing, settler 
society was formed in this period: ―Saskatchewan was based on one dominant culture 
(Anglo-Canadian) engaged in one dominant activity (the production of wheat for the 
export market) in one dominant zone of activity (the southern half of the province)‖ (p. 
9). It was a contradictory project. On the one hand, it was the clear, top-down articulation 
of the federal government‘s National Policy‘s vision for Prairie grain export. They would 
also provide a captive market for the tariff-protected manufactures of central Canadian 
industry. Saskatchewan‘s role in this early division of labour was consequently that of an 
internal colony. The wheat boom would be harnessed to drive a commercial boom in 
central Canada.  
 
On the other hand, the ―big idea‖ of the Wheat Province also forged the agrarian class 
consciousness and organization necessary to resist successfully. In addition to leading 
political action and forming protest parties, farmers also targeted the grain trade, eastern 
manufacturers, profiteering middle men, the railroads, and the bankers. From the outset 
of the Province‘s history, this powerful farmers‘ movement drove co-operative 
development, and commanded provincial state support for these efforts. While the federal 
state was remote from the concerns of Western farmers, the first government of the new 
Province overlapped the farmers‘ movement. Over the first decades of Saskatchewan‘s 
existence as a province, agrarian co-operation emerged as one of its strongest 
foundations. Farmer-led co-operation helped build the early province, both practically 
and by articulating a powerful associative ethic that defined a sense of collective identity. 
The great pooling campaign of the early twenties forged a powerful commitment to 
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collective action and staked the terrain on which further development would take root, 
while largely forgetting whose land this had been less than half a century earlier.  
 
However, long before frontier agricultural settlement in the region of present-day 
Saskatchewan, developments elsewhere were laying the groundwork for Prairie co-
operation. The Rochdale experiment was established in England in 1844.
57
 In just over 
forty years, Canada‘s federal government was putting down the Riel Resistance in the 
North-West Territories. The state consolidated its hegemony against the agitations of 
settlers and Aboriginal peoples for representative government by executing Métis leader 
Louis Riel and eight Indians in Regina (Conway, 2006; McLean, 1985). This move 
further inflamed the sense of regional grievance against Ontario, particularly for Prairie 
francophones and Métis and les Québécois. Increased antagonism toward the federal state 
lent further force and moral sanction to the co-operative projects to later emerge as part 
of a regional protest in Saskatchewan
58
 and a nationalist movement in Québec.  
 
The heavy hand of state repression marginalized, assimilated, or eliminated Métis, 
French, and Indian populations in the emerging, British-dominated culture. The 
weakening of communication channels between Saskatchewan and Québec slowed 
innovation diffusion both ways. A legacy of ethno-cultural segregation delayed the 
widespread Depression-era adoption of credit unionism in Saskatchewan by two full 
decades (MacPherson, 1979) and deferred ―the encounter between the social economy 
and social democracy‖ in Québec (Vaillancourt, 2009, p. 74).  
 
Co-operativism was an historically young but robust movement at the turn of the 
twentieth century. The movement grew quickly. In the next three decades, as settlement 
accelerated across the Prairie West, co-operative ideas spread across Europe. The first 
congress of the International Co-operative Alliance was held in London in 1895, 
                                                 
57
 As Birchall (1997) notes, there were precursors to the famous experiment of the Rochdale Pioneers (pp. 3 
- 4). A detailed reflection on ―The Meaning of Rochdale‖ can be found in Fairbairn (1994). 
 
58
 As Brown (1973) chronicles, this ―long and bitter struggle to achieve provincial status…helped to 
accentuate the regional antagonism to the East and distrust of the national political parties‖ (p. 63). 
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including delegates from the USA and Argentina (Birchall, 1997). It was a benchmark for 
the trans-Atlantic diffusion of the co-operative model. More important were the 
experiences many settlers had with co-operation before venturing West. As MacPherson 
(1979) documents, the early experiments of the Patrons of Husbandry in the 1870s and 
the Patrons of Industry in the 1890s, primarily in Ontario, set the stage for Prairie co-
operation. Many settlers bound for the territories of present-day Saskatchewan were 
exposed to Ontarian efforts to establish insurance, trust, and salt companies. The Grange 
(as the Patrons of Husbandry was called) developed a co-operatively owned wholesale in 
Ontario before the movement‘s collapse. These efforts set the stage for later farmers‘ 
marketing and supply societies (MacPherson, 1979). Indeed, the Patrons of Industry built 
the first farmers‘ grain elevator in Boissevain, Manitoba (Conway, 2006).  
 
Farmers in Central Canada had been establishing mutual insurance companies since the 
1830s, but in 1891, the Patrons of Industry pushed West, organizing at Portage la Prairie. 
The Patrons established consumer co-operatives for twine, coal oil, and coal and 
unsuccessfully attempted a binder twine production co-operative. Co-operative 
creameries, which took root in Denmark and the USA in the late Nineteenth Century, 
were also emerging in Québec, Ontario, and the Maritimes by the 1870s and 1880s. By 
1900, there were over 1200 co-operative creameries in Canada. Some began to sprout on 
the Prairies. By 1917, twenty Saskatchewan creameries combined to form Saskatchewan 
Co-operative Creameries (MacPherson, 1979). Complementing this central Canadian 
influence was a wave of first generation British immigrants, many schooled in trade 
unionism, consumer co-operation, and socialist politics. Cross-border migration from the 
U.S. also brought first-hand experience in dry-land farming, populist farmer politics, and 
co-operative organization. Notably, the Americans brought experience with wheat-
pooling. Sharp (1997) contends the most important influences on the early agrarian 
societies of the Canadian Prairie were the Ontario influence, British influence, and 
American influence, in that order (p. x).
59
 
                                                 
59
 This Anglo-American interpretation discounts the important role of Saskatchewan‘s increasingly diverse 
population to co-operative efforts. As Lipset (1959) details, by 1941 14.7 percent of the total population of 
the province were Germans. 7.8 percent were Scandinavians. 9 percent were Ukrainian and 2.9 percent 
were Russians. 5.7 percent were French and 4.1 percent were Dutch (p. 34). Each of these countries had 
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Sharp‘s classic study, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, focuses on the American 
influence. He argues significant settlement of the Canadian Prairies did not take place 
until the availability of land south of the border was exhausted. As the price of land in the 
U.S. spiked, an ―American invasion‖ turned North-ward. By 1920 America immigrants 
likely exceeded a million and a quarter (1997, p. 3). These American settlers, with their 
more violent experience of dispossessing Indigenous peoples, joined the dominant, 
British-Canadian settler culture. But they exercised important influence on early, farmer-
led co-operation in Saskatchewan. While the scope, scale, and longevity of the great 
Canadian Prairie pools out paced the American pools, ―by 1907 half the farmers of 
America were members of some form of co-operative enterprise‖ (Sharp, 1997, p. 28). 
The driving force of the Saskatchewan pooling campaign, E. A. Partridge, took 
inspiration from developments across the wheat belt of the continental North-West 
(Knutilla, 1994).
60
  
 
The diffusion of co-operative experiences from Ontario, Britain, the U.S., continental 
Europe, Scandinavia, Russia, and the Ukraine all converged on the Saskatchewan scene 
as the population of present-day Saskatchewan leapt ten-fold, from just over 91,000 in 
1901 to 920,000 by 1931. In this period, total farm acreage increased fourteen-fold, from 
3,833,434 acres to 55,673,460 acres (Knutilla, 1994). This massive tide of immigration 
and agricultural settlement brought with it fresh knowledge of co-operative successes 
elsewhere, intimate familiarity with the techniques of co-operative organization, and the 
ability to organize and educate an emerging co-operative movement. Conditions were 
ripe (MacPherson, 1979). 
                                                                                                                                                 
their own co-operative traditions. Taken together, these populations come close to the British proportion of 
the population, at 44.2 percent to 44.9 percent. If one breaks down the definition of Britishness to extract 
the predominantly Catholic, and largely anti-British, Irish segment, this proportion declines significantly. 
Certainly, Anglo-Saxon dominance prevailed but it is also clear that minority cultures also played an 
important role. In particular, ethnic bloc settlement meant the ethnic mix varied widely from region to 
region (Fung, Barry & Wilson, 1999).  
 
60
 ―By 1914, for example, there were 264 co-operative elevator companies in North Dakota, 241 in 
Minnesota, 288 in Iowa, and 183 in Nebraska. In the prairie provinces in the same year, there were 135 
farmers elevators in Manitoba, 192 in Saskatchewan and 52 in Alberta‖ (Sharp, 1997, p. 30). 
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This was a unique Euro-colonial conjuncture: new people with new ideas were 
populating a new place, and were poised to invent a new settler civilization. The mix of 
diverse experiences in co-operation created a crucial condition for the achievements to 
follow. But the take-off of the Saskatchewan wheat economy also depended on three 
other developments. First, a revolution in milling methods in the 1870s and 1880s made it 
possible to grind the hard wheat produced in this region into clean white flour. This 
meant Saskatchewan crops could be sold on world markets. Second, Canadian farmers‘ 
agitations secured the Crow‘s Nest Pass Agreement of 1897. The Crow Rate shipping 
subsidy gave Canadian farmers a significant advantage over their cross-border cousins. 
Third, massive rail line expansion meant widely dispersed grain growers could 
effectively get their product to market. Railway mileage across the Prairies tripled from 
1901, at 3716 miles, to 1915, when 11,710 miles of track had been laid (Sharp, 1997). 
With these new means of production and distribution in place, commercial grain 
production was poised to revolutionize the political economy of the Prairie West: 
 
The emergence of this area as a wheat-producing region coincided 
with the fundamental change in North American agriculture which 
transformed a self-sufficing economy into a commercialized 
economy. By the time the Dakotas, Montana and the Prairie 
Provinces had been settled, the commercialization of agriculture was 
accomplished, and the modern farmer had appeared. (Sharp, 1997, p. 
17) 
 
Like the Industrial Revolution in England, which created the modern working class, the 
birth of Saskatchewan‘s wheat economy at the turn of the twentieth century was also a 
―great transformation‖ (Polanyi, 2001; Spry, 1976). It also brought a new mode of 
production and a new class into existence. The enclosures drove English peasants off the 
land and into wage-labour. Similarly, the 1870 ―purchase‖ of the West from the Hudson 
Bay Company and the introduction of the reservation system blighted the Indian 
populations‘ way of life. It was the end of the Indigenous Commons in Western Canada. 
The colonial state aggressively resettled the Prairies with immigrant agrarians by the late 
1890s (Brown, 1973). From an economy based on hunting and gathering and the fur 
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trade, the region of present day Saskatchewan would be radically restructured by an 
agricultural mode of production. These petit bourgeois commodity producers would work 
their own land (often with hired help),
61
 trade in international grain markets and drive 
further economic, social, and democratic development of this new settler society. Like 
co-operators in other settler societies, Saskatchewan farmers lived the contradiction of 
being both oppressor and oppressed on this new frontier. On the one hand, the settler-
landowners occupied Aboriginal lands and were an instrument of the colonization 
process. On the other hand, they were part of a colonial hinterland pitted against the 
federal state and central Canadian capitalist interests (Fairbairn, 2005).   
 
Following the Rochdale weavers‘ legacy, a powerful and varied English co-operative 
movement, these family farmers would also adapt, expand, and diversify co-operation to 
meet their emerging needs and aspirations in the decades ahead. However, just as the 
Rochdale project was defined by the rapidly urbanizing, industrial capitalist economy in 
which it was embedded, Prairie co-operation was shaped by the suppression of regional 
industry, its dependence on the international grain trade and its virtual one-class structure 
as a farmers‘ society. Indeed, by 1905, when Saskatchewan was finally granted 
provincial status, Waiser argues the new province had already been defined by the ―big 
idea‖ of agrarian settlement for wheat production (2005, p. 9). This ―big idea‖ would 
ultimately account for both the rise and fall of Saskatchewan‘s early, agrarian co-
operative movement. It provided strong force and focus to early movement development, 
while placing limits on its long-range expansion and renewal. 
 
6.2  The first wave: Building the wheat pools, 1900 – 1920.  
The achievements of Saskatchewan‘s co-operative movement must be understood in 
terms of the historically transient conditions created by the rapid influx of a million 
settlers to the Prairie West between 1896 and 1913 (Conway, 2006). In Saskatchewan, 
the population rose from 41,522 in 1891 to 257, 763 in 1906. The Aboriginal population, 
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 ―Every August the railways sponsored what were known as harvest excursions, bringing thousands of 
migrant workers to the prairies at reduced rates to help bring in the crop. Nearly 17,000 men made the trip 
west in 1905; a record 27,500 were recruited three years later.‖ (Waiser, 2005, p. 21) 
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officially estimated at 6,358 was reduced to only 3 percent of Saskatchewan‘s population. 
Eighty percent of the population was rural (Waiser, 2005). State-sponsored settlement 
defined the frontier at the turn of the century. Aggressive marketing by colonization 
companies like the Saskatchewan Valley Land Company and the Canadian Colonization 
Association (Sharp, 1997) attracted the pioneers of this settler society.  
 
Those breaking the frontier for farming endured great hardships, from hard labour to 
social isolation to an extreme climate. They soon also encountered the challenges of 
underdeveloped infrastructure and mercenary grain-traders, railroads, merchants, and 
bankers. The pioneers soon realized that the National Policy‘s east-west railway ties and 
a tariff wall against cross-border trade with the United States had created a ―captive 
market‖ for central Canadian manufacturing and commercial interests. Settlers had been 
lured by free land and the wheat boom only to find themselves ambushed by vested 
interests. Many returned to the United States as a result: ―The high cost of agricultural 
implements discouraged (some) who felt that they were paying up to 20 percent more for 
their equipment than they had in the States, and, at the same time, were receiving 10 to 20 
percent less for everything they sold‖ (Sharp, 1997, p. 13). An enduring regional 
disparity between an industrial heartland and its dependent agricultural hinterland was 
thus built into Confederation by design. The contradiction, as Conway (2006) puts it, is 
that Territorial farmers were forced to ―sell cheap‖ into an international wheat market; 
everything else they had to ―buy dear‖ from protected Eastern manufacturers (p. 30). The 
settlers of early Saskatchewan were vulnerable, exploited, and increasingly militant 
against what they viewed as a project of social engineering on behalf of central Canadian 
capitalists. Throughout the twentieth century, Saskatchewan would struggle to break free 
from the hated tariff and the volatility of a one crop economy, but the first mover 
advantage granted Eastern manufacturers would condemn the West to an enduring 
position of industrial underdevelopment and dependency. 
 
The co-operative movement would spring up as one response to this structural 
contradiction. From the outset, the co-operative movement was embedded within a larger 
extended movement family for agrarian reform. It became a key tool in the larger 
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repertoire of farmers‘ movement action. The early force, trajectory, and character of co-
operation in Saskatchewan all reflected this fact. The clearest example of the central role 
of the wheat staple, and the formative leadership of the grain growers in the emerging co-
operative movement, was the great campaign of the early 1920s to organize the Wheat 
Pool. Farmers never forgot the fall of 1901 when half their record-breaking crop was lost 
to spoilage because neither the Canadian Pacific Railway nor the grain companies were 
prepared for the volumes. This sparked the formation of the TGGA and organized 
agitation on box car shortages and elevators. Buoyed by complaints about grading, 
weights, dockage, and price-fixing, farmer-owned, co-operative grain-handling 
triumphed on the Prairies (Knutilla, 1994). By 1930, over half of Prairie farmers 
contracted with a Pool (Conway, 2006). Within another decade, the Prairie pools were the 
―largest business groupings in Canada in terms of dollars‖ (MacPherson, 1979, p. 120). 
 
Growing out of SGGA buying clubs, retail co-operatives also had their roots in the 
agrarian movement (Fairbairn, 1989, p. 21). By 1920, there were over 300 consumer co-
ops, with about 19,000 members across the Prairies (MacPherson, 1979, p. 63). In 1926, 
with government aid, the Saskatchewan Livestock Pool and the Saskatchewan Egg and 
Poultry Pool
62
 were organized (p. 98). This chain of broad-based innovations in the first 
three decades of the century established a leading role for producer co-operation. It was a 
producer-led and dominated movement in which consumers were a junior partner.  
 
However, the early pooling campaigns also left an enduring influence on the culture and 
sense of identity of Saskatchewan people. Following McAdam (1982), the mobilizing 
network for the early agrarian settlers‘ co-operative movement was clearly based in the 
TGGA (after 1905, the SGGA). The TGGA organized local meetings and published the 
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 As Taylor (2000) documents, the Eggs and Poultry Pool was an early women‘s beachhead in a male-
dominated co-operative movement. Reflecting the division of labour on early Saskatchewan farms, women 
often tended farmyard production (keeping garden, collecting eggs, churning butter, milking cows and 
separating milk). In 1925 a group of women resolved to form a pool to market the surplus products which 
they had previously bartered or sold locally. By March 26, they had signed up 8730 members and the 
―Women‘s Pool‖ was born (pp. 68-70). Taylor‘s account of Violet McNaughton‘s co-operative organizing, 
journalism, and movement entrepreneurship provides important insight into a male-dominated movement, 
and movement history. Similarly, Holtslander (1998) accounts for the important role of Annie Hollis, 
another feminist pioneer of the early farmers‘ and co-operative movements. 
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Territorial Grain Growers Guide to establish and popularize the farmers‘ voice and 
agenda (Knutilla, 1994). As the American pool organizer and advocate Aaron Sapiro 
toured the West to preach the pool gospel, he found throngs of already informed and 
well-primed Guide subscribers in his audience. The Guide was a key element in the 
TGGA repertoire, supporting on-the-ground activism and organizing a persuasive, 
consistent, and insistent agrarian voice. The Guide railed against the vested interests and 
campaigned for farmer control (Brown, 1973). It played a crucial role in forging a shared 
definition of farmers‘ problems, in facilitating and leading dialogue, and in building a 
sense of collective identity and community around farmers‘ shared interests and purpose. 
It helped animate the continuing conversation that defined an agrarian public and 
structured an agrarian public sphere, as surely as the TGGA created a formal association 
to represent farmers‘ interests. As the SGGA became the new province‘s ―farmers‘ 
parliament,‖ the Guide emerged as their movement bible.  
 
But the Guide was more than a propaganda organ designed to indoctrinate farmers with 
TGGA dogma. Subsidized by the Grain Growers Grain Company, with board 
representation from the GGGC, the Guide helped ―weld the individualistic prairie farmers 
into an effective unit which thought and acted with uniformity‖ (Sharp, 1997, p. 27), 
while offering an early forum for alternative journalism to partisan press, such as the 
Conservative Regina Leader. It gave farmers the interpretive means to resist symbolic 
domination, including widespread industry efforts to discredit or undermine co-operative 
efforts. It promoted women‘s suffrage and a frontier feminism that emphasized the vital 
role of women‘s work on the farm and in economic and social organizations. The Guide 
hired journalists like Nellie McClung, Violet McNaughton (MacPherson, 2007), and 
Annie Hollis (Holtslander, 1998).  
 
Indicative of the power of the agrarian press was the battle between Davin‘s Leader and 
the insurgent movement for the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. It commenced with the hasty 
launch of The Progressive to agitate for the Pool on August 27, 1923. A rising crescendo 
of front-page attacks on pooling and the credibility of its leading advocate, American 
lawyer Aaron Sapiro, hit the boiling point in February 1924. Two years of court action 
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followed. Finally, The Leader was forced to settle out of court, retracting its stories, and 
printing an apology (G. Fairbairn, 1984).
63
 Ironically, the Leader may have been an even 
more indispensable asset for the pooling campaign than the newspaper organized to 
advance it. ―Those (Leader) stories gave Sapiro and the struggling pool organization a 
heaven-sent target on which to focus farmers‘ wrath‖ (p. 36). As Brown (1973) notes, 
one of the side-effects of this battle was an abiding ―hatred for the press by the farm 
community which helped to undermine its influence‖ (p. 76). One index for this enduring 
hostility was the Pool delegates‘ banning reporters from its meetings, a tradition that 
lasted for over fifty years (G. Fairbairn, 1984). 
 
As the balance of power shifted within the agrarian movement in the twenties, the role 
and significance of the Guide diminished. The radical insurgency mounted under the 
banner of The Progressive (later the Western Producer) to establish the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool supplanted the increasingly conservative TGGA with the robust radicalism of 
the Farmers Union of Canada. The Guide lapsed into a mere ―journal of an institution‖ in 
the twenties, and was increasingly marginalized, forced to pursue an increasingly 
advertising-driven path to survive. Under pressure from the rapidly growing Western 
Producer, now the leading reform journal, the Guide sank further into a business 
agriculture focus, serving a more liberal, affluent, and individualist segment of farmers. 
This commercial niche strategy was fully realized as its new rural family magazine 
format was baptised The Country Guide in 1928 (MacPherson, 2007).  
 
Nonetheless, the Guide had helped forge a democratic public out of the sparse farm 
population of the Prairie West. It knit them together into conversation and community 
despite the isolation enforced by climate and geography. An adult education vehicle, the 
Guide spurred on the development of a vibrant intellectual life and settler culture, and an 
agrarian press tradition. As Lipset (1959) notes, the average farmer he visited in the 
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 The motivations behind Davin‘s attack were commercial as well as ideological. As Brown (1973) notes, 
the Leader Publishing Company had a virtual monopoly of all the printing, book-binding, and office 
supplies used by the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company which would undoubtedly go out of 
business when the Pool was organized. 
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forties subscribed to three or four farm weeklies. He claimed the province had ―a larger 
proportion of lay social scientists than any other area (he) visited‖ and that farmers were 
exceedingly well-read (pp. xv-xvi). The agrarian press also established a greater capacity 
for rational autonomy for farmers, otherwise dominated by the colonial, partisan, and 
commercial press. It was, in short, part of the cultural democratization of the Prairies that 
made the economic and political democratizations which followed meaningful, attractive, 
and therefore possible. These were all part of the reason that a movement publication was 
such a high priority, so early, for the TGGA and why the GGGC was willing to sponsor 
the Guide financially. The central role of The Progressive in the effort to launch the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and the role of the Western Producer in sustaining member 
loyalty, explained the Pool‘s considerable expenditure on The Western Producer. 
 
Importantly, the agrarian press also accelerated the diffusion of the radical ideas in 
circulation in the Old Country in the early twentieth century. Unlike the earlier settlement 
of the American frontier, Lipset points out that ―Saskatchewan was settled in part by 
working class immigrants during a period of rising trade unionism, a growing world 
socialist movement, and an active co-operative movement in England, Germany, and 
Scandinavia‖ (Lipset, 1959, p. 25). Against the American pragmatist tradition, the 
agrarian press provided these Old Country immigrants with a life-line to the radical 
traditions emerging in Europe at the time. The Guide profiled new forms of co-operative 
development, providing an innovation diffusion channel for buying clubs, stores, and silo 
construction co-operatives (MacPherson, 2007). But farmers‘ newspapers also provided a 
window into British labour movement politics, strengthening that influence in Prairie 
movement debates. The later emergence of consumer co-operation and the CCF each 
owes a clear debt to the agrarian press. The Guide popularized Fabian perspectives and 
fostered a culture of citizen participation and social innovation.  
 
The Guide was also a ―gate-way publication.‖ It didn‘t simply help integrate its thirty 
thousand readers in 1908 into the agrarian movement by raising their sense of common 
interest, purpose, and class consciousness. It also connected them to the larger world of 
thought and action, including other periodicals and books. It introduced many to the 
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muckrakers of U.S. magazines like McClure’s Magazine and Collier’s Weekly, all of 
which further helped fuel grassroots distrust of political corruption and economic 
exploitation (Sharp, 1997). Similarly, the agrarian press cultivated demand for the 
progressive nationalism of the Canadian Forum founded in 1920 and for the Canadian 
Radio League‘s struggle to launch public broadcasting in the early thirties.  
 
In McAdam‘s term, the agrarian press was a key pivot in the ―cognitive liberation‖ of the 
farm community. Similarly, the TGGA (and later the Farmers‘ Union of Canada) played 
a vanguard role in the emerging farmer-led social bloc on the Prairies. Their role might 
be compared to that of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People 
(NAACP) within the American civil rights movement which would emerge in 1955 in the 
U.S. The connection of this early insurgent movement of agrarian settlers to the church 
network was also more than rhetorical. While the Guide played a large role and the 
church presence was relatively weak on the frontier, churches provided important venues 
for meetings, and announcements of meetings, in both cases. Clerics provided meaningful 
moral and practical support in reaching out to, and cultivating, the interest and support of 
their parishioners. In fact, the Prairie social gospel movement reflected the overlap of an 
engaged frontier clergy, the agrarian movement, and the emerging co-operative 
movement. The social gospel lent important moral legitimacy and social cohesion to the 
movement (Smillie, 1991).  
 
Together, these elements, along with the early progressive populist and socialist parties 
that served as the farmers‘ intellectual and political advance guard, constituted an 
extended social movement family. Information traveled across these networks, 
memberships overlapped, and resources were shared during key mobilizations. Following 
Gramsci, one might say that this inter-connected web of relationships was an emergent 
social bloc. Meeting minimal resistance from weak institutions of establishment authority 
and a virtual blank slate of local tradition, farmer-led innovation prevailed. 
 
Given the strategic primacy of wheat production, the priority of rapid, orderly settlement 
to the National Policy, and the popular momentum of the farmers‘ movement, local elites 
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recognized early that it would be necessary to accommodate and co-opt the farm 
movement. Indeed, from the very inception of the Province of Saskatchewan in 1905, 
state support for co-operative development recognized the importance of the model to the 
needs of the populous and increasingly powerful farmers. SGGA leaders were enticed to 
sit in Walter Scott‘s first Provincial Cabinet (Argue, 1992). Farmers were the force 
motrice of this underdeveloped new province, and the key to its stability and prosperity. 
In 1913 a provincial Co-operative Organization Branch was formed (Fairbairn, 1989) in 
the Department of Agriculture.
64
  
 
6.3 The second wave: Farmer-producers, Depression, and the challenge to diversify 
in the 1930s 
The grain elevators still standing across the Prairie West are monuments to the early 
farmers in the once-dominant wheat economy. In part, their successes reflected the fact 
that rural Saskatchewan was a one class society (Lipset, 1959). SGGA meetings were 
called the ―farmers‘ parliament‖ because of its power to influence provincial government. 
(Waiser, 2005). Agricultural producers dominated Saskatchewan‘s emerging political 
economy, and pooling was their project. But co-operation, more generally, would also 
emerge under their wing. In this sense, co-operation in Saskatchewan was itself a 
dependent movement. The farmers‘ movement was its principal patron, and farm leaders 
like E.A. Partridge (Knutilla, 1994) its agents. 
 
The rapprochement between the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and the emerging consumer 
movement in the thirties was an important broadening of agrarian co-operation. With the 
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 The Co-operative Associations Act of 1914 went out of its way to restrict the co-operative franchise to 
farmers alone. Argue (1992) cites the following statement from the Department of Agriculture‘s 1914 
Annual Report: ―The Co-operative Act is not to provide a means whereby public trading concerns may be 
cheaply launched, but is rather to enable groups of farmers, who wish to co-operate in producing, 
purchasing or marketing, to do so in a businesslike way at a small expense. Trading bodies who wish to 
deal with the general public should incorporate under the Companies Act‖ (p. 11). This language appears to 
reflect an historic compromise. On the one hand, it suggests an effort to appease farmers. On the other 
hand, it suggests an effort to contain the growth of consumer and worker co-operative sectors which might 
further encroach on private enterprise. This tact may indeed have deterred, diverted, and delayed urban 
diversification of the co-operative movement, as incorporation-bound proponents encountered resistance 
from the Act‘s official gatekeepers. But it did not restrain rural diversification. 
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consolidation of the province‘s consumer co-operatives under the Saskatchewan Co-
operative Wholesale Society in 1929, collaboration finally replaced competition between 
retail co-operatives and the Trading Department of the SGGA (in the process of 
becoming the United Farmers of Canada). This three and a half year struggle between the 
principles of farmer and consumer control was finally resolved.
65
 A benchmark in the 
struggle for the diversification of the co-operative movement, and co-operation among 
co-operatives, the partnership involved the support of the provincial government and, of 
course, the province‘s leading established co-operative, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. 
 
By 1932, the Pool and the co-operative wholesale in Saskatchewan 
were working closely together in a contractual partnership. Pool 
fieldmen carried out general co-operative education and helped 
organize many new co-operatives, with the wholesale contributing to 
the field-staff budget… The help of the Pools, as well as of other 
farm organizations and co-operatives, meant that in many 
communities the development of consumer co-operatives ‗piggy-
backed‘ on established rural organizations. (Fairbairn, 1989, p. 63) 
 
The increased proximity and frequency of contact between consumer co-operators and 
wheat-poolers generated new trust, goodwill, and a new willingness to take joint-risks. 
From joint-purchasing emerged increasing mutual respect and a new willingness to give 
unto the consumer co-operative movement what increasingly appeared to be its 
purview.
66
 
 
Ironically, it was the Great Depression that spurred on some of the most bold and creative 
efforts to find the deeper economies and synergies within the co-operative movement. 
The retail co-operative movement expanded decisively through the thirties and forties, 
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 Continuing competitive pressures from the United Grain Growers wheat pools ultimately led to their 
forced resignation from the Co-operative Union of Canada in 1929 (Fairbairn, 1989). 
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 ―Since 1933 the wholesale and the pools had been co-operating in the purchase of bulk supplies, notably 
binder twine purchased from British manufacturers and petroleum and coal purchased locally. Building on 
this relationship was difficult because of vested interests on both sides, but as the wholesale displayed its 
strength and as the pools refrained from attempting complete domination, a satisfactory relationship 
emerged. By the late thirties, pool leaders, both provincial and local, were nearly all sympathetic to 
consumer co-operation, and they recognized the value of having the wholesale supply most farm-supply 
items‖ (MacPherson, 1979, p. 154). 
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with the support of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool agents. It was also in the depths of the 
Great Depression that the first co-operative oil refinery in the world was established and 
that the campaign for a farm implements co-operative was launched (MacPherson, 1987). 
With government aid, the credit union movement would also finally take off. It was 
buoyed by the spectacular achievements of producer and consumer co-operation and 
made necessary by the credit crunch of the Great Depression (Fairbairn, 2005). This 
broadening out, starting with the reorientation of the Pool, was key to the regeneration of 
the movement, battered by drought and Depression. The Pool fieldmen played a key role 
in the mobilizing network for renewal (MacPherson, 2007). Fairbairn (2005) argues ―the 
Pool staff of the 1930 - 40s was likely the most important group of community economic 
developers the province has ever seen‖ (p. 22).   
 
In the twenties, the role of SWP fieldmen was largely a matter of signing and enforcing 
contracts. After the introduction of the Canadian Wheat Board, their main role 
disappeared. This group of up to eighteen staff and a supervisor or two used the 
opportunity to re-invent themselves. In the thirties, the needs of their members were 
many and urgent so the SWP fieldmen transformed themselves into what we now call 
―community organizers.‖ In addition to helping organize the next wave of producer co-
operatives, consumer co-operatives, and credit unions, they fanned out across the 
province as agents of social change and cultural development. As Gary Fairbairn argues, 
―it was impossible to define their function precisely, so no one really tried—the unspoken 
obligation was to be everywhere and help with everything‖ (1984, p. 120).  
 
It was the fieldman‘s responsibility to build up the system of member 
representation into an effective policy-making and member-control 
organization. From this base the Wheat Pool extended leadership to 
the development of other co-operative enterprises. The field staff and 
local committee of the Pool took the initiative in the formation of 
local consumer co-operatives at the same time that the Pool itself was 
struggling for survival following the collapse of the voluntary Pool in 
1929. The records of these years indicate that the Pool‘s effort on 
behalf of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Wholesale Society provided 
a substantial basis for its rapid expansion in the late 1930s. Similar 
contributions can be documented in the development of the Livestock 
Dairy and Poultry Pools, and, at a later time, the Credit Unions and 
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Canadian Co-operative Implements Limited. (Kristjanson, Baker, & 
Everson, 1964, p. 39)  
 
Along with the movement newspaper, launched as The Progressive in August, 1923 to 
support the Pool‘s initial sign-up campaign (and re-named the Western Producer in 
September, 1924), a library-by-mail service launched in 1930, a rotating books service 
managed through the network of local elevator agents, and radio broadcasts in 1934, the 
fieldmen took their place as organic intellectuals within a broader process of knowledge-
mobilization, and democratic community capacity-building
67
 (G. Fairbairn, 1984). They 
helped build a common vocabulary and analysis, a shared ethic of joint-action, and a 
sense of social solidarity. This practice of gathering neighbours and building trust, 
goodwill, and communication channels largely built the legendary base of the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation that would come to power in the mid-forties.  
 
In 1933-34, the new bridging role of the fieldmen also made possible an important 
innovation. The ―affiliate plan‖ emerged from the new partnership forged between the 
Pool and the Saskatchewan Co-operative Wholesale Society. The scheme used local 
Wheat Pool organization as a delivery node for bulk commodities like binder twine, coal, 
and fuel purchased through the SCWS. The wholesale paid for facilities and managed the 
affiliate while a Pool fieldman often did the organizing and a Pool elevator agent served 
as secretary. The wholesale thus built up volume and accumulated surplus. The Pool 
earned revenues and strengthened member loyalty through the difficult years of the 
Depression. Many of these bulk commodity affiliates eventually matured into general 
                                                 
67
 Indeed, the field staff of the SWP alone signed up 5,393 subscribers to launch the new Western Producer 
(G. Fairbairn, 1984). One winter, fieldmen were directed to devote a full two weeks to a single-minded 
drive to build the subscriber base (p. 128). The prairie tradition of showing movies, in fact, was part of a 
strategy to boost the circulation of the Western Producer. Fieldmen offered free admission to families with 
paid subscriptions (p. 129). Another indication of the developmental movement in which the Western 
Producer and the fieldmen were embedded, and which they embodied, was the role of pioneering journalist 
Violet McNaughton. As Gary Fairbairn notes, she approached her journalism as a form of community 
organizing as well: ―One of the three SGGA representatives on the Progressive‘s editorial board, 
McNaughton helped arrange the transition into the Western Producer. As she worked for women‘s rights, 
regional hospitals for the deaf and a hundred other causes, she built up a network of correspondents and 
fans that amounted to an invisible social-reform movement and included virtually every prominent figure in 
prairie social reform‖ (1984, p. 127). From the pages of the Western Producer and lending library books to 
the film nights and district meetings, the staff of the Western Producer, the elevator agents, and the field-
men were all part of a concerted effort to extend the frontier of co-operativism and agrarian socialism.  
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stores. In fact, by 1945, 53 affiliate locals operated general stores. With over 300 co-
operative associations affiliated to the Saskatchewan wholesale, this was a very 
significant advance for consumer co-operation (Fairbairn, 1989). The debt owed to the 
fieldmen of the SWP is incalculable but there is one striking empirical indicator of their 
contribution. In one five month campaign, the team fanned out across the province and 
enlisted Pool delegates and local committees to set up 419 affiliate co-operatives 
(Fairbairn, G., 1984). 
 
The SWP fieldworkers drove adult education and co-operative and community 
development through the Depression years.
68
 In part, their achievements reflected their 
role in this period ―as guardians of the Pool‘s democratic structures and communication 
channels.‖ Agents of community animation and movement regeneration, the fieldmen 
sowed the seeds of redoubled social action through a program of ceaseless agitation, 
facilitation, and support for local initiatives. In the 1937 – 38 fiscal year, the team of 
sixteen fieldmen attended 372 Pool conventions, 1788 general meetings, and 747 Pool 
committee meetings (Fairbairn, G., 1984). Much of the education, organization, and CED 
work of the co-operative movement in these years was led by Pool fieldmen. In 1938 
SWP delegates adopted a formal policy to encourage all forms of co-operative 
development, unleashing their field-men to organize hundreds of co-operative stores and 
credit unions (MacPherson, 1987). The moral resolve of this crusade reverberated 
through the movement right through the fifties.  
 
The retail co-operatives and credit unions that sprang up in this period were often open to 
non-farmers, and therefore more communitarian in their character than the exclusively 
producer-controlled co-operatives, such as the pools. Still, the agrarian imprint remained. 
The organization of these consumer retails relied on a crucial resource-sharing agreement 
                                                 
68
 ―Its fieldmen (were) a force of enthusiastic and well-equipped men to devote to the co-operative cause; 
equipped with cars, motion picture projectors, portable screens, films and an assortment of literature, the 
fieldmen became essentially co-operative organizers in the late thirties… While it is difficult to estimate the 
impact of these activities, they undoubtedly did help the movement consolidate its position and develop 
new initiatives. The growth is suggested by government statistics: by 1937, there were 301 trading 
organizations, 130 community hall societies, 14 combination trading and community halls, 20 community 
pasture associations and one reservoir project‖ (MacPherson, 1979, p. 153). 
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with the province‘s leading agrarian producer co-operative and the support of Pool 
fieldmen. The financial viability of these consumer co-ops was often based on the bulk 
commodity needs of the farming membership. Consumer co-operative boards were 
dominated by farmers due to their numbers and experience in co-operative leadership. 
Even through the development of this semi-autonomous consumer co-operative sector, 
the province‘s co-operative field still remained driven and defined by farmers. Indeed, the 
articulation of consumer co-operation to the farmers‘ social project helped to further 
consolidate farmer position. Non-farmers benefited from participation in co-operative 
retailing and credit, but were beholden to SWP fieldmen and farmers on their boards. 
Indeed, mutualist institutions played a vital role in fusing the interests and ideology of 
farmers and non-farmers. By the same token, farmers built a broader affinity with their 
non-agrarian neighbours, assuming leadership responsibilities for a larger community.  
 
Table 6.1 Participation opportunities in local governance, 1944-5 vs. 2006 
 1944-45 2006 
Telephone 
companies 
 
1,127 1 
School districts 5,184 27 
Hospital boards 79 13 
Total  6,390 41 
 
Source: Courtney, J. C. (2007). p.12. 
As farmers got involved in cross-class organizations like consumer co-operatives, credit 
unions, school boards, town councils, and hospital boards, they brought their skills, 
experience, and maturing socialist perspectives with them. Indeed, Lipset (1959) suggests 
it was the scope for participation in public life in this sparsely populated province that 
accounts for the rise of agrarian socialism. As Courtney (2007) has argued, the extent of 
local involvements in the decentralist structures of this era created an exponentially 
greater degree of civic participation than we experience today. As Table 6.1 illustrates, 
the index of telephone companies, school districts, and hospital boards alone provides an 
 203 
image of a vastly more engaged citizenry. With a ratio of 155 boards to one overall, and 
each of these boards providing for a number of directors‘ seats, it is clear that democratic 
life and community service was exponentially more integral to the Prairie lifestyle and 
ethos in the forties. Co-operatives were a driving force in the public-minded spirit of the 
age. 
 
The communitarian impulse unleashed in this period also involved the maturing 
sophistication of what George Keen described as ―associative intelligence‖ (MacPherson, 
1979, p. 28). Although largely sponsored by a responsible and caring agrarian parent, the 
emerging three-sector co-operative movement (pooling, consumer co-operation, and 
credit unionism) would be inspired by the restless re-invention of the era‘s co-operative 
innovations. Personifying this broad-based knowledge of movement networks and 
potential was co-operative renegade, Harry Fowler (Phalen, 1977). By 1939, the founder 
of the co-operative oil refinery in Regina was the chairman of the Saskatchewan Co-
operative Trading Association. In his group‘s successful submission to a government 
committee, they drew together the experience of the dairy co-operatives and American 
farm implement co-operatives with the potential of the emerging credit union system, the 
wholesale, and the state to meet the need for affordable farm machinery:   
 
Fowler outlined the potential for a co-operative organization that 
could sell new equipment and service old machinery. To help farmers 
finance their equipment costs, Fowler recommended extensive use of 
the province‘s rapidly growing credit union system. Aware of the 
problems that had beset the co-operative dairy industry in 
Saskatchewan, Fowler emphasized the need for grassroots support 
rather than a top-down, government-initiated ―co-operative plan.‖ He 
did advocate, however, that government become involved by 
providing expanded education and supervisory services through the 
Co-operation and Marketing Branch and by making available a small 
amount of seed capital. McCaig followed Fowler‘s presentation and 
described how American co-operatives were becoming involved in 
the farm machinery business, and McKay described the work of the 
Wholesale, suggesting that its method of local ownership might 
provide a model for the organization of a new farm machinery co-
operative. (MacPherson, 1987, p. 3) 
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In microcosm, this presentation exemplified the accrued learning of second wave 
movement experience. It revealed a determined and innovative spirit, forged by both 
hardship and accomplishment. It demonstrated the role of sequential and reciprocal 
innovations in the forward march of the movement‘s creative problem-solving and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
When credit unionism finally emerged in Saskatchewan in 1937, it took off rapidly. This 
third force in prairie co-operation further diversified and drove the popular cultural 
expansion, and regeneration, of the wider movement. By 1939, 32 credit union branches 
with 3,000 members were open for business (MacPherson, 1979). Only one year later, 
there were 52 branches with 4,481 members. In 1950, the movement had swelled to 245 
branches, with 48,183 members. In 1960, there were 278 branches with 88,288 members 
(Fairbairn, 2005). By 2009, 313 credit union outlets claimed 515,680 members (Credit 
Unions of Saskatchewan, 2010).  
 
Significantly, the diffusion of the caisse populaire concept, pioneered in Québec from 
1900, had been delayed by the isolation of Fransaskois communities. La Caisse 
Populaire d’Albertville opened in 1916 (Credit Unions of Saskatchewan, 2010), a full 
twenty years before enabling legislation was finally passed in Saskatchewan. Ironically, 
this impasse was only overcome as efforts in the (English-speaking) Maritime region 
came to light in the (English-language) agrarian press and through speaking tours by the 
CUC‘s George Keen and visits by Moses Coady in 1936 and 1938. Father James Boyle 
of the Antigonish movement even assisted with credit union development in 
Saskatchewan (MacPherson, 1979). The delay in transferring this innovation was clearly 
due to linguistic and cultural drag, but ethno-linguistic segregation was doubtless 
compounded by the organized efforts of the Orange Lodge, the Ku Klux Klan, and the 
provincial Conservatives—all of which deepened a nascent anti-Catholic xenophobia 
(Sher, 1983). Diffusion took a circuitous path, postponing the broad-based development 
 205 
of credit unionism in Saskatchewan.
69
 It took the desperation of the ―dirty thirties‖ to 
finally forge the breakthrough.  
 
Ironically, the degeneration that often befalls established movements was also arrested by 
the hardships of the Depression. It broke down institutional isolation and drove grassroots 
revitalization (MacPherson, 1979). Indeed, this period of crisis stirred an intellectual and 
cultural ferment. The agrarian press once again played a key role. The Western Producer, 
heir to the Saskatchewan Grain Growers’ Guide and a ―powerful voice for co-operative 
action on the Prairies‖ (MacPherson, 1979, p. 181), reached 105,000 subscribers by 1939. 
The agrarian movement, with the Wheat Pool at its back, demonstrated remarkable 
grassroots ingenuity and resilience. However, the shifting urban media landscape had not 
proved so favourable for Prairie co-operation. In 1929, Regina and Saskatoon both 
became one-paper towns when Clifford Sifton amalgamated The Leader and The Post in 
Regina and The Star and The Phoenix in Saskatoon (Gruending, 1980). Gone were the 
days when Saskatoon‘s Star Publisher W. F. Herman supported the Progressive political 
movement. Like Davin, Sifton was politically motivated. Unlike Davin, he was a Liberal. 
A Member of Parliament when he purchased the Winnipeg Free Press, he supervised 
immigration to the Prairies under Prime Minister Alexander MacKenzie (G, Fairbairn, 
1984). 
 
While the Western Producer reached across rural Saskatchewan, its penetration was 
comparatively weak in Saskatchewan‘s two major centres. Under the direction of Sir 
Clifford, daily print media in Saskatchewan‘s two major cities was monopolized by the 
ideological equivalent of a colonial governor. He was both geographically and 
ideologically remote from Saskatchewan‘s unique economic and political traditions: 
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 Although about forty Francophone caisses populaires were founded in Saskatchewan in the forties, only 
four were left by 1980—victims of assimilation into an English-speaking culture (NTFCD, 1985). 
Similarly, the province‘s first credit union was started by the Jewish Colonization Company in 1910, a case 
that further illustrates the drag which ethnic segregation has represented for the diffusion of co-operative 
innovations (Credit Unions of Saskatchewan, 2010). 
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Editorially, the (Star-Phoenix) has not been a sturdy opponent of 
progressive thought and organization, so much as the befuddled 
defender of a concept of rugged individualism imposed by its 
absentee owners, the Siftons of Ontario. They never have understood 
that the most significant forces in Saskatchewan‘s development have 
been co-operative and collective. (Gruending, 1980, p. 140) 
 
The early disinterest of the new commercial owners in co-operative traditions may have 
seemed innocuous to urban co-operators.
70
 To the rural-based co-operative movement, it 
perhaps seemed irrelevant. Indeed, with the historic connection of the provincial Liberal 
party to the SGGA, some may have viewed this as a progressive turn. Certainly, set 
against the backdrop of the vicious newspaper war between Davin‘s Leader and The 
Progressive over the launch of the Pool, the arrival of the Siftons may have come as a 
relief. Davin‘s Leader Publishing Company had owned all four of the province‘s morning 
dailies, cornering 80 percent of the province‘s daily circulation (Brown, 1973).  
 
While consumer co-operative and credit union organizers continued to move against 
bankers and retailers, and Harry Fowler pushed through the launch of the Co-operative 
Consumer in June 1940 to fill the breach (Phalen, 1977), the monopoly capitalist press 
posed a creeping threat to their project. The Grain Growers Guide and the Western 
Producer had helped pave the way for agrarian co-operativism, and the Co-operative 
Consumer became the largest circulation newspaper in the West (Phalen, 1977). 
However, the rise of the monopoly press and its steady encroachment over a wider 
trading area would create an historical undertow. The cultivation of consumer culture and 
economic liberalism would gradually help frustrate and defeat the democratic culture of 
left-populism in a rapidly urbanizing Saskatchewan.. 
 
Most importantly, what the resurgent co-operation of the second wave in the Great 
Depression could not reverse, however, was the long-range trend toward larger farms and 
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 Indeed, as Fairbairn (2005) argues, Sifton viewed co-operation as a constructive alternative to socialism. 
He attempted to articulate its accomplishments to the individualist ethos of Confederation capitalism by 
praising the pools ―as a high and notable example of individual energy and capacity‖ (p. 17). Unlike the 
vitriol he reserved for socialism, he courted and sought to co-opt co-operative currents within the discourse 
of settlement boosterism. 
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the urbanization of Saskatchewan society. As we will see, the very strength of co-
operation in the farmers‘ movement would also prove to be the source of its later 
weakness. With the decline of the family farm and the depopulation of rural 
Saskatchewan, the agrarian social base of the co-operative movement would continue to 
erode. Although the Depression-era diversification into retail and credit co-operation 
eased the movement‘s absolute dependency on producer co-operatives, all Saskatchewan 
businesses ultimately rose or fell on the strengths of the wheat economy. It may well be 
that the crisis of the Depression forestalled this date with decline. By buying time for the 
movement to broaden out and forcing cross-sectoral collaborations, the agitations of the 
Great Depression secured new foundations for future growth and stability. Waging a 
three-front war that included credit unions and consumer co-operatives as well as the 
agricultural producers‘ co-operatives, the co-operative movement could look forward to a 
future that extended beyond the horizons of the one crop economy of the past.  
 
6.4 The third wave: Recovery, socialism, and movement expansion, 1940 - 1960 
While the Depression represented a crisis of authority for capitalism, it also demonstrated 
the resilience and rootedness of Prairie co-operation. The return to prosperity thus set the 
stage for further growth of the co-operative movement and the maturing project of 
agrarian socialism. With the revival of economic growth, the Saskatchewan co-operative 
movement was well positioned to expand. Indeed, it had improved its position as private 
sector competitors failed and withdrew from the market (MacPherson, 1979). An 
important forties innovation, building on the affiliate plan initiative of the thirties, was 
SCWS‘s  ―associated stores‖ plan, whereby the co-operative wholesale supplied private 
store owners, buying them out on retirement and converting their stores to co-operatives 
(Fairbairn, 2005). In 1939, the SCWS took its first step into manufacturing when it 
bought a flour mill in Outlook, Saskatchewan. In 1940 it banded together with the 
Manitoba and Alberta wholesales to form Inter-provincial Co-operatives Limited 
(MacPherson, 1979). By 1944, the Consumers Co-operative Refineries Limited merged 
with the SCWS to form SFCL. The first co-operative oil refinery in the world, CCRL had 
been launched in the depths of the Depression by renegade Regina co-operative organizer 
Harry Fowler in ―one of the most important events in the history of co-operative retailing 
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in the West‖ (Fairbairn, 1989, p. 109), multiplying sales volumes for unprecedented 
economies of scope and scale, and nearly tripling sales from $6.7 million in 1945 to $17 
million in 1950. Ironically, the refinery launch in 1934 had received no support from 
established central co-operative organizations, including the SCWS. They expected it to 
fail. Yet, the future growth of the Western Canadian co-operative retailing powerhouse, 
which posted $4.2 billion in sales in 2005 (Fairbairn, 2005), was ultimately driven by the 
cash flow generated by Fowler‘s risky gambit in the depths of the Depression.  
 
Another landmark development in the post-Depression expansion was the incorporation 
of Co-operative Life Insurance on March 12, 1945. Sponsored by the Pool and other farm 
co-operatives, SWP fieldmen were briefed and fanned out across the province. They took 
no commissions in the first few months to establish the new venture. By April 1947, over 
$6 million in policies had been written; by its fiftieth anniversary, Co-operators had sold 
over $3 billion in policies. Today it holds a central position in a dense, nation-wide 
network of insurance and financial co-operatives (Co-operators, 2010). 
   
The first socialist government in North America took power in Saskatchewan in 1944. 
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) both sprang from, and further raised 
the profile of, the co-operative movement.
71
 The country‘s first full-fledged Ministry of 
Co-operatives, the Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development (DCCD), 
was established to scale up sector and state development efforts. Premier T.C. Douglas 
assumed personal responsibility for the DCCD‘s direction in his administration‘s second 
term. The socialist state would provide active but uneven support to co-operatives.  
 
The rise of the CCF through the Depression years was the work of the same grassroots 
agrarian mobilizing network that gave rise to the pools and co-operative movement in 
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 As Lipset (1959) notes, 73.6 percent of all rural delegates to the 1946 CCF convention also held posts in 
the co-operative movement. He concluded from the fact ―that 58.9 percent of those delegates more than 45 
years of age in 1945 held posts in co-operatives before the CCF was organized, it is clear that the CCF did 
not win control of the co-operative movement from the outside but rather that the existing co-operative 
leaders organized the CCF‖ (p. 180). Lipset also reports that ―75 percent of the members of the Wheat Pool 
and other co-operatives voted CCF in 1944, though only 58 percent of the total farming population did so‖ 
(p. 198).  
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Saskatchewan (Lipset, 1959). In finding the way forward to ―broaden out‖ beyond a 
farmer-based co-operative movement, Depression era co-operators were also solving the 
intractable problem that had stymied the growth of farmers‘ parties, like the Society of 
Equity. It split over co-operation with organized labour after World War I; the 
Progressives were similarly never able to resolve the question (Sharp, 1997). The SWP‘s 
moves to build an alliance with the consumer co-operative movement and to mandate its 
fieldmen to assist with the development of sister co-operatives all led to a wider social 
solidarity. Pool policies testified to the emerging hegemony of socialist values within the 
movement. Overlapping membership with the CCF ensured that, unlike Equity and the 
Progressives, farmers would now reach out to natural working class allies. Lessons from 
a decade of grassroots campaigning and ―broadening out‖ by the Pool were transferred to 
the political arena.
72
 This emphasis on an integrated movement culture was shared by 
early CCF leaders who felt the party was only as strong as its movement base. As 
Douglas declared, ―This is more than a political movement. It is a people‘s movement, a 
movement of men and women who have dedicated their lives to making the brotherhood 
of man a living reality‖ (cited in Johnson, 2004, p. 27). The CCF, of course, appropriated 
the term ―co-operative‖ for its own name, reflecting a pragmatic desire to avoid the 
provocative label ―socialist.‖ But it also testified to the popularity of co-operatives in 
Saskatchewan. In its Regina Manifesto (CCF, 1933), the party endorsed producer and 
consumer co-operation (the credit union movement took off in 1937). It recruited 
extensively from the movement‘s ranks. There were 30 farmers on the CCF‘s 1944 
election ticket, Lauchlin McIntosh—a Wheat Pool fieldman—would be the Province‘s 
first minister responsible for the DCCD (Johnson, 2004).  
  
Not everyone was thrilled by the rise of the CCF. The Liberal Sifton papers launched a 
hysterical red-baiting campaign against the party. Decades of grassroots education and 
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 Lipset (1959) cites one of his informants at length: ―It‘s really all one movement that we have here. We 
are building socialism through the Wheat Pool, through our co-op store, through our UFC local, as well as 
through the CCF. They are all part of one movement, the ‗people‘s movement.‘ Sometimes one 
organization or fight is more important than the other, but we need them all. The fact that our poll 
committee doesn‘t meet except before conventions doesn‘t mean the CCFers don‘t care about the party. We 
feel that we are building the CCF when we build our co-op store, and we are building co-operation and 
destroying the profit system when we build the CCF‖ (p. 208). 
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organizing by the agrarian movement, the agrarian press, and the CCF partially 
inoculated the public. Nonetheless, the Leader-Post‘s cartoon characterization of the 
CCF‘s designs as a ―road to strife and devastation‖ and a ―stultifying dictatorial system‖ 
(Shackleton, 1975, p. 124) placed the party on the defensive. The Sifton monopoly now 
also extended to radio, sowing seeds of daily doubt with the electorate in print and on the 
airwaves. It thus represented a formidable check against the CCF‘s democratic 
mandate—with significant implications for co-operative development policy.  
 
While the CCF governed without interruption for nearly two decades, business rule and 
media influence gradually enhanced the role of investors in the political economy and 
culture of the province. The rural majority dwindled. The fragile residual hegemony of 
agrarian socialism—including the agrarian co-operative tradition—eroded in the face of 
the capitalist, consumer culture and the expanding reach of the public relations industry.  
Indeed, it was precisely this power over public opinion that defeated the CCF federally in 
1945. Since the federal party couldn‘t build on the same ideological and cultural 
fortifications established by the agrarian movement, including its press, over the decades 
in Saskatchewan, a concerted business lobby campaign was able to successfully contain 
the emerging political force to Saskatchewan.
73
 
 
Back in Saskatchewan, the new CCF government settled into power. Despite facing 
determined adversaries, including a hostile press both within the province and outside, it 
rolled out a series of new co-operative development initiatives. On July 10, 1944, 
members of the Douglas Cabinet were sworn in. In September, they met with co-
operative representatives to discuss support for Canadian Co-operative Implements 
Limited (Johnson, 2004). From less than .1 percent of total government expenditure in 
1945, the DCCD budget climbed through the first and into the second term, its share of 
total provincial budget quintupled in only five years (Argue, 1992).  
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 ―It was a disastrous election for the CCF; it could hardly have been otherwise. On top of all the political 
shifts that threatened it, a scurrilous advertising campaign was subscribed to by hundreds of business firms 
in 1944. This campaign was run by B.A. Trestrail, with newspaper and radio advertising and a pamphlet, 
Social Suicide, mailed to households across Canada at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The 
object of the campaign was to vilify the CCF and paint a lurid picture of ‗socialism‘‖ (Shackleton, 1975, p. 
212). 
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Despite the CCF‘s landslide majority, it would face an entrenched and vocal minority 
intent on discrediting the regime. Initiatives in co-operative development would not 
escape their gaze, including the involvement of forty veterans in a co-operative farm 
experiment. In addition to practical problems with inadequate planning and wet weather, 
critics assailed the rehabilitation scheme as the first step on the path to Soviet-style 
collective farms (Johnson, 2004). It was an early sign of the perils of Cold War co-
operation.  
 
Stoking the flames of Cold War anti-communism was the trail-blazing work of Watson 
Thomson‘s new Division of Adult Education in the Saskatchewan CCF government. 
Through a Provincial Study-Action Plan, Thomson proposed to organize a network of 
study-action groups across the province (Welton, 1986; Chartier, 2009). Like the 
Antigonish movement in the Maritimes, which was led by Fathers Jimmy Tompkins and 
Moses Coady from the Extension Department of St. Francis Xavier University (SFXU), 
the Saskatchewan initiative was based on the study club model of co-operative 
organization used widely in Denmark and Sweden. By 1938, SFXU was sponsoring over 
1100 study groups with a membership of 10,000. A spin-off of the Nova Scotia model 
also took root in Prince Edward Island. By the late thirties, the adult education division of 
St. Dunstan‘s University had helped organize 330 study clubs and 24 credit unions. Study 
groups also sprang up in Ontario and B.C. (MacPherson, 1979). The potential of these 
adult education methods for co-operative development was exciting. It struck a 
particularly resonant ―Old Country‖ chord with the province‘s Scandinavian population 
of almost eight percent (Lipset, 1959). The initiative promised to broaden out the British-
led movement by adopting new methods and tackling new problems. Like the legendary 
Pool fieldmen, Thomson‘s unit would help local groups organize projects like credit 
unions, community centres, or co-operative farms. ―Aware that the trend in agriculture 
was towards increasingly mechanized, capital-intensive, large-scale units, Thomson 
urged farmers to bring their isolated farms together into single co-operative 
communities‖ (Welton, 1986, pp. 116 - 117).  
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By April 1945, as a group in Sturgis formed the province‘s first co-operative farm, the 
unit had identified interest in co-operative farming in the Landis-Biggar area. In June, 
175 citizens, experts, and officials participated in a weekend conference, with a study-
action group to follow up on the concept over the winter (Welton, 1986). Among the four 
core staff of the Division was Hugh Harvey, an extension specialist seconded from the 
new DCCD, who presented at the Landis conference. The acting deputy minister of the 
DCCD told the group that about 25 farm groups were interested in some form of co-
operative organization and 5 were in the process of incorporating. Among the other 
citizens‘ conferences convened around the province that month were sessions on health 
services in Kamsack, Saltcoats, Canora, and Sturgis and a co-operative farming 
conference held in Outlook (Welton, 1986). Momentum was building. 
 
But gathering hopes for grassroots resurgence would be frustrated. On the one hand, Cold 
War hysteria was on the rise: on the right, in the business community, and in the press. 
Unlike the Antigonish movement, which had the sanction and protection of the church 
and the university, Thomson‘s Division was exposed and vulnerable. Vocal critics 
framed it a propaganda arm of the socialist government. The Sifton papers remained 
consistently hostile (Gruending, 1980). On Feb. 24, 1945, the Financial Post compared 
the CCF ―propaganda plan‖ to fascism and Soviet Russia (Welton, 1986, p. 120). By the 
end of 1945, the Gouzenko spy trials were capturing headlines and leftists nation-wide 
felt the full force of Canada‘s Cold War (Whitaker & Marcuse, 1994). On the other hand, 
Thomson had only lukewarm support from an anxious and inexperienced Minister 
responsible and wider Fabian party establishment. Protective of Canada‘s first socialist 
government, aspiring to electoral gains elsewhere, and puzzled by Thomson‘s 
communitarian approach, CCF federal leader M.J. Coldwell and others feared he 
sympathized with the communists or the rival Labour Progressive Party (Welton, 1986). 
In 1934, under Woodsworth, the federal CCF had dissolved the Ontario CCF due to 
communist infiltration (Morton, 1977) and the party was not eager for further 
embarrassment. Indeed, the stakes were high across the nation. The CCF had recently 
formed official opposition in four provinces. It almost won Ontario in 1943. With the 
British Labour Party winning its first majority government in 1945 and CCF membership 
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increasing five-fold from 1939-45 (Brown, Roberts, & Warnock, 1999), pressure to rein 
in Thomson was strong. On Dec, 15, 1945, Thomson resigned, the experiment wound 
down, and the Cold War triumphed. A hundred community-based projects, including the 
Landis co-operative farm, were stranded (Welton, 1986). 
 
Thomson‘s study-action groups had been built on the tradition of Pool fieldmen and the 
achievements of the Antigonish movement, with clear promise for co-operative 
development. Their demise came as a crushing blow to many movement activists. Lewis 
Lloyd, brother of Thomson‘s boss, Minister of Education (and future Premier) Woodrow 
Lloyd, refused to speak to his brother for years (Welton, 1986; Lloyd, 1979). Lewis was a 
Vice-Chairman of the Co-operative Union board and Vice-President of Federated Co-
operatives (Lloyd, 1979). This sustained silence between brothers typified the chill which 
set in between the left-populist co-operative activists on one hand and the CCF on the 
other. 
 
The Thomson debacle also illustrates the increasingly uneasy alliance between the co-
operative movement and the Douglas CCF. Many members of the CCF and the co-
operative movement were part of the same ―people‘s movement‖ before the 1944 
election. However, state power brought with it the need to assuage voter anxieties across 
the country. The Douglas administration‘s need to prove to the nation that CCF-ers were 
prudent and pragmatic moderates constrained movement-party co-operation. The 
marriage between the culture of left populism and a culturally conservative national party 
establishment, and professional civil servants, was not dissolved by this imbroglio. But 
the seeds of estrangement had been sown: ―With Thomson‘s dismissal the left popular 
culture felt betrayed‖ (Welton, 1986, p. 134).  
 
Ironically, Thomson had seen the need to renew grassroots action ―from below‖ to 
maintain grassroots support for continuing state reform ―from above.‖ For Fabians 
preoccupied with federal party-building, parliamentary manoeuvre, and electoral 
fortunes, this two-front strategy—combining legislative and hard-to-control popular 
action—could also fatally complicate statecraft and open the party to embarrassment and 
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defeat. By shutting Thomson down and demobilizing sections of this popular movement 
base in Saskatchewan, the CCF accelerated precisely the movement degeneration that 
Thomson strove to forestall. In any event, what is clear is that a rift was widening 
between the movement and legislative wings of agrarian socialism. This had clear 
implications for co-operative development. The movement culture emphasized grassroots 
animation, education, and leadership. The managerial culture of the CCF in power 
increasingly stressed order, control, and the containment of the young Turks and old 
Turks within. Movement activists built networks and collaborations from the ground up. 
CCF technocrats and managers implemented policy and programs through the state‘s 
command-hierarchy, from the top down. Personnel, priorities, and cultural sensibilities 
were diverging along party-movement lines.  
 
Leier (1996) has argued that the divergence of ―party‖ and ―movement‖ on the Canadian 
left also reflects an abiding conflict between the class interests of workers and 
intellectuals. A similar argument might be made in the Saskatchewan case. Saskatchewan 
workers were doubly marginalized: by the awesome numbers and organization of the 
farm movement and by the emergence of a class of party intellectuals and state-
technocrats. In other words, the primary class contradiction between right-wing business 
power and a left-wing movement of farmers and their allies was complicated by internal 
class contradictions and political aspirations. There was a class of party functionaries and 
state professionals on the one hand and the popular class base upon which their careers 
depended on the other.
74
 
 
Much as Leier argues that trade unionists tend to be structured into economic struggles 
with employers, it is clear that Saskatchewan farmers were similarly structured into 
economic struggle through the co-operative movement. Popular education and cultural 
action, such as the efforts of the Pool fieldmen and Thomson‘s short-lived experiment, 
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 Leier draws on Bakunin‘s warning that, unchecked, left-wing statism would result in a new ruling class 
of intellectuals: ―Since running the socialist state would require more knowledge and control than the less 
intrusive capitalist state, the result would be ‗a new class, a new hierarchy of real and fictitious savants, and 
the world will be divided into a minority ruling in the name of science, and an immense ignorant majority‘‖ 
(Leier, 1996, p. 138). 
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were crucial to empowering these popular classes with knowledge, skills, and 
organization. Intellectuals, on the other hand, had a class interest in providing, and 
monopolizing, expert knowledge to expanding movements and the state bureaucracy. 
While they may not oppose activist strategies of popular empowerment and mobilization, 
an element of popular dependency on their expertise is crucial to their career interests. 
Unlike farmers and workers who participated in politics to advance their class interests as 
farmers and workers, intellectuals sought careers in the movement itself. Career 
advancement through movement and bureaucratic manoeuvre was their class interest.  
 
The socialist demand for increasing the intervention and jurisdiction 
of the state can … be seen as a way to give the intellectuals who 
would staff it the political power that was in the hands of capital and 
politicians linked to business… They tended to look to the state for 
hope, and thus tended to be structured into political action rather than 
economic action. (Leier, 1996, p. 145) 
 
Leier uses the case of Christian clergy and university professors whose career paths were 
often blocked in periods of economic distress to illustrate. Indeed, the Saskatchewan CCF 
leadership was filled with teachers like Coldwell and Lloyd and clergy like Douglas. 
While all of these people were strongly motivated by moral sensibility, ideological 
conviction, and a degree of altruism, Leier argues that it would be a mistake to 
completely discount the objective interests and conditions of their advancement. After all, 
they may have had a world to win but most also had families to feed. The example of 
federal leader J. S. Woodsworth illustrates the interest the socialist and technocratic 
intelligentsia had in winning party position and state power as ends in themselves:  
 
Part of the crisis of faith that led to the social gospel was prompted 
by the over-production of ministers and priests, that is, of an educated 
elite. As Canada industrialized, it became an urban society, and the 
number of parishes declined rapidly. Unable to take up their desired 
profession, these well-educated and visionary young men often had 
to seek and to justify secular employment. In particular, Woodsworth 
may be seen as an archetypal member of the Canadian new class of 
intellectuals. Trained in the seminary—the most accessible form of 
higher education for middle class Canadians at that time—he could 
not find a parish. Woodsworth instead used his knowledge to become 
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first a journalist in the socialist and labour movements and then a 
politician. His ideology was an accurate and consistent reflection of 
his class position. Like the intelligentsia Bakunin and Machajski 
examined, Woodsworth called for the increased development and 
intervention of the state into all spheres of modern life. He did not 
call for the working class to control industry or to dismantle the state 
apparatus; he called for the state to regulate, control and correct 
abuses. In this way, Woodsworth and other middle class reformers 
created a political agenda that made the state the employer of choice 
for a generation of intellectuals. If their work resulted in some 
reforms of benefit to the working class, the fact remains that their 
political program was based on priorities, class positions, and class 
interests very different from those of workers represented by the 
labour movement. (Leier, 1996, p. 147)  
 
This tension between movement-led popular participation in development and state-led 
technocratic expertise was expressed in the drift away from co-operatives toward state 
enterprise as the Fabian policy instrument of choice. It is, perhaps, a truism to suggest 
that systematic, expertly planned, and tightly controlled government action is preferable 
to popular but piecemeal local initiatives. However, in the post-war context, CCF 
officials were both buoyed by the demonstration effect of war-time planning and elected 
against a provincial Liberal legacy of unsystematic and self-serving patronage politics 
(Smith, 2005). This context served to reinforce both their Fabian ideological convictions 
and their material class interests. The plodding pace and unpredictability of co-operative 
community development did not face a rosy future against the purposeful, aggressive, and 
determined project of state modernization and central planning that were to become 
defining features of CCF government.  
 
In power, the CCF moved swiftly. It established the Saskatchewan Transportation 
Company (1946) to provide province-wide bus service. To bring telephones and 
electricity to rural Saskatchewan, it launched Saskatchewan Government Telephones 
(1947) and the Saskatchewan Power Commission (1949). Spearheading this drive was the 
Economic Advisory and Planning Board, formed in 1945 and led by George Cadbury, a 
Fabian economist, prominent in British Labour circles. This central agency ensured the 
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most rational, efficient, and systematic approach to rolling out the government‘s agenda 
of state-driven development (Marchildon, 2005). 
 
By contrast, co-operative development efforts lagged. While the CCF established the Co-
operative Guarantee Board in 1947 as a guarantor of last-resort for finance-starved co-
operatives (Argue, 1992), this measure underscored the structural weakness of the sector. 
In November 1947, the co-operative movement declined cabinet‘s invitation to 
participate in oil exploration due to a lack of resources; it was only ―very vocal support in 
annual conventions for resource development by social ownership (that) delayed the 
government‘s decision to look to private capital for oil and mineral developments‖ 
(Johnson, 2004, p. 199). In 1953, when cabinet again turned to Federated Co-operatives 
as its preferred partner in oil-patch development, the private companies and the Canadian 
Petroleum Association criticized the CCF in the press (Johnson, 2004). These 
experiences with an under-capitalized sector delayed oil revenues, and a hostile press 
likely further frustrated the CCF with co-operative involvements. It would later move 
directly, under Blakeney in the seventies, to establish a crown corporation, Sask-Oil.  
 
Moreover, the clash of organizational cultures meant that, as the senior partner, the state‘s 
terms of partnership dominated. The co-operative movement resisted being colonized by 
the state‘s technocratic emphasis on top-down bureaucratic efficiency and central 
planning. From the establishment of the 1944 Act Respecting the Department of Co-
operation and Co-operative Development to deliver ―research capacity‖ to the sector to 
Cadbury‘s 1946 request that the co-operatives submit a ten year plan for their industrial 
development to the EAPB to the 1948 divisional reorganization of the Department, the 
emphasis of Fabian state administration was to prod co-operative leaders into research-
based planning that could be better assimilated into the state‘s planning apparatus (Argue, 
1992). This top-down directive style of ―partnership‖ more closely resembled the 
managerial posture the central administration might take toward a line department than a 
posture with which strong-willed, independent Prairie co-operators were likely to feel 
comfortable. 
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Aspiring to lead the integration and development of the co-operative movement, CCF 
planners were frustrated and soon lost interest in co-operatives. As Argue (1992) notes, 
―the lack of centralized control, coupled with the slow development of autonomous co-
operatives resulted in co-operatives being discounted as a tool for major economic 
development… The combination of a fear of state control by co-ops with the view that 
state-owned and controlled economic forms were more appropriate to socialism resulted 
in a failure to further integrate the two‖ (pp. 52 - 53). From the perspective of a statist 
social democracy, co-operatives lacked expertise, resources, and were averse to working 
with government. DCCD funding peaked in 1950 at .5 percent of total government 
budget and comprehensive research was discontinued. By 1964, the budget was only 
three-fifths of its 1950 share of provincial spending (Argue, 1992). 
 
The wellspring of the CCF, co-operatives were increasingly viewed with suspicion by 
Fabian officials. Co-operatives appeared, through the technocratic lens, as ―primitive‖ or 
―transitional‖ forms of populist innovation on the long march to state power, the apex of 
rational socialist planning. CCF bureaucrats sensed the socialist state had outgrown its 
historic dependence on an ideologically ambiguous and unreliable economic ―partner.‖ In 
a challenging context where there was much to be done and no time for dawdling, it 
struck out on its own with a decisive state-led program (Argue, 1992). The EAPB played 
a central role in setting state priorities, gradually diminishing the role of the DCCD. In 
keeping with Fabian doctrine, it discredited producer co-operatives in particular. Indeed, 
Argue suggests the Department was primarily a political and symbolic interface between 
the co-operative and agrarian movements and the government rather than an expression 
of CCF policy commitment. Douglas‘s assumption of the Ministry in 1949, after the 
Thomson ―firing‖ of Dec. 1945 and a declining plurality at the polls in 1948, may have 
expressed this political calculation.  
 
6.4.1 Co-operative bust in the North 
The major exception to the general state policy preferences for crown enterprise, and only 
limited technical assistance to co-operatives appeared to be the North. The CCF‘s more 
aggressive social ownership policy for the North reflected long-range hopes to discover 
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and develop resource revenues for its project of socialist modernization as well as a moral 
obligation to address the scandal of living conditions in a region that had been bypassed 
by ―progress‖ (Dobbin, 1981). Northern exceptionalism appears to have combined the 
preferred CCF role for co-operatives as vehicles for small scale development at the local 
level with a belief that co-operatives more naturally fit the communal values of the 
Aboriginal peoples.
75
 Quiring (2004) takes a more cynical view. He argues that the 
concentration of voters and the press in the South made the North a more discrete, and 
politically safe, laboratory for experimenting with co-operatives:  
 
The power of southern voters helped ensure that CCF socialism in the 
south fit within the region‘s predominant free enterprise agricultural 
and small business tradition. In contrast, northerners lacked the voice 
and electoral clout to determine CCF policies for their half of the 
province. Most southerners cared little what the CCF did in the 
northern bush. That indifference granted the CCF free rein to dictate 
socialist-inspired solutions for the north.  (p. 255)  
 
Since the established co-operative movement had little presence in the North, this zone of 
the province also permitted the state to act more unilaterally. This opened up what was, in 
large measure, an artificial, parallel, and contradictory co-operative ―movement.‖ On the 
one hand, the CCF seemed insistent on imposing the co-operative model as a means of 
democratic local control—a cause which enlisted and empowered the new Métis 
fieldmen of the North such as Jim Brady and Malcolm Norris. On the other hand, it was 
reluctant to grant the real power that authentic co-operation presupposed—a source of 
chronic frustration for the true believers in the field (Dobbin, 1981).  
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 On the ground, Métis activists like Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady were sceptical of these idealized, 
romantic claims. They witnessed first hand the extent to which colonization had undermined the social 
structure and solidarity of the Métis: ―Norris felt that the individualistic Métis tendency to abandon co-
operatives for the short-term gain of higher prices doomed the enterprises to failure. Brady could scarcely 
dispute that the task was a difficult one. But for Brady producer co-operatives represented the Métis‘ best 
long-term hope, economically and socially. No other economic strategy commanded the same attention 
from Brady as the co-operatives, and he remained committed to the co-operative movement throughout his 
many years as a political organizer among the Métis‖ (Dobbin, 1981, p. 123). For Brady, co-operatives 
were part of an anti-colonial movement for economic independence, schools in which the individualistic 
Métis could learn the value and skills of collective action he deemed necessary to improve social conditions 
(p. 124).  
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One example of the shifting CCF development strategy toward co-operation in the North 
is the case of the Saskatchewan Government Trading Association stores. The first store 
opened in LaRonge in 1945 with posts following at Snake Lake, Wollaston, Beaver Lake, 
and Birch Rapids by 1948. Malcom Norris and Jim Brady each tried managing the SGT 
store at Deschambault with limited success against the Hudson‘s Bay Company and 
private traders. By the mid-fifties, the CCF began converting these stores to co-operative 
ownership (Quiring, 2004). Indeed, the DCCD hired its first Northern fieldman only in 
1949, increasing its presence to five positions by 1959. The timing of this shift paralleled 
the government‘s overall retreat from co-operative development in the South and its 
declining budget to the DCCD. This appears to support the notion that co-operatives were 
viewed as a better ―fit‖ for social policy niches such as the small-scale, transitional 
development required in the North, with crown enterprise better focused on major 
economic policy initiatives. The Fabian strategy was to invest heavily in crowns, with 
minor, targeted support for community-based co-operative initiatives. Early success by 
Jim Brady in Cumberland House in the late forties may have provided the necessary 
encouragement. In 1950, the Department of Natural Resources helped involve Aboriginal 
people in commercial logging and sawing lumber with the Cumberland House Wood 
Products Co-operative. By 1952, Cumberland House had a credit union, and fur, fishing, 
and retail co-ops. Unfortunately, these all failed (Quiring, 2004). 
 
Apparently concluding that these failures reflected limited technical assistance and 
insufficient cultural understanding, the Fort Black Co-op Store was organized at Île-à-la-
Crosse in 1955 with the assistance of a DNR anthropologist, and later a co-operative 
advisor. Other co-operative stores opened in Buffalo Narrows and Beauval by 1957. In 
1959, the SGTA formally turned over its stores to Northern Co-operative Trading 
Services (NCTS), an adapted second-tier co-op. The stated intention was to provide for a 
five-year transition to full Northern control, but the paternalist approach of the CCF-
sponsored and supported enterprises raised serious questions about how co-operative they 
really were. While the CCF were willing to get out of the business of crown enterprise in 
the North, they couldn‘t get the command and control Fabianism out of their conception 
of co-operation: ―In time, the CCF increasingly turned to a modified form of co-
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operatives to implement its programs, although it did so with the heavy hand of 
compulsion and control. Northerners would ‗co-operate,‘ whether they wanted to or not‖ 
(Quiring, 2004, p. 255). As Brady‘s biographer notes, he was extremely disappointed by 
the CCF‘s failure to undertake co-operative education with Native people. He dismissed 
the co-operativized SGT stores as ―castor oil co-operatives:‖ ―the Natives were being 
given what the CCF decided was good for them‖ (Dobbin, 1981, p. 208). 
    
Faced with continued losses and state bailouts to survive, most of these co-ops failed 
after the Thatcher Liberals, elected in 1964, dissolved the NCTS (Quiring, 2004). 
Whether the CCF transition strategy would have fared better with more time and further 
refinement is arguable, but the stores clearly lacked a solid financial footing and 
meaningful local member control. As a consequence, what the state had given, the state 
could take away. 
 
The failure of CCF-sponsored co-operation in the North really reflected the failure of 
CCF colonialism. For the co-operative program was not simply part of the colonization of 
the North by state power. It also represented the colonization of the democratic, one-
member, one-vote co-operative model itself. Just as the statist ethic of command and 
control had failed to understand or deal with Watson Thomson‘s cultural project and had 
been unable to build an effective partnership based on mutual trust with the established 
co-operative sector in the South, the technocratic foundations of CCF co-operation 
doomed it to failure in the North. A movement that involved many well-intentioned CCF 
activists, civil servants, and Northerners in what they had understood to be a 
democratizing project of social emancipation from the ―bottom up‖ turned increasingly 
into a frustrated and resisted project in social engineering from the ―top down.‖ In large 
part, it was a phantom co-operative movement—a movement without a real social base of 
authentic, involved members or a real commitment to core co-operative principles. 
Rather than another failure of the co-operative model, as it was likely perceived by 
Fabian planners, this more likely represents another CCF failure to effectively partner 
with emerging co-operatives and the co-operative movement. What difference alternative 
policy choices might have made to co-operative development in this period is impossible 
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to discern. But the documentary record suggests that an oppressive culture of control 
resulted in missed opportunities in adult education, established sector-partnerships, new 
sector development, and genuine engagement with Northern communities.  
 
6.4.2 Co-operative boom in the South 
While the CCF experimented with state-sponsored co-operatives in the North, the 
established co-operative sectors of southern Saskatchewan continued to keep pace with 
the post-war boom. Pent-up consumer demand dove-tailed with accumulated reserves and 
plans—often held up by wartime supply and investment restrictions (MacPherson, 
1979)—to drive this expansion. The baby boom, of course, reinforced this initial surge of 
growth by further bolstering demand in the era of the consumer society. 1944 saw co-
operative wholesaling in Saskatchewan introduce dry goods, provide assistance to 
expanding stores, buy out a coal mine, and amalgamate with Co-operative Refineries to 
form Federated Co-operatives (MacPherson, 1979). 
 
The fifties also saw ambitious expansion of adult education networks and organization in 
the co-operative movement. As informants recounted, new retails and credit unions 
needed training and assistance in accounting, management, and marketing. New boards 
and managers needed training. In the late fifties, FCL organized regional education 
federations in each district. Paid fieldmen studied co-operative principles and adult 
education and group development methods at the Western Co-operative College. They 
assisted local boards and Women‘s Guilds in their districts and worked with Pool 
fieldmen to staff co-operative schools for young people and other co-operative district 
activities. University Extension also offered credit courses to the public based on the 
College‘s certificate program. A couple of this study‘s collaborators described this period 
as the ―golden age‖ of formal co-operative education in Saskatchewan. 
 
Post-war commercial growth and reorganization also required a new generation of 
managers and experts to oversee the development of important new intermediary 
organizations designed to consolidate established sector strength. The increasingly 
complex web of modern prairie co-operation included federations, second-tier co-ops, 
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and inter-provincial wholesales. The credit union movement launched what became 
Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan in 1938; today‘s Credit Union Deposit Guarantee 
Corporation was established in 1951, as the Mutual Aid Board (Fairbairn, 2005). By 
realizing new economies of scope and scale, these second and third-tier institutions 
accelerated established sector growth and consolidation.  
 
Interviews found that these two tendencies would increasingly come in to conflict. On the 
one hand, the associational or movement-building side had emerged to meet early 
communities‘ needs for a vast adult education and co-operative development network. On 
the other hand, the managerial or business-building side of the sector increasingly 
brought specialized vocational training in-house and strove for management efficiencies. 
In the field, as the retails and credit unions grew and developed their own field staff, 
education and development efforts became fragmented. Overlapping districts meant that 
fieldmen from the Pool, the Credit Union League, Federated Co-operatives, and the Co-
operative Union of Saskatchewan worked overlapping territories but were unable to 
effectively coordinate regional development support. Centralization also encouraged a 
technical focus on area specialists. With the addition of field staff from the provincial 
government, the division of responsibilities for movement education and development 
became increasingly unclear; this led to a study on the increasing incoherence of co-
operative education in the early sixties (Kristjanson, et al., 1964).  
 
The golden age of fieldwork was drawing to a close. It was still possible for researchers 
to interview 23 government fieldmen, 16 Pool fieldmen, 14 Co-operative Union fieldmen 
10 FCL fieldmen, and 4 Credit Union League fieldmen by 1964. But their ranks would be 
culled and their mandate refocused from education and development to commercial 
priorities over the decades ahead. Managers and directors alike mostly still viewed 
themselves as ―working for a common goal‖ but less than ten percent of the directors at 
this point still viewed ―building a better society‖ as central to the co-operative idea. This 
was particularly curious against the backdrop of the recent community clinic campaign of 
1962 and the new idealism emerging among the young through the sixties. Leaders had 
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―become more concerned with organizational maintenance rather than with creating a 
sustained co-operative movement‖ (Kristjanson, et al., 1964, p. 67).    
 
This study was a harbinger of difficulties ahead according to those interviewed for this 
study. For just as the CCF had turned inwards to modernize and expand the state, and 
away from the wider movement culture, an ascendant new class of managers and 
directors in the established co-operative sector had become preoccupied with growth and 
bureaucratic efficiency. The gap between popular movement co-operative culture and the 
creeping managerialism of the established co-operatives widened. The managers‘ focus 
narrowed and their locus shifted in-house. Community animation and grassroots 
movement-building were out. Planning to increase market share and margins was in. The 
centre of gravity moved from the field to head office for the entire co-operative 
movement. As the mature co-operatives developed internal training and support capacity, 
support for fieldwork, movement-based training, and member education waned. This 
shift marked the pinnacle of business expansion but the end of an impressive movement 
regeneration cycle. As the sixties dawned, the challenge was to sustain growth without 
allowing the educational infrastructure and associational life of the co-operative 
movement to collapse. The managers would succeed, but the movement would flounder. 
 
6.5  The fourth wave: Consolidation and conflict, 1960 - 1980 
With a supportive socialist government in place for four consecutive terms, the sixties 
might have been a new high tide for co-operative innovation. Certainly, the business 
community feared rising public support for the left. In 1961, the Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce launched Operation Freedom, a public relations offensive against the creeping 
red menace. Conservative Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker campaigned on a free 
enterprise versus socialism platform (Morton, 1977). In this volatile context, it was a 
decade of mixed results and missed opportunities for co-operation. This study‘s 
informants described an uneasy tension in which the Old Left and New Left were at once 
both drawn to each other and mutually distrustful. In the end, the sixties further polarized 
the province‘s political culture, and its old and new popular movements in particular.  
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It was in the context of the CCF‘s struggle against the medical establishment to introduce 
Medicare in 1962 that co-operative health care was first funded by the Province.
76
 
Community clinics broke the doctors‘ strike and helped secure socialized medicine. As 
thirty communities mobilized to establish clinics, their actions recalled the great co-
operative mobilizations of the past (Rands, 1994). For many, the community clinic 
campaign appeared to prefigure a new frontier for co-operation, another bold new 
―broadening out.‖ A new opportunity for the creative expansion and re-invention of the 
welfare-state, it also established long sought after beachheads for co-operation in the 
urban centres. It opened a new dialogue and sense of common purpose with the trade 
unions. It offered hope to rejuvenate community-based popular organization and engage a 
whole new generation of activists. Expectations ran high until this emerging movement 
was abandoned with the Saskatoon Agreement, an effort to buy the peace with the 
medical profession. This deal buoyed the spirits of Fabian socialists who claimed perhaps 
their greatest victory to date for state-action. By contrast, trading away support for the 
expansion of the community clinic movement had a disenchanting and demoralizing 
effect on many co-operators. 
 
Unable to overcome the denial of hospital privileges to clinic doctors or even place 
doctors in the chilly post-strike climate, several co-operative health care committees had 
to disband. Despite a commission of inquiry into these practices, many activists felt 
betrayed by the government for failing to stop the harassment of clinic doctors by the 
medical establishment. Defeated by the politics of compromise and worn down by this 
emerging sector‘s stymied growth, the CCF-NDP‘s greatest victory came at a 
considerable price to the province‘s co-operative movement. It had been dealt a stinging 
setback by its legislative ―allies.‖77 
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 There was a long pre-history of municipalities hiring salaried doctors and pooling resources to build 
union hospitals, but this was the first Provincial initiative. See Rands (1994).  
 
77
 Once again, the monopoly press played a significant role. For the NDP‘s willingness to cut a deal with 
the medical lobby reflected sustained editorial pressure to withdraw Medicare altogether. Former Star-
Phoenix journalist, Dennis Gruending (1980), sums up the Sifton position this way: ―There was no doubt 
where the Sifton press stood editorially: they were opposed to ‗state medicine‘ and repeatedly talked about 
the loss of ‗individual rights,‘ the right of a doctor to practice and bill as a private entrepreneur, and the 
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While the co-operative, socialist, and social democratic movements sprang from common 
roots in the same agrarian social movement family, the community clinic impasse 
profoundly soured relations between the Provincial state and the activist movement base. 
Interviews for this study found that young activists had increasingly turned away from 
the ―dead-end‖ of co-operation toward the greener pastures of the counter-culture, trade 
unions, Marxism, feminism, ecology, and the formation of the socialist Waffle faction 
within the NDP. Increasingly urban and youthful, popular movement energies were 
buoyed by sixties radicalism. While the grand prize of socialism through state power 
seemed within reach, the social conservatism of the rural co-operative establishment and 
the system‘s creeping managerialism held little appeal to this generation.  
 
Public fatigue with the Medicare conflict contributed to the NDP‘s defeat in 1964 but so, 
it has been argued, did the longer range ―disintegration of the co-operative democratic 
socialist coalition‖ (Argue, 1992, p. 153). Indeed, the community clinic activists‘ sense of 
betrayal over the health care settlement of 1962 was merely a microcosm of the long-
range erosion of the CCF-NDP relationship with the popular movements, including the 
co-operative movement. The defeat of the community clinic movement, followed by the 
NDP‘s defeat at the polls, was part of a gathering storm. It would pit Saskatchewan‘s old 
left-populist culture and the emerging New Left against the modernizing bureaucrats that 
dominated the party. It would also redefine the terrain for co-operation in Saskatchewan.   
 
6.5.1 The New Left in Saskatchewan  
The contradictions came to a head on March 25 1970, at a special joint meeting of the 
Saskatchewan NDP provincial executive and caucus. It was convened to address 
concerns over the growing influence of the socialist Waffle formation within the party. 
Lloyd had voted in favour of the Waffle Manifesto (Connections, 2010) at the 1969 
federal convention in Winnipeg. He had viewed the youthful movement as an important 
                                                                                                                                                 
right of the patient, whether or not he could afford it, to pay whatever the doctor cared to charge‖ (pp. 145 
– 146). 
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revitalizing force. The Manifesto carried a third of the votes. Lloyd stood against the 
party leadership, including Tommy Douglas, David Lewis, and his eventual successor 
Alan Blakeney. Ostensibly, the occasion for the March 25 meeting was the open 
connection of the party president, Bev Currie, to the Waffle and his endorsement of their 
proposal for a land bank (Lloyd, 1979). In fact, the meeting proved to be Lloyd‘s ouster. 
Ironically, while the influence of the Waffle had been rolled back by the party brass and 
led ultimately to their withdrawal from the NDP, Blakeney‘s 1971 New Deal for People 
(New Democratic Party of Saskatchewan, 2010) would include the land bank proposal as 
well as considerable concessions to the Waffle faction.  
 
Yet, much like the Fabians, the New Left‘s 1969 Waffle Manifesto (Connections, 2010) 
expressed only marginal interest in co-operatives. Despite the vast achievements of the 
co-operative movement since the Regina Manifesto (CCF, 1933), the Waffle Manifesto 
further marginalized the option. While the party‘s founding document had called for 
consumer and producer ―co-operative enterprises (to) be assisted by the state through 
appropriate legislation and through the provision of adequate credit facilities‖ (CCF, 
1933, Section 6), the Waffle Manifesto argues only that ―consumers‘ and producers‘ co-
operatives are examples of areas in which socialists must lead in efforts to involve people 
directly in the struggle to control their own destinies‖ (Connections, 2010). Rather than a 
focus on enhanced and expanded policy commitments that would build on the early 
Regina Manifesto commitments (i.e., enabling legislation, and finance), the co-operatives 
receive no program or policy support. Instead, they appear simply as terrains of struggle. 
Moreover, the Waffle Manifesto features only one passing reference (Connections, 2010, 
pp. 6 – 7) to co-operatives—leaving out completely the vast new expanses of modern co-
operation in childcare, housing, and even credit unionism. Despite a passing reference to 
―worker control‖ and ―worker participation‖ (Connections, 2010, pp. 5 – 6), there is no 
reference to the worker co-operative model, arguably the principal democratic means for 
the achievement of these goals. Despite the appropriation of the rhetoric of libertarian 
socialism, the Waffle Manifesto‘s evasion of programmatic commitments to an expanded 
co-operative sector marks a ―great leap backward‖ from early Fabianism into an even 
more virulent statism. Scant interest in co-operative possibilities would prove to be an 
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enduring feature of this tradition (Richards and Pratt, 1979; Laxer, 1996). Interestingly, 
however, interviews with leading Waffle activists found practical personal involvements 
in co-operative organizing efforts, particularly student housing, despite the apparent 
doctrinal marginalization of co-operation in the faction‘s official program.  
 
Like the party‘s Fabian faith in state centralism, the New Left‘s brand of neo-Marxism 
demonstrated a strong commitment to state power and nationalization. Like the party 
establishment they opposed, the Waffle had a policy blind spot where co-operative 
development was concerned. The Waffle‘s emphasis on a ―strong state‖ to counter 
American domination was an understandable extension of its commitment to economic 
nationalism but it also suggested a lack of strategic clarity and specificity regarding the 
intermediary organizations of socialist transition and renewal. State power appeared as a 
quick fix, a short cut to social transformation for a movement impatient for rapid change. 
Like the Fabian agenda, the Waffle‘s vision was rooted in a bipolar development model, 
pitting private sector against public, and simply discounting the co-operative option. 
 
6.5.2 The Thatcher Years, 1964 – 71 
Coming to office in 1964, the Thatcher Liberals, strongly committed to private enterprise, 
had the support of the business lobby and the Sifton papers. Indeed, the fealty of the press 
to the Thatcher agenda seldom wavered.
78
 Past ties between the Liberals and the early co-
operative movement were set aside in an offensive to make Saskatchewan ―open for 
business.‖ Collective action generally, and the DCCD in particular, were treated with 
deep suspicion. Thatcher moved decisively to curb the DCCD. Of total government 
budget from 1965 to 1972, its budget was slashed from about .25 percent to about .1 
percent. Any commitment to research, planning, or sector development disappeared, 
replaced by the core functions of statistical and regulatory surveillance (Argue, 1992). 
The Committee to Study the Role and Structure of the Department of Co-operation and 
Co-operative Development was appointed by Thatcher in 1971 to explore how the 
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 As Gruending recounts ―the sixties had never happened at the Star-Phoenix. As students we could read 
Marcuse, as young reporters we could read Tom Wolfe, but at the city desk it was still the five Ws, 
Rotarian lunches and supplements on bridal gowns… The sixties, the counter-culture, the New Left, none 
of that had any effect at the Star-Phoenix or with the Siftons‖ (1980, pp. 142 – 143). 
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department ―could be absorbed into other government departments.‖ The Hansen Report 
found the Department both ―isolated within government and insulated from co-
operatives,‖ as well as ―passive in developing new forms of co-operatives‖ (Argue, 
1992). The Liberals appeared poised to dismantle the Department altogether when they 
lost the 1971 election to the Blakeney NDP. 
 
The Thatcher years were characterized by a clear shift—toward the investor-owned firm, 
private-sector development strategies, and focused policy and program supports to 
private enterprise. Meaningful support to co-operative development, or even sector 
engagement, was suspended. However, on the ground, and in the pages of the alternative 
press (Verzuh, 1989) and the increasingly radical and aggressive student press (Pitsula, 
2008), the sixties also saw the rise of popular movement ferment and a swing back to the 
left that helped to bring down the Thatcher government in 1971. Thatcher‘s defeat and 
the seventies also brought a better climate for new co-operative development. But 
technocratic statism would continue to cast a long shadow.  
 
In fact, the province‘s co-operative movement would also continue to struggle for light 
against a crusading capitalist press that had remained to the very end of the Thatcher 
regime steadfastly ―vitriolic in its editorial stance against the same old socialist ghosts‖ 
(Gruending, 1980, p. 146). Moreover, the anti-CCF Sifton monopoly played a significant 
role in shaping the debates that would define the Blakeney era. It had not simply defined 
the residual ideological terrain of Ross Thatcher‘s cultural offensive against socialism. It 
remained actively engaged in its reproduction and rehabilitation. In 1971 both the editor 
and city editor at Saskatoon‘s Star-Phoenix had served as cabinet press secretary for the 
Thatcher Liberals. The sole political reporter had served Thatcher‘s Information Services 
branch (Gruending, 1980). Expelled from political office, the ideological ghost of Ross 
Thatcher came to haunt the province‘s newspaper pages.  
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6.5.3 The sixties and the co-operative movement 
Meanwhile, respondents for this study recounted that the sixties also created new strains 
within the co-operative movement. Through the sixties and seventies, the established co-
operatives and their leadership often found themselves at odds with increasingly militant 
trade unions, a women‘s movement calling for greater representation and the urban, 
university student based New Left. These popular movements increasingly preferred to 
launch their own autonomous underground newspapers (Verzuh, 1989; Pitsula, 2008), 
health food stores, student housing co-operatives, and participate in edgy Marxist politics 
and counter-cultural activities than join the old co-operative establishment. A militant 
student movement, assembled on the province‘s rapidly expanding university campuses, 
settled instead in the Waffle. The lingering opposition between co-operative managers 
and grassroots activists today, about which infomants had much to say in this study‘s 
interviews, has its roots in this formative generational experience of mutual distrust. 
 
An entrenched rural leadership that was struggling to come to terms with ―the urban 
mind‖ (Kristjanson et. al., 1964, p. 131) now had to grapple with a generation gap. Much 
as the early agrarian pioneers had constructed a white, male, farmer-led movement to 
assert its interests, many established co-operative leaders now instinctively pushed back 
against the demands of the long-haired, college-educated Marxists and feminists who 
were little inclined to contest seats on their increasingly well-fortified boards.  
 
The sixties was therefore a period of rapid demographic and structural dislocations as 
well as political volatility for the co-operative movement. The membership base itself 
diverged as the values and interests of the well-established and prosperous old co-
operatives and fledgling new co-operatives grew further and further apart. On the one 
hand, the moderate and often right wing social democracy of the male, middle-aged, 
rural, farmer-led traditional co-operators aligned with management and had grown 
distrustful of state involvements. On the other hand, the modernizing left radicalism of a 
young urban insurgency was marxist, anti-racist, feminist, and ecological in outlook. 
Rapid urbanization and the radicalization of the baby boom generation would pose 
serious long-range problems for the succession and renewal of an increasingly entrenched 
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agrarian movement through the sixties and seventies. The radical emphasis on aggressive 
state action, particularly calls for resource nationalizations, further reinforced a state 
versus capitalist orientation. The politics of the farm-gate were decentred and co-
operatives were further eclipsed. As sixties activists chronicled in interviews for this 
study, organized co-operation became increasingly disconnected from the New Left. 
Indeed, while other movements exploded, this would be a decade of ―blocked transition‖ 
for co-operation in Saskatchewan. 
 
The establishment of the Western Co-operative College (later, the Co-operative College 
of Canada) and the Centre for Community Studies at the University of Saskatchewan in 
1959 both seemed to anticipate some of these looming threats to movement cohesion and 
vitality. As one adult educator of the era explained in conversation for this study, these 
new mechanisms tried to recover the movement‘s potential for cultural expansion and 
leadership development. But they may have been too little too late to turn back the ebbing 
tide. The Thatcher Liberals came to power in 1964 and cut the Centre‘s funding. It was 
closed soon after (Quiring, 2004).  
 
As the resource economy decentred agriculture, urbanization gained momentum, and the 
struggles of the province‘s workers, women, students, and Indigenous Peoples 
increasingly moved to centre stage. Agrarian-managerial hegemony in the Saskatchewan 
movement became increasingly mismatched with the emerging economic base, and the 
needs, constituencies, and values of the New Saskatchewan in an age defined by resource 
wars and the feminist, anti-colonial, and Marxist radicalism of an urban youth movement.  
 
This generation gap was deepened by the increasing consolidation of farmland, which 
made it less feasible or attractive for young farmers to start out. Farmers faced rising 
prices for land, equipment, industriual inputs, and credit. These all lowered margins and 
forced them to establish greater economies of scale by debt-financing larger tracts of 
land. Between diminishing returns on the land and new educational, employment, and 
cultural opportunities in the cities, urban migration was increasingly led by the young. 
The agrarian and co-operative movements were greying, and co-operation‘s traditional 
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base and development path in agriculture and rural development was eroding. Rather than 
―broadening out,‖ the co-operative establishment turned away from the new urban base 
and development trajectory of activism in the new social movements. Meanwhile, the 
rapidly expanding consumer and credit union sectors were preoccupied with managing 
growth. The movement was therefore challenged to adapt to the marginalization of the 
farm economy and the shifting foundations of its own social base. For, while youthful 
and diverse urban movements emerged to drive new co-operative development, the 
establishment was preoccupied with the internal demands of rapid growth and expansion. 
Failing to tap the new mobilizing potential of the women, workers, and students who 
comprised the New Left, this generation of activists instead wound up confronting the co-
operative establishment on picket lines and at annual general meetings. Worse, as 
movement activists interviewed for this study lamented, they gave up altogether, 
dismissing the co-operative establishment as hopelessly insular, out of step, and 
reactionary. While the sector grew economically, its traditional membership was eroding 
and potential new membership energy simply drifted away. 
 
Like the labour movement and the NDP, the co-operative movement was polarized by the 
New Left. Here, too, leaders exhibited a protective impulse to retrench and protect the 
gains of the movement from reckless adolescent excess. The fear of being swamped by 
impulsive young activists reflected rural traditionalism and the Cold War paranoia of the 
age. It fed the trend to tightly controlled and manipulated annual membership meetings. 
The demands of an ever-expanding economy reinforced the tendency to bureaucratic 
centralization, the closed managerialism of the ―frozen co-op,‖ and a narrowing focus on 
bread and butter management issues. While the twin rise of marxist radicalism and Cold 
War paranoia were not solely responsible for youth exclusion and disengagement, they 
certainly added to the chill on co-operative movement by the close of the decade.  
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6.5.4 The Blakeney Years, 1971 – 82. 
While the community clinics were the first of the province‘s new co-ops, their experience 
in the early sixties was not promising for childcare initiatives in the seventies. As women 
entered the workforce and post-secondary education in growing numbers, childcare co-
operatives met a pressing need for working parents. Dozens sprung up, aided by the 
newly formed Saskatchewan Action Committee on the Status of Women (SAC) that 
successfully lobbied the Blakeney NDP for support in 1973.  
 
The emerging sector faced severe structural constraints, as one childcare movement 
activist interviewed for this study recounted. First, by definition, working parents were 
too busy for active membership and sector building. Second, the emerging sector based 
on non-profit service provision had weak revenues and was unable to hire development 
staff. As a result of these two handicaps, the sector was unable to build up a strong 
central organization or voice (Fairbairn, 2005). Childcare co-operatives were therefore 
inadequately represented, understood, and supported within a larger provincial movement 
that was led by male farmers and managers and dominated by the established co-
operatives.  
 
The Blakeney NDP‘s record on co-operation was mixed. On the one hand, the Thatcher 
Liberals‘ era of overt state hostility to co-operative development came to a close with the 
New Deal for People platform (New Democratic Party of Saskatchewan, 1971). The 
DCCD survived and in 1973 the government hosted a conference on co-operation 
(Argue, 1992). The ideological and political value of reinforcing the CCF-NDP‘s support 
for co-operative development was clear. This was particularly true in the context of the 
New Left upsurge, activism around student housing co-operatives and childcare co-
operatives. On the other hand, in line with the evolving view of the Douglas-Lloyd CCF 
administrations and the neo-statism of the Waffle, the overwhelming preference was still 
for a state-led development strategy. Under Blakeney, co-operatives would serve a 
―street-level‖ function, particularly in addressing social concerns like daycare, housing, 
and health care (Argue, 1992). The rescue of the DCCD by the Blakeney NDP was both a 
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symbolic gesture to party members and the sector and a co-optive device to appease the 
dispersed rank and file Waffle who needed to be wooed back to the fold:  
 
In effect, this strategy enabled the dominant technocratic Fabian 
element to control the levers of government while redirecting an 
allied, but potentially disruptive, political force into an area of 
secondary importance… The Department … was used to nullify the 
contradiction between dispersed and centralized democratic notions 
within democratic socialism… It absorbed democratic forces while 
maintaining their political allegiance. (Argue, 1992, p. 156) 
 
Through the seventies, co-operative development was thus sidelined. In 1973, the 
government created the Saskatchewan Oil and Gas Corporation (SaskOil). In 1975, it 
moved to nationalize potash (Richards & Pratt, 1979). Blakeney‘s defining legacy was 
the much vaunted ―family of crown corporations.‖ Co-operative development became a 
mere footnote to the resource wars and the rise of the ―entrepreneurial state.‖  
 
The new darlings of the Blakeney NDP would be small business on the one hand and the 
new family of crown corporations on the other. By courting small business, the Blakeney 
administration hoped to articulate a new antagonism between the little guys and big, out-
of-province capital (i.e., the resource companies). It was a prudent and effective strategy 
for pre-empting the recruitment of small business to the anti-nationalization lobby, but a 
demotion for the co-operative movement. Revealingly, the 21-page program on which 
Blakeney campaigned includes only one reference to co-operatives. Under ―Resource and 
Economic Development,‖ the party promises that ―co-operative ownership will be 
encouraged‖ but that ―the NDP will give first priority to public ownership through crown 
corporations‖ (New Democratic Party of Saskatchewan, 1971, p. 7). In contrast to the 
two sentences devoted to a minor role in one sector of the economy for co-operatives, the 
program commits a whole section to small business. A seven-point program promises a 
new division of government, technical services, and financial and research support (New 
Democratic Party of Saskatchewan, 1971, p. 9).  
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When the DCCD was reorganized in 1973, it was with a niche conception for co-
operative development: as an extension of the welfare state rather than a challenge to 
either small business or large-scale capital. New co-operatives would be supported in the 
targeted areas of farm production, housing, handicrafts, daycare, and ―production 
enterprises.‖ Over the next decade, the Blakeney administration would emphasize a token 
social development role for co-operatives. This focus was apparently intended to appease 
the sector, the women‘s movement, and elements of the now largely disbanded ranks of 
the Waffle. The Hansen Report‘s recommendation to fold the DCCD‘s functions into 
other departments was shelved out of concern for the political optics and support of the 
sector. The Department‘s funding and staff each nearly doubled from 1973 – 1983 as it 
rebuilt from the Thatcher years (Argue, 1992).  
 
It is perhaps most accurate to say that, as the eighties dawned on the Prairies, the 
Blakeney NDP had a marginal interest in co-operative development and an ambivalent 
attitude toward the role and importance of the DCCD. One internal memo to Blakeney 
from the minister responsible stated this flatly: ―the Department lacks credibility within 
government circles… all tend to view the department as an historic appendage with little 
relevance to this government‘s overall social and economic objectives‖ (cited in Argue, 
1992, p. 113). Indeed, through the seventies, the state‘s position on co-operatives was out 
of focus, unstable, and contradictory. The Blakeney administration brought the Thatcher 
regime‘s ideological and absolutist hostility to co-operative development to a close. It 
made significant political pronouncements and financial commitments to a limited role 
for co-operatives in niche areas of social policy. However, the substantive policy drift in 
the early Blakeney years flowed from the view that co-operative enterprise was an 
historic appendage. The retreat from co-operative development continued in favour of 
significant support to small business and a decisive emphasis on crown corporations.  
 
The Blakeney administration had a clear economic rationale for marginalizing co-
operatives: state enterprise was faster, easier to control in line with policy objectives, and 
simply more expedient (Argue, 1992). In part, this tact reflected the rise of the resource 
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economy as a government priority.
79
 This new economic engine was ill-suited to co-
operative exploitation due to the large capital and expertise requirements. Only the state 
could marshal the resources to challenge private sector development and support a 
redistributive, expanding welfare state. The urgency of this overarching mission shaped 
the government‘s overall approach to development. As the rise of the resource economy 
eclipsed agriculture, it seemed as though co-operation was yesterday‘s model, 
increasingly out-of-step with the trends of a modern resource-led economy and the 
growth of urban economies driven by small business. 
 
There was also a political rationale. Obviously, it was more difficult to take credit for co-
operative gains than it was for clear-cut achievements of the government. But the real 
spoiler for co-operation as a policy vehicle was the political need for speed. While the 
Blakeney NDP shared a larger social project and purpose with the Douglas and Lloyd 
regimes, it manoeuvred within an evolving political context shaped by the impatient 
ethos of the consumer culture and the rise of the public relations state. It contended with 
the immediacy of televised political coverage, the increased prominence of the sound-
bite, image, and personality, and the need for initiatives to be implemented province-wide 
and demonstrate clearly positive results to voters within a four-year election horizon. The 
uneven, slow, and unpredictable path of co-operative development was increasingly 
uncompetitive in a political marketplace marked by rapid change and voters impatient for 
demonstrations of decisive leadership and instant results.  
 
For example, Blakeney did little to build on the gains of the community clinic movement 
to establish a co-operative, preventive health care model
80
 while other jurisdictions 
enthusiastically embraced the model. By 1994 only five community clinics still existed in 
                                                 
79
 Indicative is the organization of Blakeney‘s memoirs. There is scant reference to co-operative 
development policy. However, there is a chapter each devoted to ―Oil,‖ ―Potash,‖ ―Uranium,‖ and ―Some 
Thoughts on Resource Policy‖ (Blakeney, 2008, v-vi). 
 
80
 This is ironic since he was Minister of Health under Lloyd who introduced Medicare and a member of 
the Regina Community Clinic. In fact, in 1964, as a result of the Regina General Hospital‘s refusal to grant 
his family doctor hospital privileges, Blakeney‘s son David was delivered in their Regina home (Blakeney, 
2008).  
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Saskatchewan. Meanwhile, Ontario had established 53 clinics, Manitoba‘s network 
included 14 community clinics, and Québec had undertaken a massive development of 
health centres with doctors on salary. Even Alberta, the heartland of free market health 
policy, had three community clinics (Rands, 1994).
81
 Yet Blakeney‘s administration 
would move aggressively into uncharted territory against the dental profession in 1972 to 
launch a universal, state-managed, school-based dental program for children. It did so 
without federal funding and bankrolled entirely by resource revenues (McGrane, 2007). 
Unlike the plodding and uneven development of community clinics from the bottom-up 
that had left those dispersed popular organizations vulnerable in 1962, the dental program 
was rolled out with military precision. The Blakeney regime started training dental 
hygienists in 1972 and took the new service province-wide as they graduated in 1974. 
Blakeney delivered on his promise in one term, edging the program‘s reach up two 
grades with every graduating class of hygienists.
82
 
 
Beyond the narrowly economic and political cases for setting aside the co-operative 
tradition was a professional-ideological factor. From 1950 - 58, Blakeney served the 
Treasury, the bureaucratic nerve centre of centralized socialist planning, as a senior 
official. When he returned to government in 1960, this time as a senior minister, he 
brought this reverence for professional competence and the desire to reinstate Cadbury‘s 
legacy: ―Blakeney was determined to revive the progressive Fabian tradition of the 
professional CCF bureaucracy‖ (Richards, 1979, pp. 255 - 257). The rise of the resource 
economy, the invention of Saskatchewan‘s entrepreneurial state, and the restoration of 
the Fabian tradition reinforced each other. They also marginalized co-operative 
development in the priorities, policies, and plans of the Blakeney regime. 
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 Ironically, the Blakeney regime adapted a prescription drug plan pioneered by the Saskatoon Community 
Clinic as the basis for a province-wide program (Blakeney, 2008). Resource revenues enabled the state to 
deliver this program without federal contributions (McGrane, 2007), thus demonstrating the public benefits 
of the resource crowns.  
 
82
 Of course, the downside of short-term political expediency is political vulnerability. While the remaining 
co-operative community clinics enjoy strong member support and have survived eight Premiers, the entire 
school-based dental program was wiped out in 1987, the second-term of the next government to take office, 
i.e. the Grant Devine Tories (Blakeney, 2008). 
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6.5.5 The co-operative movement in the seventies 
In interviews for this study, members of the student movement reported the ways in 
which that movement overlapped briefly with the co-operative movement during the 
upsurge of the New Left in the late sixties and early seventies. Saskatchewan‘s 
established co-operative movement reached out to the emerging New Left, funding a 
student co-operative conference in 1967. The Co-operative Union of Saskatchewan also 
helped raise $10,000 each from Federated Co-operatives Limited, the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool, and the credit union movement for mortgages on five houses in Regina‘s 
General Hospital area. They were converted into the Wascana Student Housing Co-
operative. Student activists were responding to the baby-boomers‘ housing needs as they 
flocked to the expanding University of Saskatchewan Regina campus. The co-operative 
model was a natural fit for a generation searching for new ways of living together. The 
Canadian Union of Students hired a national co-operative housing organizer in the 
seventies. 
 
However, for the most part, these interview subjects suggested the established sectors 
became increasingly inward-turning as the seventies unfolded. The co-operative sector 
was now more focused on managing growth than new co-operative development. Unlike 
the Wheat Pool fieldmen of the thirties and forties, who were preoccupied with sector 
diversification, the possibilities of emerging sectors in the seventies—such as community 
clinics or childcare—now disappeared from view. MacPherson (1987) argues there were 
several reasons for the general decline of broad-based initiatives in the Canadian co-
operative movement after 1960: 
 
These include the growth of managerial cadres with overwhelming 
concern for immediate gains, the decline of broad perspectives 
among directors, and the loss of organizing skills. Or, put another 
way, the decline may best be seen by contrasting the inertia and 
institutional limitations of recent years with an understanding of how 
co-operative entrepreneurship, building on context and networks, 
worked in the past. (p. 10) 
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As the management of Saskatchewan‘s well-established co-operative sectors became 
entrenched, membership participation diminished. New waves of co-operative 
development had previously acted as a foil against movement-wide degeneration. But the 
―lost generation‖ to new co-operative development left an entrenched management and 
officialdom to increasingly stand alone. Federated Co-operatives Limited began to refer 
to itself as a ―system‖ rather than a ―movement.‖ In the sixties, under the pressure of 
serious economic difficulties, there was ―a steady de-emphasis of the ideas and structures 
that had made co-operatives into a movement. Education, public relations federations and 
finally the public relations division fell by the wayside; along the way the provincial co-
operative unions declined, and the relationship of the system with the Co-op College 
became much weaker‖ (Fairbairn, 1989, p. 182). Although the Co-operative Consumer 
reached a circulation peak of 300,000 in the mid-seventies, subscriptions fell off as retails 
ceased subscribing their members. In 1982, the recession squeezed FCL and the 
publication was wound down (Fairbairn, 1989). 
 
Similar symptoms of managerial oligarchization and movement disengagement appeared 
within the ranks of the SWP. Information and resource sharing, and joint-action for new 
retail co-operative development had once knit the co-operative sector together into a 
movement united by common interest and purpose. Now, established co-operatives 
increasingly retreated into their uni-functional organizational silos. The principle and 
practice of co-operation among co-operatives that had driven such tremendous new 
development activity in the thirties and forties now reversed itself in a great top-down 
retreat from new co-operative development. Even as individual sectors realized 
significant commercial success, this broad-based neglect of associative life and broader 
social connections helped plunge the movement into a powerful degenerative cycle. 
 
6.6   Conclusion: Prairie co-operation at a crossroads 
This chapter has demonstrated the evolving position of the co-operative movement in the 
shifting field of twentieth century Saskatchewan‘s economy and society. This evolution 
has been analyzed in terms of four waves of co-operative development (Fairbairn, 2005).  
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Agrarian settlement and the development of the wheat economy set the stage for the first 
wave of co-operative development at the turn of the century, from 1900 to 1930. Early 
co-operation emerged out of the unique conjuncture of this settler society. On the one 
hand, established authority on the frontier was still weak, the federal state was remote, 
Aboriginal cultures were quarantined to reservations, and private enterprise alternately 
neglected and exploited the region‘s population. These elements all helped to create a 
vacuum for new social actors and social projects to emerge ―from below.‖  
 
On the other hand, the pioneering settlers sought a new start, and were driven to innovate 
by a range of frustrated needs. Many brought knowledge, experience, and skills with 
them from the evolving co-operative movements of Ontario, Europe, and the United 
States. These settlers had time between crop seasons to read the agrarian press, ponder 
their problems and prospects, and to meet and organize with their neighbours. Although 
distances created difficulties, the isolation of the farm frontier also motivated settlers to 
socialize and take joint-action. It was within this context of a surging, innovative settler 
population and agrarian revolt that farm leaders like E.A. Partridge ignited the great 
pooling campaigns of the twenties.  
 
The world-wide Great Depression ushered in a ―second wave‖ of co-operative 
development in Saskatchewan. The hardships of this period further discredited capitalism 
with the already sceptical and increasingly socialist ranks of the farm movement, many of 
whom had become involved in farmers‘ parties like the Progressives. While private 
enterprises failed or withdrew from the collapsing Saskatchewan economy, the co-
operative model proved its resiliency and its rootedness. Indeed, from the launch of the 
world‘s first co-operative oil refinery to the take-off of credit unionism to the province‘s 
first effort at organizing a community health clinic, the co-operative movement undertook 
some its most bold efforts at diversification and community economic regeneration 
during this period. Unlike the agrarian leaders who founded the co-operative movement 
in Saskatchewan, Harry Fowler was an urban, professional outsider with a 
communitarian worldview. He represented a generation of new leadership determined to 
innovate in the dire straits of the Depression. This economic and cultural weakening of 
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private enterprise and redoubled commitment to grassroots co-operation, and a 
broadening out of the movement, positioned Saskatchewan for a surge of growth with the 
return of prosperity. It created the context for the diversifying and modernizing third 
wave, from 1940 to 1960.  
 
Fairbairn (2005) argues that the movement culture of this ―third wave‖ was a unique, one 
generation phenomenon. Saskatchewan co-operators were doubly traumatized by the 
experiences of the Depression, soon followed by the rise of fascism and a Second World 
War. These experiences revived a strong reformist resolve. This generation of activists 
was determined to transcend the narrow economic dependency on wheat that made the 
province so vulnerable to drought and Depression. They were also committed to building 
a new world of peace and prosperity, free of imperialist ambitions and capitalist rivalries. 
The powerful pent-up growth and expansion plans of Saskatchewan‘s co-operative 
sectors converged with the province‘s turn to socialism in 1944 and the booming 
optimism and consumer demand of the post-War era.  
 
Further diversification was cut short by several forces. These included bureaucratization 
and the rise of managerial oligarchies within the established co-operatives. For its part, 
the CCF state eliminated the study group campaign of the Division of Adult Education—
at a cost to new co-operative development and movement momentum. Despite reaching a 
peak of 62 Northern co-operatives in 1971 (Beveridge, 2007), the CCF-NDP‘s 
technocratic Fabianism and the ambivalence of established sectors in the South failed to 
attract Northerners to the model. The CCF became increasingly committed to state-
enterprise, but momentum provided to consumer co-operation and the credit union 
movement through this period was irreversible.  
 
Clearly, the forties and fifties was a period of society-wide and intra-movement 
transition. Urbanization and the rise of liberal-left, secular values redefined the 
membership and leadership base for co-operation as surely as it transformed the 
economic and social terrain on which it manoeuvred. Accelerating urbanization placed in 
doubt traditional precepts, such as the rural locus of development activity; the leadership 
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role of the farmers‘ movement; the supremacy of producer co-operation; and 
ambivalence toward trade unions and city-life. An effort to re-establish the basis for co-
operative education and movement re-generation therefore emerged in the fifties (Crewe, 
2001). This period widened the sector base from agriculture into the realms of consumer 
co-operation and credit unionism. It strengthened movement autonomy and introduced a 
more innovative and expansionist attitude. 
 
The movement culture that drove the growth of the co-operative sector through the forties 
and fifties would eventually reach the limits imposed by the market-driven growth of 
farm-size. Rural decline was the foremost, and most intractable, factor in co-operation‘s 
―fourth wave‖—a period of consolidation from 1955 to the present-day. Dwindling rural 
populations forced centralization and consolidation on all the sectors that serviced those 
farm communities. On the urban scene, the rise of the sixties counter-culture and the 
aversion of established co-operative leaders, many weaned on Cold War anti-
communism, to the radicalism of these youth, diverted new energies from co-operation. 
The consolidation of state enterprise as the preferred alternative to co-operative action, 
particularly with the emergence of the resource economy, further undercut the socialist 
movement‘s enthusiasm for co-operative possibilities. The vigorous movement culture 
that had defined the previous two decades dissipated. A national level housing co-op 
drive would go on to yield important gains in the eighties, but this sector and the 
emerging childcare sector both lacked organization, cohesion, and direction at the 
provincial level.  
 
As new constituencies, new models, and new activists were bottled up by the impasse 
that defined the fourth wave, the movement‘s capacity for innovation, renewal, and 
regeneration withered too. Experiments in student housing, worker co-operation, 
childcare, and community clinics were all left to sink or swim. Overall, by the end of the 
seventies, co-operation in Saskatchewan was a divided movement. The established co-
operatives were retrenching. The provincial state‘s co-operative development policy was 
contradictory and the DCCD was adrift. The new co-ops were few and unsupported. 
Those new co-ops, and the social movements from which they sprang, viewed the 
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disinterest of the established sector in movement-building, and the half-measures of the 
state with increased resignation. In this period, the movement was re-defined by the 
conservative, inward-focus of the large, old co-ops and the withdrawal into marginality of 
the emerging new co-ops. This was the precarious state of the Saskatchewan movement 
in 1980 as the globalization storm gathered at its borders. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEXT YEAR COUNTRY:  
GLOBALIZATION, THE NEW RIGHT, AND THE  
COLLAPSE OF AGRARIAN CO-OPERATION 
IN SASKATCHEWAN, 1980 - 2010 
 
 
The history of co-operation in Saskatchewan over the first eight decades of the twentieth 
century is uneven. Although agricultural pooling, co-operative retailing, and credit 
unionism are all part of one co-operative movement family, with common roots and 
overlapping memberships, each sector has also been defined by its own market realities 
and waves of movement advance, consolidation, and retreat. The first mover in this great 
chain of co-operative innovation was the agrarian movement. Wheat-pooling marked the 
origins and rapid take-off of early co-operation in the twenties, propelled by the twin 
motors of the land rush and the wheat boom. Farming pushed the nomadic hunting and 
gathering and fur trade economies of the Indian and Métis peoples to the margins of 
economic life, at least in the populous South. The grain trade would drive the new 
province‘s economy and sense of identity, the provincial coat of arms a wheat sheaf. 
License plates heralded Saskatchewan as ―the wheat province.‖ Farmers were fond of 
calling their home the ―bread-basket of the world.‖ Through Saskatchewan‘s first 
century, its co-operative movement was primarily, and profoundly, an agrarian 
movement.  
 
By the seventies, the tables had turned on the dominant agrarian economy. The rise of 
potash, oil, gas, and uranium reduced the role of agricultural producers and their producer 
co-operatives while resource sector linkages reinforced urban growth. By 1971, the 
majority of Saskatchewan residents were living in urban centres (Fairbairn, 2001b). 
Provincial politicians still railed against federal agriculture policy but now they also went 
to court to enforce their rights to develop Saskatchewan‘s resource economy. The 
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province‘s economic fortunes increasingly moved to the mines, the oil patch, and the 
cities. Politicians who once pandered to the co-operative movement now declared their 
commitment to state-driven resource development, and their devotion to small business. 
 
By the nineties, increasing emphasis was placed on information technology. No longer 
viewed as mere agricultural service hubs, urban centres assumed an increasingly 
important role in the emerging research and information-based economy (Fairbairn, 
2001b).
83
 Saskatchewan‘s economic base had moved beyond the farm gate. The 
province‘s social structure, culture, and politics were all dislocated by this seismic shift in 
the mode of production. The co-operative movement shifted too. The resource boom of 
the seventies, the IT and deregulation revolutions in the nineties, and the long-range 
development of the urban prairie all played a role in diversifying the Saskatchewan 
economy. They also decentred the grain economy, producer co-operatives, and the once 
foundational role of co-operatives in the province‘s development.  
 
Given the economics of commercial agriculture and the scarcity of productive land, this 
outcome may well have been inevitable without a major intervention—such as capping 
farm size or advancing co-operative farming. As Marchildon (2005) puts it, there is an 
inverse relationship between farm size and rural population. Among other things, this 
meant that, over time, unfettered market forces would simply eliminate marginal, and 
then middle-range agricultural producers. Only smaller operations, subsidized by off-
farm income, and the largest, most productive industrial farms would survive. In other 
words, unregulated commercial agriculture would systematically liquidate the class base 
of the co-operative movement as mid-sized farms were acquired by larger, industrial farm 
operations.  
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 One index for the urgent new priority attached to research-led economic development is former 
Saskatchewan Finance Minister Janice MacKinnon‘s comment about securing $170 million in funding for a 
synchrotron at the University of Saskatchewan: ―it was my highest priority in my last two years in cabinet. 
I had no intention of leaving the government until the synchrotron was landed‖ (2003, p. 281). MacKinnon 
also served as Minister of Economic and Co-operative Development and Minister Responsible for Trade, 
Research, and Investment. By contrast, while her memoirs provide brief but intriguing insights into 
government relations with the co-operative sector, she is dismissive of co-operative development (p. 75). 
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This trend to concentration meant the base for agricultural co-operation would grow 
smaller. As farmers became more dispersed and competitive, their movement would 
become less cohesive. If the co-operative movement failed to diversify away from its 
dependency on this declining activist base by making significant breakthroughs in the 
cities, the industrialization of farming was a self-destruct mechanism for the movement. 
This is the structural contradiction that defined the rise and fall of agrarian co-operation 
through the first eighty years of the Saskatchewan movement.  
 
The latest wave of globalization, beginning in the eighties, was triggered by the rise to 
economic dominance and political influence of multinational and transnational 
corporations; the articulation and diffusion of a deregulationist political program in the 
form of the New Right; and revolutionary advances in information and communication 
technology (Marchak, 1991). Yet, these powerful new economic and political forces 
merely accelerated underlying trends in Saskatchewan agriculture. Politicians moved 
more aggressively to deregulate, sign free trade agreements, dismantle subsidies like the 
Crow rate, abandon rail lines and rural post offices, and realign public policies and 
programs to ―let the market decide.‖ A century of agrarian agitation to protect farmers 
from unregulated capitalism was systematically rolled back. At the same time, Canada 
maintained a laissez faire commitment through the international grain wars, while Europe 
and the US continued to heavily subsidize their farmers (Pugh, 1991). Farmers felt 
abandoned by their governments and at the mercy of the markets. But they were being 
squeezed by more than costs and prices; they were also being politically squeezed. The 
social cohesion and faith in collective action necessary to mount a spirited defence was 
also being depleted. 
 
Not surprisingly, efforts to regenerate the co-operative movement in the face of relentless 
rural decline were uneven. The focus of established co-operative sectors was on 
defensive retreat to higher ground. The credit union and retailing sectors kept pace 
through aggressive efforts to centralize and consolidate. By proactively restructuring in 
the face of rural depopulation, these sectors were better able to meet the challenges of 
globalization in the eighties. But the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool found itself considerably 
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more exposed, both to volatile wheat prices and dwindling rural populations. Co-
operative options in banking and retailing services were attractive to city-dwellers. Many 
had grown up in rural areas and carried their loyalty to the local co-operative and credit 
union with them. A pool created to market farmers‘ wheat faced a more daunting task. It 
diversified away from the declining farm economy but it was stranded in a contradictory 
new political economy. Just as the rise of the giant Saskatchewan Wheat Pool propelled 
the further development of co-operation over the first eight decades of Saskatchewan‘s 
history, its demutualization from 1996 to 2007 would spell the end of co-operation‘s 
agrarian era in Saskatchewan.  
 
Perhaps the most striking themes emerging from the Saskatchewan interviews conducted 
for this study were the lack of established sector enthusiasm for new co-operative 
development in the globalization era and the related level of frustration among isolated 
activists in the emerging sectors. This division between the stewards of the movement‘s 
resources and those activists struggling to build new co-operatives fatally limited their 
ability to shift the culture or policy environment in co-operation‘s favour.84 Isolated 
childcares struggled to sustain their operations and the province‘s remaining community 
clinics soldiered on. The only real ―green shoots‖ in the eighties were the spill-over of co-
operative housing work started in the sixties by the Co-operative Union of Canada 
(forerunner of today‘s CCA) and the Canadian Labour Congress. Together with the 
Canadian Union of Students (now the Canadian Federation of Students), they formed the 
Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada (CHFC) in 1968. Shepherded through the 
seventies by the federally-funded Co-operative Housing Association of Saskatchewan 
(Cole, 2008), the result was seventeen non-profit housing co-operatives, mostly in Regina 
and Saskatoon (Fairbairn, 2005; Goldblatt, 2000).  
 
                                                 
84
 A notable exception at the federal level was the 1984 National Task Force on Co-operative Development 
calling for targeted campaigns to build the worker, health-care, fishery and housing sectors by investing in 
technical resource groups. This report led to the creation of the Co-operative Secretariat but its 
recommendations failed to get concerted action from the incoming Mulroney government or their 
conservative provincial cousins led by Grant Devine in Saskatchewan.  
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But co-operative housing starts would not spark broader development interest and 
activity. The partnership model promoted by the National Labour Co-operative 
Committee (Wetzel & Gallagher, 1987) and embodied in the CHFC would not inspire 
similar partnerships at the provincial level or among the Co-operative Union of Canada, 
the Canadian Labour Congress, and other emerging sectors like the worker co-operative 
or child care co-operative movements. Eventually, housing starts would fizzle out as 
federal funding plunged from $7.2 million in 1988 to zero in 1992 (Cole, 2008). Neither 
new sector development nor regeneration of Saskatchewan‘s broader co-operative 
movement would characterize this period. Instead, the overall pattern of consolidation 
that dominated the movement in the late fifties continued to dominate into the twenty first 
century. Worse, global restructuring deepened institutional retrenchment and withdrawal 
from development activity.  
 
By the end of the twentieth century, fourth wave co-operation would face distinct new 
challenges. These would include overlapping new crises of authority for the Keynesian 
welfare state (KWS) and social democracy, both attenuated by economic globalization. 
Against a backdrop of urban - rural political polarization and the rise of a free 
enterprising new rural populism, a new generation of activists in Saskatchewan would 
turn to community economic development and new forms of co-operative enterprise 
(Fairbairn, 2005). But they would be few, isolated, and lack supportive structures. Like 
previous disruptions to the province‘s economic and social life, globalization and the 
New Right revolution in Saskatchewan would prompt equally profound and lasting 
consequences for future co-operative development. From 1980 to 2010, the movement 
would also be wracked by internal crises—including the demutualization of the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, which had provided the practical and symbolic foundation for 
the movement. The co-operative sector was placed on the economic, political, and 
cultural defensive. Of course, the picture varied by sector and region. However, the 
Saskatchewan movement overall responded sluggishly to new economic and social 
problems, new state-priorities, new movement actors, and new economic opportunities. 
While the movement had rallied in the Great Depression, globalization-era co-operation 
seemed to lack popular relevance.  
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Like the welfare state, co-operation in Saskatchewan was entering a period of 
unprecedented uncertainty and confusion. Sectors adapted and consolidated, but the 
movement was adrift. 
 
7.1 The rise of the New Right, 1982 - 86 
Just as the Blakeney administration‘s vision of a ―family of crown corporations‖ was 
being realized in the early eighties, the tide of public opinion was turning against it. 
Ironically, it was the greatest achievements of Fabian centralism that evoked the loudest 
protests from voters. This revealed the ideology‘s greatest weakness: cultivating left-
populist support. Farmers, in particular, felt besieged by the farm crisis and neglected by 
their resource-focused political representatives. Discounting the decentralist ethos of the 
co-operative movement in favour of bureaucratic planning had contributed to this crisis 
of authority for Blakeney and the entrepreneurial state he had helped pioneer.  
 
Of course, these wounds were not entirely self-inflicted. The rise of the sixties youth 
movements, the New Left, the election of NDP governments in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
and British Columbia and the looming spectre of resource sector nationalizations elicited 
well-funded and concerted social control responses from the corporate elite. Among other 
things, efforts to discredit the left and deter economic intervention included the launch of 
the Fraser Institute in 1973 and the Business Council on National Issues in 1976. 
Extending the ideological, cultural, and political reach of traditional business lobbies like 
the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, these 
agencies would ―rollback‖ criticisms levelled by the New Left, the underground press, 
the NDP‘s corporate welfare bums campaign, and the Catholic Bishop‘s statement 
(McQuaig, 1992). They took aim, in particular, at the NDP‘s socialist wing. 
 
Sensing trouble as the political mood shifted against its aggressive use of public 
enterprise, the Blakeney regime moved to give co-operative development a more central 
role. In May 1980, the DCCD developed a report on worker co-operative development, 
but a lack of dedicated staffing, political desire, and outside pressure prevented 
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movement on this frontier (Laycock, 1987). In 1981, a new policy and planning unit was 
created in the Department in an attempt both to play down the administration‘s 
technocratic image and to avoid being marginalized by federal Liberal efforts to rebuild 
its Western base by building a closer relationship with the co-operative sector. The 
reorganization—too little and too late—signalled a shift in thinking toward co-operatives 
as a more central part of economic development strategy. The unit carried out a study for 
FCL (Argue, 1992). 
 
On April 26, 1982, Grant Devine‘s Progressive Conservatives won the largest legislative 
majority in Saskatchewan history. The new government captured fifty-seven seats, 
reducing the NDP from a governing caucus of forty-four to an opposition rump of seven. 
Voters proved receptive to the Tories‘ campaign message that the Blakeney regime had 
fallen out-of-touch; that it cared more about its family of crown corporations than it did 
for real families. The ―Monday Night Massacre‖ was a seismic shift in political and 
economic culture.  
 
Co-operative movement hopes for a fresh start with a politically chastened and changed 
Blakeney NDP were soon dashed. The Devine Tories proceeded swiftly to follow in the 
footsteps of their anti-socialist Liberal predecessor Ross Thatcher. In its first term, the 
PCs curbed co-operative support, in line with their neo-conservative populism: funding to 
the DCCD was discretely reduced, the new policy and planning branch eliminated, co-
operative loan guarantees discontinued, and department staff reduced from 78 to 59 
(Argue, 1992). 
 
7.2 Saskatchewan’s missed date with the worker co-operative wave, 1984 - 89 
The rise to power of the New Right in Saskatchewan also set the provincial political 
context in the eighties for the international ―rediscovery‖ of the worker co-operative. As 
governments cast about for job creation alternatives in the depths of the 1982 recession, 
news of successful worker co-operative experiments in the United Kingdom, France, and 
Móndragon—in Spain‘s Basque country—made their way across the Atlantic. The 
Québec government, with a face to Europe, was quick to adapt innovations. It engineered 
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a breakthrough pilot in youth worker co-operatives in 1983 that helped lay the basis for 
its CDR Network (Tremblay, 1985). There were four conferences on worker co-
operatives in Canada in 1984: in Edmonton, Gander, Montréal, and Victoria (McCarthy, 
1985). In May, the National Task Force on Co-operative Development tabled its report, 
declaring that worker co-operatives were ―an idea whose time has come;‖ they would 
―become the next great frontier of the co-operative movement‖ (NTFCD, 1984, p. 69).  
 
The Centre for the Study of Co-operatives was founded at the University of 
Saskatchewan that July. Its first Director Chris Axworthy quickly embarked for Europe 
to survey progress in the United Kingdom, France, and Mondragon (Axworthy, 1985). In 
February 1985, the centre hosted a conference on worker co-operatives, drawing together 
leading advocates and provincial and federal government representatives. Benoît 
Tremblay, a leading architect of the Québec development strategy was among the 
speakers. Axworthy‘s study-tour findings were made available as an occasional paper and 
the conference proceedings published. In 1987, the centre published an international 
bibliography on worker co-operatives; in 1988 Axworthy and David Perry published a 
major report on worker co-operative development in Canada. For a time, the Centre 
assumed responsibility for the publication of Worker Co-operator Magazine. Prospects 
for a worker co-operative break-through in Saskatchewan seemed good.  
 
Instead, the effort sputtered and stalled. Early research at the Centre for the Study of Co-
operatives sheds some light on the difficulty. Certainly, farmers‘ distrust of workers and 
trade unions had deep roots. The NLCC had cited ―rural values‖ as a friction point in 
relations between the labour and co-operative movements across the country two decades 
earlier. Among other things, ―cost conscious farmers, who work long hours for uncertain 
income and no fringe benefits, often resent those working shorter fixed hours for assured 
remuneration‖ (Wetzel & Gallagher, 1987, p. 11). What lent these historic antipathies 
decisive effect in the eighties was the flare up of strike activity in the consumer co-
operative system. In this period, financial strain on FCL drove a wage-lag relative to its 
competitors. From 1983 - 85, co-operatives accounted for 37 percent of all strikes in 
Saskatchewan even though they only employed 6 percent of the province‘s unionized 
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workforce (Wetzel & Gallagher, 1987). Indicative of a situation in which co-operative 
sector disputes were becoming more frequent, hard fought, and corrosive of member 
morale and inter-movement social capital was the 1983 strike at the Saskatoon Co-
operative. In this instance, over a hundred members petitioned to oust the board of 
directors (excluding the president) as the dispute ran to three months. 3500 members 
attended the special membership meeting forced by the petition (Wetzel & Gallagher, 
1987). Deteriorating labour relations prompted the Centre‘s Director to publish Co-
operatives and their employees: Towards a harmonious relationship (Axworthy, 1986). 
One movement activist consulted for this study described this period as a cultural and 
political turning point, merely ratifying lingering suspicions that the co-operative 
establishment had been hijacked, had ―sold out‖ its principles, and was now simply 
beyond reform.   
 
Laycock (1987) diagnosed Saskatchewan‘s failure to catch the worker co-operative wave 
by citing three factors. First, Saskatchewan lacked a mobilized social base for worker co-
operative development. This reflected the conservative agrarian roots of the established 
movement and the distinctly urban flavour and potential of this new model. Second, 
concerns that worker co-operatives might put downward pressure on wages fostered 
union distrust. Finally, he argued, ―the provincial government is not ideologically 
predisposed to promoting new workplace practices and relations of power (except in the 
negative sense of working to reduce trade union strength in the private and public 
sectors)‖ (1987, p. 150). Despite an ambitious and energetic campaign, the CSC initiative 
was derailed by an entrenched agrarian co-operative sector establishment, an anti-union 
state, and a distrustful trade union movement. Inertia prevailed and innovation was dealt 
a stinging defeat. 
 
7.3  Consolidation of the New Right agenda, Devine’s second term, 1986 – 91 
Things got worse for co-operative development in the late eighties. Early in their second 
term, the Devine Tories disbanded the Department of Co-operation and Co-operative 
Development, reducing it to a branch in the Department of Economic Diversification and 
Trade. Where the DCCD had brought together a focused workforce of 78 in 1982, by 
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1987 only 35 staff remained. 22 were re-assigned to the Department of Tourism, Small 
Business and Co-operatives and 13 went to the Department of Consumer and 
Commercial Affairs (pp. 122-123). Since taking power in 1982, the Devine regime had 
cut the number of personnel dealing with co-operatives by more than half. In the new 
―common sense‖ of neo-conservatism, co-operatives were like any other business and 
shouldn‘t receive state favouritism; the influence of these remaining co-operative 
specialists was therefore diminished, dispersed, and diluted.  
 
The general thrust of neo-conservative economics was to make Saskatchewan ―open for 
business,‖ inviting foreign capital to invest. The Devine administration downplayed the 
embarrassing collectivist artefacts of socialism like crown corporations and co-
operatives. Where possible, crowns would be privatized. Sask Oil was sold in 1985 - 86; 
the Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation privatized in 1988; the Potash 
Corporation of Saskatchewan went on the block in 1989 - 90 (Crown Investments 
Corporation of Saskatchewan, 2010). In their ideological zeal to move against public 
opinion to privatize Sask Energy, the government provoked a broad-based, labour-led 
social mobilization, the NDP walked out of the Legislature, and the Tories‘ fate was 
finally sealed (Pitsula & Rasmussen, 1990).  
 
Moving against co-operatives was even more politically dangerous. They sank deep roots 
in rural Saskatchewan, the Conservatives‘ political heartland. The Devine Tories instead 
positioned their free market crusade alongside the folksy lineage of the province‘s co-
operative movement. It was, of course, a contradictory crusade—enlisting agrarian 
populist affiliation by invoking co-operative traditions, while substantively undermining 
them. Adopting the euphemism of ―public participation‖ for privatization, Devine 
compared his campaign to those of the province‘s pioneering co-operators.85 However, 
this substantively anti-co-operative but loudly pro-farmer articulation split the co-
                                                 
85
 ―We are going to take what we‘ve been blessed with, and we‘re going to get Saskatchewan people 
involved and roll up their sleeves as deep as they want to go… It will go back to the co-operative 
movement it will go back to my grandparents that homesteaded here, it‘ll go back to anybody that ever 
believed in building—building, diversifying, growing, manufacturing, and providing opportunities for 
people all over this province‖ (Devine in Pitsula & Rasmussen, 1990, p. 153) 
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operative movement, between conservative and progressive members, and between 
agricultural producer co-operators and mostly urban consumer co-operators. This was 
easy politics since co-operation in Saskatchewan had often been as much an agrarian 
movement as it had been a co-operative movement (Fairbairn, 2005). As Conway (2006) 
documents, Devine played the ―rural card‖ regularly. To the extent co-operators bought 
into this anti-urban sentiment, or were constrained by others in their movement who did, 
the co-operative movement was pushed away from expansion along its urban frontier, 
falling back instead into a defence of its own heartland. The Conservative strategy to 
polarize the electorate was cynical and divisive. It also undermined the sense of 
communitarian solidarity on which co-operative movement expansion depended. The 
classic co-operative antagonism to capitalist concerns like grain merchants and bankers 
was discounted. In its place Saskatchewan‘s New Right offered an imperilled farm 
population an assortment of faux new folk devils, mostly slackers and city-slickers from 
Regina. This city-bashing undermined years of work to move the co-operative movement 
beyond sheer agrarian class consciousness toward a broader movement (Conway, 2006). 
As one of this study‘s informants argued, it also drove many urban activists, who might 
otherwise have involved themselves in long-range projects to build housing, childcare or 
worker co-operatives, to the protest tactics of short-term, defensive politics; first to 
defend programs under attack and eventually to defeat what seemed to be hopelessly 
mean-spirited and reckless administration. 
 
Another major public relations manoeuvre to rearticulate co-operativism to the New 
Right‘s agenda was a 1986 pre-election deal with Federated Co-operatives Ltd. The 
principal beneficiaries of the deal to develop a heavy oil up-grader in Regina were in the 
―oil patch,‖ where 1000 jobs were created. Nonetheless, the publicity created by the 80 
new jobs at the FCL Refinery helped to demonstrate the pragmatic, populist credentials 
of the Devine administration. It also affirmed the Conservative critique of the 
bureaucratic and aloof socialists in the NDP: ―They couldn‘t do a deal with the Co-
operative or with the private sector. But we did,‖ declared Devine (Argue, 1992 p. 138). 
The New Grade deal would also create a longer range strain on relations between the 
leadership of FCL and the NDP. 
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7.4 The decline of the farm economy 
One of the low water marks of the Devine years was a desperate pre-election scheme in 
1990 to decentralize 2,000 civil service jobs from Regina to its electoral strongholds in 
rural Saskatchewan. It dramatized that beneath the ideological surface of the eighties 
polarization, the real nerve centre of discontent was the shifting foundation of 
Saskatchewan‘s economy—from the country to the cities. Throughout the eighties, the 
long-range decline of the agricultural economy and the depopulation of rural 
Saskatchewan continued. About 1000 farm families were forced from the land every year 
of the Devine administration (Pugh, 1991). Although the resource boom of the seventies 
was transitory, the Saskatchewan economy was in the throes of a significant long-ranging 
structural transformation. From 1984 to 1997, agriculture accounted for ten percent or 
less of the provincial GDP, less than mining and oil extraction, and less than half the 
value of industrial production (Stirling, 2001). Wheat had been reduced from king to 
pauper and economically anxious and insecure farmers were not pleased about it.  
 
In an effort to defend the rural way of life and prop up their political fortunes, the Devine 
Tories poured billions into farm aid packages. Farm subsidies defined a government 
mainly remembered for its reckless spending and financial mismanagement. Devine 
racked up nine consecutive deficit budgets and an accumulated debt of $4.3 billion. The 
list of perks for cash-strapped farmers in the first term is long: interest rate subsidies, 
cancelled gas tax, low interest production loans, cash advances, tax credits, a farmers‘ oil 
royalty refund, etc. (Pugh, 1991). The net cost to the Provincial Treasury, according to 
the Devine administration, was about $2.4 billion, or $36,000 per farmer (Conway, 
2006). On the eve of the 1986 federal election, Devine also secured a $1 billion promise 
for farm relief from the Mulroney Conservatives.  
 
In the Devine Conservatives‘ second term, the next federal election brought another 
timely promise of $400 million in drought assistance. The Province pledged $525 million 
more for operating loans. Despite literally emptying the Provincial Treasury in ―defence 
of the family farm,‖ this series of ad hoc income transfers actually accelerated the rise of 
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industrial farming at the expense of the family farm largely due to the practice of making 
payments on a per acre basis. The number of farm bankruptcies went from 19 in 1981 to 
112 in 1988. Others left their farms ―voluntarily‖ as assets were seized or they were 
forced to sell. In 1981, the province had 67,318 census farms. A decade later, only 60,000 
remained (Pugh, 1991).  
 
The farm crisis of the eighties brought into greater relief the long range restructuring of 
Saskatchewan agriculture. In the five decades from 1931 to 1981, the rural percentage of 
the provincial population declined from 68.4 percent to 41.8 percent. A decade later the 
figure had reached 37 percent. The percentage of on-farm population declined from 61 
percent in 1931 to only 16.2 percent by 1991. No short-term cash-flow problem, this was 
a long-range commercial consolidation of the agriculture industry driven by farmers 
competing with each other to get bigger, encouraged by governments and even 
agricultural co-operatives. Average farm size almost tripled from 1931 to 2001 (Stirling, 
2001). 
 
The eclipse of the family farm, by market forces and state policies favouring corporate 
agribusiness, placed significant strain on the co-operative movement. In this study, 
informants recounted how the stress on farm families, including new pressure to find off-
farm income, undermined traditional co-operative involvements. Rural depopulation 
further ravaged the economic and voluntary basis for local co-operatives and credit 
unions. It forced regional consolidation and eliminated local services. Once-profitable co-
operative enterprises struggled. Once-vibrant democratic associations waned. Once loyal 
members felt betrayed. 
 
7.5 The agrarian political culture shifts 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool was pummelled by declining member loyalty—as it was 
forced to close uneconomic elevators, undermined by the repeal of the Crow Rate, and 
menaced by aggressive transnational competitors in a rapidly consolidating global grains 
trade (Fairbairn, 2005). In this study, informants recalled how the family farmers who 
had built the Pool were also drifting apart, both geographically and ideologically. They 
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managed larger, more capital-intensive operations. As small farms failed and others 
acquired their land and machinery, sometimes at bankruptcy auctions, a survivalist ethos 
overtook traditional attachments to the culture of left populism. As farmers drifted toward 
a new agri-business model, they became more competitive, individualistic, and right-
wing. Historical bonds of agrarian affiliation, class consciousness, and unity eroded in the 
face of competition between producers, diminishing returns from collective action, a co-
operative movement in retreat, and the emerging political culture of the New Right.
86
 
 
As the associational base of the agrarian movement dissolved, co-operation also lost its 
social base. Despite efforts to revive the left-populist farm agenda by creating the 
National Farmers Union in 1969, the political culture of rural Saskatchewan gave way to 
right-wing reaction (Brown, 1997), including angry separatist fringe groups like the 
Western Canada Concept Party. This shift reshaped the co-operative movement and 
leadership itself.
87
 This right turn culminated on the federal stage under the Reform Party, 
founded in 1987. As the farm crisis deepened and the mood darkened, the Reform Party 
consolidated this angry populism (Dobbin, 1991). Provincially, Devine also cultivated 
this deeply restorationist new rural vote.   
 
This rural political realignment ―represented radical individualism rather than 
communitarian populism‖ (Brown, 1997). It was a new organic ideology that combined 
male protest, social conservatism, regional paranoia, and anti-urban sentiments with the 
free enterprising faith of the New Right. The campaign against Ottawa‘s gun registry 
resonated with farmers disappointed by the state‘s failure to protect them from structural 
changes to the farm economy, and exasperated by the endless stream of forms to fill out 
                                                 
86
 Brown (1997) argues this right-wing undertow had actually begun much earlier—with the election of 
John G Diefenbaker‘s Conservatives: ―The federal election of 1958 was… a watershed which marked the 
beginning of the end of the old legacy. Diefenbaker in some respects embodied a vague and weakened 
version of the old populism, but after his political demise western conservatism increasingly represented a 
regional business class with meaningful connections only to that part of the agrarian class which made 
common cause with agribusiness‖ (p. xxvi). 
 
87
 As early as 1969, Brown (1973) would mourn the Pool‘s fall into conservatism: ―Its president, C.W. 
Gibbings, is also a director of the Royal Bank of Canada and the Western Producer is innocuous and 
reactionary‖ (p. 76). 
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for short-term and politically timed relief payments. Ironically, as the Spicer Commission 
found, the consequences of economic restructuring were at the nerve centre of this 
popular discontent, even though that dissatisfaction was being exploited by the right—
precisely to accelerate and deepen those processes.
88
 
 
Tired of waging a losing battle against apparently irreversible market forces, and 
increasingly eager to simply get the state off their backs, many farmers resigned 
themselves to free market solutions. Many applauded the privatizations of crown 
corporations, both as revenue sources to finance farm aid and as blows against a distant 
and unresponsive state. Ironically, these anti-statist sympathies also extended to efforts to 
dismantle long fought for gains of the farmers‘ movement like the Wheat Board: ―A new 
regional bourgeoisie led by the energy and resource industries, but allied with the most 
prosperous and conservative sector of the agrarian community, was rapidly becoming the 
driving force of prairie politics‖ (Brown, 1997, pp. xxvii-xxviii). In this context of 
demographic, market, and political transition, the face of co-operation, too, was radically 
made over. In this period, the co-operative movement itself became increasingly 
defensive, disengaged from the historic social project of left-populism, and conservative.  
 
7.6 The Romanow years, 1991 – 2007 
At the dawn of the nineties in Saskatchewan, the relentless commercial consolidation of 
the agricultural economy continued. Family farmers were still being squeezed out of the 
market. Against this dire backdrop, agrarian co-operation seemed to be a spent force. It 
appeared a change of provincial government could do little, particularly in an age of 
market liberalization, to rescue the family farm or revive a defeated farm movement.  
 
                                                 
88
 Canadians ―still look to their governments to insulate them from international economic forces, despite 
the fact that Canadian governments, including the federal government, have been emphasizing the need to 
adapt and adjust to market forces. Privatization, deregulation, the Free Trade agreement, the Mexican trade 
initiative, and reinforced attempts to achieve expanded GATT agreements are all cases in point. As a result, 
many [Canadians] feel betrayed and bereft and are confused and angry. Part of this is due to their sense that 
traditional Canadian values are being usurped by market forces and that governments are doing nothing to 
deal with these‖ (cited in Panitch, l993, p. 4). 
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Outside Saskatchewan, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had ruled through the 
eighties. Mulroney came to power federally in 1984 with the largest parliamentary 
majority in Canadian history (Conway, 2006). He campaigned on a low-key neo-
conservative agenda and won a second term over free trade in 1988. As if to emphasize 
the triumph of market populism, the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991. Although the Devine Tories had driven the province to the brink of 
bankruptcy, the emerging global popular culture, diffused by an increasingly 
homogenizing and hegemonistic Western media and cultural industry, was now 
underwritten by an all-pervasive New Right common sense (Marchak, 1991; McQuaig, 
1992; Pitsula & Rasmussen, 1990). This limited the viability of policy options that 
contradicted widely-held new popular assumptions about the entrepreneurial or welfare 
state. Like Blair in the UK, the Clinton Democrats in the USA, or Chretien in Ottawa, the 
Romanow NDP would rule within the constraints of this residual ideology. For the neo-
conservative revolution reached deep into the public‘s very definition of reality, thus 
shaping the political culture and terrain of the nineties.
89
 Additionally, while 
Saskatchewan had handed the NDP a decisive majority in 1991, the urban-rural split 
remained. The Tories were decimated in the cities, gaining no urban seats and only 
sixteen percent of the urban popular vote. All of the seats retained by Devine were rural 
seats. Over a third of the rural population had continued to vote Conservative (Conway, 
2006).  
 
As it turns out, reviving the beleaguered co-operative tradition in Saskatchewan was the 
furthest thing from the minds of the Romanow government. They were charged with the 
urgent task of managing a $4 billion debt inherited from the Devine Tories. The 
Province‘s debt to GDP ratio stood at sixty percent, triple the level of public debt carried 
by the Blakeney and Douglas administrations (McGrane, 2007). Indeed, in the home of 
Medicare, a fitting index for the fiscal crisis was the 1993 closure of fifty-two hospitals 
                                                 
89
 In this conservative restoration of corporate power, the historic rise of the free market ‗think tank‘ played 
a crucial role. In the West, the Fraser Institute had been relentlessly assailing the intellectual, policy, and 
political foundations of social democracy and laying the groundwork for a fundamental realignment of 
public policy. By 1996 the Institute funded a staff of 22 out of an annual budget of $2.35 million (Dobbin, 
1998). The corporate-funded National Citizens Coalition also played a leading role in spearheading the 
campaign to disband the Canadian Wheat Board.  
 
 260 
(MacKinnon, 2003). The DCCD, abolished by Devine, was not reinstated. Co-operatives 
branch funding was frozen in 1991 - 92. It received a sixteen percent increase in 1992 - 
93 as the state bowed to sector pressure, creating a Co-operatives Directorate within the 
reorganized Department of Economic Development (Saskatchewan Economic 
Development, 1992; 1993).  
 
In what came to be known as the ―War Cabinet,‖ the early focus was on rapid deficit and 
debt reduction. There would be no return to the province‘s tradition of active intervention 
in the economy. There would be no major new social programs. There would be fiscal 
restraint on the expense side of the ledger and tax and royalty incentives on the revenue 
side. As one cabinet minister recounts: ―The agenda that we inherited in 1991 was 
overwhelming, as might be expected for a province on its knees. As well as the 
deepening financial problem, the economy was languishing, the province was mired in an 
agricultural crisis, and several of the mega-projects were on the verge of collapse.‖ The 
party‘s left was excluded entirely from cabinet—reassuring nervous credit agencies, 
investors, and voters that the government would pursue a moderate, fiscally responsible, 
and business-friendly approach to managing the crisis. Cabinet increasingly viewed the 
party‘s left-wing as a ―problem‖ to be managed (MacKinnon, 2003, pp. 66 - 67). 
 
In the Romanow NDP, the co-operative movement would thus find an unwilling partner. 
Public finances precluded it, economic development ideology pre-empted it, and 
lingering resentments with FCL under-wrote it. There would be neither pause to reverse 
the privatization of the crowns nor cause to ponder the prospects of co-operative 
development. As MacKinnon recounts, the NDP‘s economic development strategy, in 
contrast to campaign trail stumping for a mixed economy in the eighties, would be 
unambiguously private sector-led: ―By the 1990s … the world had changed‖ (p. 75). To 
this end, the Premier convened a full two-day retreat with key cabinet ministers and 
business leaders. Institutionalized co-operatives were viewed with suspicion and as 
strategically secondary. 
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Saskatchewan, it is true, is home to some of Canada‘s largest co-
operatives, notably the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Federated Co-
operatives, and Credit Union Central. By the 1990s the major co-
operatives—although still committed to the principle of one member, 
one vote—operated more like well-run businesses, a shift that was 
symbolized by the decision of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool to sell 
shares on the stock exchange. The reality in Saskatchewan as 
elsewhere in the 1990s was that growth was driven primarily by 
private-sector business people, and turning the economy around 
meant inspiring their confidence and encouraging them to invest. 
(MacKinnon, 2003, p. 75)  
 
Released in November 1992, the government‘s economic blue-print reflected an 
intensification of the Blakeney era New Deal for People turn toward ―small business.‖ 
Although Partnership for Renewal used the language of community economic 
development, the network of Regional Economic Development Authorities it launched 
was intended to support investor-led business development in the community rather than 
to support the development of the community, upon which the organization of co-
operatives depended. Declarations of commitment to a pluralist economic model and the 
co-operative movement were public relations overtures to the party‘s rank and file rather 
than substantive policy and program commitments. Long forgotten were the promises 
made in the 1986 election campaign to introduce tax-breaks, loans, preferential 
procurement, co-operative education, and support to youth co-operatives (Laycock, 
1987).  
 
Beneath the veneer of fiscal and economic realism lurked another factor in the 
government‘s turn away from the co-operative model: the troubled relationship between 
the Romanow NDP and Federated Co-operatives. As if the political affront of signing its 
deal with the Tories on the eve of the 1986 election was not enough, Cabinet now had to 
pick up the tab for Devine‘s election-motivated generosity to FCL. By 1992, the 
government claimed to have already lost $307 million, with further losses projected. The 
alternative was not to pay, push the project into default, and be on the hook for millions 
in loan guarantees (MacKinnon, 2003). Arguing that the New Grade investment and loan 
guarantees had compromised the Province‘s finances and credit rating, the government 
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moved to re-open Devine‘s deal with FCL. It was preparing, in MacKinnon‘s words, for 
a ―public brawl with one of the province‘s largest co-operatives‖ (p. 85). 
 
In other words, the Romanow administration was not simply overlooking the co-
operative sector; the co-operative sector, or FCL to be more accurate, was very much in 
cabinet‘s sights. The trouble was that its intention was to disentangle itself from a sector-
state partnership, not build one. Even worse, to re-open the deal, the Romanow 
administration was planning to isolate and discredit the leadership of FCL and divide its 
membership in a battle for the hearts and minds of the public, FCL‘s own members, and 
the wider co-operative sector. Clearly, New Grade had helped push co-operative policy 
and program development off the political agenda. While the heavy oil up-grader 
represented a major step forward in building the economic strength and reach of FCL, it 
pushed political support for emerging co-operatives two steps back. 
 
Ironically, the Romanow Cabinet‘s greatest weapon in its struggle with FCL was the fact 
the social democratic and co-operative movements overlapped. The government could 
therefore appeal, behind the backs of FCL leadership, to the memberships‘ conflicted 
loyalties. As MacKinnon (2003) recounts, ―We were asking co-operative members to 
choose: Was their first loyalty to the co-operative movement or to the province of 
Saskatchewan‖ (p. 90). Just as the public relations state under Devine had attempted to 
dilute co-operative identity by subsuming it under a neo-conservative agrarian populism 
from the right, the Romanow NDP now disarticulated the co-operative social bloc from 
the ―left.‖ FCL attempted to stand its ground, warning of a shutdown of the New Grade 
and of downstream effects on vulnerable local retails. It enlisted the Canadian Co-
operative Association‘s support, threatened court action, and suggested it might move its 
headquarters to Calgary. But its Achilles heel was that, as a democratic, member-based 
movement, party activists walked among the membership at FCL meetings. A group 
called the Concerned Co-operators Federation circulated posters and raised funds for a 
province-wide campaign against FCL‘s intransigence. Many cabinet ministers had deep 
roots in the movement. MacKinnon herself served as president of the Saskatoon Co-
operative in the midst of the public relations battle (MacKinnon, 2003).  
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On August 20, 1993, nearly two years of struggle ended in a settlement (MacKinnon, 
2003). Relations with the province‘s co-operative movement remained chilly throughout 
the NDP‘s stay in office. The government had achieved some limited success in 
lightening its financial obligations. But it came at a considerable cost in trust, goodwill, 
and missed opportunities. A decade of sector-state partnership in Saskatchewan had been 
lost, and stocks of social capital were dangerously depleted. Already weakened by the 
same forces undermining its agrarian base in the nineties, the FCL debacle exacted a 
heavy toll—in movement energy, focus, and cohesion, in public credibility, and in the 
movement‘s resilience and capacity for expansion. Indeed, the most significant measure 
undertaken in co-operative relations during the Romanow administration was the passage 
of enabling legislation for the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool to subscribe outside capital and 
eventually demutualize, i.e. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Act, 1995. In this context of 
profound structural weakness—economically, socially, culturally, and politically—it 
would be the privatization of the Pool that would deal the authority of the co-operative 
idea in Saskatchewan its most lethal blow. 
 
7.7   Privatizing the Pool, 1996 - 2007 
The demutualization of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool began in March 1996, when it 
became a publicly-traded company, and was completed with the 2007 dissolution of the 
SWP in favour of an investor-owned successor firm, Viterra. This episode marked the 
dénouement of twentieth century agrarian co-operation, and producer co-operation, in 
particular, in Saskatchewan. The Pool, one of the first, the most visible, and largest of 
Saskatchewan‘s co-operatives, was also the province‘s largest company. With a staff of 
3,000 people, it employed one out of every five people employed in the entire co-
operative sector. Its privatization meant the dividends once paid out to Saskatchewan 
members would be diverted to shareholders, increasingly outside the province. Without 
member-control, jobs and investments would become increasingly mobile. But the 
implications of the demutualization of the SWP went far beyond employment and 
economic development.  
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The Pool‘s democratic structure included 449 local committees and a five-day annual 
meeting attended by 140 delegates (Rasmussen, 2001). Rolling up this democratic 
structure eliminated opportunities for adult education, democratic participation, and the 
experience, knowledge, and skills which those structures of participatory learning had 
previously enabled. Privatizing the Pool was not only a commercial transaction but also a 
direct and immediate democratic disenfranchisement, driving the longer-range political 
deskilling of the province‘s grain farmers. The Pool‘s ―customers‖ would no longer 
participate in the company‘s management as equal voting members. This was a major 
structural reform to the province‘s political economy. It was regressive, anti-democratic, 
and devastating to the co-operative movement. For these reasons, subjects interviewed 
for this study routinely winced, sighed, or vented at length over the fate of the Pool. 
Almost a decade and a half after its move to market several study subjects still seemed to 
be angry, in mourning, or both. 
 
This rollback of popular democracy needs to be placed in perspective, as part of the 
broader trend to centralization of school boards, health boards, retail co-operatives, and 
credit unions across rural Saskatchewan. Winding down the Pool‘s democratic structures 
further reduced already dwindling opportunities for citizen engagement, participation, 
and development. As Courtney (2007) illustrates, from 1944 to 2006, opportunities to 
participate in democratic structures had been reduced by the consolidation of 79 hospital 
boards to 13, school boards from 5184 to 27, and telephone companies from 1127 to one. 
Similarly, McLaughlin (1996) shows that consumer co-operative retails had declined 
from 550 in 1944 to about 200 by 1984. With a later sector take-off, Saskatchewan credit 
unions peaked at 296 in 1966 (Bromberger, 1973) but today there are only 65 
(Saskatchewan Co-operative Association, 2010). In any event, other co-operatives, and 
levels of democratic governance, had long depended on the spill-over effect of Pool 
director training and experience for the effective functioning of the broader democratic 
movement. Pool dues also played an important redistributive role within the movement, 
helping to support co-operative central organizations like the Canadian Co-operative 
Association, the Saskatchewan Co-operative Association (which lost about 100 paid Pool 
delegates to its annual youth camps). The Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at the 
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University of Saskatchewan also lost a major contributor (although other established co-
operatives back-filled). With the loss of a major patron, some organizations found 
themselves short-funded and less able to focus movement efforts on public education, 
new co-operative development efforts, and support to emerging sectors. The surviving 
co-operatives found themselves under greater pressure to step into the breach. The ripple 
effect of this privatization on Saskatchewan‘s democratic and co-operative development 
infrastructure would be far-reaching indeed; it was a recurring theme in conversations 
with study participants about the state of the Saskatchewan movement. 
 
The privatization of the Pool is also a case study in cultural politics and a paradigm for 
the collapse of agrarian left-populism. A decade of farm crisis and capitalist triumphalism 
appears to have both emboldened predatory demutualizers and worn down a beleaguered 
agrarian class. Just as the temptation to cash in crown corporations in potash and the oil 
patch in the eighties to finance farm support payments had weakened their historic 
support for democratic economic action in the public interest, demutualization became 
less ideologically noxious as it became more financially irresistible—both to cash-
strapped producers and those eager to expand their operations in line with the new 
thinking in agribusiness. Wealthy farmers were increasingly business-minded and right-
wing in their views. Desperate for the one-time, purchase pay-out of their Wheat Pool 
shares, family farmers agreed—many reluctantly—that it was time to roll-up this out-
dated experiment. But the privatization of the Pool was also a metaphor for a new 
agrarian populism, in which the New Right‘s capital-led political project was effectively 
linked to farmers‘ sense of self-interest. Although the case to privatize the Pool was made 
in narrowly economic terms, as a series of incremental business decisions, each move 
further dissolved the long withering associative ties that had once bound farmers to each 
other and a left social project. It was also a plebiscite on the agrarian social contract. 
Yielding to a gnawing sense of historical inevitability and an apparently exhausted 
popular movement, Saskatchewan farmers‘ vote to privatize the Pool seemed like a vote 
to ratify reality. The decline of the grain economy, the collapse of the family farm, and 
the retreat of agrarian left-populist culture made the wind-down of the Pool seem as 
natural, inevitable, and irreversible as the changing of the seasons. In turn, the collapse of 
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this icon ratified the ‗common sense‘ hunch of a new generation—brought up in a 
market-driven era—that co-operatives don‘t work anyhow. 
 
7.8 The Black factor, 1996 
In 1996, there was another major industry restructuring in the Saskatchewan economy 
that would have both direct and indirect consequence for co-operative development: the 
entry of Conrad Black‘s Hollinger Inc. into the province‘s already monopolized 
newspaper markets. By gaining control of all five of the province‘s daily newspapers, he 
secured wide leverage over public opinion. For, as the ―medium of record,‖ the 
newspaper is the first line of information gathering. It sets the agenda for what daily 
readers think about, and sets the pattern for framing and interpretation across the 
province‘s rural weeklies and electronic media system. 
 
Black exercised the power of this daily newspaper monopoly on behalf of capitalist 
proprietors and right-wing politics. He had a political agenda (Black, 1993). Unlike the 
relatively benign neglect of the Siftons, who were merely out of touch with Saskatchewan 
traditions like co-operativism (Gruending, 1980), Black was actively hostile to the 
province‘s socialist heritage. Like the legitimation crisis which the privatization of the 
Pool created for Saskatchewan‘s co-operative sector, the Black monopoly lent further 
moral and intellectual force to the province‘s business establishment. Black‘s holdings 
routinely editorialised for market-based solutions and celebrated capitalist enterprise. 
Black‘s contempt for trade unions and popular movements was legendary (Black, 1993; 
Siklos, 1995; Barlow & Winter, 1997) and acted as a limit on free journalistic expression. 
After Black fired 25 percent of the staff at Saskatoon‘s Star-Phoenix and Regina‘s 
Leader Post, lay-off chill intensified. After the buy-out, complaints abounded about the 
declining quantity and quality of local journalism at the Leader Post. Editors were 
rumoured to avoid taking controversial positions that might be at odds with the Hollinger 
line. Black reinforced the authority of the free market and the investor owned firm in a 
context where left-populism and co-operative enterprise were already discredited, in 
decline, and vulnerable. 
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The Black monopoly also transformed the terrain on which the provincial state 
manoeuvred. Already sharply constrained in its options by the fiscal and economic 
contexts, the Black monopoly further narrowed the scope of feasible state action for the 
Romanow NDP. Policy initiatives that might antagonize the proprietor or his friends 
would now have to account for the Black factor, his reputation for unpredictable 
behaviour. This trait routinely devalued share prices (Siklos, 1995). Black was a sworn 
ideological adversary of the NDP. Like his wife Barbara Amiel Black who attacked NDP 
premier Bob Rae in MacLean’s, he relished public confrontations with the Ontario NDP. 
A year before he set his sights on the Saskatchewan market, Black even moved 
Hollinger‘s corporate headquarters from Toronto to Vancouver to protest Rae‘s labour 
bill (Barlow & Winter, 1997). Black companies contributed $75,000 to the Saskatchewan 
Party experiment to unite-the-right (Marsden, 2000). From the inaugural issue of his 
flagship national daily, the National Post, political revitalization of the right was clearly 
one of his most cherished causes.  
 
It is clear that the Romanow NDP had its own fiscal and economic reasons for not 
making a priority of more active co-operative development policies. The ―Black factor‖ 
merely reinforced this drift to the centre-right. As the Romanow NDP moved against its 
rank and file and social partners to reduce the debt, it had to place a premium on public 
relations—and good press. The new discourse for the pragmatic centre adopted by siege 
social democracy locked future NDP governments into that narrative and governance 
path. Ironically, however, Conrad Black‘s ideological flamboyance also had 
contradictory consequences for the province‘s political culture and emerging co-operative 
sectors. Just as the vitriolic opposition of Conservative N.F. Davin‘s Leader had 
inadvertently provided the Wheat Pool campaign with attention, controversy, and broad 
popular sympathy in the early twentieth century (Browne, 1973), the layoffs and political 
agenda of Conrad Black also reinforced popular distrust of corporate monopoly in 
general and deregulated media monopoly in particular. 
 
Emblematic of the contradictory consequences of Black‘s arrival in Saskatchewan was 
the rise of a small worker co-operative, the prairie dog, which published an alternative 
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newspaper in Regina. Like SGGA members who relished their Guide‘s broad-sides 
against the excesses of Davin‘s opposition to pooling seven decades earlier, the prairie 
dog fiercely opposed the Black monopoly. Over the next several years prairie dog would 
articulate an alternative, urban, progressive world view to an ever-expanding audience. It 
went from monthly to bi-weekly; from a one title shop in Regina to launching a second 
publication, Planet S Magazine, in Saskatoon; from a print-only format to a full range of 
online media, including web-sites, blogs, Facebook pages, and Twitter in both cities. 
Although prairie dog was launched in 1993, well before Black arrived on the scene, 
Hollinger‘s market entry provided forceful impetus to the co-operative‘s growth and 
helped secure it a faithful following that now numbers about 60,000 readers in each city. 
Although isolated and under-capitalized, this was a high profile success for urban co-
operative development. The prairie dog rearticulated a contemporary, urban left 
populism. It also helped to make the case for, and profile, several important innovations 
that were taking shape in the otherwise under-reported New Social Economy.              
 
7.9 The New Social Economy, 1983 - 2010.  
The developments of the eighties and nineties were, on balance, bleak for co-operation in 
Saskatchewan. They included the privatization of the Pool; a profound and protracted 
disengagement of the state; a dramatic consolidation of established sectors; and an 
increasingly hostile political culture for co-operative development. Worker co-operation 
was largely the collateral damage of this train of events. Nonetheless, green shoots 
emerged in new fields of co-operation. New generation co-operatives were promoted for 
value-added processing such as pasta plants (Fulton, 2001) and organic farmers formed 
their own pool. But like the new wave co-operatives of the sixties and seventies, most 
new activity was in the cities. Unlike previous co-operative waves which engaged in 
economic activity to redress gaps in market provision, these co-operatives often delivered 
social services to redress failures of the state (Fairbairn, 2005). 
 
The social focus of much of the new wave co-operatives expressed a few factors. These 
new co-operatives were often launched by young students or unemployed urban workers 
who lacked the financial resources and established organization of farmers. Generally, 
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farmers had considerable assets and credit facilities for co-operative ventures and a clear 
business focus on the ―bottom line‖ of their farm operations. Also, unlike the agrarian 
tradition, which had a series of historic patrons in the TGGA, the SGGA, the UFC, and 
the Wheat Pool, these co-operatives were largely isolated. Lacking the market or 
movement resources that fostered the ―old co-ops,‖ and confronting a lack of technical 
and financial assistance, they were dependent on state subsidies for employment, training, 
or social service provision. Finally, they often found themselves developing the 
community itself. They were not embedded in a unified, well-structured, and powerful 
agrarian movement. Rather they pioneered the precarious early stages of a more nebulous 
process of urban community development. Combating social and economic exclusion in 
the urban realm requires a strong focus on social as well as employment objectives. 
 
There were other reasons for the social focus of the new urban co-operatives. The retreat 
of the state from social provision meant these emerging needs drove co-operative 
proponents. Many came to co-operation through urban-based movements. The paucity of 
financial instruments (and technical assistance and promotion) for launching new, 
market-based enterprises also acted as a deterrent to co-operative risk-taking without 
some kind of state-sponsored employment subsidy or fee for service. Finally, the career 
paths of many young activists who might otherwise have worked in the (downsized) 
public sector or the (largely de-funded) non-profit sector were blocked by the recession 
of the early eighties and federal and provincial funding cuts. Through co-operation, they 
strove to find new ways to create an economic base for meaningful public service.  
 
The reality gap separating the old and new co-operatives was wide. The ranks of the 
established co-operatives were rooted in the bread and butter economics of the agrarian 
tradition. These strange new co-operatives were emerging from the radically new 
conditions and struggles of twenty-first century urban Saskatchewan. This posed a 
considerable cultural barrier to co-operation between old and new co-operatives. The case 
of childcare illustrates. In this period, the increased need for childcare drove modest 
sector expansion. However, as lagging provincial social policy in this area indicates 
(Martin, 2001), many old-timers in Saskatchewan had a hard time making their peace 
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with the idea of women in the workforce. Shockingly, from 1992-2004, regulated 
childcare spaces increased less than 2 percent and were available to less than 5 percent of 
Saskatchewan children under 12 years of age (Friendly, 2005). For rural residents, 
support to the provision of childcare was often seen as a perk to urban families. For the 
religious right, it eroded the traditional family. Just as rural social conservatism was a 
barrier to provincial childcare reform, attachment to patriarchal ―family values‖ explains 
some ambivalence among co-operators to support the emerging sector.  
 
Contradictions in the co-operative movement on childcare illustrate the cultural resistance 
that many new urban-based co-operatives faced from the traditional wing of the co-
operative establishment. The Wheat Pool, for example, functioned as an all-male preserve 
for over half a century; the first woman attended as a delegate in 1981 (G. Fairbairn, 
1984). Despite the agrarian co-operative movement‘s many democratic and progressive 
achievements, feminism encountered resistance in established ranks (Theis & Hammond 
Ketilson, 1994).
90
 As Fairbairn (2005) notes, many of the new co-ops have a greater 
proportion of active women members: emerging sectors, such as housing, health-care, 
childcare, and some worker co-operatives therefore have an important role to play in 
building gender equality across the movement. Ironically, a significant barrier to co-
operative participation and development activity in the age of the two-income family is 
precisely a lack of affordable quality childcare in Saskatchewan.  
 
Through the eighties and nineties, the deficiencies and retreat of the welfare state also 
stimulated experiments in new social co-operatives, such as training businesses. In 1983, 
the Crocus Co-op, for example, was launched in Saskatoon as a self-help organization for 
people with disabilities (Fairbairn, 2005). Like Moose Jaw‘s Churchill Greenhouse Co-
operative or Regina‘s Crackerjack Janitorial Co-op, it provided employment 
opportunities for people with disabilities. The short-lived Marina Restaurant in Regina 
and the more resilient Core Neighbourhood Youth Co-operative in Saskatoon (Tupone, 
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 There is an element of historic regression to this given the strong role played by women such as Violet 
McNaughton (Taylor, 2000) and Annie Hollis (Holtslander, 1998) in the formative periods of the agrarian 
co-operative movement. Ironically, this participation also created important historical connections to the 
suffragette movement, for which the agrarian press (and women journalists) crusaded. 
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2003) created work opportunities for disadvantaged inner-city youth. The Regina 
Women‘s Construction Co-operative aimed to train women for the trades (Co-operatives 
Secretariat, 2000). Even Regina‘s alt-weekly newspaper co-operative, prairie dog 
magazine, got its start by providing work-training to the unemployed, funds helping 
cover start-up costs and losses. Movement entrepreneurs found available resources, 
innovating to meet their communities‘ needs. But the lack of a well-articulated support 
system for new co-operative development left these co-operatives vulnerable.  
 
In contrast to the agrarian era, all these co-operatives place a premium on employment, 
the classical concern of urban workers. While many of these training businesses cater to 
marginalized populations, this created its own tensions with the co-operative 
establishment. Agrarian co-operation was steeped in the contradictory class interests of 
farmers, often indifferent to the rights of their own workers (Wetzel & Gallagher, 1987; 
Axworthy, 1986) and hostile to trade unions (Knuttila, 1994). Historic class antagonisms 
were built up over the years between Saskatchewan‘s workers and farmers through 
lockouts and strikes at co-operatives, dairy plants, railways, elevators, and grain 
terminals. These conflicts all jeopardized farm income.  
 
The failure of the worker co-operative campaign in the mid-eighties provides one 
example of the province‘s contradictory co-operative culture. Ironically, while farmers 
pride themselves on their stubborn individualism, and being their own boss, the notion of 
worker self-management did not resonate. This selective celebration of democratic 
equality within the agrarian-led co-operative movement only ―broadened out‖ to include 
consumers through the largely agrarian-driven and supported consumer co-operative and 
credit union movements. While the early movement matured from an exclusive focus on 
producer co-operation to a broader communitarian conception, the fall of the Pool (and 
producer co-operation more generally) engendered a shift toward the dominant Fabian 
conception of co-operation in which the consumer is king. Just as worker involvement 
was marginalized by the residual tradition forged by agricultural producer co-operatives, 
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the now-dominant consumer co-operation also marginalized workers as development 
actors.
91
  
 
Additionally, the co-operative movement is led not simply by farmers but also by a large 
cadre of managers. Like their historic class antagonism to unions, they have their own 
professional self-interest in arguing against the notion of worker self-management. Calls 
for forms of increased employee participation are viewed by many as a threat to their 
role, status, and authority. In worker co-operatives, managers may see a domino effect 
that would give their own work forces troublesome ideas about industrial democracy. 
This bias also taints the wider family of worker-inclusive co-operative models, like 
worker-shareholder co-operatives, multi-stakeholder co-operatives, and student co-
operatives. 
 
In a movement dominated by farmers and managers, the cultural politics of worker 
involvement in co-operative governance are certain to arouse latent class and ideological 
antagonisms camouflaged in a variety of reactionary rationalizations. Worker co-
operatives are thus multiply tainted: as not real co-operatives, as an ill-conceived model, 
as closer to the labour movement, and as somehow smacking of socialism for extending 
the democratic franchise to the workers. Arguably, worker-led co-operative development 
efforts are better able to address urban concerns with employment, and to broaden out the 
movement beyond its present confinement to a shrinking base of agricultural production, 
finance, and retailing. The cross-sectoral range of applications offered by worker-
inclusive models uniquely equips them to help the co-operative movement penetrate the 
urban-based service and manufacturing sectors. Yet, the province‘s agrarian history, 
managerial ideology, and consumer co-operative hegemony all cast long shadows over 
these possibilities. Finally, at the public policy level, the worker-involved co-operative 
models are equally distrusted by the political left and right. Fabians, on the left, question 
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  The district structure of FCL illustrates. Of nine district representatives for Saskatchewan, seven live in 
rural centres and one lives in Swift Current. The Saskatoon representative is a farmer. In part, this rural 
dominance reflects FCL‘s vast network. It also reflects the greater stake farmers place in patronage refunds 
which apply to gas and agricultural supplies and are thus part of their business operations. This goes some 
way to explaining the ‗cult of the cash-back‘ within FCL circles when emerging co-operatives complain 
that the multi-billion dollar federation is unsupportive of new sector development. It also underscores the 
fact that even ‗consumer‘ co-operation is still farmer-ruled in Saskatchewan (FCL, 2010). 
 273 
the plausibility of worker co-operatives under the influence of the Webbs‘ degeneration 
thesis
92
 and fear that the notion smacks of ―communism.‖ Investor-ownership proponents 
view the notion as a further competitive encroachment on capitalist firms. In modelling 
democracy in the firm, they also fear the model‘s success may undermine managerial and 
proprietary authority generally.  
 
More promising than the entrenched resistance to social innovation characteristic of the 
co-operative establishment is the pioneering role of an inner-city Saskatoon community 
economic development corporation. It has provided important urban shelter and stimulus 
to new co-operative development. The Quint Development Corporation, which unites 
five core neighbourhoods, provided vital management assistance to the Core 
Neighbourhood Youth Co-operative. This carpentry training business was established in 
1996 to create opportunities for inner-city youth (Tupone, 2003). Quint also spearheaded 
a pioneering program in co-operative home ownership in the core neighbourhoods. While 
these experiments remain neglected on the margins of the established co-operative sector 
and public policy, Fairbairn (2005) argues they may be exemplars of movement 
regeneration: ―After a lengthy period of maturity and relative stability, there are signs of 
fresh dynamism driven by new, predominantly urban needs. These signs include the 
health, housing, and social service co-operatives of the post-1960 era, and even more 
recent inner-city development organizations, worker co-operatives, social co-operatives, 
youth co-operatives, and others.‖ However, this possibility is contingent on a shift in 
thinking and energy toward this new co-operative frontier: ―It remains to be seen whether 
these new co-operatives, in Saskatchewan, will create a new cultural momentum‖ (p. 53). 
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 Prejudice against worker co-operation reaches its ideological apogee in the ‗degeneration thesis.‘ First 
put forward at the turn of the century by Fabian Beatrice Webb (1899), her ―criticism was twofold: that the 
poor performance of worker co-operatives was due to their not allowing managers to manage effectively 
and without interference, and that if they were successful they had a tendency to limit membership and to 
deform into petty capitalist enterprises‖ (Birchall, 1997, pp. 23-24). This fed the reductionist argument that 
worker co-operatives are doomed to fail due to an intrinsic, ‗fatal flaw‘ in their design rather than the 
hostile environment for development they faced. ‗Common sense‘ rationalizations abounded. Workers 
would sell if their firm was successful. It would fail as they chose raises and bonuses over long-range 
reinvestment. Given the much-publicized, painful failure of the SWP, fatalism toward the worker co-
operative option only deepened in Saskatchewan as agrarian co-operation collapsed.  
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Certainly, Quint was frequently cited as a model among Saskatchewan respondents 
interviewed for this study. 
 
Among the achievements of these otherwise marginalized and isolated experiments was 
their influence on provincial policy and program realignment. Ironically, the collapse of 
the Pool lent further force to the claims of the long-neglected emerging sectors with a 
panicked and chastened established sector and state. In the Romanow administration‘s 
second term, co-operatives gained a higher profile as the department was renamed 
Saskatchewan Economic and Co-operative Development in 1996. However, funding 
would not reach its new 5-year norm, in the $725,000 range, until the 1997 - 98 budget 
(Saskatchewan Economic and Co-operative Development, 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 
2001). A state-sponsored international conference on co-operatives in 1995 provided 
some comfort in the aftermath of the FCL struggle and the approaching privatization of 
the Pool. It also signalled a qualified re-engagement and modestly improved prospects for 
active co-operative development policy.  
 
In 1997, the Province engaged the sector‘s complaints over limited development capacity 
by circulating a discussion paper on reorganization options (Co-operatives Directorate, 
1997). This effort was driven by an effort both to rebuild damaged state-sector relations 
and recognize that co-operatives and community economic development strategies had a 
role to pay in shifting new economic and social conditions under globalization (Co-
operatives Directorate, 1993). The Romanow administration increased its co-operative 
development budget by $285,000, presaging the launch of the Co-operative Development 
Assistance Program in June 1998 to provide annual financial and technical assistance to 
up to ten new co-operatives. While this was an extremely modest gesture in support of 
new co-operative development, it was an important break with orthodoxy (that co-
operatives should not receive financial assistance from the state and should simply be 
treated like other businesses). This pilot program was a decisive break from a passive 
tradition of regulatory oversight and technical assistance to experimenting with active 
development assistance. The state took note of the urban resurgence and felt established 
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sector and grassroots pressure to respond. However, this reappraisal also represented a 
major missed opportunity.  
 
The 1993 document was revealingly titled Building Effective Partnerships: The Co-
operative Sector and Government in Saskatchewan. It intimated a significant policy and 
program surge, including the re-introduction of focused research and analysis capacity. 
Like the research and education surge for worker co-operatives led by the Centre for the 
Study of Co-operatives in the late eighties, the state also articulated a new conception of 
co-operative possibility. Influenced by CED currents, the new partnership was based on 
the government‘s understanding that there was a ―logical linkage between co-operatives 
and this area.‖ In the 1993/94 budget, the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for co-
operatives assumed responsibility for community economic development (Co-operatives 
Directorate, 1993). In part, this reorientation reflected work undertaken by the CSC in 
1992 for the federal-provincial Task Force on the Role of Co-operatives and Government 
in Community Development (Hammond Ketilson et al., 1992). 
 
Driven to mend fences with Federated Co-operatives Limited and the co-operative 
establishment, the Directorate report emphasized the leadership role of the old co-
operatives. The first objective for the new Directorate was "Improving and strengthening 
relations between the co-operative sector and government, and fostering an awareness of 
co-operatives and the co-operative model in all areas of government‖ (p. 9; my 
emphasis). Indeed, the administration appointed a sector representative from the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool as Assistant Deputy Minister for the Directorate.  
 
However, as would soon become clear, the administration‘s conception of co-operative 
community development did not necessarily assign a central role to co-operatives in 
community economic development strategies. Prefiguring the 1993 introduction of the 
network of Regional Economic Development Authorities, the Directorate document 
noted, ―Co-operative governance may also be appropriate for regional economic 
development planning, which would encourage communities to work together to 
maximize economic development by recognizing and building on regional strengths and 
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opportunities‖ (p. 10). The directorate sold the REDA network as a ―co-operative 
approach‖ even though the network regionalized the investor-privileged development 
model, rather than provide specific support to co-operative development. 
 
A more significant structural reform was the Province‘s response to Quint‘s grassroots 
efforts in the distressed core neighbourhoods of Saskatoon to establish a community 
development corporation. Part of a groundswell of activist commitment to take direct 
action to curb poverty, unemployment, the sexual exploitation of children, and sub-
standard housing, the Quint Development Corporation was founded in February 1995. 
Although it took three and a half years for the state to respond to this citizen initiative, the 
Neighbourhood Development Organization initiative was launched in August 1998. This 
program was an admission that REDAs were really traditional business development 
organizations rather than co-operative or community development agencies. It also 
recognized that urban poverty and under-development required unique institutional 
responses. The program provided core funding support to a network of four NDOs. In 
addition to Quint in Saskatoon, new NDOs were established in Prince Albert, Moose Jaw, 
and Regina. Although the funding was extremely modest—at about $100,000 per NDO 
per year over its first decade of operation—this response also reflected a further shift in 
policy thinking. From the segregation of economic development and welfare provision, 
this policy shift suggested an integrated urban focus and positive welfare policy. 
Community and co-operative enterprise assumed new significance.  
 
In part, these experiments on the Saskatchewan policy frontier reflected the increasing 
influence of New Labour‘s ―Third Way‖ reforms in the UK (Giddens, 1998). New 
Labour borrowed from the experience of American community development corporations 
in addressing inner-city blight. It argued for community-building strategies to tackle 
poverty, including a shift from the discredited policies of a now besieged welfare state 
toward a ―social investment state.‖ It would strive to revitalize civil society, in part, 
through the active support of government for the social economy within a ―new mixed 
economy‖ (Giddens, 1998, pp. 99 - 128). The introduction of the Co-operative 
Development Assistance Plan (CDAP) in June 1998 and the Neighbourhood 
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Development Organization (NDO) program in August 1998 marked a significant policy 
break, both from the Blakeney NDP‘s commitment to a generous welfare state subsidized 
by aggressive resource sector entrepreneurialism in the seventies and the neo-liberal 
emphasis of the early Romanow regime on free markets and fiscal austerity in the 
nineties. In this turn toward the third way, civil society would loom larger as a 
development actor. Since the province had well-established co-operative traditions, 
institutions, and resources, this more balanced approach represented a significant opening 
for a new rapprochement between the sector and the state. Unfortunately, this promise 
remained largely unfulfilled due to continuing strained political relations with the 
established sector leadership (particularly FCL); the disconnect between the established 
sector leadership and the emerging, largely urban co-operatives; the minimal funding 
provided by the state; and the confusion and ambivalence toward these efforts among the 
down-sized ranks of the civil service. For example, public servants had trouble deciding 
whether the NDOs should be housed in the economic development or social services 
ministry. Important new initiatives as they were, the CDAP and NDO programs were 
modest and not integrated within a coherent and coordinated community economic 
development strategy. As a result they generated half measures in the field and 
disorientation in government. 
 
Characteristic of the promise and perils of rethinking co-operative development was the 
―return to the drawing board‖ in 1997 represented by another discussion paper. Prepared 
by the Co-operatives Directorate, it clearly expressed a crisis of confidence, at least 
among some elements of the co-operative sector, in the government‘s commitment or 
capacity to effectively drive co-operative development. As the opening paragraph notes: 
―Currently, discussion is occurring around how best to support the development of new 
co-operatives and who should provide support‖ (Co-operatives Directorate, 1997, p. 3; 
my emphasis). The study reviews three co-operative development agencies, each sector-
driven and autonomous from government and an option for an expanded and adapted 
model for the Directorate with greater sector input. The Co-operatives Directorate (1997) 
discussion paper represents an important intervention in framing the issues and proposing 
solutions. It also clarifies some of the conceptual barriers to effective development in 
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Saskatchewan. A close reading of this paper provides significant insights into prevailing 
conceptions.  
 
First, the report is truncated. It brackets larger questions of strategic sector development 
in favour of discrete services delivered to individual start-ups. Simplifying somewhat, the 
paper proposes that effective development support rests on six key functions: promotion, 
information, education and training, organizational development and planning assistance, 
business development and planning assistance, and co-ordination and referral (pp. 13 - 
14). An accurate and comprehensive account of a reactive, inquiry-driven model, it lacks 
a strategic macro-conception in which this agency might lead sector development efforts 
for promising new and emerging sectors; undertake research to identify new models and 
strategies that have proven successful elsewhere; review policy and program frameworks 
(taxes, laws, incentives); or investigate the creation of new financing tools for co-
operative development. Rather than articulate an agenda to inform development strategy, 
this approach is based on a limited conception of service delivery. Ironically, as the paper 
notes, this is precisely the reactive approach that had been the source of much frustration:  
 
Staff in government who provide support do not seek out or promote 
opportunities but rather wait for individuals, groups or communities 
to approach them with a request for services. Generally, support is 
provided to the point of incorporation and bylaws and in filing 
documents required by the Department of Justice. The focus is on 
liaison with government regulators with respect to compliance with 
legislative and regulatory requirements. This has been the 
predominant approach utilized by government field staff in recent 
years, primarily in response to staff and budget reduction. (pp. 10-11) 
 
Second, this report selects stand-alone co-operative development agencies as options: two 
American co-operative development organizations and one from Atlantic Canada (p. 16). 
The exclusion of Québec‘s network of regional development co-operatives seems odd. It 
had already achieved significant success in its first decade of operation. Its uniquely 
decentralized structure seems particularly consistent with the needs of a sparsely 
populated province like Saskatchewan. Further, its structure mirrors the logic and intent 
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of the RREDA network, launched mere years earlier by this very department.
93
 By 
contrast, the sole Canadian model considered, the Regional Co-operative Development 
Centre in Atlantic Canada, was in only its first six months of operation at the time of the 
report. It had no meaningful track record.  
 
Finally, the report‘s recommendation is illuminating. Rather than building a new, stand-
alone, movement-governed development agency, it calls for improvements to the 
Directorate. It is perhaps not surprising that civil servants would recommend against 
contracting out their own jobs. Indeed, this incentive may even explain the impulse to 
―stack the deck‖ against structural reform by excluding consideration of the Québec 
network. This is the third important theme that the 1997 discussion paper highlights: the 
insecurity of the civil service and, related to this, the ―either/or‖ construction of the 
development problem. This frame retrenches institutional protectionism, setting up a 
win/lose outcome for either the sector or the civil service. It also rules out the possibility 
of ―both/and‖ solutions, in which independent capacity would be viewed as a 
complement to, and extension of, public service infrastructure. Building on existing 
capacity would truly expand the scope and reach of development action rather than 
simply transferring resources from one organization to another. The stop-gap solution, to 
hire two development officers and propose an advisory group with representatives of the 
sector and the CSC (p. 24), would only protract sector-state antagonisms over 
development strategy. It would not resolve them. As a result, the development gridlock 
continued into the early dawn of the twenty-first century. 
 
7.10  The Calvert interregnum, 2001 - 2007 
The decline of the provincial debt and the retirement of Romanow and several of his 
senior cabinet ministers changed the political environment for co-operative development 
                                                 
93
 A couple of possibilities are: first, that the CDR concept seemed ‗too rich‘ for the Province and was 
simply kept off the table to avoid raising expectations; and second, that, political posturing aside, the 
administration was not really committed to effective development capacity because it viewed the marginal 
utility of investments in this sector as uncompetitive with investor-owned firm sponsorship. In this cynical 
view, the policy objective was to minimize costs to co-operative development while meeting the political 
objective of keeping up appearances of commitment to the sector. Another option is that the unit simply 
lacked knowledge of the CDR model, an unlikely explanation. 
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only slightly. The new Premier Lorne Calvert softened the NDP‘s hard-line on private 
sector-led development and he loosened the purse strings for new initiatives. New faces 
in Cabinet also eased political tensions somewhat with the co-operative sector. 
Nonetheless, Calvert inherited a minority government in 2001, was elected with a narrow 
majority government in 2003, and continued to steer a moderate course. Much as the 
Romanow NDP was captured by credit-rating agencies and the right-wing press 
monopoly to pursue an agenda of fiscal restraint and economic liberalism, the Calvert 
cabinet was similarly constrained by the politics of legislative survival. They had been 
―captured‖ by the short-term need to get their bills passed, avoid controversy, and woo 
the centre-right swing vote. There was little room for new energy, new ideas, or new 
initiatives in co-operative development. Neither the tired legislative ranks of the Calvert 
NDP, fighting for their political lives against a swelling conservative tide nor the 
retrenching foot-soldiers of the established co-operative sector would arrest the policy 
drift. The sector-state chill may have thawed, but the development stalemate continued.  
 
This was a period of mixed results marked by new frustrations between established co-
operative actors and the NDP but there were also modest gains for community-based co-
operative initiatives. Several benefited from the supports provided by CDAP and the 
NDOs. In 2006, the Saskatchewan Co-operative Association—under fiscal pressure from 
lost Pool dues and political pressure from emerging co-operative sectors—proposed a 
Co-operative Development Centre to the Calvert NDP. After a lost decade, it was a full-
circle return to the discussion paper of 1997. A development committee was formed by 
the SCA in 2003, its members developing a demonstration home-care co-operative in 
Tisdale and a funeral co-operative campaign in Regina. When negotiations with the 
Province collapsed over funding for the Centre, the committee ceased meeting. Instead, 
its members continued to provide direct support to the new co-operatives. In 2006, the 
SCA contracted a co-operative developer from BC to deliver its first training workshop 
for developers. This was well attended, demonstrating an active, engaged base of 
committed new co-operative organizers on the ground despite the disinterest and inertia 
that plagued the upper ranks of the established sectors. Two more workshops have since 
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been hosted. Horeover, without a development strategy to plug into, activists remained 
largely isolated and without an agenda. 
 
Still, there were other green shoots. In 2006, in response to a rash of plant closures, 
particularly in the distressed forestry sector, serious discussion began about building 
rapid response capacity to save at-risk jobs in the region. The objective was to assist 
workers in mounting union-led, co-operative conversions. It was spearheaded by a new 
inter-provincial co-operative support organization called Co-op Ventures, a worker co-
operative with three members experienced in worker co-operative development—one 
each in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Discussions between the Canadian Worker 
Co-operative Federation and the Canadian Labour Congress gradually led to a September 
2006 summit of worker co-operative movement and labour movement activists in 
Saskatoon, attended by two study informants and the author. Resource people included 
Lynn Williams, former President of the United Steelworkers of America, with substantial 
experience with several steel-plant rescues in the 70s. Participants agreed to form a 
steering committee to maintain the movement-to-movement dialogue and to support Co-
op Ventures‘ efforts to secure resources for further study and initiatives. These included 
the development of educational materials for labour schools, workshop materials, and a 
series of buy-out guides. In October 2009, as the global recession deepened, the United 
Steelworkers of America announced a partnership with the Móndragon worker co-
operative complex from Spain‘s Basque region. The groups would work together to 
convert at-risk plants in North America to co-operative worker ownership. Although the 
agreement terms were sketchy, this increased interest and excitement in possibilities for 
collaboration.  
 
However, those developments took place on the margins of the official co-operative 
movement and engendered little interest or involvement from co-operative ranks or 
government personnel. Given the historic antipathies between the co-operative and labour 
movements on the Prairies, organizers judiciously kept established co-operative sector 
representatives at a safe distance through the delicate formative stage of this initiative. 
They realized trade unionists needed a ―safe harbour‖ to explore their doubts, vent their 
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grievances with established co-operatives and governments, and ―own‖ the initiative if it 
was to move forward. This was one of the lessons learned from the failed worker co-
operative conference held in Saskatoon in 1985. As Laycock (1987) recounts, trade union 
members and worker co-operative activists were antagonized by junior Provincial 
officials who lauded the ―employment co-operative‖ model as a simple job creation tool. 
They even suggested it was an attractive alternative to union shops. The spectre of 
worker co-operatives being used by a conservative government to bust unions had 
effectively sabotaged the involvement of the trade union movement in any effort to 
establish development infrastructure for worker co-operatives (Laycock, 1987). It had set 
back the movement at least two decades. By contrast, this effort was led by April 
Bourgeois, a former Regina and District Labour Council representative. She became the 
publisher of a union-backed, alt-weekly newspaper, prairie dog, a high profile worker-
co-operative success story (CCA, 2007b). Its publisher had earned the trust and respect of 
the Saskatchewan labour movement. Involved in the Canadian Worker Co-operative 
Federation from 1994 to 2010, she went on to serve as CWCF President from 2007 to 
2009. The daughter of a Regina steelworker, she was well positioned to bridge the two 
solitudes of the province‘s trade union and co-operative movements.  
 
Also in the period of the Calvert NDP, the government joined a major development 
project in the core neighbourhoods of Saskatoon, Station 20 West. Under the leadership 
of Quint, this multi-purpose project would house a co-operative grocery store, a 
community clinic branch, a public library branch, a dental clinic serviced by the College 
of Dentistry as a training facility, an open air-stage, and 55 units of affordable housing. 
This was a landmark initiative in community economic development and had significant 
symbolic as well as practical significance. It was the locus of considerable excitement, 
energy, and renewed hope for inner-city cultural and economic rejuvenation. It also 
promised to serve as a flagship for the co-operative movement and model as part of wider 
movements and partnerships for inner-city reconstruction. Quint was a key intermediary 
institution in anchoring the co-operative movement in contemporary urban needs and 
development. Like the formation of Quint a decade earlier, Station 20 West represented a 
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major scaling up of community-led development in the political economy of inner-city 
Saskatoon. It was a symbol invested with great promise—until  provincial election day.  
 
7.11 The Wall regime, 2007 – 
The Saskatchewan Party had united the right from the ashes of the provincial Progressive 
Conservative party. The Tories, discredited by gross mismanagement and disgraced by 
fraud charges, had gone underground. This enabled the Saskatchewan Party to cobble 
together a free enterprise coalition of Reformers, right-wing Liberals, and old-time 
Tories. The party‘s rural base had made sufficient urban inroads by 2007 to form 
government. It wasn‘t long before their agenda was clear. They established a business 
roundtable, Enterprise Saskatchewan, to do an end-run around the civil service. It placed 
policy-setting directly in the hands of party strategists and business leaders. The Ministry 
of Industry and Resources was dissolved. While some co-operative and union leaders 
were co-opted into the new body, Enterprise Saskatchewan was intended to act as an 
agent of aggressive, fast-track neo-liberal reform. In the first year, the co-operatives 
budget was cut by six percent (Saskatchewan Regional Economic and Co-operative 
Development, 2007, p. 16; Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2008, p. 21). In the 
next year, the ministry‘s annual report ceased to report targeted expenditures on the co-
operative‘s branch altogether (Enterprise Saskatchewan, 2009, p. 16).  
 
In the Saskatchewan Party‘s vision of free markets and private-sector-led development 
there was little room for public, co-operative, or community enterprise. For example, in 
their first year of office the Wall administration decided to move the NDO program from 
the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation to the Ministry of Social Services (Ministry of 
Enterprise and Innovation, 2008). This aversion to community-led development was 
illustrated more dramatically on March 27, 2008, when the government moved against 
the Station 20 West project. It cancelled the previous government‘s $8 million funding 
commitment, declaring it was not in the business of subsidizing ―shopping malls.‖ This 
move was a serious setback to the project, which fell back on fundraising for a scaled-
down development. It was also a blow to the community. The co-operative grocery store 
would have been the inner-city‘s first full-service grocery store since an OK Economy 
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and a Safeway on 20
th
 Street closed their doors in the nineties, leaving some residents to 
foot the bill for up to $100 a month in cab fares to get to suburban grocery stores (Purdy, 
2007). In fact, a controversial report found the incidence of diabetes in the core 
neighbourhoods was thirteen times the city-wide average. Researchers argued this was a 
direct result of the ―food desert‖ in the inner city, which drives people to shop at 
convenience stores where fresh fruit and vegetables are unavailable (Simcoe, 2008).  
 
The government‘s justification was revealing. Premier Brad Wall argued the market 
should drive development and that state participation placed it in competition with private 
sector grocery stores or landlords that may be adversely affected by the project.
94
 NDP 
leader Lorne Calvert denounced the government‘s withdrawal from the initiative as an 
ideologically-driven antagonism toward community economic development and co-
operative development.
95
 Editorialists were quick to attack the ideological character of 
the funding cut (Klein, 2008; Mandryk, 2008) as short-sighted, out of touch with the real 
needs of the urban poor and an exercise in pandering to its pro-business and rural 
political constituencies. It also revealed a clear bias against co-operation and community-
led development, a fact not lost on Saskatoon interview subjects for this study.  
 
Clearly, the idea of a full service grocery store in the inner-city had also antagonized the 
private retailers in the neighbourhood. A new centre of commercial and community 
activity also created a backlash from a neighbourhood business district. Arguably, the 
Saskatchewan Party merely acted on behalf of its business backers and in line with its 
conservative principles. But the neighbourhoods fought back. As revealing as Premier 
Wall‘s justification for cutting the project‘s funding was the breadth and depth of this 
                                                 
94
 ―We ought not to be in the mall business and it‘s just, it‘s a different approach. We don‘t think that the 
Government of Saskatchewan should be opening up basically a mall development, where we‘d be 
competing with grocery stores, competing with others who are already renting (facility space) now to 
community clinics in the area‖ (Wall cited in Coolican & Wood, 2008). 
 
95
 ―I know the Premier has a problem with any kind of community-based economic development initiative. 
This is a private-sector co-op, no different that any other co-operative that you would find in a small 
town… Maybe (Wall) thinks everyone should shop at Wal-Mart. I guess that is his concept. Well, I‘m 
sorry. The folks that I met on 20
th
 Street yesterday maybe have little kids and carriages and they can‘t get 
over to the Wal-Mart‖ (Calvert cited in Coolican & Wood, 2008). 
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popular backlash. It was quick. It was articulate. It was well organized. It was forceful. 
And it was sustained. Within days, outraged letters began to flood the local daily 
newspaper. Within a week, a Facebook page was launched and had logged 4200 
members (Mario, 2008a). Within two weeks of the announced cut, 2500 residents turned 
out to a protest walk on April 5. It was the largest protest in the city‘s history. Ten 
thousand dollars were raised on the spot (Mario, 2008b). A Friends of Station 20 West 
planning meeting was called for April 24. 175 people showed up. 150 cheques followed 
the protest walk. Trade unions also stepped up, with the Saskatchewan Union of Nurses 
and the Canadian Union of Public Employees each donating $100,000 to the project‘s 
rescue. (―Thousands come out in support of Station 20 West,‖ 2008). The fundraising 
continued. A February 2010 benefit concert raised another $53,000. This brought the 
tally of funds raised to $2 million, leaving another $6 million to make the project happen. 
(CBC, 2010). 
 
Although the community rallied, the project was stalled. Momentum was squandered and 
volunteers and activists were demoralized. It was not an auspicious beginning for the new 
government‘s relationship to the New Social Economy and emerging co-operatives, like 
the Good Food Junction grocery co-operative. Co-operative innovation in Saskatchewan 
had suffered yet another setback. Nevertheless, once again movement activists 
demonstrated resolve and resilience to use co-operative enterprise, this time to meet the 
new needs of urban Saskatchewan. The prospects of a co-operative resurgence, and a new 
urban era in co-operative development could not simply be dismissed.  
 
7.12 Movement degeneration as a political process 
The three decades outlined here were not good ones for co-operative development in 
Saskatchewan. From the closure of FCL‘s Co-operative Consumer and its Member 
Relations Division to the wind down of the DCCD and the Co-operative College of 
Canada to the privatization of the Wheat Pool‘s Western Producer, followed by the Pool 
itself, this was a period of phased retreat from development. The sector and state each 
ratcheted down their commitments to sustaining the co-operative movement, a process of 
regressive structural reform that would have lasting consequences. 
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Several informants interviewed for this study argued the closure of the Co-operative 
College of Canada was a crucial mistake, contributing to the effective demobilization of 
Saskatchewan‘s co-operative movement. To be fair, it was only an aspect of the state and 
sector‘s broader retreat from the fieldwork activity that had provided a once expansive 
movement with its adult education and mobilizing network. However, one long-time 
movement activist referred to the College as the brains of the co-operative movement, 
and its closure as that movement‘s effective decapitation. Another respondent, a retired 
civil servant, explained that the effective pooling of co-operative education had fostered 
and sustained a ―movement consciousness.‖ With the elimination of the College, training 
was brought in-house, focused on operational needs and cultivated instead an ―enterprise 
consciousness.‖   
 
The loss of this institution thus eliminated an important site for activists to reflect on 
movement dilemmas, exchange views, and re-imagine movement possibilities. In 
Gramscian terms, the site‘s closure marked the end of structured support and facilitation 
for the cultivation of ―organic intellectuals‖ to reproduce, renovate, and realize 
movement values on the ground. Instead, it fragmented movement networks, eliminated 
an important dialogue site for movement activists to build cross-sectoral networks, 
bridging social capital, and a common vocabulary and agenda; it led to their long-range 
isolation, deskilling, and demobilization. 
 
The closure of the College was a divestment in movement agency; it not only pulled the 
plug on educated and inspired activists who might otherwise ignite and organize new 
campaigns; it also disempowered the active memberships of already existing co-
operatives. For, as one adult educator told the author, managers have to fill the vaccum in 
a co-operative when members become inactive or lack education in effective 
participation. 
 
To a significant extent, the College had become the institutional base for the province‘s 
movement culture. ―Would the continued existence of the College have provided 
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distressed Wheat Pool activists with the space and movement infrastructure to re-think, 
reorganize, and avert the privatization of the Pool?‖ I asked one movement veteran. It 
might have, he replied. In any event, the significance of the College closure was not 
simply that the decision was a symptom of movement decline and degeneration; it also 
represented the elimination of a mechanism for its regeneration. 
 
More generally, interviews uncovered profoundly mixed feelings and sharp divisions in 
today‘s movement leadership. At the commanding heights of Saskatchewan‘s co-
operative establishement, sector leaders expressed a vague sense of anxiety over the 
declining prestige of the co-operative model, its standing with government, and fading 
popular attachment to the model. As one informant suggested, the movement seemed to 
have skipped a generation or two. However, this nostalgic melancholy tended to take the 
form of a nagging doubt rather than a pressing concern for established sector leaders. For 
their primary frames of reference tend to be shaped by the day-to-day concerns, 
operational plans, and growth strategies of their own co-operatives, even for those with 
senior positions in apex organizations. Their outlook was managerial and their 
preoccupation was growth. Established co-operative informants were neither aware of 
declining formation rates nor concerned about new co-operative development. As one 
senior official reported, many other sector leaders simply do not see the need for new co-
operative development and, compared to the scale of established co-operative business, 
view the whole focus as frivolous. 
 
Not surprisingly, perspectives differ among leaders of the emerging sectors and in the 
social and community movements. In these quarters, there is a first-hand attachment to 
the need to encourage and support emerging co-operatives, a common sense that the big 
co-ops have become bureaucratic, have fallen out of touch with community needs, and 
have become insular and arrogant. For some, this antagonism takes a sharp edge, with 
respondents referring repeatedly to feeling that the big co-ops had abandoned, or even 
betrayed, the movement. One respondent told the author that the SCA was not relevant 
because it was all about lobbying for the big co-ops. Another referred to the principle of 
―co-operation among co-operatives‖ as a bad joke. 
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One of the sources of emerging sector-movement alienation is a sense that co-operatives 
have become undemocratic, yielding a deep-seated distrust of managerial power in the 
established co-operatives. Two community activists referred to the co-operative 
movement as having been hijacked by managers. Another argued that managers tend to 
view democratic member structures the way they view unions, as impediments to 
executive action.  
 
The role of the SWP privatization in fueling this wider grassroots backlash against the co-
operative sector‘s managerial class should not be discounted. This was a defining trauma 
for a whole generation of Saskatchewan co-operators, and has left deep, open scars. A 
couple of informants said the demutualization of the Pool had made cynics of a whole 
generation; one argued it was a defining moment for those who lived through it and that it 
would take the next generation to restore optimism. One farm leader emotionally 
recounted the day the local Pool elevator was demolished and expressed wariness that 
other co-operative or credit union managers may be emboldened by the fact SWP 
managers benefited from the Pool‘s conversion. 
 
Despite their diverging interests and views on development, leaders of the emerging and 
established sectors share a certain sense of crisis. Representatives of both groups were 
shell-shocked by the privatization of the Pool. Indeed, the presently precarious position of 
the SCA demonstrates the tentative and fragile character of post-Pool movement 
relations. One senior officer of the SCA explained that the loss of SWP dues has left the 
apex organization extremely vulnerable. The loss of one dues-paying member could kill 
the organization, the author was told. In this context, one senior established sector officer 
expressed wariness about the insularity of the credit union movement, discussions about 
merging the Alberta and Saskatchewan credit union centrals, and the dominance of 
managers on the central board—all of which threaten its continued support of the SCA. 
Similarly, another established co-operative informant complained that FCL and the credit 
union movement were undermining the SCA by not permitting the organization to sign 
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up their individual members. The precariousness of the SCA only further deepens trust 
deficits and undermines the effective joint-action of its members.  
 
In this context, SCA has been pushed into a survivalist mode and a minimalist program 
carefully designed not to antagonize any of its dues-paying members. For example, one 
senior informant involved with the SCA reported that the organization had to be careful 
to avoid brushing up against sector conservatism. Links with the environmental 
movement might displease FCL, which is heavily invested in oil refining and pesticide 
retailing. Involvements with the Saskatchewan Council for International Co-operation 
and CCEDNet have both been discouraged, because SCIC‘s youth program was too 
activist-oriented and CCEDNet was viewed as a potential rival. Like a minority 
government, the SCA has little room for manoeuvre and is thus too vulnerable to propose 
decisive actions. 
 
These dilemmas of an unstable co-operative movement coalition dogged by insecurity, 
anxiety, and division ultimately derive from an antagonism between the emerging 
sector‘s social or movement-building objectives and the primacy the established sectors 
attach to their own commercial objectives. Since the established sectors have the tenure, 
institutional strength, and dues to dominate the SCA, a commercially focused 
managerialism has traditionally tended to dominate its activities. Established sectors are 
preoccupied with lobbying government on sector-specific issues, such as the incursion of 
crown corporations into markets where co-operatives are active or would like to be. The 
SCA has in the past provided political leverage to these interests. However, in the present 
context in which the SCA is unable to arrange meetings with an ideologically hostile 
provincial government, the organization‘s value to established sector members has 
declined. Moreover, one senior established co-operative informant attributed this problem 
not to the government but to movement activists who portray the co-operative sector as 
some kind of left-wing cult. One solution proposed to this infection is to put in place 
nominating committees to better screen for candidates who have ―business sense.‖  
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Since the emerging sectors tend to lack resources and provincial organization, and are led 
by ―activists‖ who are often held in ill-regard by ―traders‖ drawn from managerial ranks, 
they have difficulties mustering a voice in SCA. Establishing support for a provincial 
development agenda is thus a daunting challenge. One informant suggested the SCA has 
few contact points with other social movements because the large co-operatives are not 
interested in building a movement culture; they merely tolerate it. As one labour leader 
suggested, it is too late in any event; since the co-operative sector long ago abandoned its 
movement philosophy, common interests no longer tie their movements together. While 
one SCA insider suggested there is a strong sense of wider movement-belonging at the 
national level, provincial leaders do not share that orientation. In fact, most established 
co-operative leaders view broader movement involvements as a potential threat to their 
dominance and as undermining the sector‘s credibility with government. 
 
From the perspective of this uneasy and unequal alliance of the dominant, established 
sectors and the dominated, emerging sectors within the SCA, the creation of a 
development committee and the proposal for a development centre appear as half-
hearted, even ingenuous, establishment accommodations to a small but vocal minority 
interest. Indeed, as one informant reported, the most recent proposal for provincial state 
support to develop seniors‘ rural housing (while there is a major affordable housing crisis 
in the cities) was specifically designed to serve the current provincial government‘s 
political base. In this sense, the co-operative establishment appears more interested in 
using development to rebuild political leverage with the Province on its more pressing 
concerns than it is in new co-operative development as such. In this structural crisis for 
the SCA, most co-operative leaders are simply oblivious to the empirical reality of 
declining new co-operative formations or its implications for the future. The gravity of 
the problem is neither acknowledged nor understood, and these piecemeal movement 
actions therefore amount to little more than rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. 
 
Nonetheless, there are significant—if still marginalized and under-resourced—signs of 
generational renewal in co-operative ranks. For example, despite the convictions of 
earlier leadership to ―go it alone,‖ the SCA recently hired youth interns through a 
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CCEDNet work experience program to help build the regional base of the SCA and to 
advance green co-operatives (SCA, 2010a); announced it would jointly stage an April 
2011 conference on regional development with the CCEDNet (SCA, 2010a); extended 
the scope and reach of the co-operative youth program (SCA, 2009a); and assisted the 
development of two student co-operatives at a Saskatoon high school (SCA, 2009b). The 
Co-operators also staged two youth conferences for sustainability leadership in the fall of 
2009 and 2010, and the Youth Engagement in Sustainability program now reaches into 
seven Regina high school environment clubs (SCA, 2010b). While these efforts fall far 
short of the coordinated, broad-based response which may be required, these initiaitives 
may also prefigure a generational shift toward a more engaged, broad-based, strategic, 
and developmental movement. 
 
7.13 Conclusion: The future of co-operation in Saskatchewan. 
Since the eighties, globalization has accelerated the long-range decline of the family 
farm. At the same time, the state retreated in the face of the dual pressures of fiscal crisis 
and market liberalization. Related to these developments in the province‘s political 
economy was a rightward shift in the political culture. The rise of agrarian reaction 
reflected frustrations and anxieties rooted in the farm crisis. It also coincided with the 
international rise of the New Right.  
  
Although the agrarian sense of loss was a distinct feature of neo-conservatism in 
Saskatchewan, it had deep roots and provided fertile soil for the resonant themes of the 
New Right. For, as Apple has argued, ―behind the conservative restoration is a 
widespread sense of loss: of control, of economic and personal security, of the knowledge 
and values that should be passed on to children, of what counts as sacred texts and 
authority‖ (1989, p. 20). Rural Saskatchewan was retreating behind the defences of a 
rugged macho individualism, frontier family values, and social conservatism to restore a 
semblance of stability, security, and control to their ―runaway world.‖ Co-operative 
involvements were increasingly viewed as distractions from more immediate threats to 
the survival of family farms, and as increasingly risky. These critical shifts in 
Saskatchewan‘s mode of production, social formation, and political culture have all 
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combined with sector-state disengagement to radically undermine the conditions for 
successful new co-operative development, particularly in the country. In contrast to the 
spirit of optimism and innovative energy that characterized this study‘s interviews in 
Québec, Saskatchewan informants more typically exhibited a melancholic weariness. 
 
Co-operative retailing, insurance, and credit union activity remain dominant, profitable, 
and expanding factors in the provincial economy. But beyond the limited and mixed 
results of efforts to organize New Generation Co-operatives (Fulton, 2001), the base of 
new development activity has largely moved to the urban milieu. New urban sectors such 
as the community clinic movement, childcare, housing, and worker co-operation all 
struggle with scant support from established sectors and the state.
96
 Rather than a simple 
lack of support to the social economy, divisive recent politics suggest an intentional 
strategy not simply to ―contain‖ the social economy, but to ―roll back‖ the sector‘s very 
meagre gains.
97
  
 
Only marginal new co-operative development activity has taken place over the last three 
decades in Saskatchewan, including social co-operatives and housing co-operative 
experiments. For example, a cluster of community activists, largely disconnected from 
the established co-operative sector and the rural tradition, have attempted to reinvent co-
operation to intervene against economic and social dislocations in inner-city Saskatoon. 
Often, these efforts have attempted to address the wider failure of the welfare state, 
particularly with respect to disadvantaged populations who are excluded from 
employment. 
 
Only a concerted effort, aligning community movement energies, co-operative sector 
supports, and state resources is likely to break this impasse. However, the strategic and 
                                                 
96
 In the case of Station 20 West, government has even attempted to foster divisions. It suggested funds 
released from that project might be made available instead to urban initiatives of the Saskatoon Tribal 
Council (Wood, 2008). The community clinic, which relies on the Province for its funding, deemed it wise 
to disassociate itself from the project (Lewis, 2008). 
 
97
 Deep cuts to NDO budgets in the 2010/11 Provincial Budget, including a $185,000 cut to Quint, 
reinforce this interpretation. 
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coordinated joint-action necessary to realize new sector potential appears unlikely in the 
near future. This failure to renew movement culture and construct democratic 
partnerships for co-operative development is not simply a problem for new sectors, the 
emergence of which is blocked. It is also a central problem for the co-operative 
movement as a whole. For only new sector development is likely to revive the 
Saskatchewan movement. Renewal will require strong leadership from within host 
communities, established sectors, emerging sectors, and state administration. It depends 
also on targeted research into opportunities for innovation-transfer. It requires grassroots 
education and organization. It will require policy reform and commitments to new 
programs, legislation, and financial and tax tools. All of these new efforts will have to be 
undertaken with a much clearer, shared conception of the shifting structure of needs and 
opportunities within Saskatchewan‘s new, more ethnically diverse, and increasingly 
urban mosaic. This massive marshalling of resources appears presently as a possible, 
preferable, but improbable alternative. Trends suggest continuing movement 
degeneration and erosion of the co-operative option in popular culture. Bureaucratic 
inertia, resistance to innovation, and entrenched leadership and attitudes threaten new 
developments with continued isolation, lack of support, and marginal viability.  
 
As the case of Station 20 West illustrates, the situation is dire and a ruthless realism is 
called for. Only a substantial rethinking and retooling to promote and support viable new 
forms of rural co-operation, from organic agriculture and agro-forestry to proximity 
services and greenhouses that can rebuild on a more solid footing, are likely to yield a 
rural co-operative resurgence among a new generation of activists over the medium term. 
This requires strong sector-state leadership and a massive scaling up of the province‘s 
commitment to co-operative development. Over the long-term, serious movement 
regeneration requires a virtual reinvention of the mobilizing networks of previous eras. 
Movement regeneration hinges on well-conceived and executed new campaigns backed 
up by bold public policy commitments. Just as governments periodically intervene to 
stabilize capitalist firms and markets to restore business confidence, restoring the 
development capacity of the Saskatchewan co-operative movement will also require a 
new partnership, involving activists, the emerging and established sectors, and the state. 
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Just as the agrarian economy is now marginal to the modern, diversified economy, the co-
operative movement too must diversify to remain relevant. Elements of a potential 
recovery are in evidence, but these initiatives are isolated, under-resourced, and 
vulnerable.  
 
A realistic strategy for movement recovery and renewal needs, arguably, to follow the 
lead of the credit union and co-operative retailing systems. These sectors have weathered 
this wrenching period of demographic and economic transition by rebuilding their bases 
of operations on more solid urban foundations. This Himalayan strategy of retreating to 
the higher ground of more viable operations does not mean abandoning rural initiatives or 
closing our eyes to emerging rural opportunities, from forestry to fishing to organic 
farming or tourism. It simply recognizes that, just as centralization and consolidation of 
credit union and retail co-operative operations has been necessary to protect the vast rural 
network of branches they continue to maintain, co-operative development must also shift 
its centre of gravity to reflect the shifting structure of needs and opportunities. Until the 
dispersed ranks of Saskatchewan‘s co-operative and community movements embrace this 
conceptual and cultural shift beyond nostalgia for the agrarian era, the sober, hard work 
of rebuilding on new foundations will be delayed. The Saskatoon branch of Affinity 
Credit Union (formerly Saskatoon Credit Union, and then First-Sask Credit Union) has 
taken some innovative and important steps, reaching out to labour, Aboriginal people and 
the city‘s Core neighbourhoods (Diamantopoulos & Findlay, 2007). The youth programs 
of the SCA (SCA, 2009a; 2009b; 2010a) and the Co-operators (SCA, 2010b) are also 
noteworthy. Until the co-operative movement as a whole identifies and embraces a 
serious urban strategy that builds on these exemplars of co-operative innovation, the 
regeneration of meaningful co-operative activity in Saskatchewan—urban or rural—will 
remain a pipe dream. 
 
A fundamental strategic repositioning implies an opening up to new social actors like the 
ecological, labour, and women‘s movements, and First Nations, inner-city and new 
immigrant communities. Within these social and community movements, too, there will 
be considerable education and engagement work to be done, most significantly in 
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effecting an interest in economic action as a legitimate, realistic, and achievable form of 
social action. There is now a vast chasm separating the leadership of the established co-
operatives and the grassroots activists of the province‘s varied and disconnected social 
and community movements. Yet co-operative development presupposes a rebuilding of 
these historic movement-to-sector links, to bringing into being through old-fashioned 
community organizing a new extended social movement family.  
 
It took many years and campaigns to persuade farmers to consider pooling, to build their 
adhesion and loyalty as members, and to build their willingness and capacity to expand 
their horizons into new sectors like credit unionism. It will take a similar, concerted 
intellectual and cultural effort to cultivate new movement entrepreneurs and win new 
constituencies back to the co-operative model. Like the role of the Pool fieldmen and the 
agrarian press in an earlier era, co-operative promotion and education depends on 
effective cultural intermediaries. Unlike the unifying force of the farmers‘ movement and 
its ―one-model-fits-all‖ pools, however, these diverse currents will need careful and 
ongoing facilitation to pull them together into a coherent and unified movement. For 
established co-operative and credit union leaders in the habit of standing alone and 
―thinking big,‖ the necessary diversity of targeted strategies and supports will require a 
significant conceptual and cultural shift from hierarchal management to the development 
of partnership networks. For just as the great ―broadening out‖ of the Great Depression 
depended on re-tasking the Pool fieldmen to drive Western Producer subscriptions, life 
insurance policies, or regional retail co-operative and credit union organising, 
contemporary diversification will also require rethinking and redirection on the ground.  
 
Regeneration implies a restructuring of the movement itself, shifting the balance of 
resources and energy from the operational and representational needs of the established 
sectors to the development needs of the emerging sectors. It implies a decisive shift from 
serving the base of the established memberships to reaching out to the new prospects that 
populate emerging communities and movements presently ―outside‖ the co-operative 
movement. The construction of a new coalition, involving new constituencies, and 
knitting them together in a reconstructed culture of co-operation is a political process; it 
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requires a return to the roots of serious, long-range, and sustainable co-operative 
development—in emerging social movements and neglected communities. 
 
There will be both new learning and unlearning involved in a successful transition to the 
diverse, developmental, and pluralist co-operative movement of the future.  
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          CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: A TALE OF TWO MOVEMENTS, 1980 TO 2010. 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This study has contrasted the achievements of the co-operative movements of 
Saskatchewan and Québec in the globalization era. Since 1980, it has been argued that 
the Québec movement successfully regenerated—an achievement evidenced by record 
new co-operative start-ups (Clement, 2009; Co-operatives Secretariat, 1984-94; 1995-
2007) and the innovative application of new models to new spheres of action (Côté, 
2007; CCA, 2007c; Girard, 1999; Girard & deBertoli, 2004). Meanwhile in 
Saskatchewan new co-operative start-ups lagged, and the sector contracted overall (Co-
operatives Secretariat, 1984-94; 1995-2007). While Québec exhibited strong movement 
entrepreneurship (Québec, 2003; Côté, 2007), Saskatchewan‘s movement demonstrated 
scant developmental interest beyond growing the established sectors (Co-operatives 
Directorate, 1993; 1997).   
 
This final chapter is divided into two sections to further explore the nature of these 
contrasting experiences in co-operative development. The first applies the seven pillars 
benchmark of development action, both as an index of provincial development capacity 
and an index of movement degeneration / regeneration. The second section draws on the 
theoretical framework to address broader themes that also emerge from the case study 
findings. 
 
8.2 Sector Leadership in Québec 
Development in Québec has often been driven by the strong personal leadership of key 
actors, such as Alfonse Desjardins at the turn of the century, George-Henri Lévesque in 
the fifties, or Claude Béland in the eighties. Each promoted the co-operative option 
vigorously in the context of their times. They were movement entrepreneurs for specific 
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courses of action. Desjardins led the organization of the caisse populaire movement. 
Lévesque organized the provincial apex organization, the Conseil superieur de la 
coopération (now the CQCM) to unify and focus a diversified movement, to bring it out 
from the long dark shadow of Church paternalism, and to reposition the movement for a 
leading role in the new Québec, after the Quiet Revolution. Béland responded to the 
crises of degeneration, recession, and globalization by leading a series of movement fora 
to rejuvenate co-operation for a changing Québec.  
 
A key achievement of Béland was to animate shared leadership, both at the regional level 
and across the wider social movement family in which co-operation was embedded. The 
CCQ partnered with the state, the trade union movement (under the leadership of the 
CSN‘s Léopold Beaulieu), and the social economy (under the leadership of the Chantier 
de l’économie sociale‘s Nancy Neamtan). The animation of broad-based dialogue was a 
necessary step in the renewal of sector leadership and the regeneration of the movement. 
This amenable environment for co-operative innovation has driven escalating orders of 
financial, technical, and promotions support for co-operative development in Québec. 
The CDR network and a wide range of financial instruments have turned the province 
into a world leader in co-operative development. Strong movement leadership three 
decades ago arrested and reversed processes of degeneration, securing the foundations of 
today‘s vibrant, expanding co-operative sector. 
 
8.3  Sector leadership in Saskatchewan 
In Saskatchewan, early co-operation was also driven by visionary leaders. These included 
men like E. A. Partridge, whose TGGA led the grain growers‘ campaign for pooling in 
the twenties (Knutilla, 1994). Harry Fowler drove many campaigns in the depths of the 
Depression, including organizing the first co-operative oil refinery in the world (Phalen, 
1977). Women like Violet McNaughton played a leading role in building the early co-
operative movement. She led through her early agrarian journalism, her leadership in the 
Women Grain Growers, and her historic role in the amalgamation of the SGGA and the 
Farmers Union into the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section).  
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At present, the Saskatchewan sector faces profound challenges that again call for strong, 
movement-focused leadership. In the wake of the structural crisis in agriculture, the 
demutualization of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, strained sector-state relations, and the 
frenzy of amalgamations and mergers in the credit union sector, co-operative leaders are 
understandably focused on the operational and lobbying priorities of their own 
enterprises and sectors. In addition, sector leadership is principally drawn from the 
established co-operatives and the ranks of white, male, middle-aged managers and 
farmers. This poses particular problems in attending to the concerns of emerging sectors 
since the base of new development activity is increasingly urban, younger, and more 
ethnically diverse. Declining start-up statistics and difficulties cited in recruiting to the 
SCA youth camps are warnings of the movement‘s decreasing cultural relevance to the 
emerging generation.  
 
Serious co-operative development strategies require ―honest brokers‖ to help build sector 
and state support.
98
 A more contemporary example is Claude Béland‘s decisive response 
when the Québec movement faced similar gridlock, free rider problems
99
 and symptoms 
of movement degeneration in the eighties. Like Béland‘s campaign, successful 
regeneration of the Saskatchewan movement depends on openness to regional initiative 
and new social partners. For example, while the Quint Development Corporation 
spearheaded important new co-operative development initiatives in the urban context and 
the Western Labour Worker Co-operative Council suggests a broader base for 
development, forging new development partnerships will take concerted effort. The SCA 
shows increasing promise for more systematic and comprehensive approaches. Examples 
include recent moves to propose a development centre; offer developer training; build a 
development committee; take on pilot projects in funeral services, homecare, and 
housing; and reach out to development partners and youth.    
                                                 
98
 The failure to effectively coordinate development capacity in Saskatchewan is what economists call a 
―where to meet dilemma,‖ ―a situation in which all parties would be better off co-operating than competing 
but lack information about how to do so‖ (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 832). 
 
99
 ―Situation in which people secure benefits that someone else pays for‖ (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 814). 
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8.4  Promotion and outreach in Québec 
There is a strong tradition of active campaigning for co-operative action in Québec. It 
goes back to Desjardins‘ journalism and his lobbying and public speaking tours to build 
the caisse movement at the turn of the twentieth century. The co-option of the Catholic 
church network gave vital access to the province‘s most important medium of 
communication, but Desjardins also made substantial use of the popular press. Similarly, 
as the rule of the Church in Québec was challenged through the fifties, George-Henri 
Lévesque leveraged the increasing importance of higher education to advance the co-
operative movement. Through the stream of occasional papers, research reports, editions 
of CSC magazine Ensemble, conferences, and, of course, the graduation of his students at 
Laval, Père Lévesque helped secure the movement‘s intellectual renovation and 
reinvigoration. 
 
The modernization of co-operative education was an important legacy. It secured the 
renewal and expansion of the co-operative movement during the Quiet Revolution. 
Rather than being marginalized as part of the discredited, Church-based ancien régime, 
Lévesque‘s manoeuvres rescued the co-operative movement‘s continuing relevance by 
rearticulating its relationships to other secular elements of the popular sector resurgence 
in Québec, like the trade union movement. From the informal processes of adult 
education that typified traditional Québec co-operation, these interventions ensured 
institutional support to necessary movement modernization. 
 
The crucial role of Laval as a dialogue site for the co-operative movement in the throes of 
the Quiet Revolution forged a powerful affinity between the academy and the Québec co-
operative movement. As this study‘s interviews clarified, this would have four important 
implications for future co-operative development: First, co-operative development was 
central to Québec social science and to the study of social innovation. In the post-eighties 
period, academics like Benoît Tremblay at HEC played a central role in conceiving 
worker co-operative development strategies, and in proposing new development 
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mechanisms. Research networks like CIRIEC, CRISES, RQRP-ÉS and ARUC-ÉS all 
reflect an abiding conviction that collective enterprise is an important feature of the 
Québec political economy. Academics take co-operatives seriously, as a field of 
investigation and development. Tremblay‘s move to government to help launch the CDR 
network reflects high-level integration of research and development. 
 
Second, the concertation of co-operatively-focused academic and research energies in 
Québec‘s universities has also created the conditions for modern curricula, in-service 
programs, and a vast literature in support of the cadres of co-operative development 
personnel now working in the CDRs and the wider support network for emerging co-
operatives and collective enterprises. Opportunities for professional specialization 
leading to employment in co-operative development in Québec‘s social economy are 
significant.  
 
Third, the co-operativization of bookstores at Québec‘s CEGEPs and universities has 
created an opportunity to demonstrate the practical benefits of membership to the total 
student body. It has also created opportunities for students to participate as members, 
elected directors, and staff in these co-operatives. This co-operative presence on campus 
has contributed to a higher profile, and greater prestige, for the model amongst youth. 
This is reinforced by the tendency of student co-operatives to bid on campus concessions 
and by provincial program support for students to create summer employment co-
operatives. The co-operative presence in the college years raises Québec youth‘s 
familiarity with co-operative enterprise, highlights the rewards of co-operative 
membership, and encourages careers in the co-operative sector, including specialization 
in co-operative development. 
 
Finally, each of the eleven CDRs in Québec has a full-time outreach staff person to 
promote co-operative development in their region. This includes presenting in district 
high schools, facilitating co-operative week activities, organizing co-operative youth 
programs like summer camps, and publishing CDR magazines for regional distribution. 
In the early eighties it is also worth noting that Béland broke the gridlock by stimulating 
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discussion at the movement base, across the regions. One of the first conferences in this 
rejuvenation effort dealt with co-operative education. It led to the creation of an 
educational foundation and subsequent conferences on this theme. 
 
8.5 Promotion and outreach in Saskatchewan 
From the very origins of the Saskatchewan campaign for the Wheat Pool, leaders like 
E.A. Partridge understood the importance of communication channels, compelling 
stories, and quality information to the co-operative movement. Partridge lobbied 
tirelessly for a co-operative newspaper in the early days. The Territorial Grain Growers 
Guide created an important forum for diffusing the pooling concept and a critique of 
vested interests. This was crucial to building a strong ideological and cultural foundation 
for left-populism on the Prairies. Through the Guide, The Progressive (later The Western 
Producer), and The Co-operative Consumer, the agrarian and co-operative press played a 
crucial role in advancing the cultural frontiers of co-operative development in 
Saskatchewan. 
 
A great deal of the work of the Pool fieldmen in the thirties and forties was also cultural 
work. They staged film nights, helped organize recreational facilities like rinks that 
created gathering places and common projects for isolated neighbours. Pool elevator 
agents managed a traveling library for the widely dispersed farm community. These 
cultural interventions played a crucial role in building awareness of the consumer co-
operative and credit union models, and commitment to a co-operative social project. 
Through the social gospel movement, reform Protestantism also provided an important 
communication channel and mobilizing network for early agrarian co-operation.  
 
With urbanization, secularization, and the rise of consumer culture, the co-operative 
movement‘s traditional outreach capacity was reduced. Significant efforts were taken to 
reposition co-operation and rebuild the movement on sustainable modern foundations. 
These included investments in public relations clubs, membership development, and the 
creation of the Western Canada Co-operative College (later the Co-operative College of 
Canada) to deliver sector-wide extension education and incubate movement leadership. 
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Unfortunately, this study‘s informants report that pressures to centralize and consolidate 
operations, including increased in-house specialist training, diminished sector 
commitments to movement-building activities. Outreach and education were gradually 
reduced to the marketing activities of individual co-operatives, centrals, and federations. 
In 1987, the CCC was wound down.  
 
A specialized research centre was founded in 1984 at the University of Saskatchewan, 
providing an important platform for the development of co-operative curriculum in 
business, law, history, sociology, political studies, and agricultural economics. Its 
research was diffused through publications, conferences, and occasional CSC seminars. 
However, co-operative movement outreach and promotion activities were largely reduced 
to an annual summer youth program (principally attended by sector leaders‘ children and 
sponsored by the SCA), Co-operative Week events in Saskatoon and Regina, and an 
annual SCA golf fundraiser. This was a minimal program at best, severing meaningful 
ties beyond the inner-circles of the established co-operative sectors. There is no 
equivalent of the crusading Guide or early Western Producer to reach mass publics in 
2010.
100
 Instead, SCA issues a board newsletter and relies on social media, these tend to 
further tighten the insider flow of information. Despite important, but very recent, efforts 
to build youth interest and engagement (SCA, 2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b) and links to 
CCEDNet, there is no adult education capacity such as that once provided by the Co-
operative College. Decades of systematic educational and cultural retrenchment has left 
the Saskatchewan movement without capacity or a strategy for meaningful cultural 
renewal or expansion, a frequent complaint of those interviewed in the course of this 
investigation. In this vacuum, community leaders and ―movement ambassadors‖ of the 
past such as the clergy, teachers, social workers, the unions, and the student movement no 
longer preach the ―old time religion‖ of Prairie co-operation.  
 
                                                 
100
 Although the urban alt-weeklies in Regina and Saskatoon are published by a worker co-operative, the 
co-operative was forced to drop their Co-operatives Week features due to lack of sector interest and 
support. Ironically, many co-operatives prefer to channel support to advertising features published by their 
historic foes in the corporate monopoly press. Similarly, Access Communications, a telecommunications 
co-operative with a community channel, is not viewed as a communication vehicle by the movement. 
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8.6 Public policy in Québec 
There is a significant legacy of state support for co-operative development in Québec, 
including the provision of technical and financial assistance to new co-operatives and 
preferential policy treatment (in forestry, for example). The co-operative sector has been 
included, for decades, in Québec‘s corporatist style of economic policy-making—along 
with the private sector and the labour movement. State support to co-operative 
development intensified in the seventies as Desjardins became the state‘s financier of first 
resort and government backed new co-operative efforts in housing and worker co-
operatives. The economic nationalism of the modernizing entrepreneurial state reserved a 
special place for co-operatives in public policy. They were a bulwark of employment for 
Francophones and a lever for the francization of the Québec economy, a point frequently 
emphasized by this study‘s collaborators.  
 
The recessions of the seventies and early eighties raised the stakes considerably for 
public policy partnership. The state turned to the co-operative sector as a ―territorially 
rooted‖ alternative to high flight-risk private capital, much of which had already fled 
Montréal for Toronto. One example of the tightened-up democratic partnership between 
sector and state is the CDR network. It is now managed by the CQCM but mostly funded 
by the state. Another example is the creation of sector-state managed research and 
development funding to particular sector federations. These discrete partnerships 
comprise an important innovation system, strategically aligning state policy, program, 
and resources with sector structures, needs, and development objectives. Moreover, this 
study‘s conversations revealed these achievements are a source of considerable pride for 
sector and state contacts alike, and provide an incentive, template, and momentum for 
continuing innovation.  
 
Another example of the realignment of public policy to revitalize co-operative 
development in Québec can be found in the area of legislative reform. The state has 
undertaken a comprehensive review of existing legislation, commissioned studies of 
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several European approaches, and has introduced new enabling legislation for worker 
shareholder and solidarity co-operatives. Provincial statutes were also introduced to build 
a domestic capital pool, some of which is earmarked specifically for co-operative 
development. Provincial legislation allowed the launch of the QFL‘s Solidarity Fund, 
followed by the CSN‘s FondAction. These RRSP-eligible, venture capital funds offer 
substantial tax advantages to Québec investors. These pioneering funds have been only 
the beginning of government involvement in the amassing of a formidable range of 
solidarity finance instruments (See Appendix C), some of which were launched with 
government start-up capital and some of which target co-operatives in particular. These 
financial instruments also include the state‘s Co-operative Investment Plan through which 
members can realize tremendous savings by investing in their own co-operatives. 
 
Also, a high level of government-sector coordination has been evident in the co-
operativization of vast fields of program-delivery in recent years. Like the preferential 
tendering of crown lands to support forestry co-operative development decades ago, the 
conversion of close to a third of the province‘s ambulance service to co-operative worker 
ownership depended on state-union contract negotiations and tight coordination between 
the state, the emerging sector, and the CSN‘s Groupe Conseils which carried out the 
conversion program. Support from the CDRs and state-policy has also helped drive the 
development of solidarity co-operatives in home care. 
 
Finally, since its formation in 1996 le Chantier de l’économie sociale has won resources 
for emerging social enterprises, including co-operatives, creating a delicate balancing act 
for the government. It is conscious of factions of the CQCM which resent the Chantier 
―trespassing‖ on its turf. As a result of this conflict, an inter-departmental secretariat for 
the social economy was created. This eliminated the conflict for Finance Ministry 
personnel. They had been expected to serve ―both masters‖ but had a long-standing 
mandate to work with the CQCM and time-bound relationships with their personnel. 
Trust, goodwill, and working relationships with the CQCM were at risk in ―playing both 
sides.‖ Given the achievements of state-sector concertation, and a natural affinity 
between the outlooks of the co-operative sector and co-operative-focused state personnel, 
 306 
the branch was reluctant to jeopardize that relationship by showing any sympathy 
whatsoever for the Chantier. In partnership with the Chantier, the government recently 
unveiled an Action Plan for Collective Entrepreneurship. It will further advance new 
social economy start-ups, including co-operatives. The state has also contributed to the 
Chantier‘s social economy development fund, the Fiducie, to help finance them. Finance 
continues to maintain a productive relationship with the CQCM. 
 
Certainly, disputes, gaps, and new vistas remain in an increasingly complex constellation 
of forces, programs, and legislation in Québec. However, the achievements of a maturing 
sector-state partnership over the last three decades have been considerable.  
 
8.7 Public policy in Saskatchewan 
The general thrust of Saskatchewan co-operative development policy has seldom moved 
beyond the provision of a basic regulatory and legislative framework. The view that the 
CCF - NDP favoured co-operative development was largely a carefully cultivated and 
politically useful illusion (Argue, 1992). Early investments in fieldworkers to support 
rapid regional expansion, including retails and credit union branches in the forties and 
fifties, and a short-lived campaign in the North (Dobbin, 1981; Quiring, 2004; Radloff, 
2004) provide the only cases of aggressive state action to foster co-operative 
development. These were conjunctural policy episodes; not sustained policy principles. 
 
However, the post-eighties period brought increasing political ambivalence and policy 
confusion to the role of co-operatives in a post-agrarian economy. Beyond the towering 
examples of the retail, credit union, and mutual insurance sectors, Saskatchewan policy-
makers viewed co-operatives as relics of a bygone era, offering little to today‘s resource-
led, free market economy. In contrast to the Québec case, globalization-era co-operative 
development in Saskatchewan is defined by state disengagement, stagnation of policy and 
program development, and a retreat from innovation and new initiatives.
101
  
                                                 
101
 Indicative is the fact that while the federal government turned repeatedly to the Centre for the Study of 
Co-operatives to inform federal policy-making (Fairbairn et al., 1992; Hammond Ketilson et al., 1993) in 
the nineties, the Province contracted Centre researchers to establish the ―the social and economic 
importance of the co-operative sector in Saskatchewan‖ (Fulton et al., 1991; Hammond Ketilson et al., 
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The false start around worker co-operative development in the early eighties is indicative. 
This aborted campaign helped to deepen a sense of fatalism fostered by sector 
retrenchment. It also rubbed salt in movement wounds over the government‘s previous 
failure to support expansion of the community clinic sector. These factors all conditioned 
the climate for co-operative innovation in Saskatchewan.  
 
Polarized ideological commitments to private versus public sector development through 
this period also served to marginalize the co-operative option significantly. No substantial 
policy or program measures were taken during this period to promote or support new co-
operative development. No effective measures were introduced to modernize legislation, 
providing for neither solidarity co-operatives nor worker shareholder co-operatives.  
 
Perhaps the only significant exception to this broad trend was the creation of the NDO 
program in 1988. These community development corporations struggled against 
entrenched authority structures and conceptions, with predictably mixed results. 
However, the Quint Development Corporation in Saskatoon sank deep roots and 
developed an engaged constituency to support its inner-city redevelopment agenda. It 
developed an innovative program of home ownership co-operatives that was replicated 
elsewhere and gained nation-wide attention. Unfortunately, its efforts to develop Station 
20 West encountered a major setback when the new provincial government reneged on 
the previous administration‘s financial commitments. In fact, three years into its first 
term, the Saskatchewan Party Cabinet has yet to meet with the SCA, an annual meeting 
that has proceeded as a matter of routine and protocol for decades. As a result, small, 
infrequent, and limited policy and program gains in Saskatchewan were readily and 
routinely set back by a change of administration, creating quicksand for co-operative 
development. This was particularly true on the new development frontiers for co-
operative development in urban Saskatchewan. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1998). In other words, while the federal state engaged research as a lever in assertive and expansive policy 
entrepreneurship, the Provincial Department of Economic and Co-operative Development sought defensive 
justification to maintain standing commitments to the sector. This reflects a hostile policy environment.  
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8.8 Solidarity finance in Québec  
Some of the most profound advances for co-operative development in Québec over the 
last three decades have been in solving the capitalization problem (See Appendix C). 
Indeed, a consensus of those interviewed in Québec feel that capital is no longer a 
problem for co-operative development. Important policy and taxation measures have 
been taken by the Province to enable the launch of the QFL‘s Solidarity Fund, the CSN‘s 
FondAction, and the Desjardins Regional and Co-operative Development Fund—all 
important pools of patient capital for new co-operative ventures. The government has 
also invested in the Chantier-contolled RISQ fund and the Fiducie, both dedicated to 
collective enterprise. Indeed, Québec now boasts a full range of financing instruments for 
co-operative development, from micro-enterprise to major investments. Financial 
assistance is available at the start-up phase and generous tax-credits are also available to 
those who invest in their own co-operatives. Desjardins and the Caisse d’économie 
solidaire Desjardins frequently back new co-operative enterprises; expanding the scope 
of viable enterprise well beyond the parameters of for-profit banks. The Caisse 
d’économie, with over eighty staff, specializes in worker co-operative and social 
economy financing. Also, Desjardins has recently adopted an annual quota of mid-sized 
business conversions to worker shareholder co-operatives, with Desjardins taking an 
ownership stake. Québec has seen a broad-based revolution in financing in the last thirty 
years, a ―socialization of finance‖ to the considerable advantage of new co-operative 
development. 
 
8.9 Co-operative finance in Saskatchewan 
Reflecting the general co-operative policy impasse in Saskatchewan over the last thirty 
years, there has been scant innovation in co-operative finance instruments since the 
cancellation of the co-operative loan guarantee program in 1982 (Argue, 1992). The 
labour movement has been divided on entering the labour-sponsored investment fund 
market, essentially conceding the terrain to ―rent-a-union‖ funds which have no social 
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objectives whatsoever (Quarter, 1995). SaskWorks is a provincially-focused LSIF like 
Solidarity. Established by CEP, it does not favour socially responsible investment 
options. During this period the credit unions also launched two funds. Neither extended 
preferential treatment to co-operative start-ups.
102
 SaskWorks is managed by the same 
equity firm that manages both these funds. 
 
Facing little co-operative or social movement pressure, the Saskatchewan Government 
has also played no significant role in addressing the capitalization barrier to new co-
operative development. In fact, its major intervention in the field was reactive and 
regressive: the introduction of legislation to enable the privatization of the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool. In the area of grants and loans to new start-ups, apart from the short-lived 
and short-funded CDAP, the provincial government‘s s policy is one of non-preferential 
treatment for co-operatives. Although co-operatives can set up their own company-based 
―Class B‖ LSIFs to capture RRSP and labour tax credits for investing in their own 
business, this mechanism is neither well-known nor commonly used for co-operative 
start-ups. The incentives are also far less compelling than Québec‘s Co-operative 
Investment Plan.  
 
Isolated efforts to support community economic development such as the fledgling 
Community First Social Development Fund, developed under the Saskatoon Credit 
Union (now part of Affinity Credit Union), merely illustrate the lack of meaningful 
coordinated action to address the capitalization problem. Similarly, the massive solidarity 
financing behind Montréal‘s Angus Technopôle (Beaulieau, 2009) provides a stark 
contrast to the predicament of Saskatoon‘s Station 20 West project, reduced to 
fundraisers and philanthropy to raise its capital. As a result of this coordination failure at 
                                                 
102
 The Saskatchewan Entrepreneurial Fund was capitalized jointly by the provincial credit union system, 
through SaskCentral, and the Crown Investments Corporation. Its mandate was to direct venture capital to 
―small and medium sized businesses‖ requiring less than $1 million. The Prairie Ventures Fund was a joint-
venture of a syndicate of 18 Saskatchewan Credit Unions, PFM Capital partners, and the Crown Investment 
Corporation of Saskatchewan. This Fund was also established to support ―small and medium sized 
businesses.‖ Both funds are managed by PFM Capital Inc., a private equity and venture capital 
management firm (PFM Capital Inc., 2010).  
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the provincial level, the SCA‘s current hopes rest on the CCA‘s lobby for a federal Co-
operative Investment Plan and development fund rather than provincial financing 
innovations.
103
 
 
8.10  Technical assistance in Québec 
Québec has mounted an aggressive adult education movement in support of co-operative 
development. This extensive effort has included investments in academic and 
professional specialization in co-operative development. It has also included the creation 
of immersion experiences in co-operative membership and development through summer 
co-operative employment programs and the province-wide network of co-operative 
bookstores on CEGEP and university campuses. 
 
The lynchpin of Québec‘s technical assistance delivery system is the regional outreach 
and education function. Over sixty staff are employed by the province‘s network of 
regional development co-operatives. Similar to the Co-operative Development 
Authorities in the U.K. in the early eighties (Cornforth, 1988), this network promotes the 
co-operative option across the province. Its staff advise on co-operative development, 
work together with proponents to develop feasibility and business plans, and deliver 
after-care to fledgling new co-operatives. The CDR network also provides a decentralized 
innovation dissemination system through which new models and applications can be 
tested, refined, and systematically replicated across the province. This regionalized 
technical assistance network is the hub of the province‘s co-operative development 
system. It has both stimulated and supported record sector growth, and is widely 
considered to be one of the best development systems in the world.  
 
8.11 Technical assistance in Saskatchewan 
In line with the general retreat of the Saskatchewan sector and government from 
development, there has been little progress in solving the technical assistance gap for new 
                                                 
103
 Since the federal lobby has been unsuccessful and there is no reason to expect the current administration 
to have a change of heart, this position is either ill-considered or reflects the issue‘s low priority to current 
movement leadership, mostly drawn from established sectors. 
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co-operatives in Saskatchewan. There have been important, but isolated efforts. For 
example, informants for this study confirmed that the SCA formed a development 
committee in December of 2003; has delivered three developer training workshops; and 
has twice proposed (without success) a sector-managed ―development centre‖ to the 
provincial government over the last decade. A consulting group, Co-operative Ventures, 
has worked to link the labour movement across the Prairies to developers able to assist 
through plant shut-downs and other situations in which jobs are placed at risk. And Quint 
Development Corporation has provided what shelter and support it can to its housing co-
operatives, a training business in its neighbourhoods, and the Station 20 West grocery co-
operative. Most recently, SCA secured $65,000 from the Province to support delivery of 
co-operative development advisory services. It will focus on rural seniors housing. 
 
While there is a wide range of business development services in Saskatchewan, some of 
which are useful to co-operative proponents, the fundamental assumption is consistent 
with the mistaken laissez faire approach to co-operative finance, program, and policy 
support generally: co-operatives have the same needs as other businesses and do not need 
distinct supports. 
 
8.12 Sector development in Québec 
The pattern of co-operative development in Québec since 1980 has been uniquely 
structured. Interviews revealed that strategic support has been targeted and rolled out in 
phases. Starting with a concerted effort to promote and support worker co-operative 
development in the early eighties through the CDR network, CDR efforts next turned to 
worker-shareholder co-operatives and solidarity co-operatives. 
 
Parallel to these sector-state driven development priorities was the campaign waged by 
the CSN‘s Groupes conseiles to organize the co-operative conversion of a number of 
paramedic services across the province. Another campaign countered the incursion of 
multinationals into the Québec funeral market, buying-out retiring proprietors and 
establishing new funeral homes province-wide. The rapid roll-out of promotion and 
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support for home-care co-operatives also drove a large number of start-ups in a short 
time.  
 
A million dollar innovation fund also concentrates campaign resources on sectors of 
opportunity. Each federation makes annual proposals for a share of this research and 
development budget to explore ways of stabilizing or expanding their sector. For 
example, the forestry co-operatives are now studying the possibilities of bio-mass to 
shore up their collapsing market. The CQCM is now rolling out a guide to the rescue of 
proximity services. The state and sector jointly invest in innovation in new sector 
development on an ongoing and systematic basis. 
 
8.13 Sector development in Saskatchewan 
Emerging sectors in Saskatchewan like childcare and co-operative housing lack support 
and effective organization. Worker co-operatives are few and isolated. The last 
significant sector-building mobilization was the community clinic campaign of 1962. 
Since then, co-operative development has been unstructured and driven entirely by 
isolated local initiatives. Even the ambitious effort to spark new generation co-operative 
development in the last two decades lacked coordinated support (Fulton, 2001). 
 
As noted, recent efforts by emerging sector leadership resulted in the formation of a SCA 
development committee in 2003. Despite supporting a couple of new start-ups, 
informants report this committee has no budget and no dedicated staffing. It has no 
strategic plan, meetings have become irregular, and membership has dropped off. 
Preoccupied with youth camp out-reach, communication, and networking within the 
sector and lobbying, development is simply not viewed as a priority for the short-staffed 
apex organization. The committee, developer training initiatives, and the development 
centre proposals may represent first steps to meaningful action. Alternately, they may 
simply represent concessions to a minority constituency within the SCA, or a fundraising 
effort to backfill for lost dues. All three motives likely exist in an uneasy tension. 
However, one suspects that if there was real will to pursue development, senior members 
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of SCA would have made financial contributions toward their organization‘s Centre 
proposal or some form of negotiated compromise. They did not.  
 
What meaningful impetus there may be for systematic sector-focused development in 
Saskatchewan now comes from outside the province. However, national-level 
organizations such as CCEDNet, the CCA, and its sector federations like the Canadian 
Housing Co-operative Federation or the Canadian Worker Co-operative Federation do 
not have adequate on-the-ground capacity. This situation is far from ideal. 
 
A telling expression of the general disinterest of government in meaningful co-operative 
development strategy was a decision to roll up a committee to investigate co-operative 
options for public services in the nineties. Sector and governmental leaders apparently 
agreed that ―the Saskatchewan government was carrying out an effective role in 
encouraging and supporting the development of co-operatives‖ (Rasmussen, 2001, p. 
122). This inaction in support of sector development, like failures in technical assistance 
provision and financing support, reflects a clear loss of faith in co-operative development 
possibilities. This reflects the failure of the sector itself to effectively propose, pressure, 
and persuade. Indeed, one collaborator likened the dilemma of the province‘s emerging 
co-operatives to that of a neglected child cursed by two equally reluctant parents. 
Building a sustainable foundation of democratic partnership with the state is a pressing 
and urgent challenge for future sector and state leadership alike. 
 
8.14 Co-operative research in Québec   
From the intensive research conducted by Alfonse Desjardins before launching the caisse 
populaire movement at the turn of the twentieth century to the role of George-Henri 
Lévesque‘s School of Social Work at Laval in driving the modernization of the co-
operative movement and the Quiet Revolution, research has played a formative role at 
key moments in the constitution of the Québec co-operative system. The central fact of 
co-operation in Québec sociology, and the central role of Lévesque, has made the study 
of co-operation a consistent focus. Since the eighties, the intensity of research activity 
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increased with the jobs crisis. The development of the CDR network by Benoît Tremblay, 
a professor at HEC, and his subsequent secondment to oversee its roll-out at the ministry 
responsible for co-operatives in the mid-eighties provides only one important glimpse 
into the tradition of engaged research at the service of co-operative development in 
Québec. As study collaborators confirmed, this is a tradition that actively guides 
contemporary researchers. A more recent example is a study tour to Europe undertaken 
by HEC professors Daniel Côté and Martine Vézina. This research was co-sponsored by 
the sector and the state. It provided a guide for policy reforms in legislation and taxation. 
It was also a spur to innovation-adoption in Québec movement and policy circles. This, 
too, was a strategic intervention in the course of subsequent developments. 
 
Today, two SSHRC funded community-university research alliances focus on co-
operatives and the social economy in Québec. There is an active CIRIEC chapter which 
publishes Économie et Solidarité and CRISES, a research network devoted to the study of 
social innovation. The CQCM recently hired an in-house research director to further 
strengthen these linkages. Through movement publications and frequent fora, this dense 
network of social scientific and business researchers overlaps with policy-makers and 
activist circles. The result is a highly expert, innovative, and reflexive movement culture 
that enjoys significant credibility and influence with policy-makers.  
 
8.15 Co-operative research in Saskatchewan 
Although prairie sociology, since the landmark publication of Agrarian Socialism in 
1955, has recognized the importance of co-operatives, adult education efforts in co-
operation were not primarily anchored in universities. Instead they were rooted in 
farmers‘ movements, the agrarian press, and later in training retreats for fieldmen, 
directors, and managers at the Co-operative College of Canada (Crewe, 2001). Formal 
academic research on the movement arrived late to Saskatchewan. In part, this reflected 
late settlement of the Prairies, the small population base of the province, its small and 
late-blooming university sector, and the early emphasis on extension services to farm 
communities and the new co-operatives of the day. These factors further delayed 
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academic specialization and the development of significant research capacity until the 
formation of the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at the University of Saskatchewan 
in 1984. The formal institutionalization of academic research capacity on co-operatives in 
Saskatchewan thus lagged the research program initiated by Lévesque in the Faculty of 
Social Sciences at Laval by nearly half a century. 
 
This research centre contributed significantly to co-operative development strategy at the 
federal level (Hammond Ketilson et al., 1992; Fairbairn et al., 1993). Yet, from its first 
conference on worker co-operatives in 1985, it was clear that there was much work to be 
done at the provincial level. Bureaucratic inertia and entrenched attitudes were powerful 
obstacles to new sector development. Momentum from this gathering dissipated as the 
dark clouds of agricultural decline shifted the political culture against demanding and 
expensive new campaigns. Despite its small size and relative youth, the Centre has 
nonetheless played an important role in raising the profile of co-operatives and in 
supporting sustained reflection on the promise and perils of Prairie co-operation. This has 
included significant SSHRC-funded research, including the social economy CURA which 
has supported this study. Although the epic project of re-thinking co-operation in  
Saskatchewan is still in its early days, this forum provides an important venue for critical 
dialogue and movement regeneration. 
 
The elimination of the Centre‘s grant in the Provincial 2010-11 budget poses a new 
setback for co-operative development in Saskatchewan. In particular, it undermines the 
Centre‘s ability to act as an ―honest broker,‖ bringing state and sector personnel together 
on neutral terrain. This makes an already difficult situation infinitely more daunting. 
Much remains to be done to rebuild commitment to an innovation agenda for co-
operatives in Saskatchewan.  
 
8.16  Emerging themes: Conceptual barriers to co-operative development 
This study has provided a relatively detailed account of the historical complexities of the 
co-operative development paths of Québec and Saskatchewan. The seven development 
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mechanisms outlined by the CCA‘s Co-operative Development Strategy Council draw 
attention to several dilemmas in development, including the key role which guiding 
visions play in movement action (or inaction). For this reason conceptual models of co-
operative development strategy are crucial. Since the eighties, Québec and Saskatchewan 
have embraced very different conceptions of co-operative possibility: one dominated by a 
managerial ideology focused on the growth of established sectors; the other also 
committed to the collective entrepreneurship of a developmental movement. The next 
sections address how managerial movement frames are also conceptual barriers to new 
co-operative development.  
 
8.17 Comparative innovation systems: From diffusion to dissemination 
At the most general level, this study demonstrates a fundamental conceptual and strategic 
difference between the Québec and Saskatchewan co-operative development models 
since 1980. For a pattern of consistent polarization cross-cuts the provincial approaches 
to each of the development mechanisms identified by the seven pillars model. In 
Saskatchewan, state and sector personnel respond to proponents‘ inquiries from the field 
(Co-operatives Directorate, 1997; McCarthy, 1985). This is a passive or reactive model, 
in line with the dominant managerial ideology. By contrast, Québec‘s development 
system is structured and staffed to provide comprehensive promotion and support to co-
operative development. Québec sector and state personnel work closely together, often 
with other social movement partners, to ―co-construct‖ public policy. Together, they 
build infrastructure for technical and financial assistance, stimulate demand, promote new 
models and applications, plan campaigns, and actively build an ever-widening range of 
services to provide incentives and support to co-operative start-ups. This is an actively 
interventionist or proactive model, in line with the developmental ideology shared by the 
movement, state, and other social movement actors.  
 
The difference essentially amounts to the difference between a commitment to a passive 
model of co-operative innovation based on a naturalistic process of diffusion in 
Saskatchewan and an active model of co-operative innovation dissemination in Québec.  
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8.17.1 Diffusion and reaction: The Saskatchewan model 
The Saskatchewan Co-operative Association, which has abandoned state-sector 
partnership around technical assistance delivery in favour of a streamlined vision of core 
service to existing sectors in recent decades, currently comes closer to the ideal type of 
the competitive movement. The approach of the Saskatchewan government and sector to 
servicing requests from co-operative proponents assumes co-operatives spontaneously 
emerge and need only minimal supports. The governing assumption is that co-operative 
development is a gradual process of diffusion. Good ideas spread. When they match 
peoples‘ needs, they are adopted. As they proceed to adopt the innovation, some 
assistance may be necessary from a responsive agency. This basically laissez-faire model 
relies on a semi-automatic diffusion of co-operative innovations. Certainly, this emphasis 
on self-help and voluntarism has a nostalgic resonance with rugged frontier individualism 
and the pioneering ethos of the co-operative movement. It also provides a handy 
justification for sector and state managers who have systematically stripped ―expendable‖ 
movement education, development capacity and supports, or who simply have other 
priorities.  
 
However, an examination of the actual historic foundations of Saskatchewan co-
operatives does not support this ―common sense‖ interpretation of people simply pulling 
themselves up ―by their boot-straps‖ (Hammond Ketilson et al., 1992, p. 4). In fact, as 
this study has illustrated, the early co-operative movement in Saskatchewan relied 
heavily on vigorous mobilizations. It invested in networks and institutional intermediaries 
such as movement organizations (the TGGA, SGGA, and the UFC), the agrarian and co-
operative press (The Guide, The Progressive, The Western Producer, and The Co-
operative Consumer), parent co-operatives (the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool), apex 
organizations (the Co-operative Union of Canada, the Saskatchewan Conference of 
Trading Associations, the CCA—Saskatchewan Region, and the SCA), and educational 
intermediaries (study groups, Womens‘ Co-operative Guilds, fieldmen, youth camps, co-
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operative summer schools, the Western Co-operative College, and the Co-operative 
College of Canada).  
 
As Hammond Ketilson et al., (1992) explain, ―every major co-operative movement in 
Canada today was sponsored originally by some larger social movement and received 
educational and organizational assistance from established agencies possessing staff and 
other resources‖ (p. i). As Maaniche‘s ―generation and a half theory‖ suggests, the loss of 
movement knowledge and understanding of how new co-operatives develop reflects the 
decay of institutional memory and movement know-how in the commanding heights of 
the established co-operative sectors. MacPherson suggests arrested co-operative 
development reflects a ―loss of organizing skills.‖ Without educational interventions, our 
―understanding of how co-operative entrepreneurship, building on context and networks, 
worked in the past‖ simply decays over time (1987, p. 10). 
 
Crucial elements of the Saskatchewan mobilizing network have been systematically 
dismantled over the years. Some have been wound down (fieldmen, the agrarian and co-
operative press, the women‘s guilds, the Co-operative College) while others have been 
under-resourced (Co-operatives Branch, SCA). The co-operative development system has 
thus fallen into a state of disrepair, and dysfunction. It is now unable to regenerate the 
movement. Start-ups are in steep decline and the movement culture shows symptoms of 
stagnation and fatalistic resignation. Even on the movement‘s own terms, development 
action is modest. 
 
The coordination failure in co-operative development in Saskatchewan thus reflects an 
underlying crisis in how we think about co-operative development. This study lends 
overwhelming support to the interpretation that co-operatives do not simply emerge 
―naturally,‖ wherever there is a need. History shows that new co-operative development 
requires structured intervention and an extraordinary marshalling of education, 
organization, and support. Infrastructure which has been pared back and dismantled over 
the years has come at a price to current development capacity. Restoring it will require 
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movement reinvestment, ethically, conceptually, and practically. Comparative experience 
in Québec supports this interpretation.  
 
8.17.2  Dissemination and accompaniment: the Québec model 
As this study demonstrates, the Conseil québécois de la co-opération et de la mutualité 
(CQCM) currently embraces a developmentalist orientation, actively engaged in social 
innovation (including sector-state partnerships such as the delivery of technical 
assistance through Québec‘s province-wide network of eleven co-opératives de 
développement regional).  The Québec development regime thus places considerably 
less faith in the ―invisible hand‖ to guide individuals to the co-operative model. It 
invests in planned and comprehensive innovation dissemination. Its agents are not 
asked merely to stand at the ready to assist proponents as they step forward. As 
interviews and site visits have confirmed, the Québec movement systematically and 
aggressively promotes the co-operative option through the CDR network.  
 
CDRs organize continual outreach to youth, co-operatives and caisses populaire, other 
development agencies, and the general public in their development zone. Ongoing 
education and promotion are reinforced with targeted campaigns for specific models 
and applications. By organizing ongoing campaigns, the CDRs stimulate demand, 
broaden the base for co-operative innovation-adoption, accelerate the innovation-
adoption process, and cultivate a business culture in which co-operatives are a visible, 
credible, and compelling option. Laws and technical assistance enhance the 
attractiveness of the option and increase prospects for its successful adoption. Tax 
incentives and targeted co-operative financing pools give groups attractive incentives 
for joint risk taking. Through continuous campaigning, the CDR network establishes 
the infrastructure for a sustainable, systematic, and developmental movement–alert to 
emerging opportunities and prepared to stimulate, support, and accompany proponents 
through the early stages of new co-operative formation. 
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This approach relies on effective organization and ―concertation.‖ Movement 
intermediaries, the state, sector federations, and CSOs all play key roles. Planned 
dissemination campaigns have driven growth of several emerging sectors including 
worker co-operatives, worker shareholder co-operatives, solidarity co-operatives, funeral 
co-operatives, ambulance co-operatives, and proximity service co-operatives. The state 
and sector are presently collaborating on the development of a strategy for co-operative 
retirement succession. This involves the development of a campaign: including a 
strategy, training modules, background materials, promotional materials, and guidelines 
for this particular form of intervention and development practice. Each CDR also 
develops its own dissemination strategy based on the particular structure of opportunity 
in its region. Overall, the fundamental advantage of the Québec model is that it is based 
on a strategic, active, and targeted approach to co-operative development and a 
commitment to constant campaigning. It thus recalls the historic role of similar grassroots 
education and organizing efforts in the movement‘s formative stages.  
 
In Québec, traditional development mechanisms have not been wound down or de-funded 
as traditional methods failed to meet new needs. As job creation and regional 
development capacity became urgent priorities, the development system was re-invented, 
with renovated or scaled-up intermediaries. Québec co-operative leaders thus built a 
modernized infrastructure. It fulfils expanded development functions through new 
institutional means. This modern development network assembles a permanent 
infrastructure for continuous innovation dissemination. It drives co-operative start-ups 
and contributes to a vibrant and healthy movement culture. A vigilant entrepreneurial 
movement, its performance meets and exceeds the commitments set out in the CCA‘s 
seven pillars and represents important innovations in co-operative development (Côté, 
2007). 
 
8.18      Emerging themes: Structural barriers to co-operative development  
Another theme that emerges from this study is the importance of effective coordination of 
diverse interests in co-operative development strategies, as MacPherson (1987) also 
emphasizes. Central to this problem is the question of who (if anyone) is responsible to 
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advance new development. This is essentially a matter of agency and apex organization 
governance. For example, this study finds that provincial coordination failure in 
Saskatchewan is rooted in a principal-agent problem. Established co-operative 
representatives have the least obvious and immediate interest in creating effective 
development strategies. Yet they dominate the movement‘s apex organization, the 
SCA.
104
 According to one well-placed insider informant, the SCA is primarily a vehicle 
for staging youth camps, networking (including golf tournaments), and for lobbying—in 
that order. Development is not a priority.  
 
On the one hand, the marginalization of development is a practical accommodation. The 
SCA does not presently have the capacity to effectively support development. As a result, 
there is little to discuss. It‘s just not a realistic prospect for a short-staffed organization. 
On the other hand, the failure to commit meaningful resources to a comprehensive 
strategy is a political choice. Apparently, investing in development does not coincide 
with the interests or ideology of the dominant faction on the board, or their home co-
operatives. 
 
The SCA governance structure reflects and reinforces inequality among the sectors. For 
example, this informant also confirmed that the SCA typically assigns its top executive 
posts to the members who pay the highest dues. This provides a virtual veto on 
democratic decision making. Although business is conducted by formally democratic 
means, established practice has dictated that the FCL representative will serve as 
president and the SaskCentral representative will serve as vice-president. The unintended 
consequence of this practice is to institutionalize an inverse relationship between a 
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 Of course, this is also true at the federal level. While emerging co-operative sectors have some 
representation within the CCA, it is marginal. There are four national sector federations for emerging 
sectors (Canadian Worker Co-operative Federation, Community Health Co-operative Federation Limited, 
Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada, and the Coop-Zone Developers‘ Network Co-operative). 
Observing scholars from three co-operative studies institutions, granted auxiliary membership, might be 
expected to appreciate the predicament but don‘t have votes. In any event, even in a situation of total 
solidarity, this bloc would still be handily swamped by the 33 established sector members that all do have a 
vote. While the overwhelming influence is exercised by established co-operatives, at least these four 
emerging sectors have a voice and a vote. Other sectors don‘t even make it to the table. Childcare is the 
obvious example. At the national level, this sector has been unable to sustain a sector federation. Childcare 
representatives are not at the national table and their voices are therefore not heard.  
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representative‘s interest in emerging sector development and the weight of their voice in 
movement deliberations.  
 
To make things worse for the emerging sectors, their national sector federations often 
have weak or non-existent representative structures at the provincial level. Study 
informants reported that emerging sectors that do manage to make it to the table 
provincially are chronically under-resourced. Their unpaid volunteers can not rely on per 
diems, office space, or staff support. They may be unable to attend regularly. They may 
also have difficulty being heard over the dense network of shared interests, values, and 
relationships which binds the clique of old co-op leaders.  
 
Further reinforcing this polarization are divides of gender, class, race, age, and ideology. 
Old co-ops are more likely to draw on middle-aged, white, male managers as their 
delegates. New co-ops are more likely to be led by younger working people, often 
women. Old co-op representatives are more likely to be from the country. New co-op 
representatives are more likely to be from the city. Old co-op delegates are insiders. New 
co-op delegates are outsiders.  
 
An example that demonstrates the growing gulf between the co-operative establishment 
and the emerging movement rank and file is the case of childcare. In Saskatchewan, there 
are now more childcare co-operatives (including pre-schools and daycares) than credit 
unions. Yet, the province‘s 64 credit unions (Credit Unions of Saskatchewan, 2010) have 
the resources and organization to play a dominant role in the SCA. The province‘s 99 
childcares (Co-operatives in Canada, 2003), on the other hand, don‘t even have the 
resources to create a sector federation. This constituency is not at the table in 
Saskatchewan despite the fact that half the childcare co-operatives in Canada are located 
in Saskatchewan. While childcare co-operative memberships are characterized by a 
continuous and rapid turnover of over-extended working parents, this structured silence 
in leadership circles reinforces insensitivity to the plight of working parents (increasingly, 
its movement base) and to the needs and promise of this emerging sector.  
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Another curious convention at SCA that fuels emerging sector alienation relates to board 
elections. Although there are only nine member organizations, interviews with a couple 
of SCA insiders revealed that an annual election is nonetheless held to select seven board 
members. This seems unnecessary and counter-productive, since it excludes two 
members from decision-making and governance. Clearly, a nine member board is far 
from onerous.
105
 The practice of excluding two in competitive elections is also potentially 
humiliating, an incentive to simply resign rather than be ―fired.‖ It thus serves to exclude 
emerging sector experience, expertise, and involvement since new co-operative 
representatives know who have the least social capital at the movement‘s upper reaches, 
the least familiarity, sympathy, and perceived competence in the institutional politics of 
the established co-operatives, and are therefore most likely to get voted off the ticket. 
 
There is both a charitable and a cynical interpretation for this curious board structure. The 
charitable view is that this arrangement is a historic product of better days when the 
movement was more diversified and the number of members was more unwieldy. In this 
view, the effort to streamline simply reflects the penny-pinching you might expect from a 
well-meaning board dominated by managers and financial services representatives. The 
cynical view is that this is not a clumsy failure to be adequately empathetic and inclusive 
but a calculated exclusion. Excluding the bottom two members from board service 
insures that the five established sector members (Federated Co-op Ltd., Saskatchewan 
Credit Unions, CUMIS Insurance, The Co-operators, Concentra Financial, and Access 
Communications Co-operative Limited) maintain their majority. Without limits on board 
size, an insurgent majority could (theoretically at least) force expensive commitments on 
the movement, for which the established co-operatives would have to pay their share. 
Board limits protect against late joiners, like the four current new co-ops and new co-op 
federations, from spending the old co-ops‘ money frivolously (on development schemes 
for example). Presently, the new co-ops include Farmer Direct, the Co-operative Housing 
Association of Saskatchewan, the Community Health Co-operative Federation Limited, 
and the Canadian Worker Co-operative Federation. Limiting their representation on the 
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 In Québec, for example, the CQCM executive council has an executive of 7 but a board of 14 additional 
directors (including two observers). That‘s a total of 21 members compared to the SCA‘s felt need to trim 
its board of 9 down to 7.  
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board ensures a comfortable structural majority in favour of the co-operative 
establishment. It confines the emerging co-operatives to a safe minority. SCA governance 
is thus based on a patron relationship rather than a substantively democratic process as it 
compels the emerging sectors to special pleading with the entrenched establishment bloc. 
Whether this arrangement is accidental or intentional, the consequences are clearly not 
favourable for a developmental movement. This helps account for deep-seated 
disappointment and distrust with the big co-operatives encountered in several interviews. 
 
It is worth noting also that the established co-operatives are not simply bound together by 
an economic interest in minimizing dues or the cohesive social ties of an ―old boys club.‖ 
The financial sector is also tightly inter-locked and over-represented within the SCA. 
CUMIS Insurance provides products to the credit union system and Concentra Financial 
is owned by the national credit union system. Clearly, one might expect a common front 
amongst these members and Credit Union Central. Similarly, one might expect a 
coincidence of interest and outlook between CUMIS Insurance and Co-operators, since 
CUMIS is partly owned by Co-operators. The possibility of block voting against 
proposals, such as funding a development centre, seems far from remote given the 
coincidence of interests, outlook, and career incentives. With forty percent of the SCA 
membership rooted in the financial sector, this practically amounts to a controlling 
interest in the Saskatchewan movement‘s apex organization.   
 
In any event, there appear to be only three resolutions to this situation. One would be for 
the emerging co-operatives to formally withdraw from the SCA and establish a new 
organization to better advance their interests. This would be undesirable for both parties. 
It would leave the already under-resourced emerging sectors even further isolated and 
vulnerable, and further strain relations. It would also deepen already pervasive cynicism 
toward the ―big co-ops,‖ and deprive them of further credibility. The second option 
would be good faith negotiation for governance reform to more meaningfully include the 
historically marginalized emerging sectors, although this flies in the face of vested 
interests and entrenched incentives. The third option would be an inside-outside strategy. 
Emerging sectors would both maintain formal ties with the SCA and push for 
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democratization. At the same time, they would refocus their efforts on building an 
independent vehicle for their specific needs, and alliances. For example, a more 
decentralized and development-focused membership could form under the umbrella of a 
Saskatchewan region of the Canadian Community Economic Development Network 
(CCEDNet) (Downing & Neamtan, 2004). 
 
Ultimately, the success of reform efforts at SCA would rest heavily on movement 
education and moral suasion. For the essential barrier to effective coordination is free 
riding behaviour. Established co-operatives once benefited from considerable 
investments of voluntary and institutional investments and supports in their own founding 
periods. In the Depression, Wheat Pool fieldworkers built the foundation for Co-
operators by selling its policies, even waiving commissions to help establish the 
enterprise. Similarly, credit unions were organized by state and Pool fieldworkers in this 
period. Even Federated Co-operatives Ltd. has its roots in the work of Pool elevator 
agents and fieldmen. Together with the early Co-operative Wholesale Society, buying 
clubs for bulk commodities like binder twine, coal, and fuel were established around 
local Pool committees. Many of these ―affiliates‖ would eventually grew into free 
standing retail stores or service centres. However, present-day established sector 
representatives are reluctant to contribute to the support of emerging sectors. The 
―principal‖ thus fails to exercise representative and duly diligent leadership for long-
range movement renewal; leadership fails to act as a good faith ―agent‖ for the movement 
at large and instead serves the short-term, narrowly defined sectional interests of the ―big 
co-ops.‖ This creates a leadership vacuum. State action is precluded by its increasing 
fiscal conservatism and retrenchment behind investor-led development strategies and the 
sector‘s ambivalence about state-led development efforts in any event. The 
marginalization of weak and vulnerable emerging sectors clearly prevents them from 
asserting effective leadership without support. Overcoming the perverse incentive which 
prevents established sectors from movement-building and lending support to new co-ops 
thus rests largely on forging a settlement on ―where to meet.‖ 
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One possible resolution may rest in a regionalization strategy similar to the Québec 
approach.
106
 This strategy can address the financing problem. SCA clearly lacks the 
resources and established members lack the interest or willingness to foot the bill for 
serious development work. Since SCA is a provincial apex organization, this precludes it 
from signing up first tier, dues-paying members (like Saskatoon Co-op or Affinity Credit 
Union). They are already represented by their own second tier co-operatives (FCL and 
SaskCentral). Establishing regional structures may thus create a way to sign up and 
involve base co-operatives at the regional level without undermining the provincial 
structure of authority or the reluctance of the provincial apex organization or centrals to 
increase dues on member co-operatives. Since regions are a logical base of development 
activity and local co-operative dues would not come out of central funds (although the 
centrals may choose to ―match‖ to ensure the strategies‘ success), this would not expose 
the centrals to additional expenses. Since these dues would be ―new money‖ they could 
also be considered matching funds for state support. Ideally a three-way contribution 
agreement, including the apex organizations, the participating base co-operatives in each 
region, and the provincial government would drive the strategy. Theoretically, this could 
break the current sector-state and established-emerging sector impasses by both 
proposing a credible and compelling development strategy and defining a new place to 
meet for cost and effort sharing. 
 
This approach would also meet an emerging need for established co-operatives to find 
new means for rebuilding local attachments as they amalgamate, merge, and centralize 
operations. In the credit unions this is taking place at a dizzying rate. While most multi-
regional credit unions and co-operatives have district representative structures, they do 
not presently have formal inter-co-operative linkages at the regional level. As the CDR 
network experience suggests, there are considerable benefits to rebuilding those 
horizontal relationships at the regional level. The prospect of regional co-operatives 
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 This is far from an original proposal. Fairbairn et al. (1993) proposed that Prairie ―established co-
operatives should provide the leadership for the formation of co-op councils. Established co-ops should 
also make a major effort to identify the possibilities for commercial partnerships with emerging co-ops‖ 
(xxi). Quarter and Wilkinson (1995) also proposed a community economic development approach in which 
geographic regions become the basis for organization and development for localized co-operative 
development systems.  
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pooling funds, professional support, and volunteer effort to support emerging childcares, 
housing, home care or meet other local needs of strongly felt local importance could 
deliver considerable marketing returns to participating co-operatives. It could also 
strengthen worker and consumer loyalty, realizing significant untapped development 
potential on the ground.  
 
Like the CDR network, this system could also be managed through the provincial apex 
organization, the SCA. This would help shore up the SCA‘s financial viability and ensure 
that provincial leadership remains aligned with the development strategy. Ideally, 
regional co-operatives—following the Québec model—would federate as a sector and 
help infuse their regional development perspective into longer range movement 
deliberations at the provincial level.  
 
Finally, contracting the development of this network to CCEDNet, which has a 
fieldworker for Manitoba and Saskatchewan, would leverage the development 
experience, expertise, and contacts of that network. Since the SCA was never intended to 
serve as a development agent, development is a low priority, and previous 
recommendations to the sector (Fairbairn et al., 1993, p. xxi) have floundered, 
contracting this piece of the strategy out simply makes good sense. SCA lacks the 
necessary staffing, networks, and experience to build a CED approach alone. 
Additionally, this strategy would also provide a space for emerging co-operatives and 
local developers to exchange information and experiences, and tap into tele-learning 
sessions, conferences, and the larger development network. In this way, connection to 
CCEDNet might recreate some of the co-operative adult education infrastructure that 
once paralleled official governance structures but has been dismantled over the years. 
 
8.19  Beyond Checklists: Context, sequence, and pacing 
As Stiglitz (2003) has argued, in another context, issues of sequence and pacing are also 
decisive to the success, or failure, of development innovations:  
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Perhaps of all the International Monetary Fund‘s blunders, it is the 
mistakes in sequencing and pacing, and the failure to be sensitive to 
the broader social context that have received the most attention—
forcing liberalization before safety nets were put in place, before 
there was an adequate regulatory framework, before the countries 
could withstand the adverse consequences of the sudden changes in 
market sentiment that are part and parcel of modern capitalism; 
forcing policies that led to job destruction before the essentials for 
job creation were in place; forcing privatization before there were 
adequate competition and regulatory frameworks. Many of the 
sequencing mistakes reflected fundamental misunderstandings of 
both economic and political processes, misunderstandings that were 
particularly associated with those who believed in market 
fundamentalism. They argued, for instance, that once private property 
rights were established, all else would follow naturally—including 
the institutions and the kinds of legal structures that make economies 
work. (2003, p. 73) 
 
Of course, the IMF‘s neo-liberal reform project reflects its own logic of historical 
development, and has its own specific contradictions. However, it does serve as a useful 
cautionary tale against piecemeal co-operative development tactics. Stiglitz warns us, for 
example, against lobbying for financial instruments without also organizing the political 
mobilizations necessary to implement the programs; against securing technical assistance 
programs without undertaking the cultural mobilization necessary to drive demand for the 
services once they have been put in place. Stiglitz‘s emphasis also serves as a reminder of 
the importance of a systemic and transformative approach. As Lewis (2005) has argued, 
successful interventions need to be based on an understanding of ―the local or regional 
situation … as a development system in disrepair, not a collection of loosely related 
problems and needs‖ (p. 9). Of course, public programs tend to favour project funding. 
This makes selling a broad-based and integrated strategy to government difficult. 
 
Over the last three decades, there has been persistent recognition of the need for a 
comprehensive approach at the federal level, even if it has been a minority view and a 
low priority within the established co-operative sector. Federal-level strategic reflection 
is perhaps best reflected in: the 1984 National Task Force on Co-operative Development, 
which established the need for concerted development action (National Task Force on 
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Co-operative Development, 1984); the 1991 creation of a First Ministers Task Force on 
the Role of Co-operatives and Government in Community Development, which clarified 
the options for state-sector collaboration (Hammond Ketilson et al., 1992); the work of 
the CCA, CCC, and Co-operatives Secretariat on a steering group in 1993, which spelled 
out an action-plan (Fairbairn et al., 1993); and the most recent iteration of strategic 
reflection within the CCA (2007), the work of the Co-operative Development Strategy 
Council, which resulted in the ―seven pillars model.‖ This most recent expression of 
strategic reflection at the federal level provides a comparative benchmark for measuring 
progress in Canada‘s two most co-operative provinces.  
 
While much research, analysis, and discussion has taken place over the last three decades, 
effective implementation of development strategy ultimately depends on successful 
engagement, and negotiation, with the state. Comprehensive and sustainable measures 
simply require substantial, broad-based multi-year funding commitments along the model 
of Québec‘s integrated co-operative development model ($12 million over three years) 
(CCA, 2007) or CIDA‘s five-year terms of support for CCA‘s international development 
program: $15.4 million for the 2008-9 fiscal year (CCA, 2009). As movement leadership 
is only too painfully aware, piecemeal and contradictory reforms, reflecting the 
prevailing winds of political opinion or the availability of end-of-year surpluses in 
specific programs rather than coherent, consistent, and comprehensive program and 
funding commitments, imply piece-meal, contradictory, and unsustainable outcomes. 
This understanding, however, may act as yet another brake on forward movement, further 
fuelling demoralisation, demobilization, and defeatism.
107
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 In contrast to being held captive to funding and program pressures that distort development strategies, 
Stiglitz (2003) provides a useful counter-example of decisive cultural shifts: the Ugandan decision to 
abolish school fees as part of its strategy to educate girls. Based on a more comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of the social context and culture of development, he argues that this decision was an historic 
mobilizing initiative in the country‘s literacy movement and women‘s movement: ―Most countries, facing 
severe budgetary constraints, have followed the Washington Consensus advice that (school) fees should be 
charged. Their reasoning: statistical studies showed that small fees had little impact on school enrolment. 
But Uganda‘s President Museveni thought otherwise. He knew that he had to create a culture in which the 
expectation was that everyone went to school. And he knew he couldn‘t do that so long as there were any 
fees charged. So he ignored the advice of the outside experts and simply abolished all school fees. 
Enrolments soared. As each family saw others sending all of their children to school, it too decided to send 
its girls to school. What the simplistic statistical studies ignored is the power of systemic change‖ (p. 76). 
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Despite the difficulties of thinking outside the bureaucratic silos of government programs 
and funding, comprehensive rebuilding of a failing development system may be required. 
This implies a shift from the command and control issuance of policy and programs from 
a centralized sector or state Ministerial branch to the network management approach of a 
developmental state (Mackintosh, 1993) and a developmental movement. This approach 
needs to be collaborative and involving. It needs to pool a vast network of institutional, 
movement, and state perspectives, proposals, resources, and energies. Breakthrough 
achievements require breakthrough thinking and re-organization. They require 
democratic partnerships. 
 
The Québec co-operative development policy (Québec, 2003) provides one example of a 
developmental approach based on partner networks. In contrast to the command and 
control state, it identifies eleven distinct organizations—in addition to ―government‖ and 
―universities,‖ as responsible for the success of its action-plan items. The university 
partnership network alone is impressive. It includes the Desjardins Study Centre on Co-
operative and Financial Service Management at École des hautes études commerciales 
(HEC Montréal), the Guy-Bernier Co-operation Chair at Université du Québec a 
Montréal, the Research and Training Institute at Université de Sherbrooke (IRECUS), 
and the CIRIEC research network. This collaborative approach was supported by 
aggressive animation and consultation efforts. The preliminary draft of the plan was 
posted to the Ministry website, mailed to thousands of interested groups, and provided 
the basis for a wide consultation. This included 23 meetings and presentations attended 
by 324 group representatives and 850 individuals. 77 briefs or letters of comment were 
submitted. The implications for co-operative development are varied and significant.  
 
Perhaps the main point is to conceive of the development process in terms of the 
development system that is to deliver and coordinate the necessary activities and 
supports. For example, before proposing to simply replicate Québec‘s network of 
regional co-operative development centres (CDR), which are arguably the force motrice 
of the Québec development system, it would be prudent to ask a few questions about the 
network‘s role within the wider development system which it anchors. These are largely 
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strategic sequencing considerations or questions of the reciprocal interdependence of 
discrete innovations. It would be useful to ask if the previous innovation decision to 
convert CEGEP and university bookstores to student co-operatives created an essential 
openness to co-operative entrepreneurship among the young as they moved into the 
labour market. If so, there would be some merit to pursuing a youth-based strategy, such 
as bookstore conversions, early. This would better prime the take-up of future technical 
services for other new co-operatives, grooming staff to train for careers delivering those 
services. Similarly, it would be salient to understand whether the introduction of 
specialized financing pools and tax-incentives were essential to the willingness of CDR 
clients to assume the risks involved in co-operative enterprise. If that were the case, then 
it would be wise to first set up those financial instruments and to roll out aggressive and 
escalating promotion of those incentives as the CDRs became fully operational and able 
to meet increasing client demand. And, of course, it would be useful to understand how, 
or whether, the active engagement of the research community and social movements in 
developing this social project helped create the culture of political and popular 
confidence necessary to the new system‘s success. Clearly, this all raises the larger 
question of the ―chicken or the egg,‖ or what Rogers (1995) calls ―reciprocal inter-
dependence‖ (p. 315). It took decades to build the Québec model and even the CDR 
network was expanded in stages, gradually demonstrating the innovation‘s potential, and 
building political support. 
 
Other jurisdictions considering adoption of this innovation would require an 
understanding of the social context and systemic character of the CDR network‘s success. 
Simple replication of individual elements of the development system without a larger 
strategic effort to also replicate, or reinvent, other integral elements of that development 
system would certainly lead to the kinds of failures of which Stiglitz warns. Indeed, ill-
conceived, incomplete, or ill-sequenced reforms may create more problems than they 
solve. They may also undermine the political viability of introducing more coherent 
reforms in the future.  
 
 332 
Unfortunately, given the dependence of the CCA and SCA on the prevailing winds of 
political program and funding priorities, the development of a coherent and 
comprehensive strategy that is sector-led is fraught with these types of dangers. While the 
CCA is certainly correct to argue that the ad hoc funding of the Co-operative 
Development Initiative ―should be linked to a broader development strategy that is 
created and led by the co-operative movement,‖ the politically precarious character of 
federal funding forced the Council to hedge its bets. ―The strategy will be implemented 
incrementally and will consider the capacities (human and financial) of CCA, the 
provincial co-operative associations, and other stakeholders‖ (CCA, 2007, pp. 8-10). 
Barring a federal change of government, and policy-direction, it is hard to imagine 
decisive gains over the short to medium-term. In part, this explains the recent turn toward 
supporting provincial reform efforts where winning conditions prevail (CCA, 2010; 
Lewis, 2010). Ironically, given entrenched resistance to development action in the 
structures of provincial sector power, continued CCA guidance ―from above‖ may help 
open the structure of opportunity for emerging sectors and enable regeneration ―from 
below.‖ 
 
8.20  Historical findings: Diverging paths, compelling lessons 
The co-operative movements of Québec and Saskatchewan both prospered through the 
twentieth century. From rural roots they played defining roles in building modern 
economies and political cultures. Arguably, they were Canada‘s leading co-operative 
provinces. Separated by language, culture, geography, and the structural conflicts 
endemic in Canadian regionalism, Québec and Saskatchewan had much in common. At 
the historic root of their shared commitments to a mixed economy were their experiences 
with co-operative enterprise. Co-operation not only structured their economies. It also 
structured a sense of affiliation, identity, and community. Of course, the two provinces 
and their co-operative sectors were also distinct. These vast differences had significant 
implications for the divergence of the two movements‘ development paths. The size of 
their provincial populations, the proximity to other major markets, the rural-urban 
balance, the degree of industrial development and unionization, the rise of vibrant social 
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movements, and traditions of sector-state and sector-academy relationships all helped 
channel the two movements to follow different courses. 
 
The globalization wave that washed across Saskatchewan through the eighties and 
nineties further eroded that movement‘s roots in the wheat economy and an agrarian-led 
left-populism, as family farms disappeared and rural depopulation continued. This all 
eroded prairie co-operation‘s historic social base. Urbanization and the rising resource 
economy radically undercut the farm-based co-operative movement in Saskatchewan, 
driving the progressive marginalization of co-operation in the province‘s political 
economy and political culture. While successful Depression-era campaigns to diversify 
into retailing and credit unionism provided a broader base for further development in 
urban Saskatchewan, rural restructuring after the eighties forced these sectors to turn 
inward into closing and merging local operations. Managing these restructurings also 
increasingly turned established co-operative sectors away from co-operative education, 
co-operative development, movement-building, and sector-state partnerships. The 
intensification of competition in deregulated financial markets and the rise of big box 
retailers such as Walmart and Superstore further entrenched the defensive posture of the 
credit union and retail co-operative systems. Although the province‘s population had 
shifted primarily to the cities by 1971, the movement—which was led by farmers many 
of whom were financially and emotionally committed to the defence of the family farm—
was slow to reflect this demographic and economic transition. Key to this ―blocked 
transition‖ was the failure of inter-generational succession and renewal. 
 
Québec‘s early co-operative movement also had rural roots, in the early agricultural co-
operatives, in the Mouvement Desjardins and in Coop Fédérée. However, this movement 
was not fundamentally forged as an agrarian movement. Rather, early Québec co-
operation was embedded in a church-led defence of the nation—its religion, language, 
culture, and traditional structure of authority. It therefore also had a contradictory 
character. It was both empowering for disadvantaged classes and stabilizing for the 
ancien régime. Until the Quiet Revolution, co-operation in Québec was part of an anti-
socialist, Church-sponsored movement of defensive nationalism.  
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Québec was primarily exposed to the dislocations of globalization through its 
manufacturing base. The historic rural base of co-operation did not take the lead in the 
social response, but Québec‘s large, unionized working class faced serious structural 
unemployment, attenuated by linguistic drag on labour mobility. The labour movement 
and community movements put tremendous energy into harnessing co-operative 
innovation to address deindustrialization and the jobs crisis. Building on the cultural 
momentum of the Quiet Revolution, activists struggled to expand the class base of the co-
operative movement to better serve its urban, working class, and female constituents. 
 
A province with strong collectivist traditions, a large population base, a major 
metropolitan centre, a sizeable state with a corporatist tradition, and a significant cluster 
of research-activists dedicated to co-operative development, these efforts at movement 
regeneration yielded substantial and systematic innovation. Comprehensive reforms in 
the available models of co-operative development, tax and legislative policy, 
development infrastructure, and solidarity finance essentially restructured Québec‘s co-
operative development system from top to bottom. In a post-Quiet Revolution context, 
the Québec movement was able to effect a successful inter-generational transition. Co-
operation was part of a surging social movement family—energized by a strong women‘s 
movement, the mouvement communautaire, the sovereignty movement, the trade union 
movement, and the social democratic movement. Québec succeeded in reinventing co-
operative innovations to fit the demands of emergent publics in that historic moment. 
 
As this study illustrates, the fate of co-operative movements is clearly embedded in 
broader social relations. Their rise and fall depends critically on the associational vitality 
of the social movements which give rise to their development and are the base of new 
energy, ideas, and activism necessary for new campaigns and overall movement 
regeneration. Co-operative leaders neglect these social movement ties at their peril.  
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Québec is currently at a peak of the co-operative development life-cycle, buoyed by an 
energetic and vital movement culture. The challenge for movement leaders is to ensure its 
capacity continuously to adapt, innovate, and sustain this recent record of growth and 
expansion. Sustainable co-operative development means it must always have a campaign 
in development, a campaign ready to launch, and a campaign under way. 
 
Saskatchewan, on the other hand, is presently in a trough of the movement life-cycle. Its 
vitality has been sapped by the historic decline of the wheat economy and the numerical 
and ideological erosion of its class base among middle farmers. The challenge for 
Saskatchewan is to regenerate its movement on new economic and social bases. Clues to 
adaptive innovations do not simply exist in the wider universe of contemporary world co-
operation in Italy, Spain, or Québec. They also exist in the history of the Saskatchewan 
movement‘s formative years. To achieve the province‘s full potential for co-operative 
development, this movement must, like Québec in the eighties, re-invent itself. Once 
again, it must broaden out—particularly to youth, women, the urban working class, 
Aboriginal communities, and new Canadians—to cultivate a new generation of 
movement entrepreneurs who can expand co-operation‘s social and economic base. This 
means opening up not only to pan-Canadian and international examples and experiences 
or contemporary community, social, and ecology movements. It means, more 
importantly, re-learning the lessons of its own substantial history of co-operative 
innovation, and re-inventing the skills of movement-building (MacPherson, 1987) in the 
age of the Internet and hyper-mobility.  
 
This study has found that the basis for this divergence between Québec and 
Saskatchewan has several deep roots. These include the different economic and social 
bases for the two movements. On the one hand, Saskatchewan has been heavily 
dependent on agriculture and a traditionally rural membership in a period of agricultural 
consolidation, polarization, and resurgent individualism. On the other hand, much of 
Québec is part of Canada‘s urban, industrial heartland. It features the highest union 
density in North America. While Saskatchewan‘s political culture has shifted toward a 
survivalist ethos of competitive and possessive individualism and social conservatism, 
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Québec‘s political culture has shifted toward a strengthened attachment to co-operative 
and social democratic values, partially driven by the strongest labour and women‘s 
movements in North America.  
 
Also salient are differences in labour mobility, traditionally very high in Saskatchewan 
but very low in Québec due to language. Labour mobility differences lead unemployed 
workers to out-migrate in Saskatchewan but have driven the trade unions, the state, and 
the co-operative movement to innovate in Québec. Francophone workers are simply 
unable to seek opportunities elsewhere in English-speaking North America, as their 
counter-parts in Saskatchewan may do. The sticky labour market creates additional 
pressure on the provincial state to intervene in periods of high unemployment in Québec. 
This structural vulnerability, exacerbated by deindustrialization and capital flight in 
recent decades, has driven the sector, state, and social movements into a closer 
relationship to support co-operative formations. Conversely, increased labour mobility in 
general in the globalization era has placed less pressure on the provincial state in 
Saskatchewan to consider co-operatives as a job creation strategy. During this period, 
state-sector and inter-movement relationships have thus eroded in Saskatchewan. 
 
Another crucial factor in the two movements‘ diverging paths is their differing traditions 
of state-sector relationship. In Québec, there is a tradition of state corporatism, providing 
a more sustainable opening to long range planning, compromise, and innovation. 
Saskatchewan‘s ideologically polarized, ―winner take all‖ political culture means more 
political volatility and swings from statism to private-sector led development, each of 
which marginalizes co-operative development and pours quicksand foundations for 
policy and program development. 
 
There are also different levels of popular movement readiness to respond, with 
Saskatchewan‘s movements languishing in the wake of an exhausted agrarian left-
populism and cuts to advocacy organizations while Québec‘s Quiet Revolution had 
propelled strong movement momentum and built strong, well-funded civil society 
organizations. Relatedly, there is the question of movement entrepreneurship or 
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leadership. Québec has demonstrated considerable project focus, movement energy, and 
innovation capacity typified by the CDR network. Saskatchewan‘s focus has been 
inward-turning, defensive, and protectionist. Québec also enjoyed more long-standing, 
wider, and better integration of research and movement efforts to develop and diffuse 
adaptive innovations.  
 
What the future holds for co-operation in Québec and Saskatchewan is unclear given the 
constant re-invention which market and movement life-cycles demand of contemporary 
co-operation. What is clear is that there is much for movement leadership to learn from 
these contrasting experiences in social innovation.  
 
8.21. Conceptual findings: From degeneration to development 
This study has assessed the relative health of the co-operative development systems in 
Québec and Saskatchewan. It combined an interdisciplinary, social movement approach 
with comparative statistical analysis, comparative historical case studies, and the 
application of a movement benchmarking tool, the ―seven pillars model.‖ The main 
empirical finding is that a large development gap opened up between these provinces in 
the globalization era. The result of a unique conjuncture of historical forces, Québec‘s 
exceptional performance in new co-operative development is ultimately attributed to the 
modernization of a highly effective, comprehensive, and innovative co-operative 
development system. Similarly, the relative lag of new co-operative formations in 
Saskatchewan reflects a development system that has fallen into serious disrepair. The 
combination of the systematic dissolution of historic development supports with the 
failure to repair and modernize that development system has driven an historic decline in 
new co-operatives. These diverging patterns of movement self-regulation and social 
innovation, in turn, reflect the differing historical experiences of co-operation‘s extended 
social movement families in the globalization era. 
 
This study has also applied the seven pillars model to shed light on the role of 
coordination failure in the diverging paths of the Québec and Saskatchewan co-operative 
movements. In development economics, coordination failure is defined as ―a state of 
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affairs in which agents‘ inability to coordinate their behaviour (choices) leads to an 
outcome (equilibrium) that leaves all agents worse off than in an alternative situation that 
is also an equilibrium‖ (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 808). In large part, the failure of the 
Saskatchewan movement and state to effectively coordinate development supports stems 
from a principal-agent problem—an unwillingness or inability to find effective 
institutional means to share responsibility for movement renewal. Difficulties of 
movement stewardship and a lack of innovation and due diligence have enabled a 
precipitous decline in new co-operative development. This has come at a significant 
opportunity cost to the movement, the Province, and the public interest. The cost of 
leadership failure will include both lost employment, services, and prosperity for the next 
generation and the deferred cost, with interest, of repairing a dysfunctional system that 
becomes more difficult to renovate the further it is allowed to deteriorate.  
 
Of course, while leaders are ultimately responsible for managing crises, they seldom 
create them. Indeed, this crisis has deep structural and historical roots. The social 
movement approach and historical case narratives further explain these roots. They 
suggest the present course and state of these movements need to be understood in terms 
of movement life-cycles. The Saskatchewan movement is presently in a valley in its life-
cycle, driven by the collapse of the family farm, its historic parent movement—the 
progressive farmers‘ movement, and the culture of agrarian left-populism. It exhibits 
symptoms of advanced movement degeneration, including oligarchization, and a lack of 
movement entrepreneurship, reflexivity and self-regulation. The failure of co-operative 
sector actors to effectively coordinate new sector development, and regenerate this 
besieged and drifting movement, is thus seen as the expression of movement decline and 
pathology rather than a simple technical or policy problem. This requires significant 
leadership intervention in conditions that militate powerfully against it. 
 
The Québec movement, by contrast, is in a peak of its life-cycle, demonstrates strong 
new co-operative growth, aggressive and strategic movement entrepreneurship, 
systematic movement education and outreach, and ongoing dialogue and reflection on 
development strategy. Effective coordination and innovation reflect measures taken since 
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the early eighties to revive a stagnant and gridlocked movement and drive comprehensive 
innovation and modernization of the development system. Québec movement leadership 
successfully broadened out in challenging new conditions, solved the principal-agent 
problem, and found the strategic means to regenerate their movement. The investment of 
significant sector and state resources in innovation and due diligence has provided 
considerable returns to the movement, the Province and the public interest. Movement 
leadership has ensured new employment, new services, and a higher quality of life for 
Québeckers over the last three decades, a powerful legacy and example in which the 
emerging generation are now actively involved.  
 
8.22 Avenues for further research 
This investigation suggests several priorities for further research to advance our 
empirical, historical, and theoretical understanding of effective co-operative development 
systems. Conceptual research (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 22) can provide further strategic clarity 
to some of the key concerns that emerge from this work. The work of McAdam (1982) on 
the dilemmas of movement degeneration has clear relevance, as do the work of Develtere 
(1996) and Fairbairn (2001) on the role of social movement ties in fostering the adoption 
of the co-operative model to meet emerging needs. Indeed, a central premise and finding 
of this work has been that the roots of co-operative development lie in vibrant social 
movement families, and strong social movement ties that encourage activists to take 
social action for economic power. Further research on this central task of movement-
building can also build on the work of Neamtan (2004), Downing (2010), and Mendell 
(2002).  
 
Further attention to the character of innovation diffusion and dissemination strategies, 
such as the work of Rogers (1995), can lend greater focus to our understanding of co-
operative innovation systems. The work of Cornforth (1988) and Dickstein (1986) can 
shed further light on the clear centrality this study establishes for intermediary 
organizations, including co-operative support organizations. Finally, the significance of 
cultural barriers to co-operative development suggest more focused attention to the 
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hegemony of the investor-owned firm and the necessary educational interventions, 
cultural politics, and communication strategies available to more effectively popularize 
the co-operative model (Baldacchino, 1990; Mendell, 2002; Carroll, 2006) against a 
hostile environment (Halladay, 1988; Vanek, 1971; Benello, 1982; Greenberg, 1986) for 
co-operative innovation. 
 
Additional conceptual-empirical research can also advance innovation transfer and re-
invention. Each pillar of the seven pillars model represents an area in which more 
focused attention and detailed work would enhance understanding and ability to act 
effectively. Similarly, while this exploratory study has been necessarily broad in scope, 
sector-specific investigations into gaps in housing, childcare, forestry, fishing, or workers 
co-operatives can provide the concrete specificity necessary to guide sector development 
strategies. Since Québec and Saskatchewan are large, diverse provinces, a focus on 
region-to-region comparisons would also generate important concrete detail. Following 
on Silver (2008), this would better enable the transfer of replicable innovations from 
Pointe Ste. Charles to the Quint neighbourhoods of Saskatoon, for example, or from 
Northern Québec to Northern Saskatchewan. A focus on localized approaches would also 
provide important insights and resources to emerging urban movements. 
 
Focused case studies on specific innovations with high replication value (such as the 
CDR network, the Angus Technopôle industrial park development, student or forestry co-
operatives, proximity service rescues or solidarity finance instruments) would further 
enhance understanding and be of significant value to co-operative movements elsewhere. 
Of course, while this study has approached co-operative development from the 
perspective of the movement itself, there is a strong public interest in effective public 
policy. Further research on policy options can build on the recent work of Loxley and 
Simpson (2007) and Adeler (2009) as well as the seminal work of the National Task 
Force on Co-operative Development (1984), Hammond Ketilson et al. (1992), and 
Fairbairn et al. (1993). 
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Finally, further comparative case study work on other jurisdictions can also expand the 
range of understanding and options for innovation adoption. Obvious examples include 
building on research on world-leading high-performance systems, such as the Mondragon 
complex (Whyte and Whyte, 1991) and the Italian case (Earle, 1986; Ammirato, 1996). 
Also valuable would be greater focus on geographically and structurally proximate urban 
innovation cases such as those of Winnipeg, Manitoba and Madison, Wisconsin. 
 
8.23 Implications for movement action 
To conclude, one may ask: what fundamental lessons can co-operators and their social 
movement allies learn by comparing these highly contrasting, extreme cases? As 
anomalous cases, there are limits to generalization. However, as ideal types of 
movements which are exceptionally vulnerable, on the one hand, and exceptionally 
resilient, on the other hand, these findings have much to offer a fuller understanding of 
how all co-operative movements may better ensure their sustainability, or regeneration.  
 
As a paradigm of degeneration, Saskatchewan provides a cautionary tale. As a paradigm 
of regeneration, Québec provides a global exemplar. By comparing why and how these 
movements took such different paths, movements everywhere can more reflexively 
modernize their own movements, guarding against degenerative threats and seizing on 
regenerative innovations that may be prudently adopted, adapted, or reinvented in their 
own context.  
 
This study illustrates the penalties paid for inattention to the long range viability of 
regional co-operative movements in light of economic and social trends. It also 
illuminates the rewards that may be redeemed by more purposefully and effectively 
adapting to the evolving socio-economic context. While a voluntarist approach to co-
operation—as if anything was possible at any time anywhere—would be clearly 
mistaken, equally mistaken is the determinist notion that there are natural laws of 
economics or politics that predetermine whether co-operative movements will emerge 
and sustain themselves or not. Instead, it is important to recognize that movement 
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entrepreneurs manoeuvre within a set of structured choices, that not all those choices may 
be viable or sustainable over the longer term, but that those choices matter.  
 
Strategic social movement leadership in the Québec case was able to realize emerging 
possibilities for co-operative development through a vigorous effort in social innovation 
and mobilization. By building up commitment to a ‗developmental movement‘ model, 
state, movement, and sector actors were able to coordinate effective responses to the job 
crisis (through worker, worker-shareholder, and solidarity co-operative models), the 
fiscal crisis of the state (in homecare and ambulance services), and the crisis of retirement 
succession (in funeral services). Social incentives to act on imminent problems—rather 
than retrench—were not a sufficient condition to effective action. A process of strategic 
and sustained social innovation was also a necessary condition to realizing that potential.  
 
Similarly, while the privatizations of poultry, dairy, and grains in Saskatchewan reflect a 
deeper malaise—a long-range cultural demutualization of the movement which was not 
visible until it was too late—the great broadening-out of the Depression era in 
Saskatchewan built the foundations for a post-agrarian co-operative movement—in 
credit, retailing, oil refining, and insurance. Strategic social movement leadership in the 
thirties thus secured a future for co-operation in Saskatchewan that would extend beyond 
the age of the wheat economy‘s dominance. There was in this historical moment a strong 
incentive for social innovation, and it resulted in a broader, more diversified, and 
sustainable movement that was regenerated by the new energy, ideas, and constituencies 
which these campaigns brought into the expanded movement. In this golden age, Wheat 
Pool field-men and other movement entrepreneurs were able to build up commitment to a 
‗developmental movement‘ model, and state, movement, and sector actors were able to 
coordinate effective responses to the crises in banking, supply, and insurance. As with the 
globalization era in Québec, social incentives to act on imminent problems—rather than 
retrench—were not a sufficient condition to effective action for co-operation in 
Saskatchewan. It also required a culture and movement of relentless social innovation.  
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Perhaps what this tale of two movements teaches us most fundamentally is the 
importance of a ‗balanced scorecard‘ for modernizing co-operative movements. In this 
approach, co-operative leaders take responsibility for the long range sustainability of the 
movement as a whole as well as for the business performance of their home co-
operatives. This rebalancing implies creating educational and managerial tools and 
training to nurture and support movement vitality, democratic involvement, and social 
movement ties (Réseau d‘investissement social du Québec, 2005). It requires shifting the 
culture of co-operation from a ‗bread and butter‘ business co-operativism to a more social 
movement based co-operativism, and from a competitive model of development to a 
developmental movement model. Unfortunately these intangibles are too easily taken for 
granted or dismissed—particularly in a crisis context. But this is the type of paradigm 
shift that rescued Prairie co-operation from the clutches of the Great Depression, and that 
catapulted Québec co-operation forward in the globalization era which was so punishing 
to Saskatchewan. In no small part the future of co-operation rests very much on a return 
to its roots in adult education, social movement ties, and movement building.  
 
Of course, there is no protection against rapid change or churn in the co-operative sector. 
It is inevitable that some co-operatives will fail. However, this paired case study 
demonstrates that offence may be the best defence in co-operative sector building. While 
there is a tendency for mature co-operative leaders and managers to focus on the concerns 
of their own operations, this study suggests that a more developmental approach is in the 
enlightened self-interest of all co-operatives over the long term.  
 
The tragedy of the co-operative commons in Saskatchewan provides a warning to short-
sighted leadership that do not invest in movement succession and regeneration. The 
resurgence of co-operation in Québec, by contrast, provides us with a contemporary 
model for the reform, renewal, and reinvention of co-operation. One important bridge 
toward a more ‗developmental movement model‘ is to find new ways to help managers, 
directors, allies, and activists to measure what doesn‘t show up on balance sheets or in 
empirical data. These are the movement building activities—from co-operative education 
to building technical and financial assistance intermediaries—that ensure movement 
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succession. New tools will be necessary to enable co-operators to act in new ways, to 
prevent and arrest degeneration, and to put in place sensible regeneration programs. 
There is a major project in assisting maturing movements that are entering new kinds of 
crises very different from the formation and growth challenges they faced in earlier 
stages to succeed. 
 
In McAdam‘s terms, realizing the ‗conversion potential‘ of social actors—in Depression 
era Saskatchewan and globalization era Québec—relied not only on objective conditions 
or frustrated needs. It also relied on subjective conditions, a process of ‗cognitive 
liberation‘ in which old conventions and understandings could be critically reconsidered 
and co-operative possibilities could be re-imagined and re-engineered. As these cases of 
successful regeneration illustrate, this is not an abstract theoretical project; this is a long 
range, difficult process of consensus, institution, program, and policy building. It implies 
educational interventions, cultural shifts, new alliances, and the reflexive modernization 
of movement structures. It is a political process. 
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      APPENDIX A 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
Personal background 
 
1. How did you become involved with this organization?  
 
Location of institution within the co-operative development field  
 
2. Tell me about this organization in your own words; what is its purpose? Its 
history? 
3. In your view, how does it relate to the wider network of co-operative development 
organizations? 
4. What are, or do you hope will be, the lasting contributions of your organization? 
 
Globalization  
 
5. Has global restructuring since the eighties affected the work of your organization? 
How? 
6. What is the Saskatchewan / Quebec‘s co-operative movement‘s greatest 
achievement in the globalization era? The greatest failure? 
7. If you could name one decisive factor in the success or failure of co-op 
development in your province in recent decades, what would it be? 
8. In your view what should be the priority for the Saskatchewan / Quebec co-
operative movement moving forward? What is the major obstacle? How can it be 
overcome?  
9. What is your overall feeling about the prospects for co-op development in your 
province right now?  Are you optimistic / pessimistic? Why? 
 
Social movement linkage and vitality 
 
10. How important is the connection of this organization to social movements to its 
success? How? Which ones? 
11. Do you think there is a sense of common purpose across the co-operative and 
broader social movements? Should there be? Why / why not? 
12. Some say the Saskatchewan / Quebec co-op sector has become bureaucratic and 
has forgotten its social movement roots. Do you think that‘s a fair comment? Why? 
13. Do you think it‘s fair to say that the established co-ops drive the sector‘s agenda 
at the expense of emerging sectors and new co-op development? 
 
Leadership  
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14. In recent decades have new actors emerged to lead co-operative development 
efforts in Saskatchewan / Quebec? Which ones?  
15. Would you say the Saskatchewan / Quebec co-operative movement is 
―innovative‖? What is the basis for the movement‘s capacity for innovation / its 
failure to innovate? 
 
Cultural animation 
 
16. Would you say the symbolic power of the co-op model – its popular authority, its 
prestige and its appeal has changed in recent decades? For the better or worse? Why? 
17. Does Saskatchewan / Quebec‘s school system help or hinder co-op development? 
How? 
18. Does Saskatchewan / Quebec‘s mass media help or hinder co-op development? 
How? 
 
Finance theme 
 
19. Would you say that Saskatchewan / Quebec has solved the capitalization problem 
for emerging co-ops? 
20. Would you say the co-operative movement is prepared to effectively respond to 
the financing needs for retirement successions over the next decade? 
 
Technical assistance  
 
21. Would you say that the co-operative movement is prepared to effectively respond 
to the financing needs for retirement successions over the next decade? 
 
Institution / Network support 
 
22. How would you assess the relationship between the co-operative and social 
economy movements in Saskatchewan / Quebec? Other movements? 
 
Public policy  
 
23. In the age of globalization, do you think the co-operative movement has 
succeeded or failed in renewing itself?  
 
24. How important has the core strength of the sector been to movement renewal and 
repositioning? 
 
25. How important have networks and alliances been to the sector‘s success? 
 
26. What new problems has globalization posed for the co-op movement in 
Saskatchewan / Quebec? Opportunities? 
 
 381 
27. How importance has resistance to co-op development been? How? From which 
actors? 
 
28. Some say governments are biased in favour of the investor-owned firm. They 
argue that politicians and policy-makers are captive to private investor lobbies such 
as the Chamber of Commerce. Do you view corporate political influence as a barrier 
to co-op development in your province? 
 
29. How sustainable do you believe Saskatchewan / Quebec‘s co-op movement is 
politically? Are pro-co-op programs and policies reversible / at risk? Example? 
 
Research  
 
30. Do research networks play an important role in co-op development in 
Saskatchewan / Quebec? How? 
31. Does the research community play a significant role in advocating for the model 
? with public policy makers ? with the public? 
 
Current context  
 
32. Are there any questions I haven‘t asked but I should have? 
33. Do you have any questions of me? 
 
Wrap up remarks 
 
 Thanks. 
 Would you like a copy of the final study? 
 Would you suggest any people to whom you think I should also speak on these 
issues? 
 Restate that I will provide an opportunity for review of attributed quotations. 
Insure I have correct contact information. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Established non-financial co-operative comparison chart, Saskatchewan and Quebec co-
operatives that rank among the Canadian top 50 non-financial co-operatives, 2006 – 
2007.  
 
Rank by 
Revenues Name of 
Co-
operative 
Total 
Revenues 
($) 
Assets 
($) 
Total 
Members 
Employees 
Major 
Activities 
2007 2006 
Full 
Time 
Part 
Time 
1 1 
Federated 
Co-
operatives 
Limited 
(Sask.) 
5,878,406,000 3,174,698,000 276 (c) 3,145 - 
Wholesaler, 
consumer 
goods, 
petroleum 
refinery, 
building 
materials 
2 2 
La Coop 
fédérée 
(Que.) 
3,295,448,000 1,014,948,000 94 (c) 11,072 - 
Pork and 
poultry 
processing, 
petroleum, 
feed mill, 
farm supplies 
3 3 
Agropur 
Coopérative 
(Que.) 
2,454,541,000 907,555,000 3,783 4,488 - 
Dairy 
products 
9 9 
Exceldor 
coopérative 
avicole 
(Que.) 
283,786,452 89,982,365 256 930 - 
Slaughtering, 
processing 
and 
marketing of 
poultry 
products 
10 10 
Nutrinor, 
coopérative 
agro-
alimentaire 
du 
Saguenay 
Lac St-Jean 
(Que.) 
267,943,870 78,504,697 1,200 320 83 
Dairy 
products, 
petroleum, 
feed mill, 
hardware 
11 12 
Interprovincial 
Co-operatives 
Limited (Sask.) 
250,449,000 19,736,000 5 39 45 
Wholesale 
distributor of 
food and farm 
supplies, 
produces 
agricultural 
chemicals 
15 15 
Saskatoon 
Co-op 
Association 
Limited 
203,178,549 63,957,045 67,529 328 453 
Petroleum, 
supermarket, 
building 
materials, 
 383 
Rank by 
Revenues Name of 
Co-
operative 
Total 
Revenues 
($) 
Assets 
($) 
Total 
Members 
Employees 
Major 
Activities 
2007 2006 
Full 
Time 
Part 
Time 
(Sask.) consumer 
goods, farm 
supplies 
17 18 
Groupe 
Dynaco, 
coopérative 
agroaliment
aire (Que.) 
170,720,612 92,108,480 1,706 378 70 
Dairy 
products, 
building 
materials, 
farm 
machinery, 
hardware 
19 23 
Prince 
Albert  
Co-op 
Assoc. Ltd. 
(Sask) 
149,735,396 65,211,295 27,596 323 127 
Petroleum, 
supermarket, 
consumer 
goods, farm 
supplies 
20 22 
Pioneer  
Co-op 
Assoc. Ltd. 
(Sask.) 
146,752,667 69,254,016 17,946 160 200 
Fertilizer and 
chemicals, 
petroleum, 
supermarket, 
building 
materials 
21 38 
Fédération 
des 
coopératives 
du 
Nouveau-
Québec 
(Que.) 
140,466,240 85,671,439 14 108 15 
Wholesaler, 
petroleum, 
consumer 
goods, 
marketing 
Inuit 
handicrafts 
(Northern 
Québec) 
21 27 
Comax, 
coopérative 
agricole 
(Que.) 
137,683,340 49,199,605 831 126 14 
Pork, feed 
mill, farm 
machinery, 
farm supplies, 
petroleum 
26 31 
Profid'or, 
coopérative 
agricole 
(Que.) 
123,948,377 35,731,041 972 97 21 
Feed mill, 
pork 
marketing, 
petroleum, 
farm supplies, 
hardware 
32 39 
Unicoop, 
coopérative 
agricole 
(Que.) 
103,082,618 52,445,497 1,805 224 48 
Feed mill, 
pork 
marketing, 
hardware, 
farm 
machinery 
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Rank by 
Revenues Name of 
Co-
operative 
Total 
Revenues 
($) 
Assets 
($) 
Total 
Members 
Employees 
Major 
Activities 
2007 2006 
Full 
Time 
Part 
Time 
34 33 
La Co-op 
des Bois-
Francs 
(Que.) 
100,500,481 47,949,360 871 200 21 
Feed mill, 
petroleum, 
mixed 
animals 
marketing, 
farm 
machinery, 
building 
materials 
39 41 
Sherwood 
Co-op 
Assoc. Ltd. 
(Sask.) 
93,671,923 26,593,173 50,040 59 245 
Petroleum, 
supermarketf
arm supplies 
43 48 
Société 
coopérative 
agricole la 
Seigneurie 
(Que.) 
66,570,669 23,621,494 1,709 110 15 
Pork, feed 
mill, 
petroleum, 
building 
materials, 
hardware 
44 52 
Lloyd-
minster & 
District Co-
op Ltd. 
(Sask.) 
64,067,469 22,694,075 13,183 130 79 
Petroleum, 
supermarket, 
farm supplies, 
building 
materials, 
pharmacy 
45 47 
Citadelle, 
coopérative 
de 
producteurs 
de sirop 
d'érable 
(Que.) 
63,995,949 37,197,215 1,971 140 35 
Maple syrup 
products 
47 51 
La Coop 
PURDEL 
(Que) 
61,521,097 36,052,007 640 88 12 
Dairy 
products, 
farm supplies 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL
: QUE 
  7,270,208,705 2,550,966,200 15,758 18,281 334  
TOTAL 
:SK 
  6,786,261,004 
 
3,442,143,604 
176,299 4,184 1,149 
 
a : Members loans and patronage dividends portion of long term debt is included with 
members equity 
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b : Total liabilities to members equity 
c : Member co-operatives representing many thousand individual members 
Adapted from Co-operatives Secretariat (2009), ―Top 50 Non-Financial Co-operatives in 
Canada 2007.‖ Downloaded Feb 24 2010 from www.coop.gc.ca. 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
Solidarity finance mechanisms in Québec 
1) Development Capital  
Name  Fonds de Solidarité  FondAction  CRCD  
Objective  Protect Workers' 
retirement income 
while stimulating 
Quebec‘s economy 
through strategic 
investments  
Protect worker 
retirement income 
while investing in 
enterprises to 
maintain and create 
jobs in Quebec  
To contribute to 
Québec's economic 
development and to 
further the growth of 
its resource regions  
Total Assets  $7.3 billion  $635.6 million  $733 million  
Source of Funding  Worker Contribution, 
Private  
Worker Savings, 
Private  
Private Investments  
Demand/ Clientele  Large Companies and 
SME in almost all 
sectors, except retail  
SE enterprises and 
SMEs demonstrating 
participatory 
management and 
commitment to the 
environment  
Cooperatives or 
enterprises located in 
Québec‘s resource 
regions  
Total Investments  $4.1 billion in the 
Quebec economy  
$385.4 million in the 
Quebec economy  
$470 million  
Impact  126,135 jobs created 
or maintained  
Over 8,000 jobs 
created or maintained  
30,000 jobs  
Website  www.fondsftq.com   www.fondaction.com   www.capitalregional.c
om   
2) Solidarity Finance  
Name  Caisse d’économie 
solidaire  
RQCC  RISQ  
Objective  Support the 
development of the 
social and solidarity-
based economy in 
Quebec 
Develop and promote 
the community credit 
approach in Quebec 
while ensuring 
individual and 
collective well-being 
Provide financing to 
the Social Economy 
in Quebec 
Total Assets  XX  $3.2 million  $10.3 million  
Source of Funding  Labour Unions  XX  Government, Private 
Investments  
Demand/ Clientele  Cooperatives and 
Non-Profit 
Organizations  
Partner Organization 
(community loans and 
loan circles)  
Social Economy 
Enterprises  
Total Investments  XX  $5 million  $8, 325,867  
Impact  XX  2,330 jobs created or 
maintained  
4,412 jobs created or 
maintained  
Website  www.cecosol.coop   www.rqcc.qc.ca   www.fonds-risq.qc.ca   
 2) Solidarity Finance  
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Name  FilAction  Fiducie du Chantier de 
l’économie social  
Objective  Meet financing needs of small 
enterprises and finance 
community-based funds  
Meet the capitalization needs 
of collective enterprises and 
give them the support they 
need for their start-up and 
expansion projects  
Total Assets  $7 million  $53.8 million  
Source of Funding  FondAction  Government, Labour funds  
Demand/Clientele  Small enterprises and 
community-based funds 
financing the Social Economy  
Social Economy Enterprises  
Total Investments  $5 million  $6,447,335  
Impact  XX  524 jobs created or maintained  
Website  
 
 
www.filaction.qc.ca   www.fiducieduchantier.qc.ca  
3) State Finance  
Name  FLI  FDEES  Investissement 
Québec  
FIER  
Objective  Stimulate local 
businesses and 
entrepreneurship at 
the local level 
Promote the 
emergence of 
viable projects 
within social 
economy 
enterprises  
Promote the 
growth of 
investment in 
Québec and 
contribute to 
economic 
development and 
job creation 
Finance enterprise 
start-up and 
development, as 
well as support the 
creation of sector 
funds 
Source of 
Funding  
Government  Government  Government  Government, 
labour Funds, 
private investments  
Demand/ 
Clientele  
Traditional and 
social economy 
enterprises  
Social Economy 
Enterprises  
Companies, 
cooperative 
businesses and 
non-profit 
organizations  
Traditional and 
social economy 
enterprises  
Investments  $130 million 
(1998-2002)  
$80 million 
(2004)  
$642.3 million 
(2008)  
$90 million  
Website  www.mdeie.gouv
.qc.ca    
www.acldq.qc.ca   www.investque
bec.com    
www.investquebec.
com  
 
Source: Notwell, J. (2010). 
